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ABSTRACT 
Matthew Lloyd Halsted 
 
Intertextual Chaos? Investigating Paul’s Use of Hosea in Romans 9:25-26 in Light of 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics 
Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Middlesex / London School of Theology 
2017 
 
In Romans, Paul quotes OT texts to argue for the covenant inclusion of the Gentiles. 
Two important quotations, from a hermeneutical standpoint, are Hos 2:23 (2:25 LXX) 
and 1:10 (2:1 LXX) in Rom 9:25-26, which are presented here as a case study for 
testing the relevance of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutic for biblical studies. Paul’s 
quotations are thought-provoking because there seem to be difficulties reconciling the 
quoted texts’ original agenda with his own at the time of writing. The oracles were 
originally used to argue for the inclusion of rebellious Israel, not Gentiles as Paul 
argues. Thus, the issue of competing agendas becomes quickly apparent. Past 
scholarship has addressed this issue in various ways with little consensus being reached. 
This thesis utilizes Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics as a clarifying way forward. 
Despite the significance and relevance of his work, Gadamer has not influenced biblical 
scholarship as deeply as one might have expected. The most significant contribution this 
thesis makes, therefore, is to bring Gadamer’s hermeneutic to bear upon the issue of 
biblical intertextuality as evidenced in the use of Hosea in Romans. 
 
Part One introduces the issues and surveys the ways some scholars have sought to 
understand them (chapter 1). A Gadamerian approach is proposed as a way forward 
(chapter 2). Part Two outlines Gadamer’s philosophy, which includes a sketch of his 
scholarly context (chapters 3-4). Part Three revisits the intertextual intricacies in key 
parts of Romans through the lens of a Gadamerian hermeneutic. Relevant motifs that 
shape Paul’s and Hosea’s horizons are identified and traced, lending insight to Rom 
9:25-26. This is aided by an examination of key texts from the CD and Pesharim 
(chapters 5-6). Conclusions are then synthesized, bringing clarity to Rom 9:25-26 
(chapter 7). Finally, a summary is given, and areas for future enquiry are proposed 
(chapter 8). 
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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1: The Conundrum of Paul’s Use of Hosea 1:10; 2:23 
in Romans 9:25-26 
1.1 Introduction 
In Romans, Paul quotes Jewish texts to make the case for the full covenant 
inclusion of the Gentiles. Upon close inspection, there seem to be difficulties 
reconciling the quoted texts’ original agenda with that of Paul’s present one. One such 
example is the use of Hos 2:23 (2:25 LXX, MT) and 1:10 (2:1 LXX, MT) in Rom 9:25-
26, where Paul argues for the inclusion of Gentiles into the covenant family of God. The 
problem is that the quoted passages were originally used by Hosea to argue for the 
inclusion of rebellious Israel, not Gentiles.1 The present concern, then, is to understand 
the nature of Paul’s use of Hosea since it appears to go against Hosea’s original 
context.2 Consequently, questions abound. For example, can Paul’s use of the oracle be 
seen strictly as “interpreting” the text (i.e., restating it), re-authoring the text (i.e., 
revising it), or something else altogether?3 What hermeneutical components were at 
work that served to bring fusion between the original text and Paul’s latter reading of it? 
Considering these quotations were integral to Paul’s overall argument,4 it is necessary to 
pay detailed attention to the hermeneutical parameters at work. Pauline scholarship has 
pursued this in various ways. It will be argued that, while some of the past proposals are 
                                                
 1 See Colin G. Kruse, Paul’s Letter to the Romans (PNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 
388. See also Douglas J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 
613; Steve Moyise, “Does Paul Respect the Context of His Quotations: Hosea as a Test Case,” in 
“What Does The Scripture Say?” Studies in the Function of Scripture in Early Judaism and 
Christianity. Vol. 2: The Letters and Liturgical Traditions, eds. Craig A. Evans and H. Daniel 
Zacharias (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 45-46. (More will be said on this issue below.) 
 2 See also Steve Moyise, Paul and Scripture: Studying the New Testament Use of the Old 
Testament (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2010), 78. 
 3 Our conclusion will be that the best description is “dialogical re-authoring.” See Section 
7.2 below. 
 4 For a study on Paul’s rhetorical use of quotations, see Christopher D. Stanley, Arguing 
with Scripture: The Rhetoric of Quotations in the Letters of Paul (New York: T&T Clark, 2004), 
esp. 155-160 (on the importance of the citation within the argument, see 156). 
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helpful, by utilizing philosophical hermeneutics, some of these proposals could be aided 
in demonstrating sufficient fusion between Hosea’s oracle and Paul’s latter use of it.  
Using Paul’s quotations of Hosea in Romans as a test case, it will be argued that 
the hermeneutic theory espoused by Hans-Georg Gadamer offers relevant insights into 
(Paul’s) otherwise enigmatic interpretive practices.5 Gadamer’s theory is conceivably 
useful here as it brings conceptual clarification, providing terminology and language 
conducive to making sense of the intertextual phenomenon observed. Gadamer’s 
approach might not be the only means to this end. That said, his theory remains helpful, 
indeed most advantageous, to be seriously considered as a hermeneutical tool to be 
utilized by scholars working in this field. Thus, the contribution of this research is that it 
brings to bear a (Gadamerian) philosophical-hermeneutical approach upon biblical 
intertextuality. It is further proposed that, assuming Gadamer’s theory, what one sees in 
Paul’s creative use of the oracle is exactly what one might expect. Highlighting Paul’s 
use of Hosea as a test case is helpful because there the hermeneutical dilemma (and 
tension) is so pronounced, not least in regard to issues of historical distance, horizons, 
prejudgments, and application—all of which are key elements that comprise Gadamer’s 
theory (see below). Moreover, as will be seen, our aim is not so much to dissolve the 
tension inherent in Paul’s use of Hosea as much as it is to offer an adequate 
hermeneutical account of it. To this end we employ Gadamer’s theory.  
1.2 Hermeneutical Issues in Romans 9:25-26 
Paul’s quotations of Hos 2:25b-d (LXX, MT) in Rom 9:25 and Hos 2:1b (LXX, 
MT) in Rom 9:26 bring to the forefront a variety of issues. First, there is the matter of 
how he alters the text to conform to his present purposes, allowing himself a 
considerable amount of freedom in the way in which he arranges the quotation.6 This is 
                                                
 5 See Anthony C. Thiselton, “The Future of Biblical Interpretation and Responsible Plurality 
in Hermeneutics” in The Future of Biblical Interpretation: Responsible Plurality in Biblical 
Hermeneutics, eds. Stanley E. Porter and Matthew R. Malcolm (Downers Grove: IVP, 2013), 25, 
who says, “The next generation of books on hermeneutics will need to draw broadly on a variety of 
interdisciplinary fields, but also constantly illustrate its work with reference to specific biblical texts” 
(emphasis original). 
 6 See Moo, Romans, 611–612; C.K. Barrett, The Epistle to the Romans, 2nd ed. (BNTC; 
London: A&C Black, 1991), 178; Leon Morris, The Epistle to the Romans (PNTC; Grand Rapids: 
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observed clearly when Hos 2:25 and 2:1 (LXX, MT) are compared with their 
reconstrual in Rom 9:25-26:  
Rom 9:25:  καλέσω τὸν οὐ λαόν µου λαόν µου καὶ τὴν οὐκ ἠγαπηµένην 
ἠγαπηµένην.7 
Hos 2:25b-c (LXX): καὶ ἐλεήσω τὴν Οὐκ-ἠλεηµένην καὶ ἐρῶ τῷ Οὐ-λαῷ-µου 
Λαός µου εἶ σύ. 
Hos 2:25b-c (MT): רוימע־ֹאלל יתרמאו המחר אל־תא יתמח  מעי־התא    
Rom 9:26: καὶ ἔσται ἐν τῷ τόπῳ οὗ ἐρρέθη αὐτοῖς· Οὐ λαός µου ὑµεῖς, 
ἐκεῖ κληθήσονται υἱοὶ θεοῦ ζῶντος.  
Hos 2:1b-c (LXX): καὶ ἔσται ἐν τῷ τόπῳ, οὗ ἐρρέθη αὐτοῖς Οὐ λαός µου ὑµεῖς, 
ἐκεῖ κληθήσονται υἱοὶ θεοῦ ζῶντος. 
Hos 2:1b-c (MT):       ומב היהקח־לא ינב םהל רמאי םתא ימע־ֹאל םהל רמאי־רשא םוי
  
First, it is to be noted that Hos 2:25b-c LXX and the MT do not diverge from one 
another. Second, Paul substitutes καλέσω for ἐρῶ in Rom 9:25 in order to continue his 
flow of thought, giving primacy to God’s “call.”8 Doing this, he turns Hos 2:25 (LXX) 
                                                                                                                                          
Eerdmans, 1988), 369–370; Mark A. Seifrid, “Romans,” in Commentary on the New Testament Use 
of the Old Testament, eds. G.K. Beale and D.A. Carson (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2007), 647. See also 
David I. Starling, Not My People: Gentiles as Exiles in Pauline Hermeneutics (BZNW 184; 
Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2011), 110; Timothy H. Lim, Holy Scripture in the Qumran 
Commentaries and Pauline Letters (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 140-160. 
 7 Unless otherwise indicated, all citations from the GNT, LXX, MT, and Qumran texts are, 
respectively, taken from: Michael W. Holmes, The Greek New Testament: SBL Edition (Logos Bible 
Software, 2010); Alfred Rahlfs, Septuaginta: With Morphology, Electronic ed. (Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Bibelgesellshaft, 1979); Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia: with Werkgroep Informatica, Vrije 
Universiteit Morphology; Bible. O.T. Hebrew. Werkgroep Informatica, Vrije Universiteit (2006). 
Logos Bible Software; Martin G. Abegg Jr., ed., Qumran Sectarian Manuscripts (Bellingham, 
Wash: Logos Research Systems, 2003); hereafter QSM. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from 
original sources are the author’s own. 
 8 James D. G. Dunn, Romans 9-16, vol. 38b (WBC; Dallas: Word Books, 1988), 571; See 
also: Moyise, “Hosea as a Test Case,” What Does The Scripture Say, 46; Moo, Romans, 612ff; 
Morris, Romans, 370, fn. 116; Robert Jewett, Romans: A Commentary, (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2007), 600; Starling, Not My People, 112; Ernst Käsemann, An Die Römer (HZNT; 
Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1980), 264, says, “…ersetzt im ersten Wort ἐρῶ durch das 
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around, bringing καλέσω to the front.9 Third, along with the insertion of καλέσω, Paul 
does not use ἐλεέω, substituting in its place the inflected form of ἀγαπάω.10 Scholars 
have commented on this, attempting to make sense of this move.11 Fourth, Paul’s Hos 
2:1 quotation in v. 26 is very close to the MT and it matches the LXX, having no 
variation.12 Since κληθήσονται occurs at the end of the Hosea quotations, and καλέσω 
was added at the beginning, the entire catena of quotations from the Hosea prophecy 
can be said to underscore the significance “calling” has to Paul’s theology of Gentile 
inclusion.13  
One of the pressing questions being asked by intertextual scholars concerns the 
issue of “respect.” Steve Moyise is right to point out that, speaking strictly from a 
modern standpoint, Paul does not “respect” scriptural texts, for in some cases (e.g. 
Hosea in Rom 9), he does not merely repeat them word for word (as clearly seen 
above).14 Thus, Moyise’s call to offer an account of what it means to “respect” a text is 
warranted.15 As will be seen, Gadamer’s hermeneutic can provide a working scenario 
for shaping a definition of “respect,” a scenario that leaves room not in the least for the 
horizon of a past text but also the past text’s ability to speak into the present—the latter 
of which arguably remains a necessary hermeneutical criterion for a definition to what it 
                                                                                                                                          
ihm so wichtige Stichwort καλέσω, das wieder auf die göttliche Schöpfermacht weist…” (Ernst 
Käsemann, Commentary on Romans, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980, 
264). 
 9 Moo, Romans, 612.  
 10 Dunn, Romans, 38b, 571. 
 11 See eg., Dunn, Romans, 38b, 571; Starling, Not My People, 112. (Cf. Thomas Schreiner, 
Romans, [BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1998], 527; Moo, Romans, 612, fn. 9; Jewett, 
Romans, 599, fn. 135; Moyise, “Hosea as a Test Case,” What Does The Scripture Say, 46).  
 12 See also Schreiner, Romans, 527. Although, cf. Starling, Not My People, 112–114, who 
notes an alternative reading found in 𝔓46	and other MSS. In those, he observes how ἐρρέθη is 
changed to ἐάν κληθήσονται (as well as how αὐτοῖς and ὑµεῖς are left out). If these reflect Paul's 
original quotations (as Starling thinks is possible), then he surmises that, first, the change to 
κληθήσονται is for the same reason as his change in v. 25. Second, and much more provocatively, 
Paul's insertion of ἐάν before κληθήσονται serves to betray his desire to expand covenant inclusion to 
Gentiles, that is, “wherever” people are called the “not my people.” On this and issues surrounding 
ἐκεῖ, see Moyise, “Hosea as a Test Case,” What Does The Scripture Say, 46-47. 
 13 Moo, Romans, 612-613. See also Jewett, Romans, 601. 
 14 Moyise, “Hosea as a Test Case,” What Does The Scripture Say, 39. 
 15 Ibid., 40. Cf. Lim, Holy Scripture, 31-65. 
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means to respect a text. Indeed, Gadamer’s theory provides conceptual space in 
delineating such a criterion, for any notion of “respect” must allow for the otherness of 
a text to speak on its own terms, though not in a way that would exclude the 
interpreter’s own situational otherness. In fact, to exclude the interpreter’s horizon 
would be to prevent the text from speaking to their situation, an instance of 
unquestionable hermeneutical textual disrespect. In this vein, arguably, Gadamer’s 
dialogical hermeneutics can contribute to the current discussion by allowing one to 
discard notions of interpretation as repetition in favor of a more creative version that 
allows for the otherness of text and interpreter.16 Therefore, as a critique of 
enlightenment assumptions about objective interpretation in particular, Gadamer’s 
theory proves helpful and clarifying (see below). 
In addition to these (inter)textual features above, the hermeneutical issue runs 
deeper. This becomes clear when one considers the change that occurs in the text’s 
freshly-applied meaning. Moo observes that, 
…a potentially more serious instance of what seems to be arbitrary hermeneutics on 
Paul’s part is his application of these Hosea texts to the calling of the Gentiles. For the 
prophet Hosea is predicting a renewal of God’s mercy toward the rebellious northern 
tribes of Israel: those whom God rejected and named lō-ruhamah, “not pitied,” and lō-
ami, “not my people” (the symbolic names given to Hosea’s children [1:6-9]) are again 
shown mercy and adopted again as God’s people.17 
Thus, one might say that Paul is not using the Hosea texts with the same agenda as the 
prophet. That is, Paul applied these prophecies to the Gentiles and not to physical Israel. 
And yet the original Hosea text, problematically, makes no mention of any inclusion of 
the Gentiles, but rather speaks of a future inclusion of rebellious Israel, namely the 
                                                
 16 On letting the text speak, see Demetrius Teigas (“Gadamer, Hans-Georg,” in A Dictionary 
of Cultural and Critical Theory, 2nd ed., eds. Michael Payne and Jessica Rae Barbera [Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010], 293), who says Gadamer’s concept of fusion of horizons allows for a 
“higher common ground” which can “sustain” the horizons of both text and interpreter. In this way, 
the text can speak. 
 17 Moo, Romans, 613. That Paul is using the Hosea quotations with Gentiles (and not Israel) 
in mind is clear from v. 24. Additionally, Moo (Romans, 613) is correct to say that, because Paul 
names Israel as the referent in v. 27 to the Isaiah quotations that follow, the fact that the Hosea 
quotations are meant, then, to refer to Gentiles is clear. Cf. Stanley, Arguing with Scripture, 158, fn. 
47. 
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northern tribes.18 What factors, therefore, governed Paul’s hermeneutical decisions? A 
survey of previous scholarship is in order.  
1.3 Previous Scholarship  
We have selected those scholars who, in addressing the issue as they do, 
highlight the specific problems and questions that are particularly relevant for our study. 
That is, these scholars’ proposals and observations show precisely where Gadamer’s 
hermeneutic can be brought to bear upon the issue. In a survey of commentaries, it is 
interesting to note the amount of space dedicated to addressing the dilemma. For 
example, Schreiner devotes three paragraphs to 9:25-26, with much of his discussion 
reserved for the grammatical features. He does, however, offer pointed remarks on the 
hermeneutical situation itself (about ten sentences).19 Similarly, Moo provides three 
paragraphs of comments for vv. 25-26, leaving a disproportionate amount to address the 
dilemma.20 Dunn, likewise, allocates five paragraphs of explanation concerning vv. 25-
26, with approximately three sentences that explicitly discuss the historical-distance 
between Hosea’s original agenda and Paul’s, as well as the hermeneutical dilemma that 
surrounds it.21 Cranfield devotes a mere four sentences to the same.22 Other 
commentaries are similar.23  
                                                
 18 Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 1989), 66. Although, the southern tribes might have been in view as well. See 
Section 5.1.2 below. 
 19 Schreiner, Romans, 527-528.  
 20 See Moo, Romans, 611-614. In fact, much of the space Moo devotes is for expounding on 
the range of views other scholars have held, leaving approximately five sentences of either rebuttals 
or views of his own.  
 21 See Dunn, Romans, 38b, 571–572. 
 22 See C.E.B. Cranfield, The Epistle to the Romans, vol. 2 (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1979), 499-500. 
 23 E.g., F.F. Bruce, The Letter of Paul to the Romans: An Introduction and Commentary, 
2nd ed., (TNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985), 184–185; Robert H. Mounce, Romans, vol. 27, 
(NAC; Nashville: B&H, 1995), 203; Morris, Romans, 369–370; Jewett, Romans, 599–601; C.H. 
Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans (MNTC; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1932), 172; 
Barrett, Romans, 178; Kruse, Romans, 388-389. Käsemann, Römer, 264–265; Peter Stuhlmacher, 
Der Brief an die Römer (NTD; Göttingen und Zürich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), 135–137.  
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One quickly notices the range of views on the issue. Käsemann, for example, 
believes Paul was not at all reflecting on the original sense.24 His view is that the 
provoking nature of the quotation has an eschatological emphasis, saying, “Der 
Reihenfolge in 24 chiastisch entgegengestellt, sind die Heidenchristen die Empfänger 
der Verheißung, welche sie aus dem Chaos herausgeholt und zu Geliebten, also zu 
Kindern und zum eschatologischen Gottesvolk gemacht hat.”25 For Käsemann, the 
original meaning has been ignored because it has been superseded.26 C.H. Dodd is frank 
when he describes Paul’s use of Hosea as “ill chosen,” saying, 
It is rather strange that Paul has not observed that this prophecy referred to Israel, 
rejected for its sins, but destined to be restored: strange because it would have fitted so 
admirably the doctrine of the restoration of Israel which he is to expound in chapter xi. 
But, if the particular prophecy is ill-chosen, it is certainly true that the prophets did 
declare the calling of the Gentiles.27  
Considering that the original intention of the oracle seems to be at odds with the 
way in which Paul later employs it (something Käsemann and Dodd both observe), one 
can find Dunn’s alternate reading understandable, preferred even. Taking exception 
with Dodd, Dunn says he “misses the point” because “Hosea’s allegorical case study 
and the promise to the Northern Kingdom of Israel enshrine a principle (that those once 
rejected can be taken back again).”28 That is, what God promised to do for Israel can be 
applied to the Gentiles. He adds that while this “principle…can be referred to rejected 
Ishmael, Esau, and Pharaoh,” it can just “as much [be applied] to hardened Israel,” 
which Dunn believes might have been part of Paul’s intention anyway.29 Similarly, 
Barrett believes Paul’s use of Hosea “refers mainly to the call of Gentiles,” though 
                                                
 24 Käsemann, Römer, 264, says, “Wie üblich versteht der Apostel die Sprüche als 
eschatologisch ausgerichtete Orakel, ohne über ihren ursprünglichen Sinn zu reflektieren.”  
 25 Ibid. 
 26 Käsemann’s views are better understood when one takes into account his thoughts on the 
preceding argument in Rom 9 (see Käsemann, Romans, 260-272).  
 27 C.H. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans (MNTC; London and Glasgow: Collins 
Press, 1959), 172. Though his conclusion is that Paul still sees the oracle as possibly still referring to 
Israel remains a stretch, see Starling, Not My People, 119-120, for a helpful critique of those who 
argue Paul is not talking about Gentiles in vv. 25-26.  
 28 Dunn, Romans, 38b, 571; See also Starling, Not My People, 123-124, concerning the 
various terminological descriptions.  
 29 Ibid. Dunn reaches this conclusion because the Hosea citation occurs after the discussion 
in 9:6-23. 
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quickly adding that, “it is, however, possible that [Paul] is also thinking (as Hosea did) 
of the temporary lapse of Israel and their subsequent return, that is, of the possibility 
that ‘vessels of wrath’ might become vessels of mercy.’”30 The point emphasized by 
Dunn is that, on the one hand, while the Hosea prophecy itself pointed to a return of 
Israel in its original context, Paul merely used it as a “principle” for the inclusion of the 
Gentiles, and since Paul might have had in mind physical Israel anyway, Paul’s use of 
this text is not at odds with its original context.31 By going this route, one might argue 
that at least some of the hermeneutical tension has been eased on Paul’s use of the 
prophet.  
Moo takes exception with Dunn’s construal, arguing that, “Paul requires more 
than an analogy to establish from Scripture justification for God’s calling of Gentiles to 
be his people.”32 Schreiner is in basic agreement, though conceding that a “principle” is, 
on some level, at play.33 He sums up his view by saying that Paul understood the 
prophecy as “fulfilled in the calling of the Gentiles.”34 Moreover, Jewett has argued that 
one should not read Paul’s use of Hosea so “narrowly” in that only Gentile Christians 
are in view, but rather as referring to the “mixed community of the church.”35  
Two noteworthy treatments come from David Starling and J. Paul Tanner.36 
First, Starling understands the “narrative and salvation-historical dimensions” as giving 
legitimacy to the thesis of a typological relationship between God’s past redemptive 
work for Israel and in the present work of Christ.37 His typological approach is not 
reduced to “illustrative tropes,” for it recognizes that Paul’s “correspondences… 
between Israel’s history and the gospel of Christ are understood as correspondences 
                                                
 30 Barrett, Romans, 178; See also Starling, Not My People, 164. 
 31 Cf. Seifrid, “Romans,” Commentary, 648-649. 
 32 Moo, Romans, 613. Cf. Hays, Echoes, 67. 
 33 Schreiner, Romans, 528. 
 34 Ibid. Emphasis original. 
 35 Jewett, Romans, 600. 
 36 Broadly speaking, these two scholars take somewhat opposite positions on the issue and 
are therefore helpful sparring partners for our present study; see e.g., Starling, Not My People, 121, 
fn. 50. 
 37 Starling, Not My People, 123, fn. 62.  
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between the actions of the one God, whose ways (even when they are surprising) are 
grounded in a consistency of character and purpose within the one grand narrative.”38 
Moreover, Starling claims to find some warrant for a typological reading because of 
how, in the verses leading up to the Hosea quotation (i.e., vv. 6-23), “the dominant 
mode of argumentation is by analogy and example,” not least in regard to scriptural 
references.39 Paul’s aim in 9:25-26, then, was to refer back to the Hosea oracle as an 
analogical reality for what God was doing in the first century.40 Thus, the typological 
appropriation of the Hosea texts in vv. 25-26 finds collusion with other instances of 
correspondence between Israel’s story and other motifs in the whole of Romans itself.41 
According to Starling’s view, in citing the Hosea texts Paul has not “forgotten” or 
“overlooked” the oracle’s original context and would possibly still affirm its 
“continuing relevance to the Israel of his day.”42 
Turning to Tanner’s article “The New Covenant and Paul’s Quotations from 
Hosea in Romans 9:25-26,”43 one reads that it was Paul’s “New Covenant awareness”—
manifested in various New Covenant “events”—which “set the stage for [his] fresh 
understanding” of the Hosea oracle.44 Tanner acknowledges the New Covenant “was not 
overtly promised” to the Gentiles in Hosea.45 Nevertheless, their inclusion was a “direct 
fulfillment” since they “participated in the New Covenant.”46 He readily admits that, 
“Nothing in the context of these passages makes reference to Gentiles, nor did Hosea 
                                                
 38 Ibid., 123-124, fn. 62.  
 39 Ibid., 125. Starling (125) goes so far to argue that it is “far from certain” that vv.27-29 are 
“prophetic predictions fulfilled in his own time.”  
 40 Ibid., 126. 
 41 Ibid., 163-164; specifically, Starling notes how Paul depicts typological correspondence 
between the story of Israel and that of Adam, the church, the gentiles, individual Jews and believers, 
and even himself (163). See his larger discussion on 139-162. 
 42 Ibid., 120. (See also 164.) 
 43 J. Paul Tanner, “The New Covenant and Paul’s Quotations from Hosea in Romans 9:25-
26,” BSac162, no. 645 (January-March 2005): 95–110. 
44 Ibid., 106. (See 103-110; Tanner speaks of “events” such as the revelation Paul received 
concerning Gentile inclusion, Jesus’ announcement of the New Covenant at the Last Supper, and the 
coming of the Spirit—not least upon Gentiles. Cf. Moyise, Paul and Scripture, 78, 85.) 
45 Ibid., 109.  
46 Ibid., 102, 108.  
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imply that the fulfillment of the promises would be with Gentiles.”47 What is more, he 
notes the hermeneutical dilemma when he recognizes that Paul used Hosea in order to 
“prove” that Gentiles were now included in the covenant.48 The essence of Tanner’s 
argument is that Paul never rejected the original meaning of Hosea but simply sought 
“to affirm a fulfillment also with Gentiles.”49 Moreover, Tanner takes exception with the 
                                                
 47 Ibid., 100. 
 48 Ibid., 98. Tanner says (101) that “Hosea 1:10 and 2:23 clearly refer to Israel. And yet in 
Romans 9:25-26 Paul quoted those verses and applied them to Gentile believers of the church.” 
 49 Ibid., 101. Emphasis original. Cf. Mitchell Kim, “Respect for Context and Authorial 
Intention: Setting the Epistemological Bar,” in Paul and Scripture: Extending the Conversation, ed. 
Christopher D. Stanley (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012), 124-125, and his positing of a 
“latent sense” (based upon Michael Polanyi’s theory) to the text. Citing Hays (Echoes, 67), Kim’s 
specific thoughts on Rom 9:25, bringing the issue of authorial intention to the fore, touches on 
related ideas found in Tanner (cf. fn. 50 below), though with a wider philosophical flavor (125-126). 
Kim’s proposal appears helpful, at times even congruent with ours—not least in terms of how he has 
a place for christological presuppositions in Paul’s interpretation, as we will show below (125-126). 
One wonders, however, if his theory of “latent knowledge” puts too much hermeneutical weight 
upon authorial intentionality. Kim says (115) “latent knowledge” helps to “define authorial intention 
more precisely,” and how this concept “reminds us that ‘we know more than we can tell.’” This, he 
says, allows “authorial communicative intention” not to be limited to the “conscious and focused 
attention of the author at the time of writing but rather encompasses a whole body of assumed 
knowledge” (115). He says further, “To reduce authorial intention to conscious authorial intention is 
unnecessarily reductionistic. We always intend more than the focus of our attention” (121-122). 
Though it would take use too far afield to engage fully with Polanyi’s theory, a couple of responses 
are in order. First, one wonders how hermeneutically fruitful it is to distinguish a text’s “latent 
sense” from its “explicit sense,” not least when the former is somehow endowed by the author as his 
or her unconscious intentionality (115-116, 123). Not denying latent knowledge per se in readers or 
authors or all people in general, one wonders how it is even possible for a text qua text to be 
endowed with such a “sense” anyway. One might speak of a text’s horizon (as we do below), but 
this seems to be different from Kim’s idea. Under Gadamerian hermeneutics, the horizons of a text 
and its interpreter are able to dialogue in an act of genuine fusion. But to root such dialogue within 
the confines of a hidden authorial intention is not unlike psychologism (addressed below), and as 
such seems unattainable. It seems that endowing a text with a “latent sense” by a removed author 
does not, in the end, accomplish what Kim rightly seeks to do, namely, leave room for fresh 
application in “new settings” (116) in light of an author’s presuppositions (125-126). Second, in 
terms of applying this idea to Paul’s use of Hosea in Rom 9:25-26, Kim produces mixed results. He 
is correct that Paul’s christological presuppositions were integral for Paul’s reading, shedding light 
on the text (125). But that is the point of issue: Paul was reading a text, not an author—much less an 
author’s subconscious intentions. Would this even be possible to discern? Kim aims for genuine 
fusion between Paul and the text, though only by dividing the text into “explicit” and “latent” senses 
(with the latter being grounded in the subconscious of the author); the cost of doing this 
overshadows the benefits (as tempting as it might be). See also Steve Moyise, “Latency and Respect 
for Context: A Response to Mitchell Kim,” in Paul and Scripture, 131-139, esp. 134-135, who 
rightly questions Kim’s author-centered view as, in all reality, not as author-centered as it claims to 
be (see also his note on the lack of criteria provided by Kim on 137-138). This observation aligns 
with our critique about questioning a distinction between “latent” and “explicit” meanings as that 
hermeneutically fruitful. Our reply is that one does not need to focus so exclusively upon the author, 
especially to the point of grounding intention in the subconscious, as Kim seems to think.  
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idea that Paul is using the Hosea prophecy only to convey a principle.50 His ultimate 
solution to the hermeneutical conundrum is to say that the apostles—not least Paul—
had gained a “New Covenant awareness” which would have helped shed light upon 
passages like Hosea.51 Tanner’s idea of an apostolic “New Covenant awareness” was 
made possible due to certain experiences and events, such as what was experienced at 
Pentecost—namely, that it was not only believing Jews who were receiving the Spirit, 
but also the uncircumcised, believing Gentiles.52 Thus, 
The apostolic understanding that Gentiles were participants in the New Covenant 
helped the apostles see that the promise in Hosea of status change pertained not only to 
Jews in the New Covenant but to all who participated in the New Covenant—and hence 
also to Gentiles. If the New Covenant passages like Jeremiah 31:31-34 included 
Gentiles (though seemingly promised only to Israel), then the same hermeneutic applied 
to the Hosea promises. Gentiles would be included in the fulfillment of the New 
Covenant, even though it was not overtly promised to them. What Hosea was clear 
about was that the fulfillment would come with those participating in the New 
Covenant. The passing of time clarified that the Gentiles also would participate in the 
New Covenant and hence in the promises given through Hosea!53 
Having noted the variety of ways some have sought to make sense of this issue, 
it is necessary to reflect on some of their strengths and weaknesses before proceeding 
toward a Gadamerian description of interpretation, which, as we will show, remains 
conducive to bringing clarification to this intertextual phenomenon. 
1.4 Advancing the Discussion 
The basic issue concerning this instance of intertextuality54 is the fact of 
historical-distance, the contextual-time gap, between Hosea’s original agenda and 
                                                
 50 Ibid, 109-110. Tanner says, “Paul's treatment of the Hosea passages must not be seen as a 
mere utilization for purposes of analogy or application of principle. The inclusion of the Gentiles 
was a legitimate phase of fulfillment for the Hosea passages, as 1 Peter 2:4-10 confirms. Believing 
Gentiles had now become 'the people of God,' full and equal participants in the New Covenant. The 
unfolding events of the New Testament (coupled with the Holy Spirit's revelation of the mystery of 
the church) allowed the Hosea passages to be seen in their fullest perspective” (109-110). Cf. Dunn, 
Romans, 38b, 571. 
 51 Ibid, 106.  
 52 Ibid, 103-106. Cf. Wright, PFG, 758-760. 
 53 Ibid, 108-109. (Emphasis original.) 
 54 For an overview of intertextuality and some of the issues relevant for this study, see Craig 
G. Bartholomew, Introducing Biblical Hermeneutics: A Comprehensive Framework for Hearing 
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Paul’s. Specifically, this is in terms of explicit competing agendas as Paul utilizes the 
prophecy in a way that is different than Hosea originally intended, i.e., the objects of the 
prophecy are different (the Jews for Hosea and Gentiles for Paul). The stakes are raised 
even higher when one recognizes how integral the quotations are to Paul’s central 
argument in Romans, an argument that will be outlined below. It is clear that Paul cites 
Hosea for the purpose of making the case for Gentile inclusion. Thus, if how he argued 
with the quotations are to be considered suspect, then it is not unreasonable to then 
question the validity of his conclusion.55 That said, it is important to consider the fact 
that Paul seemed quite confident with his use of the quotations. In what follows, areas 
where further advances can be made will be noted, building upon some of the scholarly 
views expounded upon above. It will be seen that these areas essentially center around 
the issue of historical-distance and the role preunderstandings and application play in all 
interpretive events. 
                                                                                                                                          
God in Scripture (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2015), 121-126; and Anthony C. Thiselton, New 
Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading, Landmarks  
ed. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 38-42, 495-499 (esp. 497). The term “intertextuality” was put 
forward by Julia Kristeva to describe how texts were not “self-contained” but rather exist as a 
“transformation of other texts” (Stephen Heath, “Intertextuality,” in A Dictionary of Cultural and 
Critical Theory, 2nd ed., eds. Michael Payne and Jessica Rae Barbera [Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2010], 348). See Julia Kristeva, Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Language and Art, ed. 
Leon S. Roudiez; trans. Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1980), 64-91, esp. 66 (see also the editor’s entry “intertextuality” on 15); Julia 
Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1984), 57-61, esp. 59-60. See also Graham Allen, Intertextuality, 2nd ed. (TNCI; London and 
New York: Routledge, 2011), 8-58. For a critique of Kristeva and intertextuality, see William Irwin, 
“Against Intertextuality,” PL   28, no. 2 (October 2004): 227-242. In terms of biblical intertextuality, 
Bartholomew (Hermeneutics, 125-126) is correct to highlight N.T. Wright’s storied approach. See 
N.T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, vol. 1 (COQG; Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1992); and Hays, Echoes. (Cf. Matthew W. Bates, “Beyond Hays’s Echoes of Scripture in the 
Letters of Paul: A Proposed Diachronic Intertextuality with Romans 10:16 as a Test Case,” Paul and 
Scripture, 263-291.) See also B. J. Oropeza and Steve Moyise, eds., Exploring Intertextuality: 
Diverse Strategies for New Testament Interpretation of Texts (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2016). 
 55 So Hays, Echoes, 182: “There is no possibility of accepting Paul’s message while 
simultaneously rejecting the legitimacy of the scriptural interpretation that sustains it. If Paul’s way 
of reading the testimony of the Law and the Prophets is wrong, then his gospel does constitute a 
betrayal of Israel and Israel’s God, and his hermeneutic can only lead us astray. If, on the other hand, 
his material claims are in any sense true, then we must go back and learn from him how to read 
Scripture.” 
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It was observed that both Käsemann and Dodd believed Paul disregarded the 
original sense of the prophecy in its OT context.56 There are, however, differences 
between the two scholars’ positions. On the one hand, Käsemann viewed the quotation 
as being “eschatologically-focused oracles,”57 while Dodd dismissed the legitimacy of 
Paul’s use of the quotation altogether.58 Beginning with Dodd, points where clarity is 
needed with respect to each view will be noted. Wanting to alleviate the hermeneutical 
tension, Dodd, in terming the quotation as “rather strange” and “ill-chosen,”59 assumes 
Paul to be a less-than-careful reader. This may very well be the case, but in the end, it 
seems difficult to substantiate. For example, Dodd states that the preceding argument in 
Rom 9 laid the groundwork for what is to come in vv. 25-26. Paul, he argues, has 
defended God’s right to choose who can be in the covenant as being his own sovereign 
right, which “[constituted] a new ‘Israel’ of Jews and Gentiles.”60 Dodd adds by saying 
that this “constituting…is in accordance with what the prophets said regarding God’s 
designs.”61 Specifically, he says that the inclusion of Gentiles into this new people was 
“established” by the Hosea oracle.62 When Dodd declares that Gentile inclusion was 
“established” by the Hosea prophecy, he should not be understood as meaning it was 
satisfactorily proved by the oracle (recall that he believed the oracle was “ill-chosen”). 
This must be seen, rather, as a reference to the way the oracle functioned rhetorically 
within Paul’s argument, that is, the implied author of Romans understood it as being 
established. Thus, what compelled Dodd to understand the Hosea citation as “ill-
chosen” was his recognition of how the oracle functioned rhetorically.  
It is possible that Paul might not have noticed his own blunder nor anticipated 
objections from his Jewish contemporaries—objections like Dodd’s. But this seems 
unlikely. First, Dodd’s argument assumes that Paul was ignorant (or at least forgetful) 
of other prophetic texts that spoke more explicitly of Gentiles—such texts of which 
                                                
 56 See Section 1.3 above. 
 57 Käsemann, Römer, 264. 
 58 Dodd, Romans, 172.  
 59 Ibid.  
 60 Ibid. 
 61 Ibid. 
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even Dodd claims to be aware.63 Second, out of all the Jewish texts Paul could have 
chosen, Hosea’s oracle seems to have been purposefully placed where it was. This claim 
is supported by the fact of its rhetorical place and function, namely, its specific position 
to persuade the reader that Gentiles were now included (something Dodd, it seems, also 
recognized about the implied author). Third, when Dodd says the Hosea oracle would 
have been utilized better by Paul in ch. 11, the glaring fact that it is not used there only 
strengthens the point that its position in ch. 9 is deliberate.64 
The absence of any hint that Paul anticipates objections is interesting. Of course, 
that such an objection would have registered for Paul in the first place assumes that he 
was committed to similar hermeneutical assumptions that prevail among modern 
interpreters. The absence is nonetheless telling as Paul is quite capable of foreseeing 
rejoinders, anticipating objections, and then offering pre-emptive responses.65 Given 
how integral the oracle is to Paul’s argument, as well as the fact he never anticipates any 
objection to it, it is perhaps more likely to posit that something more intuitive is at play 
hermeneutically. Instead of imposing upon Paul modern hermeneutical criteria (and thus 
concluding that he was misapplying texts), it might prove beneficial to explore other 
hermeneutical elements possibly at play in his use of the Jewish texts.66  
Moreover, Käsemann’s “eschatologically-focused” view appears helpful since it 
provides an alternative way of dealing with some of the problems of context—that is, 
the problem of Paul’s placing the Hosea text within his own context, thus giving it 
different meaning. However, while it is reasonable to bring eschatology into this 
discussion, a further hermeneutic account of what is happening is needed. After all, 
while there should be no question that Paul’s use of Hosea has taken on a fresh and new 
eschatological meaning, further elucidation is required to show how he did so without 
ignoring the horizon of the Hosea text itself (after all, the oracle is employed to 
                                                                                                                                          
 62 Ibid. 
 63 Ibid. 
 64 Ibid. 
 65 E.g., see Rom 2:1-4, 17-24; 3:1, 27-31; 4:1; 6:1, 15; 7:7, 13; 9:6, 14, 19; 11:1, 7, 11. 
 66 See the critique of Longenecker and Gardener in Hays, Echoes, 180–181. Steve Moyise, 
“Does Paul Respect the Context of His Quotations?” Paul and Scripture, 98, is correct to warn of 
  
15 
contribute to Paul’s argument; see below). Käsemann, like other commentators, does 
well to describe what Paul is doing, but offering a philosophical-hermeneutic approach 
will fill in the gaps mentioned above. In this way, consistent with Käsemann, Paul’s 
eschatological approach can be preserved and highlighted but, perhaps beyond 
Käsemann, a total overcoming of the original horizon of the oracle is not necessary.67 A 
thorough critique of his overall thought is beyond the scope of this study. Yet, one 
wonders if the particular problem with Käsemann’s approach to the intertextual 
situation is not due to his other hermeneutical commitments which, as has been pointed 
out, remains problematic since it does not account for a deeper Jewish narrative that 
runs throughout Paul’s thought.68 Indeed, the present study acknowledges the insights 
gleaned from Käsemann’s work, though it attempts to integrate what might be friendly 
to his efforts with a more clarified account of Paul’s narrative approach, not least to the 
application of the Hosea oracle itself.69 This allows one to move, arguably, beyond talk 
of Paul’s disregard for the oracle’s horizon in favor of Paul’s, but rather to reframe the 
phenomenon into the more helpful Gadamerian language of Horizontverschmelzung.70 
 This leads us to the following questions: How does one make sense of an 
eschatological emphasis in Rom 9:25-26 textually and conceptually? Textually, how 
                                                                                                                                          
anachronism when evaluating Paul’s rather free play with texts under modern criteria. 
 67 For all the noteworthy things about Käsemann’s work—not least his commentary on 
Romans—there remains hesitancy to adopt his apocalyptic framework. Our reservations are that, at 
times, Käsemann appears to emphasize a somewhat radical newness of Paul’s thought at the 
expense, arguably, of the underlying narrative features that are, in our view at least, present within 
the Pauline writings themselves. For example, Käsemann, Romans, 273, beginning his comments on 
vv. 24-29, says, “The promise which has been given to Israel and the goal of God’s saving counsel 
which is perceptible at present diverge. Hence Paul has to show that the divine promise is neither 
calculable nor a human privilege. Salvation history is not a process of continuous development. It is 
the history of the word which constantly goes forth afresh and accomplishes election and rejection. 
In this way the Jewish belief in election is transcended…”  
 68 See e.g., N.T. Wright, “A New Tübingen School? Ernst Käsemann and His Commentary 
on Romans (1982),” in Pauline Perspectives: Essays on Paul, 1978-2013 (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2013), esp. 64, 67.  
 69 If one were to place the present intertextual study within the framework of the so-called 
“apocalyptic” and “salvation-historical” debate, see Michael F. Bird, An Anomalous Jew: Paul 
among Jews, Greeks, and Romans (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016), 114, who notes those scholars 
who have sought to account for an “apocalyptic” reading of Paul all the while still being sensitive to 
the “storied nature of Paul’s theology” (see also 114-123). This remains the general spirit behind the 
present work. 
 70 See Section 4.6 below. 
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does one account for the way the text functions rhetorically in the argument’s context? 
Should this rhetorical feature not be allowed to have full force and in a way that allows 
for Paul’s revisionary meaning? It seems that, taking into account the text’s function, 
the oracle’s own horizon cannot be disregarded so easily (as Käsemann suggests). 
Conceptually—given the historical context and agenda of Hosea—at what point can 
Paul alter, or at the very least add to, the oracle from being an exclusive one about the 
return of rebellious Israel of Hosea’s time and upon the Gentiles of his time? Does Paul 
on some level bring his own paradigm to the text of Scripture, imposing upon it the 
details he sees fit? If so, what hermeneutic can adequately account for this?71 One 
wonders, moreover, if the choice between these two differing horizons are indeed 
mutually exclusive or if the relationship between the two is much more intuitive and 
closer than one might think. In summary, Käsemann’s way forward does not ultimately 
absolve Paul from the charge of misguided exegesis nor does it answer (with full 
clarity) the question about the relationship between the horizons of the original oracle 
and its latter interpreter.72  
 Dunn, moreover, does not see the original context and agenda of Hosea as 
worrisome, since Paul’s point was only to employ it as a “principle.”73 This appears to 
be a way around the problem of opposing contexts. An initial problem with this, 
however, is that it does not give due weight to the rhetorical nature of the quotations. 
That is, this would cause Paul’s argument to rest upon the assumption that, just because 
God can in principle do something that he is therefore doing it, and (in light of Paul’s 
argument via the oracle) his readers should simply get on board with the program. 
While this has the appearance of a viable solution, it seems to fall short. In the end, 
analogical arguments can only go so far, and because of this, it is unlikely that Paul 
would have argued in this, or in any similar, manner given how much is at stake for him 
in the context.74 In Moo’s words, “[W]e must conclude that this text reflects a 
                                                
 71 See Starling’s comments below concerning Tanner’s work.  
 72 At the very least, our study provides conceptual and textual clarity to what is otherwise 
overlooked in Käsemann’s comments.  
 73 Dunn, Romans, 38b, 571. 
 74 Moo, Romans, 613. 
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hermeneutical supposition for which we find evidence elsewhere in Paul and in the NT: 
that OT predictions of a renewed Israel find their fulfillment in the church.”75 Moo goes 
on to describe Paul’s “hermeneutical key by which [he can] interpret and apply the OT” 
as being brought about by “God’s final revelation in Christ.”76 The point put forward by 
Moo, it seems, is that Christology and ecclesiology remain significant in understanding 
Paul’s hermeneutical practices. But if so, at what level? While it remains to be seen if 
this is even the case, one is left wondering how—that is the question—Christology can 
be the deciding interpretive factor. Hermeneutically, how can Paul’s present 
christological experiences and commitments shed light upon Hosea’s past prophecy? 
Perhaps it would be helpful, then, to put forward an interpretive paradigm which is able 
to take into account the idea of fusion between past and present, between an original 
text and its subsequent reading. This paradigm, as will be seen below, will also need to 
be capable of accounting for the roles experience and history both have as an effective 
phenomenon upon the interpreter—not least as they relate to the idea of prejudgments. 
Before these can be addressed, however, preliminary items need to be elucidated and 
clarified below. 
Tanner’s work on this issue is commendable as it accounts for Paul’s new 
horizon of understanding. However, his overall solution to the dilemma leaves other 
questions. First, one is left wondering how Paul’s “New Covenant awareness,” inspired 
by certain “events,” can rightly be said to serve as the interpretive tool for Paul’s use of 
Hosea, when in fact this seems contrary to the rhetorical place and function of the 
Hosea quotation itself.77 Tanner rightly, as we will see in our discussion on Gadamer 
below, places emphasis on the fact that Paul had certain experiences that helped him 
come to see that Gentiles were now included into covenant blessings and that also 
illuminated their understanding of certain OT texts.78 Though lending hermeneutical 
                                                
 75 Ibid. Cf. Seifrid, “Romans,” Commentary, 648. 
 76 Ibid. 
 77 Tanner, “The New Covenant.” 104-106, 110. Cf. Starling, Not My People, 121-122 (see 
fn. 50), who likewise notices the weakness of this and similar positions. 
 78 Ibid. Tanner states (105): “…following the Day of Pentecost it was undoubtedly apparent 
to the apostles that the New Covenant promised in Jeremiah and Ezekiel was underway, and at least 
these aspects of the New Covenant were now being realized by the ‘believing remnant’ of Israel 
(which at the beginning is all that they expected the church to be). The events of Acts 10-11 would 
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weight to this phenomenon is helpful, there is more to the interpretive situation than just 
this, as the place and function of the quotations suggest. After all, Paul does not set forth 
the idea of “New Covenant awareness” in order to shed light upon the prophecy in 
Hosea, but rather the opposite, for the Hosea prophecy functions as a proof for New 
Covenant awareness. Starling comes to the same conclusion, and it is helpful to quote 
him at length: 
But Paul's use of Scripture suggests at a number of points (particularly when, as is the 
case here, his citations are in the context of an argument from Scripture) that for him 
the inclusion of Gentiles is not simply and solely an eschatologically revealed novelty 
that he brings to Scripture ab extra, but an expansion of the circle of God's mercies that 
he claims to find taught or foreshadowed or promised or in some other way supported 
by Scripture itself. Otherwise, the appeal to Scripture is an entirely circular argument in 
which the point to be proved (Gentile inclusion) is nothing more than one of the 
interpretive presuppositions that Paul brings to Scripture and in no sense one of the 
warrants for his argument that Paul derives from Scripture. Whilst Paul is capable of 
adducing other kinds of proof than the testimony of Scripture for his case that Gentile 
believers are included among the eschatological people of God, the principal mode of 
argument that he is employing in this context is clearly an argument from Scripture, and 
our attempts to follow his train of thought should be guided by at least the prima facie 
assumption that he intends his Scripture citations to make some material contribution to 
the force of the argument.79  
Moreover, if one were to proceed with Tanner’s view, a further inquiry into what role 
hermeneutically-formative power experiences have over interpreters would need to be 
clarified, as we have said already above.80 There needs to be explanation, in other 
words, about Paul’s interpretive horizons, his own horizon development, and from 
there, the place of prejudgments in the interpretive act. This brings us to a critique of 
Starling’s view.  
Starling’s observations are equally insightful. However, further clarification 
should be sought to present a more complete account of the hermeneutical situation. For 
example, at the heart of his comments above, it must be cautioned that the rhetorical 
nature of the Hosea citation cannot bear the hermeneutical weight alone, for in some 
sense, Paul’s argument from Scripture was, as we will show, itself informed by other 
                                                                                                                                          
have significantly escalated their understanding, and those who witnessed this stood amazed at what 
was happening.” 
 79 Starling, Not My People, 122. Emphasis original. See our reply to these comments below. 
 80 The reader is encouraged to keep this in mind when Gadamer’s use of Erfahrung, 
experience, is discussed below in Section 4.3.1. 
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realities. Furthermore, while Starling’s overall narrative approach is commendable, not 
least his keen eye for typological construals that relate the story of Israel with other 
themes in Romans itself,81 there are still questions which need answered and gaps yet to 
be filled. An example of this is found in Starling’s rebuttal to Terence Donaldson’s 
understanding of Rom 9:25-26 (and texts like them). Donaldson states that “the texts 
establish what Paul wants them to establish only if one shares his convictions at the 
outset.”82 Starling thinks Donaldson’s claim here rests upon the assumption that 
scriptural texts “must either do all the work or none of the work in establishing the point 
to be proved.”83 In contrast, Starling believes that original texts and the assumptions 
from their latter interpreter are more intimately related such that while the former 
“would scarcely have suggested the inclusion of Gentiles apart from the ‘mystery’ 
revealed to Paul,” they would still “provide partial, retrospective confirmation of that 
revelation in the way that they describe the dealings of God with Israel.”84 
This is surely correct. However, a hermeneutic that is capable of shedding light 
on how exactly this happens would serve to clarify the issue. Though it is not Starling’s 
intentions to address the specific (philosophical-hermeneutical) issues we are, it is 
perhaps helpful to note that, when he does touch on issues related to them, there remains 
room for more precision and lucidity. For example, he seems to imply that granting 
hermeneutical weight (regarding the Hosea citation in Rom 9:25-26) to Paul’s reception 
of the “mystery” and his christological convictions is tantamount to a “circular 
argument.”85 Starling suggests that, for those who hold this view, the original context of 
Hosea would have been “supplanted in Paul’s mind by the new application that he sees 
them having to Gentile believers in Christ.”86  
                                                
 81 See Section 1.3 above. 
 82 Starling, Not My People, 122, fn. 54, citing Terence L. Donaldson, Paul and the Gentiles: 
Remapping the Apostle’s Convictional World (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997), 101.  
 83 Ibid.  
 84 Ibid.  
 85 Ibid., 121-122. See also 121, fn. 50, where he places Tanner, broadly speaking, into this 
group.  
 86 Ibid., 121. Starling subsequently references Käsemann, Romans, 274, and Hays, Echoes, 
67, saying the latter “flirts with this approach, without actually embracing it” (121, fn. 49). Starling 
does seem to suggest that a circle of some sort is in play (122). 
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In response, first, this may very well be the case in the view of some modern 
interpreters. All the same, one must do justice to the fundamental phenomenon inherit to 
all interpretive activity, namely, the fact of the hermeneutical circle. That said, 
Starling’s caution about circularity is not altogether clear and, perhaps if clarified, could 
serve to advance his own arguments.87 Second, it is odd that Starling seemingly 
dismisses Paul’s christological horizon as a potential clue to the Hosea citations in Rom 
9:25-26 on the grounds that this cannot, at the same time, account for how Paul argues 
from Scripture in those verses.88 Why must the latter be a necessary denial of the 
former?89 Third, in answering this intertextual dilemma, one must be prepared to 
address the fundamental question of application and its relationship to interpretive 
prejudgments. When he glosses the views that give weight to Paul’s receiving the 
mystery as having “supplanted” the original meaning of Hosea in favor of a “new 
application” to those “Gentile believers in Christ,” one must ask, Why is it the case that 
a different application of Hosea is, de facto, unwelcome even if it were, at the same 
time, an argument from Scripture? Could it not be the case that Paul’s fresh application 
of the oracle in light of both his christological convictions and his present ecclesial 
concerns, is at the same time his argument from it? Perhaps there is a way to address 
these questions while avoiding some of the pitfalls of which Starling is so 
understandably cautious.  
The basic problem is the subject-object tension between texts and their 
interpreters, that is, not being able to account for how historical texts can speak into 
one’s new present situation, as well as how one’s present situation does influence the 
meaning(fulness) of historical texts. Indeed, one sees this clearly in what was discussed 
above (e.g., Käsemann who, in order to account for the interpreter’s horizon, had to 
surrender the text’s horizon; recall Dodd, too). Even among the better treatments (e.g., 
Tanner and Starling), issues remain, as seen in our critique above. There is, therefore, 
the need to move beyond such strict constraints inspired by enlightenment ideas (see 
                                                
 87 Again, it is readily recognized that this sort of enquiry is not part of his study. 
 88 Starling, Not My People, 122.  
 89 Perhaps Starling unintentionally inflates a genuine concern to an unnecessary level. 
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below) and into Gadamer’s more intuitive, aesthetic-inspired hermeneutic. In this way, 
we can take what is best of some of the positions mentioned above and build upon them.  
1.5 Questions for Consideration 
In light of all that has been said, advancements can be made by attending to the 
central matters of interpretive horizons, prejudgments, and application, as well as by 
seeing these as integral to the interpretive process.  
One wonders, moreover, if there has been a lack of attention (and development) 
given to issues on the intersection of hermeneutics and epistemology?90 For example, 
Francis Watson’s seminal work, Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith, has offered 
invaluable insights into Paul’s use of the Old Testament, though his own approach is not 
without concern. Douglas Campbell essentially faults Watson for not dealing adequately 
with what one might describe as the problem of historical-textual distance between the 
writings of the OT and Paul’s subsequent use of them. Campbell argues that “it is 
difficult to see how [Watson’s canonical-Pentateuchal hermeneutic] could ultimately 
attest to the Christ event in any case, which lies, Watson asserts, beyond its textual 
horizon.”91 It is worth quoting Campbell at length: 
Those locked within the world of the text and reading it responsibly—that is, respecting 
the purview of its canonical authors—will almost certainly fail to recognize Christ as 
the arrival of God's definitive salvation, not to mention as God incarnate, as the 
majority of Paul's Jewish contemporaries seem to have done. Indeed, Watson's own 
parallel readings really endorse this possibility! In Watson's account Paul is now 
entitled to call these obstinate contemporaries stupid readers—as are we (although of 
course he calls them “blind”, and Christologically so!: cf. 2 Cor. 4.4, 6). The basic 
problem here is that this text does not supply any independent information that would 
allow the recognition of this event precisely because it is being read independently of it. 
(Strictly speaking Watson will struggle to get anything eschatological from the 
Pentateuch at all.) Moreover, it is only a text! Hence, in pursuing a ruthlessly non-
Christological and prior hermeneutic of the Pentateuch as an independent 
epistemological moment, Watson has in effect eliminated the possibility of any 
attestation to the Christ event and to Christianity on both descriptive and 
                                                
90 This is the essence of Campbell’s (“An Evangelical Paul: A Response to Francis 
Watson’s Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith,” JSNT 28.3 [2006], 337-351) contention with 
Watson, Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith, (New York: T&T Clark, 2004). In the second edition 
to his book, Francis Watson, Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith, 2nd ed. (New York: Bloomsbury 
T&T Clark, 2016), xlv-li, interacts briefly with some of Campbell’s overall criticisms.  
 91 Campbell, “An Evangelical Paul,” 348. 
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epistemological grounds. He cannot build on his foundation and reach Christ. And this 
is of course rather a strange place for a description of Paul to end up.92  
Thus, it seems hermeneutical clarity remains allusive in Watson’s thesis because, by 
virtue of how a canonical-Pentateuchal hermeneutic works, Scripture must, as Campbell 
observes, be read independently of the Christ event entirely—not least including the 
eschatological events entailed in the New Covenant. Is it necessary, one wonders, that 
such disparity exist between texts and events?  
Our study will seek to answer this question, as well as a related question of how 
can one meaningfully consider both horizons, that of the text and that of the interpreter, 
as well as for their respective agendas? The difficulty, perhaps, in understanding this 
instance of Pauline intertextuality is that there has been a great temptation on the part of 
commentators to cover up horizons—either Paul’s or Hosea’s. That is, there has been an 
inclination to observe in Paul’s interpretive activity what Gadamer called “naïve 
assimilation.” On this, he says, “Every encounter with tradition that takes place within 
historical consciousness involves the experience of a tension between the text and the 
present. The hermeneutic task consists in not covering up this tension by attempting a 
naïve assimilation of the two but in consciously bringing it out.”93  
The above observations serve as a springboard for the specific questions that 
need to be asked, questions that pave the way for Gadamer’s theory. First, how might a 
modern reader come to see how pre-modern Paul understood fusion to have been 
reached? Second, can it be demonstrated whether Paul saw his use of Hosea as, strictly 
speaking, interpretive? If Gadamer is right on the role of prejudgments and fusions of 
differing horizons (explained in Part Two), one should entertain the possibility that the 
kind of fusion envisioned by Paul was both broader and more intuitive than what might 
be expected on the basis of (his) mere interpretation and application as separate 
hermeneutical events. The need for such hermeneutical clarity cannot be overstated. 
Third, what prejudgments are brought by Paul to the table when using the Hosea texts, 
                                                
 92 Ibid. Emphasis original. 
 93 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. 
Marshall, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Continuum, 2004), 305. Subsequent citations from Truth and 
Method as well as from the German edition (Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: 
Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, 7th ed., vol. 1, GW  1 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2010]), will be marked TM and WM, respectively. 
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and how might these be compared to other interpreters contemporaneous to him? 
Fourth, is it conceivable that what looks like Paul’s interpretation of Hosea is actually 
the result of fusing application with interpretation into a single hermeneutical event?94 
Fifth, if this is the case, how might it be demonstrated, especially in ways that reflect 
appropriately the conventions of how Paul’s argument in Rom 9:25-26 works in its 
literary context?95 In what follows, a methodological footing will be laid that will 
provide the foundation upon which answers to these questions can be constructed. 
                                                
 94 Though it has not been given the attention it deserves, this observation about fusion is not 
out of step with mainstream Pauline scholarship (cf. Anthony C. Thiselton, Hermeneutics: An 
Introduction [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009], 89).  
 95 Cf. N.T. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, vol. 4 (COQG; Minneapolis: Fortress, 
2013), 49. 
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Chapter 2: Method and Procedure 
2.1 Introduction  
This study, first, will remain committed to contextual awareness. This includes 
Hosea’s prophetic agenda and Paul’s new covenant agenda, both of which will be taken 
into account. Second, the need to analyze and evaluate various interpretive traditions in 
a comparative way to Paul is recognized. Adequate space for evaluating other 
interpretive uses of the Twelve Prophets among some of Paul’s contemporaries will be 
given. Third, philosophical hermeneutics will be employed, specifically the hermeneutic 
of H-G. Gadamer. This, it is argued, allows for a full contextual awareness, a necessity 
for clarifying the interpretive features of Paul’s use of Hosea.  
2.2 Contextual Awareness 
Contextual awareness entails the following. First, one way to help explain the 
process of understanding is to consider the hermeneutical circle, i.e., the relationship 
between the whole and the parts.96 In order to reach an understanding of individual 
words, terms, and locutions, the grammatical place, i.e., the whole, in which they reside 
must be taken into account.97 Thus, a broad awareness of the setting is necessary. 
Significantly, context cannot be reduced merely to the realm of grammar and syntax, 
but must also be expanded so as to include possible “implicit context[s]” and the “story 
or implicit story” which may lie beneath that which is most explicit.98 That is, awareness 
must be granted to the broader, more underlying narrative features of each respective 
text’s context (e.g., Hosea, Romans). Going beyond the mere syntactical level, it is 
agreeable that, “Every human community shares and cherishes certain assumptions, 
                                                
 96 Anthony C. Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and 
Philosophical Description with Special Reference to Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, and 
Wittgenstein (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980), 104 (see also 166). 
 97 Cf. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, The Reader, and the 
Morality of Literary Knowledge (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998), 112. 
 98 Wright, NTPG, 115-116. See the discussion on the “vexed question of ‘meaning’” (115f). 
See also Bartholomew, Hermeneutics, 125f, on the value of Wright’s work for intertextuality.  
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traditions, expectations, anxieties, and so forth, which encourage its members to 
construe reality in particular ways, and which create contexts within which certain kinds 
of statements are perceived as making sense.”99 Thus, by examining contexts in this 
sense, sufficient clarity will be achieved. This means that a good account for the 
quotations in Rom 9 can be given if, and only if, a narrative substructure of the key 
motifs which occur within the context of the letter itself, as well as those within Hosea, 
has been developed (see below). This allows one to follow Paul’s line of reasoning, 
creating a condition in which one can evaluate the specific claims made with the Hosea 
quotations, as well as bringing lucidity to Paul’s broader theological purposes and 
agenda. 
Second, in addition to the whole, the parts of the text will be given 
consideration. Such details include things like the rhetorical place and function of the 
Hosea quotations. Indeed, the rhetorical purpose behind Paul’s use of the oracle plays a 
part100 in the whole context.101 This sheds light upon the question of motive, addressing 
the logic of why the quotations were used in the first place. This is integral, for one 
notices that, in offering scriptural support for the inclusion of Gentiles, there is an 
implied assumption at work for Paul, namely, that the quotations will be persuasive.102 
This reveals an important hermeneutical feature in their use, namely, that Paul was 
basing a certain claim upon them, i.e., the inclusion of Gentiles. These observations 
serve to highlight the distance between the contexts and the perceived problem this 
brings (in contrast to Hosea’s own use). This allows one to entertain the notion that, 
perhaps, Paul recognized something more inherent at work with his use, his application, 
of the oracle itself such that he believed that would convince his Roman audience. 
Thus, only by recognizing these parts, such questions are even able to be asked. By 
identifying these detailed assumptions as significant, one can be assisted in 
                                                
 99 Ibid., 36.  
 100 This “part” among the “whole” proves to play a very important role, for as was already 
mentioned, this was one of the problems with Tanner’s thesis (see above). 
 101 Cf. again Wright, NTPG, 115-116. As will be shown, the concept of “context” will be 
expanded to accommodate notions of historicality, tradition, horizons, the hermeneutical circle, etc., 
(see below). 
 102 That the significance of this assumption deserves the full attention of the modern 
interpreter cannot be overstated. 
  
26 
understanding how the part comes to terms with the whole (and vice versa) and 
subsequently with the hermeneutical event itself.  
Third, when analysis is given to each respective context—the text of Hosea and 
Paul’s subsequent use—one thing emerges, namely, the fact of historical-distance 
between the Hosea text and Paul’s latter reading of it. A legitimate contextual 
awareness is nothing short of a true awareness of the otherness of each context. Thus, 
contextual awareness necessarily brings out more fully the two seemingly-opposed 
contexts (Hosea’s and Paul’s). Any analysis must address this issue, for it cannot be 
ignored.103 Contextual awareness thus takes seriously the fact of historical distance, and 
so this methodological component remains paramount—not least because this is 
precisely what is at issue in Paul’s use of Hosea (to which the scholars mentioned above 
can easily attest). But it is not enough to recognize and analyze each respective context 
and observe the fact of historical distance; one must seek to bring them into reasonable 
dialogue. This is not sought because the modern scholar demands it be so, rather 
because Paul seems to have supposed this already given the rhetorical nature of the 
citation. The argument proposed in the present study is that one way to do this is by 
coming to see understanding itself in new light.  
Therefore, contextual awareness, by alerting the interpreter to the reality of 
historical-distance, culminates in the anticipated end: a fusion between the two 
contexts—Hosea and Paul’s. A hermeneutical approach to this passage would need to 
be able to account for how the historical-distance gap between Hosea and Paul, as well 
as their respective agendas, be bridged. This remains an important effort. After all, one 
might well ask how, among a second temple audience, it could ever have been the case 
that Paul felt he could convincingly employ a decidedly Jewish text—originally meant 
for a specific Jewish audience (i.e., unfaithful Jews)—in order to argue for the inclusion 
of a Gentile people?104 Since these quotations would indeed have been “highly 
                                                
 103 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 52. 
 104 E.g., see Starling, Not My People, 129, who calls attention to Jub 1:23-25. Here the 
phrase “sons of the living God” occurs and ought to be seen as an echo of Hos 1:10 (2:1 LXX). The 
phrase is employed in v. 25 from within the greater context (vv.19-25) as part of a divine promise to 
bring back wayward Israel, not Gentiles, who, as is well known, are portrayed rather negatively in 
Jubilees (see e.g. Jub 1:19).  
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controversial” to unbelieving Jews, what could have deemed its rhetorical use as 
persuasive?105 If understanding is to be seen as a “fusion of horizons,” then how might 
this shed light upon Paul’s reading of Hosea? Were there other hermeneutical 
components at play in Paul’s interpretive method which served, in his opinion, to 
account for this “fusion”—a bridging of the gap between past and present, between 
writer and reader, between two different agendas, Hosea’s oracle and Paul’s reading of 
it? Along with these questions, two more provocative questions surface. Might it be 
possible that what looks like competing agendas (which haunts modern interpreters) 
actually turns out to be merely an instance of historical-distance? And could it further 
be possible that the issue of historical-distance does not, in and of itself, entail a 
hermeneutical problem?106 It would appear that modern scholarship could be assisted in 
answering these questions if it was afforded a hermeneutical framework and conceptual 
vocabulary that could meet these challenges, which, it is argued, Gadamer’s theory 
provides.  
2.3 Interpretive Traditions 
The second part of this methodology will be to utilize select contemporaneous 
Jewish texts, specifically the Pesharim and the Damascus Document.107 The pesher 
                                                
 105 Wright, PFG, 1185. Cf. Stanley, Arguing with Scripture, 157-160, whose rhetorical 
approach seems to minimize the controversy, especially in the case of an “informed audience” (157) 
who would have run back to the original context of Hosea and simply found Paul to be referring to 
Israel (see esp. 158, fn. 46). This, however, ignores the clear designation the oracle has upon the 
Gentiles in 9:24 (cf. 158, fn. 47 [about his comments on 9:27], as well as 159, fn. 50 [about whether 
the “informed audience” would actually end up second guessing their conclusions once they arrived 
at 9:30-33]). Thus, Wright is correct to see this as having been controversial.  
 106 If this claim can be substantiated, then the tension inherent in Paul’s use of Hosea can be 
accounted for. For a further discussion on this, see the discussion on Lebech below. 
 107 The Damascus Document is analyzed here because they exhibit “pesher-type 
interpretations” (Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 86). Additionally, in the Damascus Document 
(CD), there is extant just under a dozen citations from the book of the Twelve (Watson, 
Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 88). Furthermore, the CD, unlike the Rule of the Community, was probably 
used for those sectarians who did not desire to live in such a stringent communal setting, having less 
regulated lives as those who lived under the Rule of the Community (John Joseph Collins, “Beyond 
the Qumran Community: Social Organization in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” DSD 16, no. 3 [January 1, 
2009]: 351-369, citing 358). Arguably, this could bring justification to the notion that the 
interpretations given in the CD characterize the standard hermeneutical activity of the time (Watson, 
Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 85. Watson adds [86], “The Damascus Document is the most comprehensive 
extant example of the sect’s scriptural exegesis, presenting pesher-type interpretations of a wide 
range of texts in the course of the reflections on the sect’s history and significance that fill its first 
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texts singled out in this study show awareness to either Hosea or the Twelve prophets. 
Out of these texts, moreover, the ones that interact with the motifs of law-keeping, 
righteousness language, or the Gentile question—all of which were so central to Paul in 
Romans (see below)—will prove to be especially insightful when juxtaposed to the text 
of Romans itself.108 The analysis of the sectarian texts will not, however, be exhaustive 
as the primary aim for their inclusion is for comparative purposes only.  
It is important to investigate the Pesharim109 because these texts “are primarily 
and foremost hermeneutical compositions,”110 exhibiting well-known sectarian—
specifically, eschatological111—interpretive activity. Charlesworth notes that the “two 
foci” of the Pesharim are the “sacred text of the Torah” and also “the commentary 
                                                                                                                                          
major section, the Admonition [i-viii, xix-xx]).” Cf. Edward Cook, “The Damascus Document 
(Geniza A + B, 4Q266-272)” in Michael Wise, Martin Abegg, Jr, & Edward Cook, The Dead Sea 
Scrolls: A New Translation (New York: HarperCollins, 1996) 49-51; Charlotte Hempel, 
“Community Structures in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Admission, Organization, Disciplinary 
Procedures,” in The Dead Sea Scrolls After Fifty Years: A Comprehensive Assessment, ed. Peter W. 
Flint and James C. VanderKam, vol. 2 (Boston: Brill, 1999), 67-92. Moreover, our analyses on the 
CD below will not comment extensively on the debates between the so-called A and B texts, unless 
it applies specifically to our investigation (for a helpful and readable translation that pieces the two 
together satisfactorily, see Cook, “The Damascus Document,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 49-74, above). 
See also Charlotte Hempel, The Damascus Texts (CQS; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 
esp. 15-25, 77-79. 
 108 Though he admits he does not observe pesher exegesis being replicated in the NT, cf. 
John J. Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment in the Qumran Scrolls,” JETS 30, no. 3 (1987): 267-278, 
citing 277, who says the pesher texts “do indeed throw valuable light on the early Christian 
understanding of Scripture.” (He mentions Matthew and Acts as examples; pp. 277-278.) On the 
value of juxtaposing the sectarian texts to Paul, see Steve Moyise, “Quotations,” in As It Is Written: 
Studying Paul’s Use of Scripture, eds. Stanley E. Porter and Christopher D. Stanley (Atlanta: SBL, 
2008), 19-20; Lim, Holy Scripture, esp. 12-14. 
 109 See Timothy H. Lim, Pesharim (CQS; New York: Sheffield, 2002), 13-22, for a general 
overview (see esp. 14-15, 46, on differences between “continuous pesher” and “thematic pesher”). 
 110 James H. Charlesworth, The Pesharim and Qumran History: Chaos or Consensus? 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 2 (see also 5-6). See also Maurya P. Horgan, Pesharim: Qumran 
Interpretations of Biblical Books (Washington, D.C.: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 
1979); Bronson Brown-Devost, “The Compositional Development of Qumran Pesharim in Light of 
Mesopotamian Commentaries,” JBL 135, no. 3 (2016): 525-541, for a suggestion about the 
composition and development of the pesharim; H. Gregory Snyder, “Naughts and Crosses: Pesher 
Manuscripts and their Significance for Reading Practices at Qumran,” DSD 7, no. 1 (2000): 26-48. 
Cf. George J. Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran: 4Q Florilegium in its Jewish Context (JSOTSS 29; 
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1985, esp. 3-4, 38-44, eBook Collection (Ebscohost), 
EBSCOhost (accessed April 3, 2017).  
 111 See Bartholomew, Hermeneutics, 182; and Michael A. Knibb, “Eschatology and 
Messianism in the Dead Sea Scrolls” in The Dead Sea Scrolls, 379-380. Knibb (381) observes 
“eschatological ideas” in the CD as well. See also Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 268; Lim, 
Pesharim, 24, 52. 
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(pesher) that both follows the lemma (scriptural citation) and is adumbrated in the 
lemma.”112 These scriptural references, moreover, are taken by the sect to refer 
specifically to their own historical situation, not least “their own special place in the 
economy of salvation.”113 Specifically, the Pesharim exhibit a type of “fulfillment 
hermeneutics,” in that, through their inspired Teacher, the sect could come to 
understand how God was bringing to fruition his plans for Israel.114 As will be argued in 
the forthcoming analysis, the Pesharim reveal a decidedly sectarian hermeneutic. 
Moreover, as “hermeneutically focused” texts, the Pesharim, 
…reveal primarily the way the Qumranites viewed their recent past by finding meaning 
for their own lives and special history by pouring over the words from God preserved 
by the prophets, his servants. They read Habakkuk, Nahum, and other prophets and 
biblical books by focusing on divine promises, predictions, and prophecies, and then 
affirming that they had been fulfilled in the life and history of their own special 
Community.115 
Because of this, the Pesharim remain fertile soil for a comparison to Paul’s own use of 
Hosea as a means by which his own community might be legitimated and expanded.  
There is not a prolific amount of reference to the prophets themselves or detailed 
discussion on the office of prophet in the Qumran texts.116 That said, as James Bowley 
cautions, one should not be tempted to think that prophecy or prophets were not 
                                                
 112 Charlesworth, Pesharim, 2. Emphasis original. On the origin of the pesher method, as 
well as a brief overview of its characteristics, see Charlesworth, Pesharim, 12, 39 and 14-16, 68-70, 
respectively. Cf. Brown-Devost, “Qumran Pesharim in Light of Mesopotamian Commentaries,” 
526-527; Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 268. Our interest here concerns not so much the 
historical, but rather the hermeneutical, details of the sectarian texts (though of course the two are 
not easily separated). On the former, see John J. Collins, “Reading for History in the Dead Sea 
Scrolls,” DSD 18 (2011): 295-315, esp. 305-306. 
 113 Ibid. See also Snyder, “Naughts and Crosses,” 27-28. 
 114 Ibid., 16. 
 115 Ibid., 5-6. 
 116 James E. Bowley, “Prophets and Prophecy at Qumran,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 354. 
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important or that that they held little significance to the Qumran community.117 Thus, 
our focus on selected texts will prove helpful to our study.118  
Part of this analysis will be to establish how these texts were read and 
interpreted, even at times when those readings were seemingly at odds with their 
original context. In fact, real gain can be made by examining these specific 
hermeneutical peculiarities because they will display both similarities and dissimilarities 
with Paul’s own interpretive activity. The purpose for interacting with these interpretive 
traditions will be to allow these investigations to serve as patterns to which Paul’s own 
interpretive practices can be compared. Furthermore, this approach will become 
especially fruitful when the hermeneutical activity of both Paul and his contemporaries 
are analyzed by way of Gadamer’s hermeneutic theory. Some of Gadamer’s key 
hermeneutical concepts will help categorize—indeed, give language to—the interpretive 
phenomena occurring in these Jewish texts.119 For example, observations will be made 
regarding how prejudgments were at work in them. Accordingly, given Gadamer’s 
theory, we will take note of the manner in which these Jewish writers applied the 
aforementioned themes and texts for their own ends and purposes. We will observe, 
therefore, the assumed fusion that takes place in them, i.e., between the horizon of the 
original text and its later Jewish interpreter. By examining those texts, one will be in a 
better position to compare and contrast with them Paul’s own hermeneutical endeavors. 
This allows for a more complete hermeneutical comparison between the two, which will 
prove helpful and instructive.120 It is correct to say, therefore, that when evaluating 
                                                
 117 Ibid. Discussing the significance the prophets had for the Qumran community, Bowley’s 
observations are insightful (see Ibid, 361-362). Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 92, who remarks 
that, taking all the pesharim into account, it is “striking” to see what “prominence” the Twelve had 
for the sect.  
 118 On reaching conclusions despite “the poor state of preservation” of the texts, see Watson, 
Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 93. 
 119 Gadamer’s theory could offer positive contributions to the hermeneutical issues 
surrounding the Qumran texts. Cf. George J. Brooke, “Reading the Plain Meaning of Scripture in the 
Dead Sea Scrolls,” in Jewish Ways of Reading the Bible, ed. George J. Brooke. JSSS 11 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 89-90, and his call for a “new model.”  
 120 For example, there is much to glean from the pesharim that specifically deal with the 
theme of Gentiles (among other themes like covenant inclusion, Torah observation, etc), as well as 
provide invaluable glimpses into the interpretive practices of Paul’s contemporaries. For example, 
Anselm C. Hagedorn and Shani Tzoref, “Attitudes to Gentiles in the Minor Prophets and in 
Corresponding Pesharim,” DSD 20 (2013): 472–509, citing 489, say, “The pesharim present 
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Paul’s use of Scripture, “it is important to ask both ‘inner-biblical’ and ‘extra-biblical’ 
questions.”121  
With reference to non-canonical literature, it has been said that serious 
examination of second temple Judaism has “reframed evangelical biblical theology.”122 
This is because NT writers were not direct recipients of OT theologies and themes, but 
were recipients of the same only after being “mediated by Second Temple Judaism and 
enriched by the ‘new wine (Mark 2:22 pars.) and ‘new treasure’ (Matt 13:52) of the 
revelation of God in Christ.”123 This fact is accommodating to our justification for using 
the literature itself. The significance of second temple beliefs, expectations, etc., as a 
hermeneutical backdrop for a study of the NT cannot be overstated. This becomes all 
the more true when one is investigating a NT writer’s interpretive practices. One of the 
benefits of engaging non-canonical Jewish literature is that factors which govern the 
inherent differences and similarities between decidedly Christian interpretations from 
that of their Jewish, non-Christian counterparts will come to the forefront.  
Excursus: Hosea’s Place and Function Among “The Twelve”  
When discussing the significance of context, one must attend to the NT writer’s 
own Sitz im Leben. This would entail taking into account the way in which the Jewish 
texts were received by Paul, particularly his reception and use of Hosea. The general 
scholarly consensus is that the Book of the Twelve, of which Hosea was part, should be 
considered as one literary unit.124 According to James Nogalski, this idea of the Twelve 
                                                                                                                                          
Gentiles as the paradigmatic Other, and they view foreign nations as both agents and objects of 
divine retribution. In some cases, they apply biblical prophecies against foreign enemies to 
contemporary Jewish antagonists.” Thus, in terms of our specific hermeneutical investigation, these 
contemporaneous texts are invaluable. 
 121 Richard N. Longenecker, Introducing Romans: Critical Issues in Paul’s Most Famous 
Letter (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 244. Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 2. 
 122 Larry R. Helyer, “The Necessity, Problems, and Promise of Second Temple Judaism for 
Discussions of New Testament Eschatology,” JETS 47, no. 4 (December 1, 2004): 597–615, citing 
597.  
 123 Ibid, 601.  
 124 See Craig D. Bowman, “Reading the Twelve as One: Hosea 1-3 as an Introduction to 
Book of the Twelve (the Minor Prophets),” SCJ 9, no. 1 (March 1, 2006): 41–59, esp. 41-44; cf. 
Aaron Schart, “The First Section of the Book of the Twelve Prophets: Hosea -- Joel -- Amos,” Int 
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being treated as a whole literary unit can be traced as far back as 200 B.C.E to Sirach.125 
Craig Bowman cites Ben Sira’s understanding of the Twelve as proof of not just the 
Twelve as a single literary unit, but also as “a single, rhetorically intended message of 
comfort and hope.”126 Bowman argues that what brings the Twelve together are (1) 
“central themes”; (2) “discernible patterns of arrangement”; and (3) “important reading 
prompts placed in the opening chapters of Hosea.”127 The last of these is important to 
his overall argument, since he sees Hos 1-3 as “[setting] a tone and a rhythm for the 
whole BT,…[which was] strategically ordered with respect to a few key terms in 
Hosea.”128 One significant observation made by Bowman was on the work of Odil 
Steck,129 specifically in what the former describes as “orientational pointers.”130 
Bowman states, “These orientational pointers for the reader create an organic logic for 
joining the parts to the overall purpose for the whole, and all of this can be discerned 
from the opening chapters in the act of reading alone. Thus, the front matter of the text 
matters!”131 To illustrate this, Bowman uses the example of Psalm 1 as having an 
                                                                                                                                          
61, no. 2 (April 1, 2007): 138–52, esp. 139; J. Andrew Dearman, The Book of Hosea, ed. R.K. 
Harrison and Robert L. Hubbard, Jr., NICOT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 7. Watson, 
Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 79-80. For opposing views, see Paul L. Redditt, “Recent Research on the 
Book of the Twelve as One Book,” CRBS  9 (October 2001): 47-80, esp. 63-64. 
 125 James Nogalski, “Reading the Book of The Twelve Theologically: The Twelve as 
Corpus: Interpreting Unity and Discord,” Int 61, no. 2 (April 1, 2007): 115–22, citing 115; See also 
Dearman, Hosea, 7. Nogalski (115) admits, though, that there are competing themes within The 
Twelve that might hinder one from thinking the corpus is all that unified. The way forward, 
according to Nogalski, is to read The Twelve theologically. He states (116) a way to read The 
Twelve with “theological sensitivity” is to understand both the “chronological structure” as well as 
“the presence of catchwords, allusions, and recurring themes.” See also James Nogalski, “Recurring 
Themes in the Book of the Twelve: Creating Points of Contact for a Theological Reading,” 
Interpretation 61, no. 2 (April 1, 2007): 125–36.  
 126 Bowman, “Reading the Twelve as One,” 42. See also: Redditt, “Recent Research,” 49. 
 127 Ibid, 43.  
 128 Ibid. See also Dearman, Hosea, 7–8. Bowman’s thesis is reinforced by the fact that 
Hosea occupies first position among the ordering of The Twelve in the MT, LXX, and 4QXIIa (see 
Ibid, 43, fn. 8). On views as to how Hos 1-3 is significant to The Twelve, especially as it serves as a 
bookend with Malachi, see Redditt, “Recent Research,” 54.  
 129 I.e., Odil Hannes Steck, Die Prophetenbücher und ihr theologisches Zeugnis: Wege der 
Nachfrage und Fährten zur Antwort (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1996) as cited in 
Bowman, “Reading the Twelve as One,” 48, fn. 25. 
 130 Bowman, “Reading the Twelve as One,” 49.  
 131 Ibid.  
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“orientational function” in that it sets the stage for the rest of the Psalter.132 So also, 
Bowman concludes that Hosea, being placed at the beginning of the Twelve, serves to 
set the tone for how one ought to read the entire Book of the Twelve.133 In essence, then, 
the front matter of the Twelve is Hosea itself, and as such, the message of Hosea 
matters.134 Of course, with this as the basic assumption, then the unity of the Twelve 
becomes all the more evident. 
Bowman’s second observation is that “the central message of the BT is the 
reciprocal use of בושׁ introduced by the universally attested placement of Hosea 1-3.”135 
Bowman, after summing up Steck’s work—namely, that “most biblical texts have some 
sort of opening piece that sets direction for the whole”136—proceeds to ask the question, 
“If there is an editorial intention behind the whole, shouldn’t it be found in the opening 
chapters of Hosea?”137 Bowman sees the implications of what is said in Hos 1:1, as well 
as the fact that שׁבו  occurs twenty-two times in Hosea, as clue to the overall direction 
the Twelve is proceeding.138 Along with the fact that Bowman observes in all the 
prophets a certain theme, he posits that this theme was launched in Hos 1-3 and as such, 
                                                
 132 Ibid, 50. 
 133 Ibid., 59, says, “The stability of Hosea’s primary reading position emphasizes its 
prominent role in establishing a reading strategy that reaches beyond its closing words.” Cf. J. 
Gordon McConville, “Hosea, Book of,” in DOTP, eds., Mark J. Boda and J. Gordon McConville 
(ACCBS; Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2012), 344-345. 
 134 Interestingly, Nogalski, “Reading the Book of The Twelve," 117, in his endeavor to read 
The Twelve “theologically,” states that out of the twelve writings, ten of them assume the story of 
God’s people, Israel and Judah. These, he argues, fall into two chronological categories, the first of 
which is further subdivided into two groups, namely, a “pre-exilic group of four (Hosea, Amos, 
Micah, and Zephaniah)” and a “post-exilic group of two (Haggai and Zech 1-8).” Furthermore, 
Hosea is said to be given prime position in the first group (though Nogalski sees Amos coming 
before Hosea by at least 15 years). The reason for Hosea’s prime position was for “theological 
reasons.” The point being, when reading The Twelve “theologically” in a decidedly “chronological” 
manner, Hosea is seen as occupying the first position. Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 80. (For a 
good overview on the various understandings as to how The Twelve gradually took shape, see 
Redditt, “Recent Research,” 50-52.)  
 135 Bowman, “Reading the Twelve as One,” 54; See also Schart, “The Book of the Twelve 
Prophets,” 141. (On the importance of “catchwords” in developing themes, cf. Nogalski, “Reading 
the Book of the Twelve,” 119ff; see also Redditt [“Recent Research,” 52ff] for an overview of past 
scholarship on this issue.) 
 136 Ibid, 50.  
 137 Ibid, 54.  
 138 Ibid, 55-56. On בושׁ in Hosea, see Gale E. Yee, “The Book of Hosea,” Vol. VII (NIB; 
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the entire Book of the Twelve toward a certain path; this theme is the call for Israel to 
return to Yahweh.139 If this observation is correct, then this adds to our awareness 
concerning the overall context of Hosea, the Book of the Twelve, and not least to the 
texts Paul quotes in Rom 9. There seems to be ample warrant, then, to consider the 
Twelve as a whole unit, with Hosea playing, arguably, a prime role. Concerning this 
latter point, a comparative analysis of Paul’s use of Hosea in particular with that of his 
contemporaries’ use of the Twelve in general becomes all the more well-founded. Given 
the abundance of research, and the overwhelming consensus that the Twelve be 
considered as one literary piece, the unity of the Twelve will be assumed in the present 
methodology.  
2.4 Philosophical Hermeneutics 
 The third component of our methodology is philosophical hermeneutics. The 
benefits are significant: “The task of philosophical hermeneutics...is ontological rather 
than methodological.”140 On first glance, this might appear ironic. However, as will be 
seen below, the appearance of irony is superficial. Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutic neither negates nor contradicts method per se. True, his theory seeks to 
pose a challenge to the claim that scientific methodology is the only means to truth; in 
this sense, method qua method is specifically challenged. Moreover, his approach gets 
beneath the question of method and into the more fundamental question of the 
interpreter’s being. Thus, this particular way of engaging hermeneutical questions is by 
starting not with guidelines, rules, or methods, but by addressing the more pertinent 
                                                                                                                                          
Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), 198. 
 139 Ibid, 58. Bowman says (58), “Yahweh’s recurring summons through these prophets is for 
Israel to return to him. This is set forth dramatically in the opening three chapters of Hosea as well 
as announced as an open condition in the last verse of the last book. Israel’s complete return and 
reconciliation to Yahweh was not resolved in Malachi’s day, nor in the day of the BT’s final 
redactor. The contingent nature of this repentance and allegiance was more than even the postexilic 
community could effect despite the prophetic warnings that filled Israel’s heritage.” (Cf. with 
Nogalski [“Reading the Book of The Twelve,” 118], who observes the “Day of YHWH” theme, 
occurring heavily in Joel and Obadiah. Nogalski says this is a “unifying element,” which, 
specifically for instances occuring in Joel, “will play out across the Book of the Twelve.”) 
 140 David E. Linge, introduction to Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, ed. 
and trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), xi. All subsequent 
citations from Gadamer are hereafter PH.  
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question of one’s place in the world.141 Therefore, our use of Gadamer’s theory as a 
component of our own methodology functions more along the lines as a component of 
assessment rather than, strictly speaking, a “methodology.”  
 As will be seen, this will prove useful for a study on biblical literature 
(especially regarding issues that concern the New Testament’s use of the Old). This 
point is accentuated by J.B. Torrance, who, in his foreword to Thiselton’s The Two 
Horizons, observed that, “One of the central concerns in contemporary theology and 
biblical studies has been the interest in linguistics and hermeneutics.”142 He continues,  
It is impossible to do genuine scientific biblical study today without raising questions of 
hermeneutics—the science of interpretation—and we cannot raise the question of 
interpretation without raising questions about the nature of knowledge, the use of 
language, and the scientific and ontological presuppositions operative in the mind of the 
exegete.143 
Thiselton, moreover, addresses those who would express concern for the intermingling 
of philosophy with biblical studies.144 He states rightly that “concepts drawn from 
philosophy” can serve to “facilitate the description and critical appraisal of the 
hermeneutical task.”145  
 Indeed, one of the great benefits that philosophy affords the interpreter is that it 
provides helpful categories which allow otherwise vague hermeneutical phenomena to 
be spoken of more coherently. In fact, “certain perspectives and conceptual schemes 
which have been drawn from philosophy may serve in certain circumstances to 
illuminate the text of the New Testament itself.”146 It is beneficial to use philosophical 
categories, particularly the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer, for an intertextual 
study such as this because the ontological presuppositions (mentioned above) of both 
                                                
 141 These thoughts will be explained further in Section 4.2 below. 
 142 J. B. Torrance, foreword to Thiselton, Two Horizons, xi. 
 143 Ibid. Cf. Bartholomew, Hermeneutics, 329. 
 144 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 3f. See also Bartholomew, Hermeneutics, 282-284. 
 145 Ibid, 4. See also William P. Olhausen, “The Role of Hermeneutics and Philosophy in 
Theological Interpretation,” A Manifesto for Theological Interpretation, eds. Craig G. Bartholomew 
and Heath A. Thomas (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2016), 112, who defines hermeneutics “as the 
philosophy of understanding.” 
 146 Ibid., 40. Thiselton refers to theological categories, though the point about the benefit of 
philosophy is clear (cf. pp. 47, 415-427). 
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the original writer (e.g., Hosea) and his subsequent readers (e.g., Paul) are allowed to be 
addressed. Rightly, Lebech says that “one of the key concepts” of Gadamer’s entire 
hermeneutical project was the “finitude of human life and understanding,” meaning 
each person is bound to his or her own place within “culture, history, and tradition.”147 
Indeed, it is precisely the issue of Paul’s and Hosea’s differing life-situations – resulting 
in their differing understandings of, and agendas for, the oracle itself – that epitomize 
the task at hand. The benefit, specifically, of using Gadamer’s hermeneutical theory 
therefore is that it “does not consider this to be an epistemological problem.”148 Thus 
Lebech says,   
While every individual subject is fundamentally conditioned through their cultural and 
historical background, Gadamer rejects entirely the presupposition of absolute, 
objective knowledge. On the other hand, he considers such embeddedness to be a 
necessary condition for judging, acting, and understanding. In the absence of pre-
understanding, one would be unable to engage appropriately in concrete situations, or 
adequately comprehend subject matter. One’s embeddedness creates a horizon beyond 
which one cannot see. However it simultaneously provides the means by which one may 
critically examine one’s pre-understanding, expanding its horizons and broadening 
one’s knowledge of the matter at hand.149 
If the idea that one’s “embeddedness” within “culture, history, and tradition” can be 
substantiated as a plausible epistemological component from which knowledge and 
understanding is achieved, then it is clearly beneficial to employ such concepts in the 
study on Paul’s use of Hosea. Given this, one would be obligated not only to address the 
question of the Hosea quotations in terms of its grammar, syntax, and lexical 
arrangements, but also expound upon the underlying features implicit within the text of 
Rom 9:25-26 itself—features such as Paul’s own “tradition” (in the way Gadamer 
means it), as well as his pre-understandings. It was said that part of the problem with 
past scholarly endeavors in examining Paul’s use of Hosea has been the lack of 
attention to how exegesis intersects with the much more vital question of 
epistemology.150 This being the case, philosophical hermeneutics provides a clear way 
forward by giving the modern reader the opportunity to look not just at the explicit 
                                                
 147 Flemming Lebech, “The Concept of the Subject in the Philosophical Hermeneutics of 
Hans-Georg Gadamer,” IJPS  14, no. 2 (June 2006), 222. 
 148 Ibid. 
 149 Ibid, 222. Emphasis ours. Cf. Wright, PFG, 67.  
 150 See Section 1.4 “Unresolved Issues” above. 
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features which entailed Paul’s use of Hosea, but rather into the more fruitful area of 
Paul’s thought-world, i.e., his “embeddedness” within his own socio-theological 
“culture, history, and tradition.”151 Enquiry into these and related areas could shed light 
on the riddles regarding Paul’s interpretive activity.  
 If hermeneutics is only preoccupied with the investigation of just texts in their 
originality, then how does that give way to meaningfulness in respect to its later 
interpreter? “From the standpoint of hermeneutics, traditional approaches to language 
usually carry with them an inbuilt limitation, namely that they concentrate attention on 
the language of the ancient text, and do not attempt to bring about a fusion of horizons 
between the world of the text and that of the interpreter.”152 Should not the 
hermeneutical process account for the world of the interpreter as well? If so, then it 
remains evident that an examination into just the “world of the text,” while necessary, 
remains far from sufficient.153 Any description of what it means to understand, 
therefore, will need to take into consideration both the thing understood and the one 
who understands—the very issue which concerns Hosea’s oracle and Paul’s later 
reading of it, respectively. As we will see, this is precisely the benefit of using 
Gadamer’s theory, specifically his concepts of prejudice, horizon, and tradition. 
Thus, the present research, with its philosophical-hermeneutical approach, is 
truly committed to a more complete contextual awareness. Having defined context to 
include broader considerations, one can see the benefits of philosophical hermeneutics 
                                                
 151 Lebech, “Concept of the Subject,” 222. Cf. Wright, PFG, 24-27. Watson, Hermeneutics, 
3-4, recognizes the role of “presuppositions and commitments” when interpreting texts, though with 
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Context?” Paul and Scripture, 97-114, who observes that term “respect” can be ambiguous.  
 152 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 117. See also his discussion on Sawyer, et al, on 117-124, esp. 
120.  
 153 Ibid. 
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more clearly since its task is descriptive in nature, addressing ontological questions 
rather than methodological ones.154 This approach is especially useful for the present 
task—a task which seeks to describe how fusion was attained between the text of Hosea 
and Paul’s latter reading of it. One issue, again, is that of historical distance. One 
wonders if the lack of attention given to the issue of historical-distance (see Section 1.3 
above) is due to the lack of significance it is perceived to have in the overall 
hermeneutical task. That is, should historical distance be seen as a liability to 
overcome? Could it be that part of the problem thus far with some studies on Paul's use 
of Hosea—not to mention the use of the OT in the NT period—is the assumption that 
historical distance is always a hindrance to interpretation? Given the Enlightenment’s 
influence in answering these questions, Gadamer’s hermeneutic (which calls into 
question some of the Enlightenment’s most central tenets) is conducive to this study, for 
Paul himself interpreted Scripture apart from enlightenment influence and assumptions. 
Paul does not, in other words, share the modern commentator’s own enlightenment 
suppositions—ones which, to be sure, inform his or her own modern critique of Paul’s 
pre-modern hermeneutic. In this vein, a Gadamerian approach has the unique advantage 
of bringing insight to the question at hand. 
 
 
                                                
 154 See above. 
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PART TWO: GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS 
Chapter 3: Gadamer and His Scholarly Context 
3.1 Introduction  
Hans-Georg Gadamer has been called a “most important theoretician,”155 and 
E.D. Hirsch, Jr., his most-ardent critic, called Truth and Method “the most substantial 
treatise on hermeneutic theory that has come from Germany in this century.”156 
Likewise, Bartholomew says it is “the central text in hermeneutical theory.”157 Malpas 
and Zabala consider Gadamer, along with Heidegger, as one of the “two key figures in 
the development of modern hermeneutics.”158 It is unfortunate, therefore, that 
Gadamer’s influence, while being widely acknowledged, has not in fact impacted 
biblical scholarship as deeply as it might have.159 By bringing his philosophical 
                                                
155 Quoting R. Lapointe (“Hermeneutics Today,” B.T.B. II [1972], 11) as cited in Thiselton, 
The Two Horizons, 25.  
 156 E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Have & London: Yale University Press, 
1967), 245. For a concise, introductory overview of Gadamer’s thought, see Teigas, “Gadamer,” 
Dictionary of Cultural and Critical Theory, 292-296. 
 157 Bartholomew, Hermeneutics, 282. Emphasis original. 
 158 Jeff Malpas and Santiago Zabala, “Introduction,” in Consequences of Hermeneutics: 
Fifty Years After Gadamer’s “Truth and Method,” ed. Jeff Malpas and Santiago Zabala (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2010), xi. They continue, saying, “...while Heidegger’s Being and 
Time is certainly a key text in the history of hermeneutics in the twentieth century, it was the 
publication of Gadamer’s Truth and Method in 1960 that was the watershed event in the 
development of philosophical hermeneutics, and that established the hermeneutical as a distinctive 
mode of philosophical inquiry and engagement. While hermeneutics did not begin with Gadamer, it 
was Gadamer who first articulated a conception of hermeneutics in its universality, and who enabled 
the expansion of hermeneutics into the wider framework of contemporary philosophical debate. The 
implications and significance of the hermeneutical approach—its consequences for philosophy—can 
thus be viewed as largely deriving from the ideas laid out in Truth and Method and their elaboration, 
including the responses to them, over the last half-century” (xi-xii; emphasis original).   
 159 This is not to say, however, that Gadamer has been entirely ignored by exegetes. See e.g. 
the positive remarks by Dunn (“Biblical Hermeneutics and Historical Responsibilty” in The Future 
of Biblical Interpretation, 85) regarding Gadamer’s work on Wirkungsgeschichte, calling it “integral 
to responsible hermeneutics.” See also the remarkable work done in Robert Evans, Reception 
History, Tradition and Biblical Interpretation: Gadamer and Jauss in Current Practice, ST 4 (New 
York: T&T Clark, 2016). Also, Thiselton (Two Horizons, 17) notes that Palmer “claims to find a 
precedent” for a Gadamerian account of hermeneutics in Luke 24:25-27. Cf. Russell Meek, “Hans-
Georg Gadamer: His Philosophical Hermeneutics and Its Importance for Evangelical Biblical 
Hermeneutics,” Eleutheria 1, no. 2 (2011): 97–106.  
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hermeneutic into dialogue with established exegetical practices, our understanding of 
Paul’s construal of the Hosea texts should be enhanced significantly. His philosophical 
hermeneutics grants the modern interpreter categories which help describe what may 
first appear as a hermeneutical dilemma and render it into something more coherent. It 
has even been said that Gadamer’s theory offers “an integrity to the whole discipline of 
biblical studies.”160 It is conceivable that this is especially true for biblical-intertextual 
issues. As stated, the value of Gadamer’s hermeneutic is that it is not normative but 
descriptive, an account of what happens in the act of interpreting;161 it is not therefore 
methodological, but ontological.162 To understand the details of Gadamer’s hermeneutic, 
a survey of his scholarly setting is necessary. He builds upon previous thought, finding 
both common agreement, as well as disagreement, with those scholars who came before 
him.163  
3.2 Scholarly Context and Influences 
3.2.1 Friedrich Schleiermacher  
Friedrich Schleiermacher operated within the sphere of so-called “romantic 
hermeneutics.”164 Merold Westphal notes several key characteristics of this school of 
thought. First, there is the notion of “deregionalization.”165 Schleiermacher sought to 
                                                
 160 Evans, Reception History, 2. 
 161 Gadamer, TM, 512-513.  
 162 Gadamer, PH, xi.  
 163 See Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, 
Heidegger, and Gadamer (NUSPEP; Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 166.  
 164 Merold Westphal, Whose Community? Which Interpretation? Philosophical 
Hermeneutics for the Church (TCPC; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009), 27; See also B.H. 
McLean, Biblical Interpretation and Philosophical Hermeneutics (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 35; John H. Smith (“Living Religion as Vanishing Mediator: Schleiermacher, Early 
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Schleiermacher completely in with romanticism. On the contrary, Thiselton argues that 
Schleiermacher had “strong reservations about ‘pure’ Romanticism,” saying his “Romanticism was 
strong but not decisive.”  
 165 Ibid., 28; McLean, Biblical Interpretation, 37. The term itself, as Westphal (28) 
acknowledges, comes from Paul Ricoeur.  
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draw hermeneutics away from being pigeon-holed into just any one discipline. He 
envisioned hermeneutics as a broad enterprise such that he sought to find what was 
“common to rather than distinctive of the various disciplines.”166 Hence, it was 
“nondisciplinary.”167 His hermeneutic was to be a “hermeneutica generalis: a theory of 
the conditions of possibility for understanding as such.”168 This proved revolutionary.169 
Schleiermacher’s project would be to deregionalize hermeneutics in such a way that the 
question would no longer be, “How shall we understand the biblical text?” but rather, 
“How do we understand any text at all?”170 Schleiermacher states that, “Da Kunst zu 
reden und zu verstehen einander gegenüberstehen, reden aber nur die äußere Seite des 
Denkens ist so ist die Hermeneutik im Zusammenhange mit der Kunst zu denken und 
also philosophisch.”171  
Second, the concept of a hermeneutical circle was characteristic of 
Romanticism.172 Schleiermacher himself calls this a “principle” that is 
“incontestable.”173 He says,  
…daß wie freilich das Ganze aus dem Einzelnen verstanden wird, so doch auch das 
Einzelne nur aus dem Ganzen verstanden werden könne, ist von solchem Umfang für 
diese Kunst und so unbestreitbar, daß schon die ersten Operationen nicht ohne 
Anwendung desselben zu Stande gebracht werden können, ja, daß eine große Menge 
hermeneutischer Regeln mehr oder weniger auf ihm beruhen.174 
Understanding, then, does not happen outside the circle, for one must understand the 
parts before one can understand the whole and vice versa. The interpreter cannot 
                                                
 166 Ibid. Emphasis original. 
 167 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 40 (see also 94). 
 168 Kristin Gjesdal, “Hermeneutics and Philology: A Reconsideration of Gadamer’s Critique 
of Schleiermacher,” BJHP  14, no. 1 (February 2006): 136 (emphasis original). See also Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, "Classical and Philosophical Hermeneutics," in The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the 
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was the first to develop a universal hermeneutics. 
 170 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 86. 
 171 Fr. D. E. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik, ed. Heinz Kimmerle (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 
1959), 80; F.D.E. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts, ed. Heinz 
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 172 Westphal, Whose Community, 28; See also McLean, Biblical Interpretation, 43–44. 
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 174 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik, 141-142; Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 196. 
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understand a whole sentence until he or she has first taken into account each word of the 
sentence; yet, the words themselves cannot be properly understood until the entire 
sentence has been grasped.175 Thus, “the part and the whole interact to make sense.”176 
This necessitates, therefore, the idea of “provisional and preliminary understanding.”177 
Understanding must be seen, therefore, as circular, since it is “a basically referential 
operation.”178 But the hermeneutical circle is not debilitating. In fact, because of the 
circle itself, understanding remains possible since it provides the means by which 
revision, and hence “knowledge,” can be achieved. 
The relation between whole and part is circular in that each is interpreted in light of the 
other; interpretation is a reciprocal interaction in which neither variable is independent 
of the other. The interpretation of the parts is guided by and revised in light of the 
whole, but my view of the whole is guided by and revised in light of my own reading of 
the parts.179  
For Schleiermacher, the hermeneutical circle was all the more intriguing, as 
there were two circles in play: (1) a grammatical-linguistic circle and (2) a 
psychological circle.180 For him, these circles both “form a hermeneutically circular 
whole.”181 In his view, one ought to focus on the philological features of a text (i.e., the 
grammatical details), for as we have seen above, sentences make little sense if we 
ignore the individual words (and vice versa). But he also sees the need to understand, 
along with the grammatical side, the psychology of the text—or more appropriately, the 
psychology of the author of the text.182 He says, “Gewiß aber wird auch die 
                                                
 175 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 87. 
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 181 Ibid., 29. See also: Palmer, Hermeneutics, 86; Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 157; 
Bartholomew, Hermeneutics, 307; Cf. McLean, Biblical Interpretation, 41.  
 182 Ibid. See Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 150–151. Westphal (29) provides the helpful 
illustration of reading Gulliver’s Travels. Whereas one navigates the textual parts in light of the 
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grammatische Seite nicht können der divinatorischen Methode entrathen.”183 But 
Schleiermacher is quick to point out that the opposite is true as well, namely, that this 
“psychological aspect” (“psychologischen Seite”) must be informed by the 
grammatical, specifically in terms of a “comparative operation” (“comparativen 
Verfahrens”) by which words are located and understood in terms of other words.184 
This leads to another characteristic of romantic hermeneutics: psychologism.  
Psychologism, thirdly, is in search of the author’s “inner psychic life,”185 from 
which language itself springs forth.186 Romanticism’s project operated from the 
assumption that meaning lay not on the surface of the text (i.e., the grammatical, 
lexical), but rather “beyond the text itself [and] in the inner motivations of its original, 
historical author.”187 Indeed, this was Schleiermacher’s “tendency,” namely, “to make 
the real focus of interpretation the author’s thoughts and experience that lie behind the 
                                                                                                                                          
something about the author and his sociopolitical context. This move from the purely textual to the 
biographical-historical indicates that the two major circles described by Schleiermacher together 
form a hermeneutically circular whole. We interpret the text in light of the person, though much of 
what we know about the person we learn only from the text” (emphasis original). 
 183 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik, 138; Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 192 (see also 150-
151). On what is meant by “divinatory” and how it relates to “psychological” interpretation, see 
Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 156-157. 
 184 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 192; Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik, 138-139. His 
argument is detailed at this point, e.g., see Hermeneutics, 190-195; Hermeneutik, 137-141. (See also 
Bartholomew, Hermeneutics, 307-308.) 
 185 See Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 157, concerning the relation between Schleiermacher's 
concepts “psychological” and “divinatory.” See also the helpful discussion on how these concepts 
relate from within the interpretive process as well, including how this gives shape to the 
hermeneutical circle, in Thiselton, New Horizons, 221-225. Cf. Manfred Frank, “The Text and Its 
Style: Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutic Theory of Language,” trans. Richard Hannah and Michael 
Hays, Boundary 2 11, no. 3 [Spring 1983]: 23–26; Gjesdal, “Hermeneutics and Philology,” 142–
143; and McLean, Biblical Interpretation, 42.  
 186 Westphal, Whose Community, 29. Westphal (29) notes that this is why this specific 
hermeneutical approach has been called “romantic,” since it “shares this expressivism with the wider 
cultural traditions called romanticism.” (Cf. Palmer [Hermeneutics, 89], who cautions us not to 
equate “psychologism” with “psychoanalsysis.” The former is just another way of saying that 
“understanding is an art of reconstructing the thinking of another person. In other words, the 
objective is not to assign motives or causes for the author’s feelings [psychoanalysis] but to 
reconstruct the thought itself of another person through interpretation of his utterance.”) See also 
Thiselton, Two Horizons, 106. 
 187 McLean, Biblical Interpretation, 43. 
  
44 
text rather than in the text itself.”188 Gadamer calls “psychological interpretation” 
Schleiermacher’s “most distinctive contribution.189  
Moreover, psychologistic hermeneutics aims to “reverse the process of writing, 
to work back from the outer expression to the inner experience, to reconstruct, re-create, 
refeel, re-experience, relive that inner experience.”190 Schleiermacher says, “Eine 
Hauptsache beim Interpretiren ist daß man im Stande sein muß aus seiner eignen 
Gesinnung herauszugehen in die des Schriftstellers.”191 Thus: 
...the interpreter must put himself both objectively and subjectively in the position of 
the author. On the objective side, this requires knowing the language as the author knew 
it. But this is a more specific task than putting oneself in the position of the original 
readers, for they, too, had to identify with the author. On the subjective side this 
requires knowing the inner and outer aspects of the author’s life (Auf der subject[tive]n 
in der Kenntniß seines inneren und äußeren Lebens).192 
The reason for his commitment to psychologism was because he had come to see a 
division between thought and expression.193 Psychologism sought to move the 
interpreter outside of his or her own realm and into the realm of the author, entering the 
latter’s psyche. Thus,  
                                                
 188 Bartholomew, Hermeneutics, 307. It should be noted, however, that there is a dispute as 
to how much emphasis the psychological aspects really had for Schleiermacher. In the translator’s 
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For Schleiermacher, understanding as an art is the reexperiencing of the mental process 
of the text’s author. It is the reverse of composition, for it starts with the fixed and 
finished expression and goes back to the mental life from which it arose. The speaker or 
author constructed a sentence; the hearer penetrates into the structures of the sentence 
and the thought.194  
Another characteristic of romanticism was, fourthly, objectivism.195 Westphal 
notes that Schleiermacher sought after objectivity, though in a nuanced manner, that is, 
for Schleiermacher, the goal of objectivity would be mediated via subjectivity.196 He 
began with a subjectivist approach—namely, a “painstaking, methodical labor in which 
the interpreter (1) works back and forth from smaller parts to a larger whole within the 
grammatical-linguistic circle, (2) does the same within the psychological-historical 
circle, and (3) works back and forth with the circle formed by these two in relation to 
each other.”197 The point here is that the driving emphasis in Schleiermacher’s 
interpretive theory lay in the subjective aspects.198 Westphal describes this precursor 
stage to understanding as “always provisional and subject to revision.”199 In essence, at 
this level nothing is certain, but everything is always up for re-evaluation, and of course 
revision and re-evaluation is possible because one is in constant movement between the 
whole and the parts. This process entails what Schleiermacher called “uncertainties.”200 
At this stage, understanding is on its way to being achieved because false assumptions 
are being eliminated during the process of movement between the whole and parts (and 
vice versa). The goal is objectivity, however. Westphal offers a helpful illustration:  
Just as the intuitions of racial bias are mediated by socialization into a world that is 
itself mediated by a variety of historical and psychological developments, so too are 
hermeneutical intuitions mediated by scholarly work under the guidance of a method. 
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The former mediation is by means of a particular and contingent social formation, while 
the latter is supposed to filter out precisely such subjective factors.201 
Though the goal is objectivity, for Schleiermacher, it is only by means of subjective 
method—but method nonetheless.202  
3.2.2 Wilhelm Dilthey 
Though considered to be Schleiermacher’s successor, Dilthey’s own 
contributions to hermeneutical theory remain significant (not least in regard to 
Gadamer’s scholarly context).203 Thiselton notes three big contributions: (1) he 
broadened the scope of hermeneutics so as to include the social sciences; (2) he placed 
hermeneutical emphasis on the notion of historicality; and (3) he underscored the 
importance of interpretive sympathy on behalf of the interpreter, which would be 
important for getting outside one’s self and into the other.204 The idea of historicality 
was central to Dilthey. In fact, “historical consciousness” was the very heartbeat of his 
interpretive theory.205 Dilthey’s hermeneutic began to take shape when he “began to see 
in hermeneutics the foundation for the Geisteswissenschaften—that is, all the 
humanities and social sciences, all those disciplines which interpret expressions of 
man’s inner life, whether the expressions be gestures, historical actions, codified law, 
art works, or literature.”206 In order to do this, according to Dilthey, certain methods 
would need to be devised.207 However, the natural sciences, properly defined, could not 
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be transposed into the realm of the Geisteswissenschaften.208 That being said, Dilthey 
understood that hermeneutics, the foundation for the Geisteswissenschaften, could be 
scientific, though in a way different from the natural sciences. The difference lay in the 
dissimilarities between the propositions that both the natural sciences and the human 
sciences make, respectively. Thiselton comments that, 
Dilthey had great ambition. He recognized that Bacon had done much to found the 
natural sciences. But what Bacon had done for physical sciences, and what Kant and 
Hegel had done for philosophy, he hoped to do for the “human sciences.” “Science” is 
simply a coherent complex of propositions, whose propositions are well grounded. But 
propositions about human life, he insisted, are distinctive over against propositions 
about the natural world. Human self-consciousness includes a moral, historical, and 
spiritual dimension that must be recognized.209 
Thus, the point of inquiry on which both the natural sciences and the human sciences 
were focused was different: the natural sciences studied objects that could be seen, 
touched, tasted, but the human sciences inquired into the Geist.210 Thus, 
Dilthey reasons that since the humanities’ object of study is different—the human 
“spirit”—its goal must also be different. The real goal is “understanding,” not scientific 
“explanation.” Thus, Dilthey made the important distinction between “explanation” 
(Erklärung) and “understanding” (Verstehung) as two contrasting approaches to the 
acquisition of knowledge...while the natural sciences are concerned with the 
explanation of general laws and ascribing causal effects in the world, the goal of the 
“sciences of the human spirit” (Geisteswissenschaften) is concerned with 
understanding.211 
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 Crowell points out that “Dilthey...turned first to the concept of consciousness 
and then to the concept of life as the basis for grasping historical reality.”212 Dilthey 
discusses the “context of life,” specifically how, “Die Geisteswissenschaften sind so 
fundiert in diesem Zusammenhang von Leben, Ausdruck und Verstehen.”213 He 
continues by saying, “Eine Wissenschaft gehört nur dann den Geisteswissenschaften an, 
wenn ihr Gegenstand uns durch das Verhalten zugänglich wird, das im Zusammenhang 
von Leben, Ausdruck und Verstehen fundiert ist.”214 Dilthey’s answer, more properly, 
was “lived experience.”215  
Though the details of Dilthey’s thought need not be elaborated, a few aspects of 
his concept of lived experiences need to be pointed out. After all, Dilthey’s lived 
experiences have direct bearing on his emphasis upon historicality, that is, the two went 
hand-in-hand.216 Expounding on Dilthey’s use of “lived experience” (Erlebnis), Palmer 
observes that the implication of such use is none other than historicality, saying, 
“Experience is intrinsically temporal (and this means historical in the deepest sense of 
the word), and therefore understanding of experience must also be in commensurately 
temporal (historical) categories of thought.”217 Therefore, Dilthey found historical 
consciousness, fleshed out in lived experience, as a place for the foundation of the 
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Geisteswissenschaften.218 Thus, there exists commonality between both Gadamer and 
Dilthey on the issue of historical situatedness.219 In his effort to develop an expansive 
hermeneutic, Dilthey understood the importance of paying attention to both the 
interpreter’s historical situation, as well as that of the object being interpreted.220 He 
says, “Der Mensch erkennt sich nur in der Geschichte, nie durch Introspektion.”221 And 
so, “Gadamer applaud[ed] Dilthey’s efforts to move away from introspection and self-
consciousness to seeing humankind as historically situated within the flow of human 
life.”222  
3.2.3 Martin Heidegger  
There was perhaps no greater influence upon Gadamer’s philosophy than 
Heidegger.223 While a complete account is unnecessary, it is helpful to keep in mind the 
key areas of influence.224 In many ways, Heidegger remained the rightful heir to post-
Schleiermacher scholarship, though not without having his own distinctions.225 
Heidegger gleaned from his study of the ancient Greeks, from whom he came to 
understand his notion of “Being” in both “[primordial] and in temporal terms.”226 In this 
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way, by utilizing the phenomenological work of Husserl, Heidegger was able to offer a 
hermeneutic that was neither romantic nor philological, but rather ontological.227 “The 
thing to which philosophy had to find its way back and which was the origin of all 
meaning, was, for Heidegger, not transcendental consciousness [a la Husserl] but life in 
its originality.”228 Fehér states further that Heidegger’s project could not have been what 
it was (i.e., his emphasis upon historicity) “without Dilthey’s influence.”229 This is not 
to say that Heidegger agreed with the totality of Dilthey’s notion of historicality, for 
even though “Heidegger appreciated very much indeed Dilthey’s attempt to approach 
historical life,” his project fell short since he sought to “attain possibly objective 
historical knowledge,” taking “history to the rank of science.”230 This method, of course, 
proved contrary to Heidegger’s ontological emphasis.231 What he sought to do was 
merge the ontological with the phenomenological, or as Palmer put it: “Ontology must 
become phenomenology.”232 That is, “Being” was to be critiqued and delineated “by an 
analysis of how appearing occurs.”233 This was an important hermeneutical project.234  
Because his central idea was ontology, it is easy to see how Heidegger’s 
definition of understanding came to be what it was. What is understanding according to 
Heidegger? Palmer offers an excellent comparison between the english word 
“understanding” and how Heidegger conceived of it quite differently. He notes that in 
English, “understanding” often implies a type of sympathy, where one can be said to 
relate to the thoughts and mind of the other: “We speak of an ‘understanding look’ and 
                                                                                                                                          
Heidegger’s Ways, 25-27. 
 227 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 124–127, 130; For an overview of Heidegger's critique of 
Husserl's phenomology, see István M. Fehér, “Religion, Theology, and Philosophy on the Way to 
Being and Time: Heidegger, the Hermeneutical, the Factical, and the Historical with Respect to 
Dilthey and Early Christianity,” RP 39, no. 1 (September 2009): 104–115.  
 228 Fehér, “Religion, Theology, and Philosophy,” 110. (See also: Palmer, Hermeneutics, 
125.) 
 229 Ibid., 110–111. 
 230 Ibid., 120–121. 
 231 On some facets of Heidegger’s “critique” of both Husserl and Dilthey, see Gadamer, 
Heideggers Wege, 50-52; Gadamer, Heidegger’s Ways, 55-57. 
 232 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 129.  
 233 Ibid. 
 234 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans., John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1962), 61-62. On the the “significance” of such a method, see Palmer, 
  
51 
suggest by this more than mere objective knowledge; it is something like participation 
in the thing understood.”235 In distinction to this, and to that of Schleiermacher’s and 
Dilthey’s definition,236 for Heidegger, understanding had less to do with attaining or 
gaining something (e.g., sympathy) and more to do with Being, or as Palmer aptly puts 
it:  
Understanding is conceived not as something to be possessed but rather as a mode or 
constituent element of being-in-the-world. It is not an entity in the world but rather the 
structure in being which makes possible the actual exercise of understanding on an 
empirical level. Understanding is the basis for all interpretation; it is co-original with 
one’s existing and is present in every act of interpretation.237 
Heidegger’s emphasis on Being ultimately brings one to the breakdown of any 
subject-object distinction.238 That is, Heidegger’s emphasis is not upon the notion of the 
subject dominating the object in question (in the sense of wanting to understand it). 
Rather, the way to understanding is via embeddedness in the world.239 “Everything, in 
Heidegger’s view, is seen and understood from within a particular horizon. Meaning is 
that from which something is understandable as the thing it is.”240 Heidegger’s idea of 
Da-sein conveys the idea that a person is “‘thrown into [his/her] own world (Welt).”241 
That is, “Da-sein always finds itself already in a certain social, cultural, linguistic 
historical, and religious environment, which is not of its own choosing.”242 And so 
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Heidegger says, “In-Sein ist demnach der formale existenziale Ausdruck des Seins des 
Daseins, das die wesenhafte Verfassung des In-der-Welt-seins hat.”243 Da-sein implies 
both “time” and “place,” with “Da” meaning a place or situation and “sein” as pointing 
to one’s temporal existence.244 With his concept of Da-sein, Heidegger doesn’t have to 
concern himself with the traditional subject-object schema.245 Bartholomew comments, 
Heidegger’s philosophy is strongly ontological, and his epistemology is rooted in his 
ontology of Dasein. Sein can only be investigated if one begins with Dasein, which 
does not have a viewpoint outside history. In this sense “the phenomenology of Dasein 
is a hermeneutic” [M. Heidegger, Being and Time, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 62]. This 
approach allowed Heidegger to rethink the subject-object relationship in knowing along 
historical lines, and it is here that his most significant hermeneutical contribution lies. 
“Worldhood” refers to that whole in which the human person finds himself or herself 
immersed. It is ontological and a priori, given along with Dasein and prior to all 
conceptualizing. To conceive of objects as merely “present-at-hand” involves secondary 
conceptualization. The primary relationship of humans to objects is a “ready-to-hand.” 
This contrasts with the Cartesian scientific orientation, which makes secondary 
conceptualization primary.246 
Because Being and understanding are taken together as “co-original,” Heidegger 
sees understanding as being something that takes place “prior to the subject-object 
dichotomy.”247 He says, “Erkennen ist ein im In-der-Welt-sein fundierter Modus des 
Daseins. Daher verlangt das In-der-Welt-sein als Grundverfassung eine vorgängige 
Interpretation.”248 Thus Gadamer can say, “Heidegger’s temporal analytics of Dasein 
has, I think, shown convincingly that understanding is not just one of the various 
possible behaviors of the subject but the mode of being of Dasein itself.”249  
One resulting influence upon Gadamer was Heidegger’s thought concerning the 
hermeneutical circle, which, he argued, was inherent to understanding.250 The circle was 
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not a “vicious” one, but rather an “expression of the existential fore-structure [Vor-
Struktur] of Dasein itself,” for “[i]n the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most 
primordial type of knowing.”251 In this way, understanding itself is always “provisional, 
historical, and temporal, resting on pre-understanding unavoidably.”252 Heidegger 
describes pre-understanding as “fore-structure,” which is a type of “interpretive 
framework that we employ when we interpret events in daily life as meaningful. By 
implication, our experience of the world as meaningful is rooted in an ontological 
structure with Da-sein, which ‘exists’ before the act of interpretation, which is why 
Heidegger terms it a fore-structure.”253 Thus, for Heidegger understanding is not 
presuppositionless: “Die Auslegung von Etwas als Etwas wird wesenhaft durch 
Vorhabe, Vorsicht und Vorgriff fundiert. Auslegung ist nie ein voraussetzungloses 
Erfassen eines Vorgegebenen.”254 And again, “Alle Auslegung bewegt sich ferner in der 
gekennzeichneten Vor-Struktur. Alle Auslegung, die Verständnis beistellen soll, muß 
schon das Auszulegende verstanden haben.”255 Thus Palmer can conclude: 
The hope of interpreting “without prejudice and presupposition” ultimately flies in the 
face of the way understanding operates…It is naive to assume that what is “really there” 
is “self-evident.” The very definition of what is presumed to be self-evident rests on a 
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body of unnoticed presuppositions, which are present in every interpretive construction 
by the “objective” and “presuppositionless” interpreter. This body of already given and 
granted presuppositions is what Heidegger uncovers in his analysis of understanding.256 
Some of these ontological features of hermeneutics will remain prominent for Gadamer, 
though with deviation and nuance.257 Concepts like historicality—specifically, one’s 
own tradition and Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein—will occupy central place for 
him as well.258 Moreover, the idea of prejudgment (Vorurteil) will take the place of the 
Cartesian view that unmediated individual reflection is an adequate means to 
understanding. 
3.3 Summary  
It was necessary to consider Gadamer’s influences to establish his scholarly 
context. For example, Schleiermacher’s program of deregionalization reverberates in 
Gadamer’s own conception of hermeneutics, which centers around understanding as 
such. Second, reference to the hermeneutical circle will be made, as Gadamer seeks to 
show that there is no starting point to understanding that is neither neutral nor free of 
prejudice (Vorurteil). Third, the idea of historicality will be brought to light, as 
Gadamer revives the central place of tradition and Wirkungsgeschichte in hermeneutics. 
Fourth, Gadamer’s philosophy is most basically not methodological, but rather 
ontological, though in a way distinct from that of Heidegger’s. Thus, the stage is now 
set to outline Gadamer’s theory so that it can be employed in our analysis of Rom 9:25-
26. 
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Chapter 4: A Gadamerian Description of Understanding and 
Interpretation 
4.1 Introduction  
Gadamer’s thought is both complex and intertwined.259 The ensuing outline 
follows his own sequence of thought, as given in his magnum opus, Truth and 
Method.260  
4.2 Truth Beyond Methodology 
Gadamer begins Truth and Method by saying that his aim is to address “the 
problem of hermeneutics.”261 That “problem” transcends the issue of methodology:  
So drängt das Problem der Hermeneutik schon von seinem geschichtlichen Ursprung 
her über die Grenzen hinaus, die durch den Methodenbegriff der modernen 
Wissenschaft gesetzt sind. Verstehen und Auslegen von Texten ist nicht nur ein 
Anliegen der Wissenschaft, sondern gehört offenbar zur menschlichen Welterfahrung 
insgesamt. Das hermeneutische Phänomen ist ursprünglich überhaupt kein 
Methodenproblem.262 
Thus, Gadamer sees hermeneutics as existing beyond the realm of science and in the 
realm of “human world-experience” (menschlichen Welterfahrung). The concept of 
“experience” (Erfahrung) will prove important to his overall trajectory in his 
explanation of “tradition” (see below).263 Before the concept of tradition is explained, 
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his aim will be to establish the primacy of experience, that is, the experience of truth. 
Gadamer wants to “seek [out] the experience of truth that transcends the domain of the 
scientific method wherever that experience is to be found, and to inquire into its 
legitimacy.”264 Therefore, his intention is not just to expound upon experience for its 
own sake, but rather those experiences of truth that lie outside, and indeed beyond the 
limits of, scientific methodological capabilities. On this, Gadamer says “the human 
sciences are connected to modes of experience that lie outside science: with the 
experiences of philosophy, of art, and of history itself. These are all modes of 
experience in which a truth is communicated that cannot be verified by the 
methodological means proper to science.”265 
 First, he turns to aesthetic experience. Gadamer discusses how the “experience 
[Erfahrung] of art” cannot be supplanted by the rigid scrutiny of scientific 
methodology.266 Science is deeply restricted in what it can do. Science simply cannot 
discover truth from a methodological approach to art like the experience of art can.267 
Because of this fact, Gadamer offers his own analysis of the aesthetic experience and 
from there seeks to pull aesthetic experience into the realm of each and every 
hermeneutical event.268 What this means, then, is that, with affinity to Schleiermacher’s 
program of deregionalization, Gadamer, too, wants to conceptualize hermeneutics as the 
“menschlichen Welterfahrung insgesamt.”269 Gadamer wishes to take the notions of 
tradition and art as the proper starting place so as to offer a description of the 
“hermeneutical phenomenon in its full extent.”270 After all, “in [the human sciences] our 
historical tradition in all its forms is certainly made the object of investigation, but at the 
same time truth comes to speech in it.”271 
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 Not wanting to consign the question of understanding and interpretation to the 
province of scientific methodology, Gadamer moves his enquiries beyond that sphere.272 
There should be therefore no confusion about Gadamer’s intentions concerning his 
investigations. He is not out to propose a method, saying that, “The hermeneutics 
developed here is not, therefore, a methodology of the human sciences, but an attempt 
to understand what the humans sciences truly are, beyond their methodological self-
consciousness, and what connects them with the totality of our experience of world.”273 
Elsewhere he states, “My real concern was and is philosophic: not what we do or what 
we ought to do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting and doing.”274 
Although he was not intent on developing a “method,” neither was he attempting to 
discard “methodical work.”275 He does not seek to “confine or limit modern science” as 
much as he wants to address the very question that goes to “precede it and make it 
possible.”276 Gadamer wants to ask something more fundamental. His question, 
primarily, is: “how is understanding possible?”277 Through his analysis of the 
experience of a work of art, a whole new “realm” begins to emerge, which itself 
“transcends” scientific methodology in its pursuit of truth.278 The central point of 
Gadamer’s work is the attention he gives to the interpreter’s historical situation.279 He 
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speaks of how “history does not belong to us; we belong to it.”280 What has served to 
shape one’s understanding has been one’s tradition, i.e., things like “family, society, and 
the state in which we live.”281 Before developing these ideas, he first examines aesthetic 
consciousness, attempting to establish the idea that one’s experience of art is a means by 
which truth can be attained—and that apart from method. Anticipating this analysis, 
Gadamer offers preliminary observations that will lend to his aesthetic critique, which 
will in turn tie into his theses of experience and tradition (mentioned above).  
4.2.1 The Problem of Method and Bildung as Solution 
 The first section in Wahrheit und Methode is titled, “Das Methodenproblem.” 
He begins by observing that, “Die logische Selbstbesinnung der Geisteswissenschaften, 
die im 19. Jahrhundert ihre tatsächliche Ausbildung begleitet, ist ganz von dem Vorbild 
der Naturwissenschaften beherrscht.”282 The problem is that the Naturwissenschaften 
have been the model by which the Geisteswissenschaften have been studied. Gadamer 
faults Mill for giving preferred status to the methodology of natural sciences.283 
Droysen, too, is criticized for wanting a scientific approach to the human sciences in the 
spirit of Kant.284 Gadamer even takes issue with Dilthey. The latter, it is remembered, 
pursued a methodology which took its cues from the natural sciences, though he did, 
admittedly, attempt to grant independence to the human sciences.285 But attempts and 
intentions are not that beneficial if results are not produced, and Gadamer was quick to 
recognize this in Dilthey. But if science did not please Gadamer’s criteria, what was his 
own alternative? At this point, Gadamer recognized the profound influence of Herder’s 
concept of Bildung. It is worth quoting Gadamer at length: 
Herder vor allem war es, der den Perfektionismus der Aufklärung durch das neue Ideal 
einer »Bildung zum Menschen« überbot und damit den Boden bereitete, auf dem sich 
im 19. Jahrhundert die historischen Geisteswissenschaften entfalten konnten. Der 
Begriff der Bildung, der damals zu beherrschender Geltung aufstieg, war wohl der 
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größte Gedanke des 18. Jahrhunderts, und eben dieser Begriff bezeichnet das Element, 
in dem die Geisteswissenschaften des 19. Jahrhunderts leben, auch wenn sie das 
erkenntnistheoretisch nicht zu rechtfertigen wissen.286  
Bildung remained an important concept for Gadamer because he saw in it the 
very principle from which the Geisteswissenschaften could be based. What science 
could not do for the human sciences, Bildung could.287 Thus, Bildung became part of the 
solution to the problem of method. Bildung, broadly, entails the idea of one 
encountering the “other,” that is, “keeping oneself open to what is other—to other, more 
universal points of view.”288 Specifically, Bildung concerns the idea of formation, 
namely, that the thing that forms oneself is not lost, but rather “absorbed” into it.289 
Thus, the “other” has been “preserved,” and because of this very fact, Bildung itself 
ought to be seen as a “genuine historical idea.”290 This connection with historicality 
proves to be an important link in Gadamer’s conception of understanding. Gadamer 
views Bildung as chained to the idea of “a universal and common sense.”291 Like every 
other “sense,” Bildung implies openness to its surroundings.292 Again, one must not 
forget that his concept of Bildung remains the alternative to the scientific method in 
being the model for the Geisteswissenschaften. Thus, his idea of Bildung as “universal 
and common sense,”293 and fundamentally as a “genuine historical idea,”294 is his way of 
saying that truth, as attained in the Geisteswissenschaften, is found in a way other than 
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scientific methodology. In other words, truth can be discovered via historical cultivation 
and formation, i.e., Bildung, and all that the term itself implies. Gadamer states,  
Ein allgemeiner und gemeinschaftlicher Sinn—das ist in der Tat eine Formulierung für 
das Wesen der Bildung, die einen weiten geschichtlichen Zusammenhang anklingen 
läßt. Die Besinnung auf den Begriff der Bildung, wie er den Überlegungen 
Helmholtzens sachlich zugrunde liegt, führt uns weit in die Geschichte dieses Begriffes 
zurück. Wir müssen diesem Zusammenhang ein paar Schritte folgen, wenn wird das 
Problem, das die Geisteswissenschaften für die Philosophie darstellen, aus der 
künstlichen Enge befreien wollen, in der die Methodenlehre des 19. Jahrhunderts 
befangen war. Der moderne Wissenschaftsbegriff und der ihm zugeordnete 
Methodenbegriff können nicht ausreichen.295 
The idea of historicality that Gadamer says is in inherent to the concept of Bildung will 
be further established when he proceeds to investigate the “humanistische Tradition” 
(“humanistic tradition”), which will lead him to the idea of the sensus communis, and 
from there, his critique of aesthetic consciousness.296  
4.2.2 Sensus Communis 
Gadamer begins his discussion about the Roman concept of the sensus 
communis with Vico.297 Before he elaborates on the sensus communis, Gadamer is quick 
to recognize that Vico is working from a “humanistic tradition that stems from 
antiquity.”298 He traces this tradition back to the ancient Greeks—to the disputes 
between the primacy of “philosophy” over and against “rhetoric” (and vice versa).299 A 
point of major contention between the Greeks was “the contrast between the scholar and 
the wise man on whom the scholar depends.”300 He adds that this is “a contrast that is 
drawn for the first time in the Cynics’ conception of Socrates—and its content is based 
on the distinction between the ideas of sophia and phronesis.”301 The former is 
concerned more with the theoretical aspect of knowledge, whereas the latter concerns 
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itself with practical knowledge.302 Gadamer notes that this same conception had been 
carried down to the time of the latter Roman period, where ideas were aimed more 
toward “the practical ideal of phronesis than to the theoretical ideal of sophia.”303 What 
remained helpful in Vico, says Gadamer, is that his conception of the sensus communis 
is focused away from the theoretical and more toward the practical, or more precisely, 
not on the “abstract” but on the “concrete” aspects of human existence.304  
One can appreciate Gadamer’s focus upon Vico’s insights when his (Gadamer’s) 
overall aims and intentions are remembered—namely, finding a legitimate alternative to 
the scientific approach for the Geisteswissenschaften. Vico provides Gadamer with the 
sensus communis, which “obviously does not mean only that general faculty in all men 
but the sense that founds community.”305 Of course, “community” is the point of study 
in the Geisteswissenschaften. Gadamer remarks that, 
Es hat etwas sofort Einleuchtendes, die philologisch-historischen Studien und die 
Arbeitsweise der Geisteswissenschaften auf diesen Begriff des Sensus communis zu 
gründen. Denn ihr Gegenstand, die moralische und geschichtliche Existenz des 
Menschen, wie sie in seinen Taten und Werken Gestalt gewinnt, ist selbst durch den 
Sensus communis entscheidend bestimmt. So kann der Schluß aus dem Allgemeinen 
und der Beweis aus Gründen nicht ausreichen, weil es auf die Umstände entscheiden 
ankommt.306 
By speaking about the primacy of “circumstances” (Umstände) as opposed to 
“universals” (Allgemeinen), the connection with the ancient Greek distinction between 
sophia and phronesis, the theoretical and the practical, becomes clear.307 Thus the 
significance of “circumstances” and phronesis (practical knowledge) remains central. 
Gadamer will suggest that this is so because humans are situated within tradition, being 
historically-effected by it.308 Gadamer is concerned with Vico to show that, contrary to 
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popular opinion of the time, the Geisteswissenschaften need only to look within to find 
its own basis, for “[t]he sense of the community mediates its own positive 
knowledge.”309 The Geisteswissenschaften do not need to be “measured by a standard 
foreign to it—namely the methodical thinking of modern science.”310 Simply put, the 
Geisteswissenschaften have their own built-in way of knowing. What Gadamer is 
hinting at is the notion that one’s “knowing” and one’s “understanding” are heavily 
facilitated by the sensus communis.311 That being established, Gadamer moves toward a 
discussion of aesthetic consciousness, which will allow him to further establish the 
primacy of historicality, and from there, tradition. But first, a few further preliminary 
items need to be addressed. 
4.2.3 “Judgment” and “Taste” as Being a Means to Truth Beyond Method 
 Gadamer’s discussions on “judgment” (Urteilskraft) and “taste” (Geschmack)312 
are necessary because they will provide the basis for his important appraisal of aesthetic 
consciousness (below). Gadamer says that “judgment” is similar to the sensus 
communis discussed above.313 It is quite synonymous with the concept of common 
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sense.314 He notes that, historically speaking, the concept of “judgment” was deemed to 
be a “basic intellectual virtue,” and that this idea was in line with English thinkers who 
believed “judgment” (moral and aesthetic) was not at all based upon “reason” but was 
more similar to the concept of “sentiment (or taste).”315 Thus, the concept of judgment 
“cannot be taught in the abstract but only practiced from case to case, and is therefore 
more an ability like the senses. It is something that cannot be learned, because no 
demonstration from concepts can guide the application of rules.”316 (Of course, this 
changed with Kant, who saw little need to let things like sentiment linger around 
discussions concerning these judgments—hence, perhaps, the outcome of his famous 
duty-based ethics).317  
  Next, Gadamer addresses the concept of taste. “Taste is defined precisely by the 
fact that it is offended by what is tasteless and thus avoids it, like anything else that 
threatens injury.”318 Simply, taste is similar to “sense.”319  It is like a “sense,” Gadamer 
says, because it is not governed by “reasons,” for when “taste registers a negative 
reaction to something, it is not able to say why.”320 Gadamer acknowledges the 
communal element of taste, saying that it “operates in a community,” though quickly 
adding that it “is not subservient to it.”321 The reason is because of the aforementioned 
concept of “judgment.” In order to glimpse the context from which the concept of 
“taste” is found, it is worth quoting Gadamer at length: 
Part of the concept of taste, then, is that one observes measure even in fashion, not 
blindly following its changing dictates but using one’s own judgment. One maintains 
one’s own “style”—i.e., one relates the demands of fashion to a whole that one’s own 
taste keeps in view and accepts only what harmonizes with this whole and fits together 
as it does. Thus taste not only recognizes this or that as beautiful, but has an eye to the 
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whole, with which everything that is beautiful must harmonize. Thus taste is not a 
social sense—that is, dependent on an empirical universality, the complete unanimity of 
the judgment of others. It does not say that everyone will agree with our judgment, but 
that they should agree with it (as Kant says). Against the tyranny exercised by fashion, 
sure taste preserves a specific freedom and superiority. This is its special normative 
power, peculiar to it alone: the knowledge that it is certain of the agreement of an ideal 
community. In contrast to taste’s being governed by fashion, we see here the ideality of 
good taste.322  
 
Gadamer concludes that taste and judgment are ways of knowing truth.323 The way in 
which this happens “cannot be demonstrated,” Gadamer says, because one simply “must 
have a sense for it.”324 Whatever taste and judgment may be specifically addressing in 
some “concrete” situation, it is doing so under the umbrella of a universal whole, 
though it is not to be seen strictly as the mere “application” of the universal.325  
 As odd as this may sound, there is seeming validation for such an idea. Even 
though this way of knowing cannot be systematized in a rule book and reduplicated, 
nevertheless taste and judgment can be illustrated. Though he reserves more substantive 
discussions for later, Gadamer brings attention to moral judgments. Even when one 
makes moral judgments, he says, one does not merely apply universal truths to specific 
situations in the sense of cutting and pasting them to some specific moral dilemma. In 
his view, rather, it is more like what happens in “jurisprudence, where the 
supplementary function of ‘hermeneutics’ consists of concretizing the law.”326 That is, 
laws, which have been codified (i.e., into a universal or whole) only exist in order to be 
applied (i.e., into a concrete circumstance or part). Interpretation, then,  
 is always something more than the correct application of general principles. Our 
 knowledge of law and morality too is always supplemented by the individual case, even 
 productively determined by it. The judge not only applies the law in concreto, but 
 contributes through his very judgment to developing the law (“judge-made law”).327 
Furthermore, the relationship between universal laws and its concrete application is said 
to be such that the latter is active in “co-determining, supplementing, and correcting” 
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those universals.328 What is important here is to remember that Gadamer is subverting 
Kant’s idea that aesthetic judgments are outside the realm of knowledge of truth.329 For 
Gadamer, concepts like taste are important, for “all moral decisions require taste.”330 
Because “taste” functions within a community setting, both critiquing and affirming it, 
the concretizing of universal morals to specific situations require special judgments. But 
these judgments are not theoretical. On the contrary, by virtue of the act of application 
(i.e., “concretization”) itself, this is not grounded in pure, abstract reason. It is not 
grounded in logic but in the sensus communis, that is, common understanding. And this, 
ultimately, is an aesthetic process. Gadamer decries Kant, who taught that the aesthetic 
was not to be considered a player in his own ethics.331 All of this, Gadamer states, was 
detrimental to the human sciences in general, since aesthetics (judgment and taste) was 
“the element in which philological and historical studies lived,” and it followed that, 
once Kant discarded the aesthetic component from the human sciences, the only method 
available to it was that of the natural sciences.332   
 For Gadamer, one must remember that the concepts of “judgment” and “taste” 
were utilized for more than just an evaluation of how communities (and individuals 
within them) function. His aims are higher: Matters of “taste,” “judgment,” and matters 
of “universal laws” and “concretizing of the law,” inherent within the living, 
functioning relationship between individuals and communities are, at the end of the day, 
hermeneutical. Indeed, for Gadamer, all of life is hermeneutical. His discussions on 
judgment and taste, not least his exposition on Bildung and the sensus communis, bring 
the reader to that point. Before this is completely developed, however, the question at 
hand needs to be answered: Contrary to Kant, can truth be found in the aesthetic 
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component? Gadamer asks, “Must we not also acknowledge that the work of art possess 
truth?”333 
Kant’s understanding of “taste” is such that he won’t allow it “any significance 
as knowledge.”334 Gadamer goes on to say that Kant “reduces sensus communis to a 
subjective principle. In taste nothing is known of the objects judged to be beautiful, but 
it is stated only that there is a feeling of pleasure connected with them a priori in the 
subjective consciousness.”335  
4.2.4 The Concept of Erlebnis  
Since Kant’s “main concern” was to ground aesthetics upon the “subjective a 
priori... feeling of life” (as opposed to, as Gadamer put it, “[raising] the question of truth 
in the sphere of art”), in Gadamer’s eyes, the Kantian program of Lebensgefühl 
(“feeling of life”) demanded a response.336 Here, Gadamer moves to expound upon the 
concept Erlebnis (“experience”). He traces the word etymologically, looking first at the 
older word Erleben.337 Erleben implies the “immediacy” of one’s experience, i.e., “to be 
still alive when something happens.”338 This type of knowing has nothing to do with 
logical conclusions or inferences, but rather one’s own direct experience.339 Next, he 
observes a second meaning, this time behind another cognate of the word Erlebnis, 
namely, das Erlebte. This refers to the “permanent content of what is experienced.”340 
Thus, this word deals not with the immediacy of one’s experience, but rather the 
“lasting result” of the experience itself.341 Gadamer says that both of these meanings—
the “immediacy” and “lasting result”—provide the foundation for Erlebnis. But why is 
this word important, and what does it have to do with understanding truth in art? 
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Gadamer remarks that Erlebnis first began to appear in biographical literature.342 
Within this genre, writers would use the word in such a way that both meanings (given 
above) would be understood.343 Experience, then, was something that spoke of both the 
immediacy of experience and the “lasting importance” (bleibende Bedeutung) of “its 
being experienced” (sein Erlebtsein).344 Gadamer traces the use of the word, as well as 
influences upon it, from Dilthey to Rousseau to Schleiermacher, Schilling, and Hegel.345 
He notes that, for Dilthey, Erlebnis is primarily “epistemological,” in that it is the “basis 
for all knowledge of the objective.”346 The fact “[t]hat life (Leben) manifests itself in 
experience (Erlebnis) means simply that life is the ultimate foundation.”347 
4.2.5 Aesthetic Consciousness and Gadamer’s Critique 
But there remained a problem. The problem for Gadamer was that “abstraction 
remains part of aesthetic consciousness.”348 “What we call a work of art and experience 
(erleben) aesthetically depends on a process of abstraction.”349 Gadamer laments the fact 
that, in order to come to see a work of art as a “pure work of art,” the process itself has 
pushed aside everything that has grounded the work of art itself (e.g., he mentions “its 
original context of life, and the religious or secular function that gave it 
significance”).350 He credits this to the fact that, for so long, the methodology of the 
natural sciences has been the mechanism by which the human sciences had been 
analyzed, which led “to discrediting all the possibilities of knowing that lie outside” 
scientific methodology.351 Art had been divorced from “its original context of life.”352 
Gadamer says further,  
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...aesthetic differentiation is an abstraction that selects only on the basis of aesthetic 
quality as such. It is performed in the self-consciousness of ‘aesthetic experiences.’ 
Aesthetic experience (Erlebnis) is directed towards what is supposed to be the work 
proper—what it ignores are the extra-aesthetic elements that cling to it, such as purpose, 
function, the significance of its content. These elements may be significant enough 
inasmuch as they situate the work in its world and thus determine the whole 
meaningfulness that it originally possessed. But as art the work must be distinguished 
from all that. It practically defines aesthetic consciousness to say that it differentiates 
what is aesthetically intended from everything that is outside the aesthetic sphere. It 
abstracts from all the conditions of a work’s accessibility. Thus this is a specifically 
aesthetic kind of differentiation. It distinguishes the aesthetic quality of a work from all 
the elements of content that induce us to take up a moral or religious stance towards it, 
and presents it solely by itself in its aesthetic being.353 
Thus, aesthetic consciousness works toward abstracting art from its context, aiming for 
the bare form, the pure form, of the art itself.  
But Gadamer sees this as nonsensical: “Abstracting down to the ‘purely 
aesthetic’ obviously eliminates it.”354 The reason is that to observe and “recognize” 
something (say, a picture) is at the same time to “read” it.355 “In fact, that is what 
ultimately makes a picture.”356 Gadamer will even claim this for listening to music, 
saying, “Even in listening to absolute music we must ‘understand’ it.”357 After all, “only 
when we understand it, when it is ‘clear’ to us, does it exist as an artistic creation for 
us.”358 All proposals, therefore, to see, read, or observe art in its pure form—as aesthetic 
consciousness under the authority of the natural sciences seems to have dictated—is, at 
the end of the day, an Enlightenment fiction. “Pure seeing and pure hearing are 
dogmatic abstractions that artificially reduce phenomenon. Perception always includes 
meaning.”359 What, then, is the answer to the aesthetic problem, which scientific 
methodology has brought upon the human sciences? “In order to do justice to art, 
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aesthetics must go beyond itself and surrender the ‘purity’ of the aesthetic.”360 But how 
does one accomplish this? It was mentioned above that to perceive a work of art is at the 
same time to understand it (this was the heart of Gadamer’s critique of the so-called 
“aesthetic differentiation”).361 What is hinted at here is the concept of co-creation, that 
is, a work of art (say, music or literature) is not to be reduced to bareness, for the very 
essence of art suggests that there is something to be perceived.  
In reply to Paul Valéry’s position that works of art are “not completable” (and 
therefore “endlessly interpretable”362), Gadamer proceeds to ask, “If it is true that a 
work of art is not, in itself, completable, what is the criterion for appropriate reception 
and understanding?”363 Does the meaning behind a work of art lie in the genius of the 
observer? Gadamer answers this in the negative: 
A creative process randomly and arbitrarily broken off cannot imply anything 
obligatory. From this it follows that it must be left to the recipient to make something of 
the work. One way of understanding a work, then, is no legitimate than another. There 
is no criterion of appropriate reaction. Not only does the artist himself possess none—
the aesthetics of genius would agree here; every encounter with the work has the rank 
and rights of a new production. This seems to me an untenable hermeneutic nihilism... 
genius in understanding is, in fact, of no more help than genius in creation.364 
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If aesthetics cannot be based upon a criterion of genius—either that of the 
creator or interpreter—then what about the criterion of Erlebnis, which was discussed 
above? Gadamer dismisses that as well. To say that some “work of art is only an empty 
form, a mere nodal point in the possible variety of aesthetic experiences (Erlebnisse), 
and [that] the aesthetic object exists in these experiences alone” results in “absolute 
discontinuity.”365 He says,  
Following Lukács’ ideas, Oskar Becker has stated outright that “in terms of time the 
work exists only in a moment (i.e., now); it is ‘now’ this work and now it is this work 
no longer!” Actually, that is logical. Basing aesthetics on experience [Erlebnis] leads to 
an absolute series of points, which annihilates the unity of the work of art, the identity 
of the artist with himself, and the identity of the person understanding or enjoying the 
work of art.366 
Erlebnis, therefore, cannot be the foundation for the aesthetic experience. But if not 
genius or experience (Erlebnis), then what? What remains a suitable answer to the 
aesthetic problem? Considering the above observation that the aesthetic problem itself 
had to do with aesthetic consciousness and differentiation, and further that this was the 
result of the domineering of scientific methodology, is it possible that the overarching 
problem (as Gadamer himself believed) is none other than the false idea that truth can 
only come via scientific methodology? If it is true that scientific methodology is the 
only route to truth, then, at least preliminarily, Gadamer has shown that its conclusion 
of aesthetic differentiation (see above) has rendered troubling results. That said, 
Gadamer leads one to initially conclude that truth can, and in fact does, transcend 
methodology. But how so? It will be observed below how Gadamer turned not to 
scientific methodology for the answer, but to the concept of historicality.    
4.3 Preliminary Discussion on Historicality and Tradition 
Gadamer insists on the primacy of historicality.367 “The pantheon of art is not a 
timeless present that presents itself to a pure aesthetic consciousness, but the act of a 
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mind and spirit that has collected and gathered itself historically.”368 What he means by 
being “collected and gathered” in a historical fashion is self-understanding. He says that 
having an “experience of the aesthetic” is a “mode of self-understanding.”369 Moreover, 
despite his scathing critique of aesthetic experience (Erlebnis), Gadamer’s goal was not 
to dismiss experience per se and its role in the process of understanding. Rather, his aim 
was to bring out the fact that Erlebnis, as normally conceived, reduced self-
understanding, indeed experience itself, to the precarious point of discontinuity (see 
above). Gadamer wanted to move beyond this. His question was, “how can one do 
justice to the truth of aesthetic experience (Erfahrung) and [still] overcome the radical 
subjectivization of the aesthetic that began with Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic 
Judgment”?370 In short, Gadamer wanted to acknowledge the prime role of experience 
(i.e., Erfahrung) in the process of understanding, but not fall into the trap of relegating 
the process itself to the level of subjectivism.371 Art, he thinks, has more to do with 
truth, knowledge, and understanding than previously thought. Gadamer asks, 
Is there to be no knowledge in art? Does not the experience of art contain a claim to 
truth which is certainly different from that of science, but just as certainly is not inferior 
to it? And is not the task of aesthetics precisely to ground the fact that the experience 
(Erfahrung) of art is a mode of knowledge of a unique kind, certainly different from that 
sensory knowledge which provides science with the ultimate data from which it 
constructs the knowledge of nature, and certainly different from all moral rational 
                                                                                                                                          
Keane, The Gadamer Dictionary, 80-82. See also Grondin, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 106-115. 
 368 Gadamer, TM, 83. 
 369 Ibid. Gadamer continues: “Self-understanding always occurs through understanding 
something other than the self, and includes the unity and integrity of the other. Since we meet the 
artwork in the world and encounter a world in the individual artwork, the work of art is not some 
alien universe into which we are magically transported for a time. Rather, we learn to understand 
ourselves in and through it, and this means that we sublate (aufheben) the discontinuity and atomism 
of isolated experiences in the continuity of our own existence. For this reason, we must adopt a 
standpoint in relation to art and the beautiful that does not pretend to immediacy but corresponds to 
the historical nature of the human condition. The appeal to immediacy, to the instantaneous flash of 
genius, to the significance of ‘experiences’ (Erlebnisse), cannot withstand the claim of human 
existence to continuity and unity of self-understanding. The binding quality of the experience 
(Erfahrung) of art must not be disintegrated by aesthetic consciousness” (83-84). See again Sections 
4.2.4 and 4.2.5 on the Concept of Erlebnis an Aesthetic Consciousness, respectively. 
 370 Ibid., 84. 
 371 It should be noted that, with respect to our investigation into Paul’s use of Hosea, 
Gadamer’s notion of historicality allows attention to be given to the past without precluding an 
emphasis upon newness. That is, Paul’s reconstrual of Hosea is not an exercise of detachment from 
his Jewish heritage. Therefore, a focus on continuity with OT Jewish motifs in Paul’s thought is as 
crucial as a focus on what is new in the same. We develop this below. 
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knowledge, and indeed from all conceptual knowledge—but still knowledge, i.e., 
conveying truth?372 
The end to which Gadamer is working is to bring validation to the idea that truth can 
come from the “experience of art itself.”373    
4.3.1. Reflections on Play 
This leads to Gadamer’s “concept of play.”374 Here he seeks to illustrate “the 
mode of being of the work of art itself.”375 What this means is that art, exhibited in 
Gadamer’s conception of “play,” is not to be seen in reference to some subject 
approaching the object (say, art); that is, an ultimate subject-object distinction ought not 
to be seen.376 Of course, a distinction can be made in the sense that “play” and the 
“behavior of the player” can be detected.377 However, these penultimate distinctions are 
not what define the essence of play itself. Never mind the player’s cognitive 
inclinations, says Gadamer.378 What matters most is not what, or how, or why the player 
is purposing and aiming to do with the game (e.g., for “recreation”379) but rather the 
built-in “seriousness” the game provides itself.380 Thus, what really happens is not that 
the player is being distinguished from the game via the player’s own purposes in 
                                                
 372 Gadamer, TM, 84. Cf. Palmer, “Heideggerian Elements,” Consequences of 
Hermeneutics, 126–127.  
 373 Ibid. Thus, Bartholomew, Hermeneutics, 310, can say, “Gadamer argues that experience 
and not abstraction is the key to understanding art.” 
 374 Ibid., 102; See also Philippe Eberhard (The Middle Voice in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics: A 
Basic Interpretation with Some Theological Implications [HUZT; Chicago: Mohr Siebeck, 2004], 
65), who says, “Gadamer’s notion of play is indebted to the Heideggerian critique of modernity’s 
subjectivism and of the concept of scientific objectivity. It is a continuation of Heidegger’s thought 
but in a more accessible and concrete form. It helps bring to the fore the inadequacy of the 
dichotomy between subject and object.” See also Dostal, “Gadamer,” in EP, 258-259; Wright, 
“Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Survey of Thought,” in EA, 263-264. 
 375 Ibid. 
 376 Ibid., 102–103; Cf. Eberhard, The Middle Voice, 63–64; Robert T. Valgenti, “The 
Tradition of Tradition in Philosophical Hermeneutics,” in Consequences of Hermeneutics, 71. 
 377 Ibid., 102. 
 378 Specifically, he discusses the “seriousness” the player lacks in the act of playing a game 
since, presumably, “play” is for relaxation (TM, 102–103). 
 379 Ibid., 102, citing Aristotle's Politics, VIII, 3, 1337 b 39 and passim. 
 380 Ibid. Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays, ed. 
Robert Bernasconi, trans. Nicholas Walker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 123-
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playing the game, but that the “[p]lay fulfills its own purpose only if the player loses 
himself in play.”381 Therefore, when one looks to unpack the concept of play, one needs 
to look beyond the cognitive happenings within the player.382 From this, it is easy to see 
where Gadamer is headed. Remembering the above discussion on the “genius of the 
creator” (as well as that of the reader), one is better positioned to see how Gadamer 
comes to find it implausible to ground the experience of art merely upon the subject’s 
own feelings toward it. He, of course, is using the concept of play to illustrate this fact. 
Gadamer states explicitly concerning the correlation between the experience of art and 
play: 
When we speak of play in reference to the experience of art, this means neither the 
orientation nor even the state of mind of the creator or of those enjoying the work of art, 
nor the freedom of a subjectivity engaged in play, but the mode of being of the work of 
art itself. In analyzing aesthetic consciousness we recognized that conceiving aesthetic 
consciousness as something that confronts an object does not do justice to the real 
situation. This is why the concept of play is important in my exposition.383 
What mattered most to Gadamer is that, when it comes to art, it is not an aesthetic 
consciousness which entails the disastrous result of aesthetic differentiation, but rather 
“the experience (Erfahrung) of art and thus the question of the mode of being of the 
work of art that must be the object of our examination.”384 And so, 
Gadamer uses Spiel to counter the modern emphasis of subjectivity in general and 
aesthetic consciousness in particular. He moves against Kant’s legacy and the 
subjectivation of art. Art is not the object of the so-called aesthetic consciousness; this 
consciousness is more than it thinks it is because art involves it in its play.385 
                                                                                                                                          
130, esp. 130.  
 381 Ibid., 103.  
 382 Ibid. See Thiselton, Two Horizons, 297; Cf. Eberhard, The Middle Voice, 69-71. 
 383 Ibid., 102. See also Gadamer, Relevance of the Beautiful, 28. 
 384 Ibid., 103. Gadamer further says (103), “The ‘subject’ of the experience of art, that which 
remains and endures, is not the subjectivity of the person who experiences it but the work itself. This 
is the point at which the mode of being of play becomes significant. For play has its own essence, 
independent of the consciousness of those who play. Play—indeed, play proper—also exists when 
the thematic horizon is not limited by any being-for-itself of subjectivity, and where there are no 
subjects who are behaving ‘playfully.’” 
 385 Eberhard, The Middle Voice, 66; See also Palmer, “Heideggerian Elements,” 
Consequences of Hermeneutics, 127. 
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On the one hand, Gadamer remained largely critical of experience (Erlebnis), 
wanting to dismiss it altogether as a proper ground for aesthetics in general.386 Yet, on 
the other hand, he says that the “object of our examination” is to be “the experience 
(Erfahrung) of art.”387 The confusion can be eliminated when one understands the 
differences between both Erlebnis and Erfahrung, despite the appearances of similarity 
in its English rendering, as both are translated as “experience.” The former, to which 
Gadamer remained largely “critical,” deals with experience in the sense of 
“immediacy,” such that Erlebnis was associated with the critique of aesthetic 
consciousness and differentiation.388 The latter, Erfahrung, is different. That is, 
“Erlebnis is something you have, and thus is connected with a subject and with the 
subjectivization of aesthetics. Erfahrung is something you undergo, so that subjectivity 
is overcome and drawn into an ‘event’ (Geschehen) of meaning.”389 With this, Gadamer 
mounts his case for concepts like historically-effected consciousness and tradition as the 
basis for which the process of understanding might be grounded.390 But first, what does 
the concept of play have to do with art?  
4.3.2 Further Reflections on Play: Presentation 
Gadamer takes the concept of play, as he has conceived it, and applies it to art.391 
First, Gadamer says that the “mode of being” of play is “self-presentation.”392 The idea 
of presentation serves as that which is common (a type of link) between play and art. 
                                                
 386 See Section 4.2.4 above. 
 387 Gadamer, TM, 103. 
 388 Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, “Translators’ Preface,” in TM, xiii. See 
Sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 above. 
 389 Weinsheimer and Marshall, “Translators’ Preface,” TM, xiii. See also Thiselton, Two 
Horizons, 297-298; Eberhard, The Middle Voice, 127-128; Wright, “Gadamer,” in EA, 262. 
 390 Though her comments are in regard to moral understanding specifically, see Atkinson, 
“Hermeneutic,” 288, who offers invaluable insight into the differences between Gadamer’s approach 
to understanding (via tradition and prejudgments) as opposed to those who operate under the sway of 
Modernism. These insights are important for what follows.  
 391 Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 213. 
 392 Gadamer, TM, 108; He says, "Das Spiel ist wirklich darauf beschränkt, sich darzustellen. 
Seine Seinsweise ist also Selbstdarstellung" (Gadamer, WM, 113). For his detailed exposition of the 
concepts of presentation and imitation, what they are not and what they are, see TM, 110-114, esp. 
113. 
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“Gadamer shows from the examples of music and drama that the work of art consists of 
the performance itself.”393 For example, he talks about a “religious act” and a “drama” 
in the context of his discussion on play, where the former is a “genuine representation 
[Darstellung] for the community” and the latter is “a kind of playing that, by its nature, 
calls for an audience.”394 He says, 
In being played the play speaks to the spectator through its presentation; and it does so 
in such a way that, despite the distance between it and himself, the spectator belongs to 
play. This is seen most clearly in one type of representation, a religious rite. Here the 
relation to the community is obvious. An aesthetic consciousness, however reflective, 
can no longer suppose that only aesthetic differentiation, which views the aesthetic 
object in its own right, discovers the true meaning of the religious image or play. No 
one will be able to suppose that for religious truth the performance of the ritual is 
inessential. The same is true for drama generally, even considered as literature. The 
performance of a play, like that of a ritual, cannot simply be detached from the play 
itself, as if it were something that is not part of its essential being, but is as subjective 
and fluid as the aesthetic experiences in which it is experienced. Rather, it is in the 
performance and only in it—as we see most clearly in the case of music—that we 
encounter the work itself, as the divine is encountered in the religious rite. Here it 
becomes clear why starting from the concept of play is methodologically 
advantageous.395 
In saying this, Gadamer comes against the idea of aesthetic differentiation, which he 
considers wrong precisely on the grounds that one cannot describe an experience of a 
work of art in terms of the work’s supposed true form, or bare arrangement.396 And so, 
“truth is not to be reduced to a mere matter of concepts, but relates to experiences in 
                                                
 393 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 298. 
 394 Gadamer, TM, 109; Gadamer, WM, 114. See also Weinsheimer, “Gadamer and 
Aesthetics,” in EA, 265. 
 395 Ibid., 115. See also what he says about the “festival” in Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Über Die 
Festlichkeit des Theaters,” in Kleine Schriften: Interpretationen, vol. 2 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
1979), 171; Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful, 59: “Ja, Begehung ist die 
Seinsweise des Festes…” Thiselton, Two Horizons, 298, says, “A drama exists only when it is 
played. Music is experienced not simply in reading the composer’s score privately, but in the actual 
event of the concert. Moreover, each performance is an event in its own right. It is not merely a 
‘copy’ of what went on in the consciousness of the composer. Indeed, we might say: it is not 
‘merely’ an interpretation; it is a creative event in its own right.” See also Eberhard, The Middle 
Voice, 71, who says, “Darstellung is the culmination of play. Representation is central because it is 
the way of being of play. The actual purposes of the game is not the content of game, that which the 
rules specify. This is only Scheinzweck, ‘illusory purpose.’... The presentation of play is most acute 
in theater play. When Spiel becomes Schauspiel play does not leak, so to speak, because of the 
openness toward the spectators. On the contrary, the spectators are part of the play’s space or 
volume and fulfill the way of being of play.”  
 396 See Section 4.2.5 above. 
  
76 
broader terms.”397 The means by which one comes to understand art is in the experience 
of it—and this happens in its own presentation, which, again, is its mode of being.398 
Thus, Thiselton rightly comments that, for Gadamer, one cannot divorce the play or the 
art from its being presented.399 Gadamer says, “A drama really exists only when it is 
played, and ultimately music must resound.”400 Gadamer, therefore, wants to advocate a 
type of “aesthetic non-differentiation.”401 This detail is important to Gadamer, for if 
one’s experience of art is more than just an experience of it in its bare arrangement, and 
is therefore an experience principally in its presentation, then the role of the interpreter 
cannot be seen as insignificant. The point here is that all experiences of the real world 
are not to be understood in Cartesian terms—that is, by means of autonomous 
individuality—but rather by understanding that the person, far from being an 
autonomous subject, is in constant dialogue with the reality itself and, in fact, has been 
shaped by it.402  
 Palmer notes the significance of the concept of play, pointing out a few 
accomplishments of Gadamer’s exposition of it. He says that the work of art itself is no 
longer to be seen as “static,” but rather a “dynamic thing.”403 That is, the experience of a 
work of art cannot be divorced from the work of art. The experience of the Mona Lisa, 
                                                
 397 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 298. 
 398 See also Valgenti, “The Tradition of Tradition,” Consequences of Hermeneutics, 71. 
 399 Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 213; See also Gadamer (TM, 125), who says, “The fact that 
aesthetic being depends on being presented, then, does not imply some deficiency, some lack of 
autonomous meaning. Rather, it belongs to its very essence. The spectator is an essential element in 
the kind of play we call aesthetic.” To illustrate this last claim, Gadamer expounds upon Aristotle’s 
Poetics in order to discuss the concept of tragedy, for it is “[t]here the spectator’s frame of mind 
figures expressly in the definition of tragedy’s essential nature.” Gadamer goes on to describe the 
effect (Wirkung) that the tragedy has upon the reader, which he argues displays the fact that “the 
spectator belongs essentially to the playing of the play” (126). (On this discussion, see 125-130.) 
More will be said on how this works into our present concerns in the section on Wirkungsgeschichte 
below. 
 400 Gadamer, TM, 115. Here he states explicitly (115) that his “thesis, then, is that the being 
of art cannot be defined as an object of an aesthetic consciousness because, on the contrary, the 
aesthetic attitude is more than it knows itself. It is a part of the event of being that occurs in 
presentation, and belongs essentially to play as play” (emphasis original).  
 401 Ibid., 116. Emphasis original. Cf. Gadamer, Relevance of the Beautiful, 143-144. 
 402 Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 214; see also Eberhard, The Middle Voice, 66. More will be 
said with Wirkungsgeschichte below. 
 403 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 174. 
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for example, is not reduced to an object of unintelligible jots and strokes. Much like a 
play or drama, its presentation belongs to its essence.404 The essence of the picture is its 
being presented, being seen and understood. Its essence is to draw the viewer into a 
form of play. It is in this sense that Palmer sees a work of art as “dynamic.” Thus, 
Palmer understands Gadamer as moving beyond the traditional hermeneutical 
distinction between subject and object, calling the distinction full of “inadequacy,” 
saying, “It is precisely the experience of art which shows that the work of art is no mere 
object that stands over against a self-sufficient subject. The work of art has its authentic 
being in the fact that, in becoming experience, it transforms the experiencer; the work of 
art works.”405  
 But how does the above discussion work into his (and our) overall project? It 
was noted above that art, like plays and dramas, is presentational. Its essence is 
performative, in that it is operative through the experience itself. The experience of art 
in terms of aesthetic differentiation—i.e., in what has been described as bare 
arrangement—ought to be, according to Gadamer, discarded. What counts is not that 
one experiences a work of art in terms of seeing it as it is in its basic form, but rather in 
the experience of being caught up in it.406 That is, one’s experience of it is such that the 
interpreter (e.g., audience) is an integral part to which the essential nature of the work of 
art itself (i.e., its presentation) is aiming. It is recalled that Gadamer, like 
Schleiermacher, saw hermeneutics as being a deregionalized discipline, in that it 
concerned all of life, not just philology, for example.407 Hence, a line of continuity can 
be traced from Gadamer’s discussions on the aesthetic experience, art, and play to that 
of the historicality of understanding in general. Palmer’s way of describing Gadamer’s 
idea of historicality is helpful: 
                                                
 404 See Gadamer, TM, 126. On the ontology of picture (in comparison to the performance 
arts such as dramas), see Gadamer, TM, 130-138. 
 405 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 174.  
 406 See again Erlebnis and Erfahrung in Section 4.2.4 above. 
 407 See Section 4.2 above. Cf. B.H. McLean, Biblical Interpretation, 176-177. McLean says 
(177) that Gadamer “argued that the humanities and the natural sciences are both a subspecies of a 
universal practice of hermeneutics.” 
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Gadamer’s hermeneutics and his critique of historical consciousness assert that the past 
is not like a pile of facts which can be made an object of consciousness, but rather is a 
stream in which we move and participate, in every act of understanding. Tradition, then, 
is not over against us but something in which we stand and through which we exist; for 
the most part it is so transparent a medium that it is invisible to us—as invisible as 
water to a fish.408 
 It is important to avoid confusion on the connection between Gadamer’s 
discussion on the aesthetic and aesthetic consciousness and his concepts of historicality 
and tradition. What does historicality have to do with aesthetic consciousness? Palmer is 
quite correct in connecting the two with one another.409 He laments that some evaluate 
works of art (specifically literary works of art) under the influence of aesthetic 
differentiation—that is, in the bareness of the work itself (i.e., the “formal aspects”), 
denying the temporal place and historicality of the same.410 “To discuss the meaning of 
the work for the present day would seem to have no justifiable place in their philosophy 
of a literary work; indeed the tension between the past and present is often swallowed 
up in the timeless ahistoricality of formal analyses of poetry.”411 The point, therefore, is 
that, since aesthetic consciousness and experience cannot be reduced down to a mere 
evaluation of a work of art’s bareness, but in its presentation, then according to 
Gadamer, this necessitates a hermeneutical doctrine of historicality. The work of art, 
although being rooted in the past, is constantly being experienced in the present. Hence, 
one can see the resulting effect this has on the nature of interpretation. Thus, 
Gadamer insists that in the case of a work of art its actual being cannot be detached 
from its representation (Darstellung). Hence the reality of something written or 
presented in the past is not recaptured by mere subjective recollection. Gadamer 
explicitly cites the Lutheran emphasis on preaching or the Catholic view of the mass as 
examples in which reality is disclosed afresh. Interpretation is not a mechanical 
reproduction of the past in the present, but a creative event in its own right.412   
                                                
 408 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 176–177. 
 409 Ibid., 162–180. Palmer discusses the issue of aesthetics on 162-176, then he immediately 
segues into a discussion on Gadamer’s critical concept of historicality. 
 410 Ibid., 175–176. 
 411 Ibid. 
 412 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 298–299 (emphasis original); Cf. Valgenti, “The Tradition of 
Tradition,” Consequences of Hermeneutics, 71, who says, “The work of art is an exemplar of 
tradition because any artistic creation is at once an appropriation of a history of artistic effects and 
the handing-over of a new work to the ongoing history of art.” Thus, there is a conceptual link 
between Gadamer’s discussion of aesthetics and his upcoming one on tradition (see below).  
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For Gadamer, contemporaneity (Gleichzeitigkeit) is central to interpretive activity.413 
Gadamer’s project, therefore, is concerned with how the pastness of a work of art (e.g., 
literature) is opened up into the present experience of the same.414 His hermeneutic, 
again, is not concerned with what methodology needs to be developed to make this 
dialogue happen; rather he is concerned more with developing an account as to how this 
happens with each and every encounter with a work of art—whether that be a picture, 
drama, or literature.415  
 The above discussion on aesthetics must be bridged to what follows, namely, to 
the problem of historical distance and from there, textual considerations. Thus, it is 
helpful to note that for Gadamer, art is to be seen as an exemplar for the question of 
hermeneutics because “art is never simply past but is able to overcome temporal 
distance by virtue of its own meaningful presence,” and “[e]ven though it is no mere 
object of historical consciousness, understanding art always includes historical 
mediation.”416 Indeed, historical mediation is key to the phenomenon of understanding, 
and it remains integral to Gadamerian hermeneutics (see below). 
                                                
 413 Gadamer (WM, 132-133; TM, 123-124) says, “Jedenfalls kommt dem Sein des 
Kunstwerks »Gleichzeitigkeit« zu. Sie macht das Wesen des »Dabeiseins« aus… In diesem Sinne 
kommt Gleichzeitigkeit besonders der kultischen Handlung, auch der Verkündigung in der Predigt, 
zu. Der Sinn des Dabeiseins ist hier die echte Teilhabe am Heilsgeschehen selbst. Niemand kann 
zweifeln, daß die ästhetische Unterscheidung, etwa der »schönen« Zeremonie oder der »guten« 
Predigt, angesichts des an uns ergehenden Anspruchs fehl am Platze ist. Nun behaupte ich, daß für 
die Erfahrung der Kunst im Grunde das gleiche gilt.” 
 414 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 176. Gadamer sees “the festival” and its “enactment” as 
paradigmatic of this hermeneutical project, saying, “Ja, Begehung ist die Seinsweise des Festes, und 
in aller Begehung ist Zeit zum nunc stans einer erhebenden Gegenwart geworden. Erinnerung und 
Gegenwart sind darin eins” (“Festlichkeit,” Kleine Schriften: Interpretationen, vol. 2, 171; 
Relevance of the Beautiful, 59). See also Gadamer, “Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical 
Task,” Gadamer Reader, 253. 
 415 See Gadamer, TM, 512. 
 416 Ibid., 158. At this point, Gadamer compares the two approaches of Schleiermacher and 
Hegel. Schleiermacher was pre-occupied with reconstruction; that is, he thought hermeneutics ought 
to be concerned with reconstructing the original place in which the object under consideration once 
stood, its “original occasion and circumstances” (Gadamer, TM, 158-159). Gadamer calls this 
“nonsensical” (159). Instead of reconstructing the past “nodal point [which originally existed] in the 
artist’s mind” (159), Gadamer opts for a more Hegelian conception of hermeneutics (160-161). 
Hegel, he says, understood that “the essential nature of the historical spirit consists not in the 
restoration of the past but in thoughtful mediation with contemporary life...In this way his idea of 
hermeneutics is fundamentally superior to Schleiermacher’s” (161). 
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4.4 Tradition, Temporal Distance, and Historicality 
Gadamer credits Heidegger (contra the Romantics and Schleiermacher) for 
bringing a “decisive impetus” to hermeneutic theory.417 Schleiermacher and the 
romanticism of which he was part were both committed to psychologism (see above). 
Because of Heidegger, Gadamer argues, the task of hermeneutics cannot be reduced to 
the reconstruction of the author’s mind.418 That is to say, “the meaning of a text goes 
beyond its author.”419 Gadamer is hesitant to pick up on the same language used by 
others who say that the task is always to understand a text better than the author; on the 
contrary, he says, “Understanding is not, in fact, understanding better, either in the 
sense of superior knowledge of the subject because of clearer ideas or in the sense of 
fundamental superiority of conscious over unconscious production. It is enough to say 
that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all.”420 This happens due to 
the fact of temporal distance, that is, the time-difference of the original location of the 
text and its later interpreter. This temporal distance should not be seen as problematic, 
“not something that must be overcome.”421 On the contrary, the temporal distance 
between, e.g., the text in its originality and its interpreter, actually proves to be the 
foundation for interpretation in general.422 Gadamer calls it a “positive and productive 
condition enabling understanding.”423 But how could something as seemingly 
problematic as temporal distance be a positive thing? One reason is because temporal 
distance itself is “filled with the continuity of custom and tradition, in the light of which 
                                                
 417 Ibid., 296. 
 418 Ibid. 
 419 Ibid. Cf. an objection to this in Hirsch, Validity, 249. Cf. Gadamer, TM, 328; David 
Vessey, “Gadamer and the Fusion of Horizons,” IJPS  17, no. 4 (October 2009), 525-536, pp. 533; 
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112.  
 421 Ibid., 297. Gadamer says (297) that the desire to “overcome” the temporal distance was 
nothing more than “the naïve assumption of historicism, namely that we must transpose ourselves 
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 422 Ibid. 
 423 Ibid. 
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everything handed down presents itself to us.”424 This is a significant feature of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutic.425 One notices Heidegger’s influence. In the section on 
Heidegger (Section 3.2.3 above), it was said that, integral to his own thought, was the 
idea that understanding was not about a subject approaching, critiquing, or possessing 
anything. The situation was more intuitive. Therefore, 
Understanding is conceived not as something to be possessed but rather as a mode or 
constituent element of being-in-the-world. It is not an entity in the world but rather the 
structure in being which makes possible the actual exercise of understanding on an 
empirical level. Understanding is the basis for all interpretation; it is co-original with 
one’s existing and is present in every act of interpretation.426 
 It becomes easy to see how Gadamer’s project of ontological hermeneutics 
would remain indebted to Heidegger, for tradition and historicality, in the case of 
Gadamer, remain central.427 Emphatically, he states that “history does not belong to us; 
we belong to it.”428 Thus we are historical beings, having been enveloped, even formed, 
by our traditions.429 This remains hermeneutically significant, for, 
Every age has to understand transmitted text in its own way, for the text belongs to the 
whole tradition whose content interests the age and in which it seeks to understand 
itself. The real meaning of a text, as it speaks to the interpreter, does not depend on the 
contingencies of the author and his original audience. It certainly is not identical with 
them, for it is always co-determined also by the historical situation of the interpreter and 
hence by the totality of the objective course of history.430 
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By giving prime place to tradition, Gadamer sought to travel a route different than 
psychologism, which maintained that what ultimately mattered was the author’s state of 
mind in its originality (à la Schleiermacher). On the contrary, the hermeneutical process 
for Gadamer was not about the mental states of the author, but rather the co-determined 
development of both the text and the interpreter’s historicality. It is in this vein, 
moreover, that, by giving prime place to tradition, Gadamer counters enlightenment 
dogma in that he “refuses to set reason in opposition to tradition.”431 Thiselton remarks 
that, 
Gadamer rejects the Enlightenment outlook which suspects all tradition and authority 
merely because it is tradition and authority. The acceptance of authority, he argues, is 
not necessarily blind or irrational obedience. It may be based on the thoroughly rational 
insight that as an individual of a particular historical generation I have my own built-in 
limitations, and may stand in need of learning from a source which has a better 
understanding of something than I do.432 
 Gadamer mentions other positive facets that temporal distance brings to light.433 
When one is removed from the historical situation from which an object originated, and 
discovers that he/she is found to be situated in a subsequent historical situation, then the 
essence of the object can be more clearly discerned.434 This is easier to see when one 
compares their observation of a piece of art that is contemporaneous with them. 
Gadamer says that we come to these familiar artworks “with unverifiable prejudices 
[Vorurteile], presuppositions that have too great an influence over us for us to know 
about them; these can give contemporary creations an extra resonance that does not 
correspond to their true content and significance.”435 Of course, it is relatively clear 
what Gadamer means. Temporal distance removes the interpreter from the object in 
such a way that, far from being unhelpful, serves to accomplish the hermeneutical task. 
“Only when all their relations to the present time have faded away can their real nature 
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appear, so that the understanding of what is said in them can claim to be authoritative 
and universal.”436 The point Gadamer moves to make is not that temporal distance 
allows one to read the text in such a way that he/she can know it as a purely historical 
text;437 his point, rather, is that temporal distance actually allows something to be done 
to the interpreter such that, if it were not there, one could not come to understand the 
text at all. Moreover, Gadamer understands temporal distance as a sort of “filtering 
process,” which can weed out the unhelpful prejudices mentioned above.438 “Often 
temporal distance can solve question of critique in hermeneutics, namely how to 
distinguish the true prejudices [Vorurteile], by which we understand, from the false 
ones, by which we misunderstand.”439 But how is this the case? How does temporal 
distance, packed with historicity and tradition, go about this filtering process?  
 For Gadamer, when the interpreter “encounters” some “traditionary text,” there 
is “provocation.”440 The interpreter’s prejudices—whether helpful or unhelpful—meet 
the other, that is, the text, the object, etc. “In fact [the interpreter’s] own prejudice is 
properly brought into play by being put at risk. Only by being given full play is it able 
to experience the other’s claim to truth and make it possible for him to have full play 
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himself.”441 Temporal distance provides the space in which provocation is possible, 
since the gap between the text and the interpreter is profound. But what brings about 
this profundity? The answer is one’s own historical situation. Gadamer says this was 
precisely the problem with previous thinking on the subject:  
Real historical thinking must take account of its own historicity. Only then will it cease 
to chase the phantom of a historical object that is the object of progressive research, and 
learn to view the object as the counterpart of itself and hence understand both. The true 
historical object is not an object at all, but the unity of the one and the other, a 
relationship that constitutes both the reality of history and the reality of historical 
understanding.442 
The problem was such that the historical studies focused exclusively on the object and 
failed to consider the historicity of the modern interpreter. Gadamer’s conception of the 
hermeneutical task is that the subject-object schema gives way to a harmony between 
both. This was what historical scholars failed to see. The interpreter’s historicity and the 
effect of tradition play a highly significant facilitating role in the interpretive process. 
“We are wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein...My consciousness is not a transparent, 
self-grounding vehicle that puts me in immediate contact with its ‘object’ but is rather a 
grounded opacity (or at best a translucency) that enables a richly mediate contact with 
its ‘object.’”443 Thus tradition is not a passive item we can choose to ignore, but rather 
an active and formative part which we cannot.444 When a reader reads a text, he or she is 
engaging it, not objectively and freely seeing it in its pure form. Rather, the reader is 
engaging the text via the efficacious media called tradition: 
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By historically effected, [Gadamer] means that human consciousness is always shaped 
by history, culture, tradition, and language, in such a way that every act of interpretation 
is always “effected” by these factors. Our sense of belonging to a history, culture, 
tradition, and language always effects our horizon of meaning, how we think, what 
questions we ask, how we relate to the past, and what we hope for in the future.445 
Thus Atkinson can say, “Neither the Romantic ideal of interpretation as divination nor 
the Enlightenment’s faith in the apriority of reason is acceptable to Gadamer or to 
anyone who acknowledges that human beings are historically situated.”446 But how does 
this wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein play out in the process of interpretation itself?   
4.5 Vorurteil 
For Gadamer, “there is no presuppositionless interpretation.”447 The interpreter’s 
own prejudgments must be brought to light, for they “must inevitably come to the text 
with ‘anticipatory ideas.’”448 Heidegger’s idea of the fore-structure of understanding is 
to be recalled at this point. Gadamer takes this idea and sees in the concept an integral 
part of the hermeneutical process. The Cartesian notion that one can assess or interpret 
things in a presuppositionless manner, knowing the thing itself in an unmediated and 
direct way, is a myth. (Recall the discussion on aesthetic differentiation above.) Part of 
the human condition—i.e., one’s embeddedness within tradition, culture, and social 
environment—entails this fact.449 Therefore, the idea of prejudice (Vorurteil) remains a 
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central feature within Gadamer’s hermeneutic. It is true that one of the duties of a text is 
to encounter and adjust, if needed, the interpreter’s own prejudgments; the text must be 
able “to speak what is new,” and when it does, it can serve to “revise” the prejudgments 
that the interpreter brings to the reading.450 But the interpretive process is not a one-
sided monologue, where the text is given primacy over the interpreter and his or her 
prejudgments; rather, it is a dialogue of question and answer—between the text and the 
interpreter.451 In the process of understanding a text, the fore-structure of the process 
itself (recall Heidegger) is just as important to the overall hermeneutical task.  
 For Gadamer, then, Vorurteile should not be seen as adverse. Rather, over 
against the Enlightenment’s demands, Gadamer wants to give “positive value” to the 
concept of prejudice.452 Of course, the Enlightenment taught that supreme authority was 
to be handed over to reason itself, and as a result, remained critical toward the idea of 
prejudice, as if it were something to be abandoned.453 Though prejudice, in the sense of 
racial or gender prejudice, is by definition both negative and harmful, it seems that the 
enlightenment thinkers may have overstated their case. Gadamer says that it was only 
after the Enlightenment came along that prejudice began to be taken negatively.454 
Thiselton writes, 
                                                                                                                                          
fruitful presuppositions and those that imprison and prevent us from thinking and seeing... 
Ultimately, Gadamer asserts, the consequences of recognizing that there can be no 
presuppositionless understanding are that we reject Enlightenment interpretation of reason, and both 
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In German legal terminology the term signifies a provisional legal verdict before the 
final verdict is reached. It was only the rationalism of the Enlightenment, with its 
maxim, borrowed from Descartes, that nothing could be accepted which might in any 
way be doubted, that established the purely negative aspect of the term as the decisive 
one. Gadamer, by contrast, insists that prejudgments are more far-reaching and 
fundamental for hermeneutics than conscious cognitive acts.455  
Thus, “Gadamer…reverses much of the sting of Enlightenment rationalism and idealism 
in his call for prejudice to be appropriated positively as part of the hermeneutic 
process,”456 as he argues that there are such things as “legitimate prejudices.”457 
Prejudices are in fact necessary for knowing anything at all: “Far from arguing that we 
must leave our prejudices behind, Gadamer claims that our prejudices are indispensable, 
for, without them, we cannot interpret anything.”458 Gadamer says,  
In Wahrheit liegt es in der Geschichtlichkeit unserer Existenz, daß die Vorurteile im 
wörtlichen Sinne des Wortes die vorgängige Gerichtetheit all unseres Erfahren-Könnens 
ausmachen. Sie sind Voreingenommenheiten unserer Weltoffenheit, die geradezu 
Bedingungen dafür sind, daß wir etwas erfahren, daß uns das, was uns begegnet, etwas 
sagt.459  
Thus, as a “contrast to Enlightenment attitudes, Gadamer sees all interpretation as 
always guided by its own prejudice.”460 On this, Gadamer took his cues from 
Heidegger’s concept of the fore-structure of understanding.  
In the face of the sciences’ emphasis on the acquisition of objective, universally valid 
knowledge, Gadamer developed an alternate model that emphasized the importance of 
appreciating one’s own  phenomenological fore-understanding (or preunderstanding), 
which both precedes interpretation and makes interpretation possible.461 
 Since prejudices enable understanding, one cannot ignore one’s own 
prejudices.462 They are the result of one’s embeddedness within their own world.463 
                                                
 455 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 305. See also Gadamer, TM, 273. 
 456 Bartholomew, Hermeneutics, 325. 
 457 Gadamer, TM, 278. See also Gadamer, PH, 9. 
 458 McLean, Biblical Interpretation, 184. See also Gadamer, “Classical and Philosophical 
Hermeneutics,” Gadamer Reader, 62. 
459 Gadamer, “Die Universalität des Hermeneutischen Problems,” Kleine Schriften, vol. 1, 
106. 
 460 Bartholomew, Hermeneutics, 310. 
 461 McLean, Biblical Interpretation, 177. Cf. Grondin, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 111. 
 462 See Ibid., 184. For a full critique of Gadamer’s concept of Vorurteil, see Hirsch, Validity, 
258-264. Cf. Atkinson, “Hermeneutic,” 289. 
  
88 
Thus, prejudices are significant to interpretation simply because they are a very real and 
effective presence. They are part of the interpreter, due to his or her situatedness within 
tradition.464 In fact, he says, “daß nicht so sehr unsere Urteile als unsere Vorurteile unser 
Sein ausmachen.”465 Therefore, one cannot know anything about the world without 
them. For Gadamer, in fact, “understanding takes place as an event within a 
tradition.”466 This is so true, says Gadamer, that not even Enlightenment thinkers are 
immune to the presence of prejudice: “And there is one prejudice of the Enlightenment 
that defines its essence: the fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment is the prejudice 
against prejudice itself...”467 That being the case, the interpreter—indeed, every 
interpreter—must be mindful of his or her own bias.468 This is necessary, he states, “so 
the text can present itself in all its otherness,” which remains significant to the 
hermeneutical task as a whole, since it is a dialogue.469 Thus, it would be a misconstrual 
of Gadamer’s theory to posit that prejudices hinder the text from speaking; on the 
contrary, prejudices are (indeed, ought to be) taken into account so that the text can 
truly speak.470 Since it is the case that “all understanding inevitably involves some 
prejudice,”471 it must be accounted for in any description or theory of understanding—
whether of a theatrical play, a musical score, or even how an ancient text such as Hosea 
can be meaningful for Paul.  
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4.6 Horizontverschmelzung  
Integral to Gadamer’s hermeneutic is the concept of “horizon.”472 Moreover, he 
defines understanding itself as the “fusion of horizons” (Horizontverschmelzung).473 The 
idea is that every person operates from a specific “vantage point,” which Gadamer 
labels a “horizon.”474 He grounds his idea of horizons upon the concept of “situation”—
defined as that which “represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision.”475 
Thus, when understanding is discussed in Gadamerian terms, it is described as the 
fusion of horizons—both of, e.g., the text and its reader.476 His concept of 
Horizontverschmelzung is linked, moreover, to his exploration of Vorurteil. 
“Gadamer...employed the term horizon itself to explain the role of one’s 
preunderstanding in all interpretation.”477 In fact, “hermeneutics aims at prejudgments 
that will foster a fusion of the past with the present, thus facilitating the miracle of 
understanding, the sharing of a common meaning by temporally distant 
consciousnesses.”478 If Vorurteile are a necessary component in the process of 
understanding, then a definition of understanding itself will need to account for it. This 
is the heart of Gadamer’s thesis.  
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It is important to remember that it is not only the interpreter who has a horizon, 
but also the text.479 Thus, 
[the horizons of the text] constitute the virtual “unsaid” of every text. As such, the 
founding sense-event of a biblical text does not reside solely in its semantic content, in 
its words, phrases, and sentences: its “sense” is also structured by these 
phenomenological horizons, within which the texts have been suspended. Therefore, 
whenever we translate, read, or interpret a biblical text, we always encounter as implied 
its phenomenological horizons, which are often, of course, strikingly different from our 
own contemporary horizons of meaning.480 
While maintaining that there exists the “otherness” of each of these horizons—of the 
text and interpreter—understanding nonetheless occurs when a fusion takes place 
between the two.481 For Gadamer, this does not mean that each horizon loses itself in the 
other and that “otherness” is lost; rather, both are respected and affirmed.482 Moreover, 
understanding, which is the fusion of horizons, occurs not when “tension” between the 
two horizons is overcome (something Gadamer calls “naive assimilation”), but in the 
act of “bringing it out.”483 The idea here is that of a conversation.484 Each dialogue 
partner, in seeking to understand the viewpoint (i.e., “horizon”) of the other, does not 
“lose” his or herself in the other’s horizon; hence, dialogue does not entail that full 
agreement be reached.485  
As we will see, this dialogical description helps give clarity in what is observed 
in Rom 9:25-26.486 Indeed, this describes all reading of texts. The goal is not for the 
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reader to assimilate his or herself into the horizon (i.e., context, viewpoint, etc.,) of the 
text itself. Again, the “otherness” of the reader and the text are to be respected.487 “In 
simple terms, the fusion of horizons creates the possibility for the interpreter to see her 
phenomenological horizon and the phenomenological horizon of the text at one and the 
same time.”488 Citing Gadamer, Valgenti comments on the more general nature of the 
fusion of horizons, that is, its conceptual connection with tradition and interpreter: 
“Through ‘the interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the 
interpreter,’ the problematic gap between the object of tradition and its audience 
becomes the site for his famed ‘fusion of horizons.’”489 Thus, everything comes full 
circle. Gadamer led up to the primacy of tradition through an extensive study of how 
truth is beyond methodology, which became clear with a treatment on the aesthetic. 
That, too, was made possible by examples of play and presentation. This, clearly, is how 
concepts like tradition, horizons, and prejudgments help make up Gadamer’s notion of 
Horizontverschmelzung, which happens on location—that is, where, as Valgenti has 
said, “the object of tradition and its audience” meet.490  
4.7 Anwendung 
For Gadamer application, Anwendung, is not something which follows 
interpretation; on the contrary, it is part of it.491 That is, one should see “not only 
understanding and interpretation, but also application as comprising one unified 
process.”492 Bringing Gadamer’s thought into broad scope, Eberhard comments on the 
link between the discussion on play and application: “Just as play culminates in 
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Darstellung as play’s involving way of being, so fusion of horizon(s) culminates in 
Anwendung as the involving way of being of understanding history.”493 Helpfully, 
Gadamer illustrates the primacy of application in the interpretation from both legal and 
theological examples. 
In both legal and theological hermeneutics there is an essential tension between the 
fixed text—the law or the gospel—on the one hand and, on the other, the sense arrived 
at by applying it the concrete moment of interpretation, either in judgment or in 
preaching. A law does not exist in order to be understood historically, but to be 
concretized in its legal validity by being interpreted. Similarly, the gospel does not exist 
in order to be understood as a merely historical document, but to be taken in such a way 
that it exercises its saving effect. This implies that the text, whether law or gospel, if it 
is to be understood properly—i.e., according to the claim it makes—must be understood 
at every moment, in every concrete situation, in a new and different way. 
Understanding here is always application (Verstehen ist hier immer schon 
Anwenden).494 
Gadamer’s discussion on the essential role application plays in the 
hermeneutical process is detailed.495 He laments the fact that application has been 
relegated outside the bounds of interpretive activity, saying, “The edifying application 
of Scripture in Christian preaching, for example, now seemed very different from the 
historical and theological understanding of it.”496 It is easy to see why he says this, 
given his detailed analysis of historical consciousness and tradition. When it comes to 
interpretation, says Gadamer, the goal is not to take the text, for example, and simply 
“repeat” what it says and call that understanding.497 On the contrary, the interpreter is to 
“express what is said [or written] in the way that seems most appropriate to him.”498 For 
Gadamer, understanding is situational, that is, from the standpoint of the particular 
questions that exist in one’s place and time.499 Hermeneutics, then, is dialogical (see 
                                                
 493 Eberhard, The Middle Voice, 89 (emphasis original). See also Hoy, The Critical Circle, 
53-54. 
 494 Gadamer, TM, 307–308; WM, 314. See also Thiselton, Two Horizons, 308; Dostal, 
“Gadamer,” in EP, 259. 
 495 See Ibid., 321-336.  
 496 Ibid., 306. 
 497 Ibid., 307. 
 498 Ibid. Cf. the differences between Heidegger and Gadamer on application in Atkinson, 
“Hermeneutic,” 294. See also Jean Grondin, “Gadamer’s Basic Understanding of Understanding,” in 
The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer, ed. Robert J. Dostal (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 42–44. 
 499 Grondin, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 116. 
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above). As Georgia Warnke observes, “For Gadamer… all understanding is situated, 
not only in the sense that we always understand from a particular perspective, but also 
in the sense that we always understand for a particular situation.”500 This was the point 
Gadamer brought in his examples from both theological and legal hermeneutics (see 
above).   
The following questions are therefore relevant. First, how might Gadamer’s 
concept of application shed light upon Rom 9:25-26? Since Gadamer’s insistence that 
application plays a vital role in the complexity of the “hermeneutical process,” is it 
conceivable that what looks to be Paul’s interpretation of Hosea is in fact an act of 
fusing application and interpretation into a single hermeneutical event?501 Second, 
having already noted the importance of considering the rhetorical place and function of 
the Hosea quotations in Rom 9:25-26, how does this fact cohere with Gadamer’s thesis 
that application remains fundamental to interpretation itself? The striking thing about 
Paul’s use of Hosea is that it, too, is being applied as (and in) a rhetorical event, namely, 
as an argument for the new covenant’s full inclusion of the Gentiles.502 
Furthermore, for Gadamer, “what is truly common to all forms of hermeneutics” 
is that, “the meaning to be understood is concretized and fully realized only in 
interpretation, but the interpretive activity considers itself wholly bound by the meaning 
of the text. Neither jurist nor theologian regards the work of application as making free 
with the text.”503 One cannot twist the text to his or her own fancy.504 Thus, radical 
subjectivism is not within Gadamer’s purview.505 Yet, this does not mean application to 
specific situations is any less part of the hermeneutical process either. Rather, it is 
                                                
 500 Georgia Warnke, “Literature, Law, and Morality,” Repercussions, 90. Emphasis ours. 
 501 Gadamer, TM, 307. Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 4. 
 502 In the introduction to Gadamer’s 1978 essay Hermeneutik als theoretische und 
praktische Aufgabe (“Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task,” Gadamer Reader, 247), 
Palmer says, “Like rhetoric, Gadamer’s hermeneutics thinks in terms of reception, of application.” In 
the same article, Gadamer says, “What kind of art hermeneutics is, then, we can learn from rhetoric” 
(251). See Section 7.3 below. See also Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 20. 
 503 Gadamer, TM, 328. See also Gadamer, PH, 208-211. 
 504 See again Grondin, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 112. 
 505 See Evans, Reception History, 230-233, and his comments on Gadamer’s dialectical 
approach to understanding (and hence not objective or subjective). See again Grondin, “Gadamer’s 
Basic Understanding,” 42-44. See also Weinsheimer, “Meaningless Hermeneutics,” Repercussions, 
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central to it. “Understanding is not a theoretical activity, in which man scrutinizes the 
material before him as [a] passive object. Indeed, in both legal and theological 
hermeneutics, Gadamer points out, the interpreter aims not at dominating the text, but at 
submitting to the will of the law or to the will of God.”506 And meaning—not least for 
biblical texts—proceeds beyond the horizon of the author.507 Gadamer illustrates this 
with the example of an order. “To understand the order means to apply it to the specific 
situation to which it pertains.”508 Simply repeating the order word-for-word is not what 
it means to understand, though repeating it back to the one who gave the order might 
prove beneficial for purposes of clarity.509 How is repetition not understanding? 
Because “real meaning” is found only when the order is “carried out and 
concretized.”510 Gadamer thinks the order’s meaning is realized when the situation to 
which it concerns is comprehended and in the actual obedience of the person carrying it 
out—both of which necessarily involves a level of creativity on behalf of the order’s 
recipient.511 
                                                
 506 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 308. 
 507 See e.g., Gadamer, “Martin Heidegger und die Marburger Theologie,” Kleine Schriften, 
vol. 1, 91-92, who says, “Versteht man unter Sinn eines Textes die mens auctoris, d.h., den 
,tatsächlichen‘ Verständnishorizont des jeweiligen christlichen Schriftstellers, dann tut man den 
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liegen, daß sie von etwas künden, das ihren eigenen Verständenishorizont übertrifft—auch wenn sie 
Johannes oder Paulus heißen. Das soll keineswegs einer unkontrollierbaren Inspirationstheorie und 
pneumatischen Exegese das Wort reden. Dergleichen würde den Erkenntnisgewinn, den man der 
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habe. Verstehen heißt nirgends die bloße Wiedergewinnung dessen, was der Autor ,meinte’, ob er 
nun der Schöpfer eines Kunstwerkes, der Täter einer Tat, der Verfasser eines Gesetzbuches oder was 
immer war. Die mens auctoris begrenzt nicht den Verständnishorizont, in dem sich der Interpret zu 
bewegen hat, ja, in dem er sich notwendig bewegt, wenn er statt nachzusprechen wirklich verstehen 
will.” 
 508 Gadamer, TM, 329. 
 509 Ibid. 
 510 Ibid. Cf. Hirsch, Validity, 251–252. 
 511 See ibid., 330: “The criterion of understanding is clearly not in the order’s actual words, 
nor in the mind of the person giving the order, but solely in the understanding of the situation and in 
the responsible behavior of the person who obeys. Even when an order is written down so one can be 
sure it will be correctly understood and executed, no one assumes that it makes everything explicit. 
The comic situation in which orders are carried out literally but not according to their meaning is 
well known. Thus there is no doubt that the recipient of an order must perform a definite creative act 
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Thus, application is not just an ancillary part of hermeneutics, but rather central 
to it.512 The implications here will prove significant for an evaluation of all interpretive 
acts, not least Paul’s.  
4.8 Summary 
Part Two explored Gadamer’s influence and scholarly context. Philosophers 
such as Schleiermacher, Dilthey, and Heidegger were thus surveyed. Gadamer’s 
similarities and dissimilarities with each respective thinker have been noted. It was 
observed how Gadamer’s hermeneutic sought to challenge the natural science’s 
methodological approach, especially in regard to how it had been adopted and utilized 
by thinkers within the human sciences. Gadamer’s argument was that hermeneutics did 
not need to adopt the prevailing view, i.e., scientific methodology, in order to discover 
truth and meaning. Rather, truth could be attained apart from a scientific approach. He 
argued for this by way of his critique of aesthetic consciousness, particularly aesthetic 
differentiation and abstraction. Using this critique as a spring board, Gadamer could 
dispel the myth that methodology was the only viable means to truth. Furthermore, 
Gadamer argued that rationalism, which had begun under Descartes with his 
commitment to unmediated knowledge of truth, ought to be discarded in favor of 
something more real to the human situation. The human situation, he argued, was one of 
embeddedness and being thrown into certain unique traditions—whether cultural or 
religious, or a mixture of both. Thus, Gadamer sought to recast the human situation in 
terms of historicality. Furthermore, tradition for Gadamer was efficacious; it impacts the 
way one interprets, not just texts, but all of life.  
Through his reflections on play, Gadamer was able to illustrate the concept of 
presentation as the primary mode of being of art. A drama exists in being performed, a 
song in being sung, and a text in being read—each in individual, concrete moments and 
situations, however unlike the original situation in which they were founded. Moreover, 
one of the perceived problems of hermeneutics, i.e., historical/temporal distance, turns 
                                                                                                                                          
in understanding its meaning.” See also Gadamer, “Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical 
Task,” Gadamer Reader, 256-257. 
 512 Cf. Gadamer, Relevance of the Beautiful, 148-149. 
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out to be for him an enabling feature of interpretation itself. Because of his concepts of 
tradition and Wirkungsgeschichtliches, Gadamer argued that every interpreter brings 
with him or her prejudices, Vorurteile. These prejudgments, far from being inherently 
bad or debilitating, pave the way to understanding. The interpreter’s situation, their 
horizon, is formed by these prejudgments and, when the interpreter interprets, say, a 
text, he or she is confronted by the prejudgments and traditions, which form the horizon, 
of the text. Thus the opportunity for dialogue is possible. Understanding happens when 
a fusion of horizons takes place—a fusion between the horizons of the text and its 
interpreter.       
Having laid out Gadamer’s hermeneutic, with discussions on those concepts 
conducive to the hermeneutical task itself—among them items such as Erfahrung, Spiel, 
Darstellung, Vorurteil, Horizontverschmelzung, and Anwendung—we will allow our 
deliberations to come to bear upon the present matter, namely, Rom 9:25-26. How 
might, therefore, Gadamer’s idea of prejudgments be used to understand Paul’s 
revisionary reading of the Hosea prophecy? What role is played by factors that shaped 
Paul’s pre-understanding that may not immediately be explicitly evident from his text? 
Could taking into account Paul’s own prejudices—whatever they might have been—
help resolve the hermeneutical dilemma in Rom 9:25-26?513 If Gadamer is right on the 
fundamental nature that Vorurteile play in the interpretive event, then an examination of 
Paul’s prior-commitments, in dialogue with some of his contemporaries, will be 
indispensable to the task at hand. One is now left with pivotal questions, for if the task 
of “hermeneutics aims at prejudgments that will foster a fusion of the past with the 
present,”514 how can this Gadamerian concept of understanding offer insight into how 
Paul’s horizon and the horizon of the prophetic text came together? Specifically, how 
can Paul’s quotations, and reconstrual, of Hosea gain clarity in light of their different 
addressees? While maintaining the otherness of both Hosea and Paul, as well as their 
respective agendas, what are the key hermeneutical fore-structures of understanding that 
help show genuine fusion between the two? 
                                                
 513 That this is valuable, cf. Evans, Reception History, 74, who analyzes Murray’s and 
Swartley’s interpretations in light of their prejudgments. Here, we do so explicitly in terms of 
biblical intertextuality, of Paul’s interpretation of Hosea.  
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Moreover, Anwendung, Gadamer argued, was not a subsequent event after 
interpretation, but rather inherent to the interpretive process itself. To understand a text 
is to apply the text. If application is interwoven into the entire hermeneutical process, 
and not relegated outside of it, how might this influence the way one understands Paul’s 
use of Hosea? For example, could it be the case that, in light of the rhetorical role the 
Hosea quotations play within the overall argument, Paul’s use of the Hosea texts were 
what they were by virtue of their application (in the Gadamerian sense), that is, by their 
application within a new concrete situation—a situation different than what existed 
within the horizon of Hosea’s own understanding? And if Gadamer is correct in seeing 
application as central to hermeneutics, and as a result, as a fresh creative act in the 
present of a past text, then could it be the case that Paul’s use of Hosea is not as 
problematic as it first seems to be? On these last two questions, the answer is a 
resounding yes.  
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PART THREE: A GADAMERIAN REAPPRAISAL OF 
PAUL’S USE OF HOSEA IN ROMANS 9:25-26 
Chapter 5: Texts and Contexts, Part 1 
5.1 Hosea 1:10; 2:23 in its Old Testament Context  
Keeping in mind that Hosea was part of a much larger collection of the so-called 
“minor prophets,” or simply, “the Twelve,” the overall narrative of Hos 1-3 will be 
outlined below to provide a better contextual awareness for Hos 1:10; 2:23.515 This will 
allow us, first, to gain a glimpse into Hosea’s “Horizont,” that is, “der Gesichtskreis, der 
all das umfaßt und umschließt, was von einem Punkt aus sichtbar ist.”516 Second, we 
will emphasize the differences between Hosea’s intentions with the oracle and with 
Paul’s latter use of it. Similarities (if any) that exist between Hosea’s horizon of 
understanding and that of Paul’s will be noted. Third, by doing these two things, fusion 
between the respective horizons can, hopefully, be observed. Thus, while space will not 
permit a full account of the oracle, certain re-occurring themes within it will be noted, 
specifically in chs. 1-3 from which Paul’s citations are taken. 
5.1.1 Dominant Motifs 
The book of Hosea can be divided into two parts—chs. 1-3 and chs. 4-14.517 The 
first concerns Hosea’s family, specifically his marriage and children,518 which serves “as 
the metaphorical means to understand the relationship between YHWH and Israel.”519 
                                                
 515 The reader is encouraged to keep in mind all that has been said in the excursus above on 
Hosea’s place and function in the twelve prophets. 
 516 Gadamer, WM, 307; TM, 301. See again Section 4.6 above. 
 517 Charles H. Silva, “The Literary Structure of Hosea 1-3,” BSac 164, no. 654 (Apr-June 
2007): 181-197, citing 181 (see also 183, fn. 7); see also Dearman, Hosea, 16–18. Cf. Matthew W. 
Mitchell, “Hosea 1-2 and the Search for Identity,” JSOT 29, no 1 (Sep 2004), 115-127, who 
questions the unity of Hosea. Cf. McConville, “Hosea,” in DOTP, 341-342; Yee, “Hosea,” 198. 
 518 See Angel Hayyim, “Rebuke Your Mother: But Who is She?: The Identity of the 
‘Mother’ and ‘Children’ in Hosea 2:4-7,” JBQ  44, no. 1 (Jan – Mar 2016): 13-20. 
 519  Dearman, Hosea, 16. See also Joshua Moon, “Honor and Shame in Hosea’s Marriages,” 
JSOT 39, no. 3 (2015): 335-351. On the metaphor of marriage, see Tom C. Parker, “Marriage and 
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Furthermore, metaphor in Hosea is intensely purposeful and is more than “clever 
literary devices,” for the prophet is intent on “making connections between phenomena 
in order to instruct an audience.”520 In fact, one of the driving motifs for Hosea is the 
metaphor of “household,” specifically with God as its divine head.521 But metaphor in 
Hosea, not least in regard to household, is utilized in service to the motif of new 
covenant. Tanner, attending to the context of Hos 2:23 specifically and connecting that 
to the new covenant language of Ezekiel and Jeremiah, has convincingly shown that the 
context of Hosea does entail a new covenant theme.522 Along with Hosea’s tendency to 
use metaphor, another significant observation to note is his use of “allusion to prior 
national history.”523 This is not insignificant with regard to Paul’s use of the oracle in 
Rom 9:25-26 (see below).  
Dearman is correct to state that the book of Hosea is an “occasional document,” 
and cannot, therefore, be said to “present theological views in systematic form, but 
addresses the particulars that occasioned prophetic responses.”524 As Brueggemann 
observes, the way Hosea characterizes God is in “concrete” terms, not in “abstract” or 
“theological” rhetoric.525 Dearman says further that, 
Hosea, like an epistle writer, does not present his theology abstractly, but responds from 
his theological convictions to the issues of his day. He does have a matrix that formed 
him and from which he developed a worldview and a corresponding set of convictions 
about theological integrity in common life. In literary and conceptual terms, we might 
describe Hosea’s matrix and resulting worldview as a narrative, a story-shaped ethos 
that he absorbed and that subsequently shaped his approach to the prophetic task. 
Working backward from his occasioned responses, we can reconstruct at least some of 
the narrative substructure of his theology.”526 
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 521 Ibid., 11; 44–50. 
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citing 13. 
 526  Dearman, Hosea, 29–30. 
  
100 
Thus, documenting some of these motifs that emerge from the narrative will help shed 
light upon Hosea’s horizon. These include exodus and wilderness, divine love and 
election, covenant, and a re-unified people of God.527 Indeed, the compassion of God 
and the status of Israel as God’s people is front and center.528 Of course, these motifs are 
orated in terms of the “household” and covenant-marriage metaphor.529 The focus of 
chs. 1-3 is upon the marriage of Hosea.530 This, moreover, is arranged as a repetition of 
judgment and restoration.531 It is important to note that, in regard to both the judgments 
and reversals of judgments given in the oracle, the former are seen as having swift and 
immediate concern, while the latter are eschatological.532 Of course, the two passages, 
which Paul cites in Rom 9:25-26, are part of the more eschatological portions of the 
oracle that depict future blessings.533 Because Paul quotes from passages occurring 
within this first part (Hos 1-3) and due to the relevant motifs which occur within chs. 1-
3, our analysis will focus there. 
5.1.2 Hosea 1-3 
One cannot overestimate the exodus and wilderness motifs for Hosea, for God’s 
rescue of Israel from Egypt was “the supreme act of Yahweh’s grace” toward his 
people.534 The household metaphor, too, is utilized in chs. 1-3 (and elsewhere) as the 
“lens through which Hosea interprets the grand narrative of YHWH’s acquisition of 
Israel in Egypt and preservation of them in the wilderness.”535 Thus, Hos 1:10 (2:1) and 
2:23 (2:25), where the people are said to be restored after having been wooed by 
                                                
 527 Ibid., 32–36, 36–37, 38–39, 42–43, respectively; see also Douglas Stuart, Hosea-Jonah, 
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YHWH in the metaphorical wilderness mentioned in 2:14, are both part of that 
household metaphor, specifically “a household restored.”536 It is in this wilderness 
where God reveals himself and knows Israel, much like he did in previous times when 
the nation was rescued from Egypt.537  
Within this first section, chs. 1-3,538 there is a clear schema of “judgment and 
renewal”: 539 Hos 1:2-9, with the depiction of Hosea’s marriage and family, speaks of 
God’s judgment and disavowal; 1:10-2:1 (2:1-3) speaks of the reversal of judgment and 
disavowal; 2:2-13 (2:4-15) again speaks of judgment, with 2:14-23 (2:16-25) speaking 
of renewal and restoration. Chapter 3 follows the reversal in 2:14-23 (2:16-25), offering 
yet further account of what such a renewal and restoration will look like.540 From this 
schema of judgment and reversal, the original context of Paul’s citations can be 
constructed.  
Following the superscription541 (1:1), the text begins with Hosea who is 
commanded to take a “wife of harlotry” and to have “children of harlotry” (2a), phrases 
that are distinctive to Hosea.542 The reason for this is because “the land commits great 
harlotry by forsaking YHWH” (2b). Taking Gomer as his wife (3), the marriage picture 
between these two is reflective of the backslidden condition of Israel.543 The command 
itself could imply the taking of a wife who is going to be unfaithful or who has been, 
though it is perhaps better to take this as neither “retrospective” or “predictive” but 
rather simply as a call to embrace a wife who had “social status” of shame.544 By doing 
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so, Hosea too would “act in a way that would bring public shame, and so demonstrate 
Yahweh’s status of disgrace in being bound to Israel.”545  
Verses 3b-9 record the birth of three children, the first child, a son, was named 
Jezreel (4).546 The second child, a daughter, was named המחר אל, i.e., “No Compassion” 
(6). And the third child, a son, was named ימע אל, i.e., “Not My People” (9). The 
children were so named to be a witness to Israel concerning judgment and the loss of 
covenant relationship with God.547 These names declared that the people were being 
“disinherited” and the compassion of God “was being removed from the northern 
kingdom of Israel in Hosea’s day.”548 The reason for the naming of the third child,  אל
ימע, is explained in v. 9b, םכל היהא אל יכנאו ימע אל םתא יכ, “for you are not my people, 
and I am not for you.”549 Here there is a word play where היהא recalls the divine name 
of YHWH given to Israel during the time of Moses.550 With an echo back to the exodus, 
this serves for Israel as a judgment that covenant status is revoked.551 “As a result of 
Israel’s disobedience God was no longer ‘I AM’ for them.”552 This includes 
discontinuing his “supporting, defending and sustaining” them.553  
The reversal of these judgments upon Israel is foretold in 1:10-2:1 (2:1-3). Verse 
10 recalls the announcement that Abraham would have numerous descendants, and 
according to the oracle, this is still going to be realized.554 This promise to the patriarchs 
will include not just Israel but also Judah such that they will be given the title “children 
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of the living God” (1:10; 2:1), a title depicting a “corporate reversal of the name Not 
My People.”555 The phrase “children of Israel” in 1:10 (2:1) comprises all of Abraham’s 
descendants, thus including both the northern and southern tribes.556 Moreover, the 
covenant with Abraham is recalled as the springboard for covenant renewal. As Silva 
observes: “Hosea was particularly adept at incorporating Israel’s earlier traditions to 
reinforce his prophetic oracles.”557 Here, “[t]he essential point is that the promise will 
prevail even over the horrific judgment.”558 Furthermore, the reversal is said to include 
the appointment of “one head,” i.e., a national leader (1:11; 2:2). This reference can be 
coupled with the reference to “David their king” in 3:5, denoting “that the future hope 
of the people of God was with a descendant of David. Such a conviction was part of a 
widespread prophetic hope about the future.”559 More so, both Israel and Judah are here 
depicted as being unified together under this leader.560 With the reversal of the fortunes 
of Jezreel mentioned in 1:11 (2:2), the reversal is again explicated in the command to 
speak to one another as “My People” and “Mercy” in 2:1 (2:3).561 More on this below. 
Chapter 2:2-13 (4-15) brings another charge against Israel, followed by another 
depiction of covenant renewal in 2:14-23 (16-25).562 However, this should not be 
viewed as an additional charge, but rather a “rehearsal of 1:2-2:1 (MT 3).”563 Hosea 2:2-
23, is where the prophet “offers his most compelling characterization of YHWH,” 
namely, that he is “presented as a surprising and unsettled mix of indignation and 
pathos.”564 This is seen in light of the couplet of judgment and subsequent reversal. This 
reversal, moreover, in 2:14-23 (16-25) draws upon the exodus and wilderness motifs. 
Thus: 
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In addition to continuing the family/household metaphor established in 1:2-2:13, the 
second half of the chapter also draws upon a grand typology whereby the significance 
of Israel’s earlier history, namely the exodus from Egypt, wilderness wandering, and 
settlement in the land of promise, gives structure to the depiction of betrothal and 
(re)marriage between YHWH and Israel. The link between metaphor and typology in 
these verses is the equation between marriage and covenant. Metaphor and typology are 
not just literary devices, but reveal a synthetic conceptual framework to Hosea’s way of 
connecting Israel’s history and identity with their divine Lord. Not only is it a grand 
typological schema, employing the events of saving history to portray a people once 
again redeemed and joined to YHWH; the expanse of the renewal is grand, whereby the 
land and nonhuman inhabitants are part of the transformation to come.565 
Two things should be noted. First, in 2:14-15 (16-17), one ought to see divine 
agency at work, being anthropomorphized in the marriage metaphor. “In the metaphor 
of remarriage and renewed covenant, God will woo Israel and speak to her heart.”566 
This clearly speaks of divine “initiative.”567 Macintosh calls this language “striking,” as 
it is a “coercion through love.”568 This part of the oracle conveys the message of genuine 
love on the part of God to his people.569 Furthermore, the wooing is back to the 
wilderness, “the origins of the Israelite nations, the place where, following the exodus, 
she found her beginnings and her initial marriage with Yahweh in the days of her 
youth… still uncorrupted by the idolatry of Canaan.”570 Second, it would be a mistake to 
forget that it is just God’s wayward people who are in view for the gracious benefits, as 
again the covenant renewal is such that it includes even the animals (v.18 [20]). Thus, 
the prophecy is imbedded with “overtones” of the “creation account.”571 The “ordering 
of nature” is intrinsic to this covenant renewal made with Israel.572  
The last part of chapter 2, particularly 2:22-23 [24-25], marks the epitome of the 
restoration. The three children of Hosea, Jezreel, “No Mercy,” and “Not My People,” 
                                                                                                                                          
 564 Brueggemann, “Hosea,” 13. 
 565 Dearman, Hosea, 119–120. Silva, “Hosea 1-3,” 192. 
 566 Ibid., 121. Emphasis original. See also Silva, “Hosea 1-3,” 194, fn. 59. 
 567 Brueggemann, “Hosea,” 14. 
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are depicted as refreshed and renewed. First, God will “sow” ( רזע ) Israel back into the 
land (vv. 22-23 [24-25]). This, again, is a play on the name Jezreel, לאערזי.573 Moreover, 
it is brought about by divine “initiative.”574 Mercy will be extended to “No Mercy” and 
God will say to “Not My People” that “you are my people” (v.23 [25]). All of this is a 
product of divine agency, a response to the divine call, for “Israel, YHWH’s household, 
is set in a cosmic arena that also has responded to YHWH’s restorative word. And none 
of this is predicated initially on Israel coming to its collective sense, but on God’s 
resolve to overcome their failures and to transform them.”575 Given the shame that 
would have been inherent to the children, God’s gift of a “new name” was such that it 
“flies in the face of the social norm.”576 As Moon says, the position of shame is 
overcome “by Yahweh’s refusal to allow the normal cultural expectation (giving 
disgrace to the disgraceful) to be the final word.”577 In light of this, it is necessary to 
note that the Hosea text never mentions Gentiles as recipients of re-inclusion, “nor did 
Hosea imply that the fulfillment of these promises would be with Gentiles.”578 And yet, 
this new naming recorded in Hos 1:10 (2:1) and 2:23 (25) is utilized by Paul to make 
the case for Gentile inclusion in Rom 9. Therefore, not unlike the renaming of Hosea’s 
children in the original context, Paul’s application of the oracle to Gentiles would have 
been equally scandalous and perhaps just as socially subversive as it was in its original 
setting.579 
Another important insight into the new covenant for Hosea is found in chapter 3. 
The chapter begins with Hosea going again after a “woman,” taking her back as a sign 
of God’s love for Israel.580 After a time of upheaval (3:4), there is a mention of “David 
                                                
 573 Dearman, Hosea, 131, notes that “[t]his is a reversal of the negative sowing of historical 
judgment in 1:4-5.” Emphasis original. See also McConville, “Hosea,” in DOTP, 342. 
 574 Macintosh, Hosea, 91. Garrett, Hosea, 94-96. 
 575 Dearman, Hosea, 131. 
 576 Moon, “Honor and Shame,” 347. 
 577 Ibid. 
 578 Tanner, “The New Covenant,” 100. 
 579 See again Wright, PFG, 1185. 
 580 See Silva, “Hosea 1-3,” 196, fn. 63, concerning the identity of the woman in 3:1. We 
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their king,” who will be sought by Israel.581 It is this king, furthermore, who seems to be 
the culmination of the renewal “in the end days” (5). The Jewish hope was that a future 
king would reign, a king from David’s line.582 Furthermore, it is not unfounded to think 
that, in this period, there “was an expectation of the healing of the tribal rift under a 
future Davidic ruler.”583 This will prove insightful when Paul’s horizon is outlined 
below. 
5.1.3 Summary: Similarities, Dissimilarities, and Hermeneutical Horizons 
In terms of horizons, there are notable similarities between the Hosea text and 
Paul’s text. First, there is for Hosea a primacy given to the Abrahamic promise over and 
against the failure of Israel to live up to the demands of the covenant implemented at 
Sinai. In Hos 1:10 (2:1) the “sand of the sea” metaphor drawn from the Abrahamic 
promise is depicted as being still in force, despite divine judgment and covenant 
disavowal.584 The promise will come to fruition despite the sins of Israel due to God's 
own initiative. This is similar to Paul’s emphasis on the primacy of the Abrahamic 
promise in Rom 4 (see below). Second, divine agency was seen in the wooing of Israel 
back to the wilderness (which recalled an earlier redemptive narrative) where the 
covenant will be renewed, as outlined in Hos 2:14-15 (16-17). This is not unlike Paul’s 
emphasis on the primacy of the divine call found in Rom 9 (see below). Thus, these 
narrative assumptions are marks of similarity. Third, there is for Hosea a hope for the 
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re-unification of God’s people in light of (especially) the Abrahamic promise. The 
subject of Rom 9:25-26 is that Paul includes Gentiles into this scheme. This covenant 
renewal, fourth, was seen for Hosea as being in reference to both the New Covenant and 
a Davidic King. It is argued below that there exists similarly for Paul a New Covenant 
and christological element to his interpretive activity in regard to Gentile inclusion.  
That said, there remains one glaring dissimilarity: Hosea’s failure to mention 
Gentiles as objects of inclusion and Paul’s radical claim in doing so. But as we have 
already noted above, even in this dissimilarity, there is remarkable similarity. After all, 
the use of oracle in both the original context and in Paul’s subsequent context would 
have been subversive to the prevailing expectations.  
More will be said below on how Gadamer’s theory can provide language for this 
hermeneutical phenomenon. Before this can be done, however, attention must be given 
to the purpose and narrative substructure of Rom 9:25-26. In what follows, the text’s 
purpose will be briefly highlighted, followed by an in-depth analysis of the said 
narrative substructure (with comparisons to Jewish contemporaries). This is essential, 
for it provides the framework for drawing conclusions in light of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutical theory.  
5.2 The Purpose and Narrative Substructure of Romans 9:25-26 
It is clear that Paul quotes the oracle in order to convey a “new covenant 
awareness” for Gentile inclusion.585 Specifically, “the purpose of [citing Hos 2:25, 1 in 
Rom 9:25-26] is to trace the origin of the Christian community back to the double-
edged electing act of God, as announced by God himself in scripture.”586 Verses 24-29, 
with 25-26 playing an integral role, emphasize that the divine call is the defining 
apparatus by which the people of God are established.587 It is true that what is at issue 
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for Paul is the universality of God’s call, which is not restricted by one’s Jewish 
ancestry, but is now open to even non-Jews: 
While vv. 24-29 pick up the theme of vv. 6b-13, they also move beyond what Paul has 
said in vv. 6b-13. For Paul now explicitly includes Gentiles among those whom God is 
sovereignly calling to be part of his people. God’s people are constituted by his call and 
not by natural descent. Paul now takes this point to its logical and (from the perspective 
of first-century Judaism) radical conclusion: physical descent from Abraham not only 
does not guarantee inclusion in the true people of God; it is not even necessary. Verses 
14-23, despite their somewhat parenthetical nature, have prepared the way for this 
conclusion by highlighting so intensely God’s absolute freedom to bestow his mercy on 
whomever he chooses. Verses 24-29, therefore, bring Paul’s defense of God’s 
faithfulness to his word to its climax.588  
One sees from the Hosea quotations in vv. 25-26 that Gentiles, like Isaac (vv. 7-9) and 
Jacob (vv. 10-13) before them, are now part of God’s family. One can frame the 
specific question concerning Rom 9:25-26 in the following manner: How can Paul see 
the Gentiles as being part of the “people of God”? The answer is because they are 
“called.” This question is similar to, and is presupposed by, another: Who are the people 
of God, and how are the lines between “God’s people” and “not God’s people” 
determined?” Considering the immediate context (vv. 6-23), Paul’s emphasis upon “the 
call” is instructive here, providing an answer to the question. How are God’s people 
established? By the divine, free call of God. Thus, it is agreeable with Moo to take vv. 
24-29—perhaps not least vv. 25-26—as a theological “climax.”589 This is especially 
clear when one remembers how Paul substitutes καλέσω for ἐρῶ in v. 25 to emphasize 
God’s calling.590 The purpose, therefore, for Paul’s quotations from Hosea is to bring 
the thread of scriptural argument in vv. 6-23 to its desired end, which entails the 
inclusion of Gentiles into the covenant family of God.  
But does the answer of “God’s call” offer a complete account of what is going 
on? The answer is no. It does not solve all the complex hermeneutical riddles of Paul’s 
quotations from Hosea, for that oracle mentions nothing about the inclusion of Gentiles, 
nor anything about their calling. It seems rather odd that Paul would interrupt the 
otherwise easy flowing argument in vv. 6-23 with quotations from Hosea. This is 
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obvious when one comes to see how a substantial amount of rhetorical weight rests 
upon them (see below). While the immediate context of vv. 6-23 helps to explain the 
purpose behind the quotations, it falls short in providing a detailed explanation for the 
way in which the quotations function—namely, as a scriptural basis for Gentile 
inclusion. In other words, it is perhaps easy to utilize the immediate context (vv. 6-23) 
to explain what Paul is doing with the quotations, but not how Paul is doing what he is 
doing. Thus, on this latter question, one must address relevant portions of the greater 
narrative substructure of the argument leading up to Rom 9:25-26 and not merely the 
immediate passage in which it resides. This allows for a glimpse behind Paul’s 
judgment that Gentiles are now called “my people” and into his pre-judgments. 
Recalling Gadamer’s idea of Vorurteile, pre-judgments are, hermeneutically, more 
fundamental than judgments; in fact, the former undergird and enable the latter.591 What, 
then, are the pre-judgments that enable Paul’s judgments? What pre-understandings are 
at work that enable the understanding that Gentiles are, in fact, in view?  
By going this route, we will encounter the location of Paul’s own interpretive 
horizon. This will become evident once Paul’s horizon is compared with not only 
Hosea’s, but also his contemporaries’. Once Paul’s interpretive setting has been 
established, one can engage Rom 9:25-26 and evaluate the rhetorical function of the 
quotations—which, as will be argued below, operate in a way similar to Gadamer’s idea 
of Anwendung. Next, one can begin to reconstruct not only what Paul was doing with 
the Hosea quotations, but also shed light upon how he was doing it. 
5.2.1 Three Motifs: Law, Righteousness, and the Gentiles  
To establish Paul’s interpretive horizon, one must enter his narrative framework, 
revealing the Vorurteile that ground his exegesis and understanding of Hosea’s oracle. 
Three motifs will emerge from the text itself as we do this, namely, the motifs of law-
keeping, righteousness, and the Gentile question. In what follows, Paul’s train of 
thought will be charted through the text as these motifs are highlighted along the way. 
Attention will be given to chs. 1-4 and 9-10:4, as these three motifs are prevalent there. 
Of course, these motifs will, if allowed, open a can of worms (not least in light of post-
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Sanders scholarship!).592 While the discussion below on Romans will interact with the 
relevant scholars, we must exercise restraint and choose our sparring partners 
carefully.593 It must be remembered that this project is philosophical-hermeneutical. 
While this research surely has ramifications for wider questions and issues, it is 
impossible to analyze every textual or conceptual nook, as tempting as that might be. In 
what follows, then, clues will emerge about the Pauline fore-structure of understanding 
which grounds his judgment that Gentiles, via a citation of the Hosea oracle, are 
welcome into the covenant.  
5.3 Gentiles and Covenant 
In Rom 1:1-7, Paul discloses his credentials concerning his apostolic role in 
advancing the “gospel of God” (v. 1).594 Regarding the Gospel, Paul makes known his 
apostolic calling to “all those in Rome who are loved by God and called to be saints” (v. 
7). Both “grace and apostleship” were given to Paul “to bring about the obedience of 
faith, εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως, for the sake of his name among all the Gentiles, ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς 
ἔθνεσιν” (v. 5). Much debate has surrounded εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως, particularly on how 
πίστεως functions as a genitive.595 It could be understood as either (1) a subjective 
genitive or (2) an appositional genitive.596 The first would place emphasis on ὑπακοὴν 
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(“obedience”), rather than on faith. That is, “[The subjective genitive] sense would be 
the obedience that springs from or flows from faith.”597  If so, “obedience” and not 
necessarily “faith” is what he wanted “to bring about among all the Gentiles.” On the 
other hand, one could translate πίστεως “epexegetically, i.e., ‘obedience which consists 
in faith.’”598 That is, the “obedience,” which Paul was so adamant about producing, is 
simply “faith” itself. Garlington’s question is appropriate: “Is the significance of ὑπακοὴ 
πίστεως exhausted by treating it as a genitive of apposition?”599 One might even dare ask 
if any strict and exclusive understanding of ὑπακοὴν πίστεως exhausts the significance it 
was meant to convey. Accordingly, it has been suggested Paul might have meant “both 
ideas.”600  
Grammatically, there lacks warrant to think Paul implied one at the expense of 
the other (i.e., a subjective genitive or genitive of apposition). Nothing in the immediate 
context (1:1-7) or the greater literary context (chs. 12-15) contradicts such a 
conclusion.601 The same can be said about the context of Rom 1-4 and 9-10:4, our 
present focus. Understanding ὑπακοὴν πίστεως as a reference to initial saving faith 
seems to preserve Paul’s emphasis on faith itself,602 thus keeping in line with his quite 
negative response to Israel’s unbelief in their Messiah in Romans 9:30–10:1-4. 
Conversely, v. 6 reveals Paul’s eagerness to “bring about the obedience of faith” (v. 5) 
to his own recipients, i.e., “those in Rome” (v. 7), lending to the idea that the phrase 
itself is more nuanced.603 Thus, two things can be said about ὑπακοὴν πίστεως: (1) Paul 
states his apostolic mission, saying this entails bringing about initial, justifying faith in 
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Christ among all the nations, and (2) that this “bringing-about-the-obedience-of-faith” 
mission includes believers, in that he is called to keep “those in Rome” (v. 7) faithful to 
the Christ, in whom they profess. It could be said, then, that the first exhibits the 
genitive of apposition, while the second the subjective genitive. Thus, ὑπακοὴν πίστεως 
ought to be understood as both/and.604 The temptation to argue for one interpretation at 
the detriment of the other must be resisted. That this should be the case is further 
realized when Garlington notes the following “interesting analogy” from Przybylski’s 
own observation: 
…Przybylski discusses the possible translations of the title moreh sedeq in CD. He 
notes that the Hebrew could be rendered either “teacher of righteousness” (objective 
genitive) or “righteous or right teacher” (explicative genitive). He opts for the former 
yet concedes that “The problem with which we have been dealing may in actual fact be 
a pseudo-problem arising solely out of difficulties inherent in the process of translating 
Hebrew into English.” Thus, “It should not be taken for granted that those two ideas are 
mutually exclusive” (p. 20). This is suggestive because it reminds us that Paul’s Semitic 
background could easily account for a flexibility in his Greek usage, permitting more 
than one meaning to reside in his genitival phrases. Perhaps the most famous of such 
phrases is δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ.605 
Garlington rightly states that “Paul has chosen to coin an ambiguous phrase expressive 
of two ideas: the obedience which consists in faith, and the obedience which is the 
product of faith…[and that] the ‘genitive of apposition’ and ‘genitive of source,’ while 
not inappropriate in themselves, are to be rejected as too restrictive.”606 Moreover, 
ὑπακοὴν πίστεως becomes less obscure when the discussion moves beyond lexical 
denotations (e.g., the subjective or appositional elements) and onto the important storied 
connotations (e.g., the implications and assumptions that exist behind the text).  
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What might Paul have been assuming in the phrase “obedience of faith,” and 
what is the significance of bringing “all the Gentiles” (ἔθνος in v. 5) into it?607 Paul, 
arguably, uses this phrase (and its immediate context) as part of a much larger working 
narrative and utilizes it “to encapsulate a world of thought.”608 It is true that in his 
introduction (specifically v. 7), Paul “draws upon concepts evocative of Israel’s 
relationship to Yahweh and applies them to all the Romans, the κλητοί of Jesus 
Christ.”609 Paul’s employment of beliefs and hopes which were once entirely exclusive 
to the Jews is now, mysteriously at this point, given to those who come in by “the 
obedience of faith.” Garlington comments further:  
The letter’s opening paragraph is paralleled by 1:16-17, which is normally perceived to 
be the letter’s thematic statement. However, in distinction to many traditional 
approaches to Romans, I take the theme to be the revelation of the righteousness of God 
in the gospel to all who believe – the Jew first but also the Greek. As such, 1:16-17 is 
the functional equivalent of 1:5, “the obedience of faith among all the nations.”610 
 
Moreover, agreement with Garlington that Paul is expanding the rights exclusive to 
covenanted Israel to “the nations” is supported, perhaps, when one observes the 
connection between ὑπακοή (occurring in v. 5) with עמש.611 The Shema, as a prayer with 
its strict focus upon monotheism, was foundational for God’s covenant people Israel.612 
The lexical association between the two, therefore, cannot go unnoticed.613 The idea that 
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obedience and hearing are closely connected is important,614 as the latter motif is 
obviously used in a covenant context for ancient Israel.615 The question, then, needs to 
be asked: Is Paul’s use of “the obedience of faith” drawing upon a larger covenant 
narrative?616 An affirmative answer to this question becomes clear when Paul refers to 
the Shema in the context of covenant (un)faithfulness later on which, interestingly, is 
also part of a discussion concerning Gentile inclusion (e.g., Rom 3:1-3, 29-31; cf. Rom 
1:5).617 Therefore, seeing ὑπακοή in Rom 1:5 as being linked to the Shema, which is 
itself utilized by Paul in the context of covenant faithfulness, one can conclude that 
when Paul uses ὑπακοή, he has in mind a specific covenant obedience. Or, in light of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutic, it is accurate to say that Paul’s use of ὑπακοὴν πίστεως is best 
understood within a Jewish horizon. To be sure, though, the motif of covenant here 
must be seen for Paul as christologically modified. Clues that this thesis is correct will 
be substantiated when Rom 2:12-29 is examined below.  
It is important to remember that Paul’s grand focus is on the question of 
faithfulness—both human and divine. Wright keenly observes that,  
[Roman 1:18 – 3:20] though, is not simply about “the human plight.” It is about God’s 
own problem and gives a preliminary statement of God’s way of dealing with it. God 
created humans to bear the divine image within the creation and called Israel to shine 
the divine light into the dark world. Faced with human rebellion and Jewish 
faithlessness, will God abandon these projects?618  
Specifically, the discussion on human and Jewish unfaithfulness (1:18–2:10) provides 
fertile ground for a debate about who will be identified as the people of God (2:11-29). 
Paul will climax his argument in the idea that “all, both Jews and Greeks, are under sin” 
(3:9). Paul has within his target particularly (though not exclusively) the unfaithfulness 
of the Jews, namely, that “Israel, too, has behaved in a pagan manner and will receive 
                                                                                                                                          
for religious activity are always to be thought of within the sphere of a religion which receives the 
divine Word by hearing and then translates it into action” (Gerhard Kittel, ed., Theological 
Dictionary of the New Testament, vol. 1 [electronic ed.; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1964], 224). 
See also Garlington, The Obedience of Faith, 11.  
 614 It is even more intriguing when Paul contrasts the two in Rom 2 (see below). 
 615 E.g. Deut 6:4. 
 616 As in e.g. Garlington, The Obedience of Faith, 247. 
 617 Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 420. See also 482.  
 618 Ibid.  
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the appropriate reward.”619 Despite it being clear that Paul is bringing the non-covenant 
Gentiles in on this indictment, he wants to show in 2:12-16 that there exists a scenario 
where Gentiles will be “justified…on that day” (2:13, 16) and not Jews who are “under 
the law” (2:12) and mere “hearers of the law” (2:13). Before he can get to that stage of 
the argument, however, Paul must point out the fact of human and Jewish unfaithfulness 
to their God. But even before this, he must point out God’s sure faithfulness to his 
people.  
5.4 The Question of Faithfulness and Righteousness  
The topic of divine faithfulness begins in Rom 1:16-17:  
Οὐ γὰρ ἐπαισχύνοµαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, δύναµις γὰρ θεοῦ ἐστιν εἰς σωτηρίαν 
παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι, Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἕλληνι· δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ 
ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, καθὼς γέγραπται· Ὁ δὲ 
δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται.620  
 
Several observations emerge. First, Paul’s not being ashamed is not to be 
interpreted in psychological terms.621 Second, it is correct to see a contrasting link here 
with the “shameful acts” of sinful humanity depicted in 1:27.622 Third, “salvation” is to 
include both Jew and Gentile, with the line of demarcation being drawn around those 
who believe, παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι, Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἕλληνι.623 Fourth, in the 
gospel, “the righteousness of God is revealed,” δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ 
                                                
 619 Moo, Romans, 429.  
 620 Rom 1:16-17. Cf. the translations in Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 38, and Wright, 
PFG, 1466. Concerning δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, the latter understands this as “covenant justice,” which 
rightly emphasizes the covenantal dimension of this highly technical phrase. While taking exception 
with Watson’s understanding of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ as one’s status before God (1466), Wright admits 
that the original context of Habakkuk suggests that “God’s righteousness” and “human 
righteousness” are not things to be played off against each other, but rather “belong firmly together” 
(1469; cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 43). More will be said below. 
 621 Hays, Echoes, 38-39, correctly links ἐπαισχύοµαι in v. 16 with the OT language of 
vindication and the faithfulness of God. Cf. Schreiner, Romans, 59-60; Fitzmyer, Romans, 255; 
Gorman, Crucified Lord, 348-349. 
 622 Nijay Gupta, “Human Idolatry and Paul as Faithful Worshipper of God: Reconnecting 
Romans 1:18-32 to 1:8-15 (Via 1:16-17),” Neot 46, no. 1 (2012): 29-40, citing 32-33. 
 623 Schreiner, Romans, 62, rightly sees Ἕλλην as denoting Gentiles in a general sense. Cf. 
Gorman, Crucified Lord, 349. 
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ἀποκαλύπτεται. Righteousness language is to be equated, all things considered, with 
God’s own faithfulness (see below).624 The “revelation” of God’s righteousness here in 
v. 17 finds its conceptual equivalent in Rom 3:21, where God’s righteousness is said to 
have been “manifested”: δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ πεφανέρωται.625 It is there, moreover, where 
one learns that this righteousness is “through the faithfulness of Jesus Christ, to all who 
believe,” διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, εἰς πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας (v.22; see below).626 
Coming to a highly relevant (and more debatable) matter, fifth, is how to translate ἐκ 
πίστεως εἰς πίστιν and how to make sense of the citation from Hab 2:4 in Rom 1:17.627 
On the first, it is probably best to understand the phrase as denoting “from faithfulness 
to faithfulness.”628 That is, in at least the first instance of πίστις, God’s own faithfulness 
is in view.629 This can be established by distinguishing πιστεύοντι in v. 16 (where human 
faith is obviously in view) from the other two occurrences of πίστις in v. 17a. The 
former is a description of how one receives the benefits of the saving power of God, 
which is inherent specifically to the gospel itself; the latter, by contrast, is a description 
of what the gospel is in its broad essence, namely, the revelation of the “righteousness 
of God,” and this, moreover, is the quintessence of the faithfulness of God. That is, the 
Gospel itself is a revelation of God’s own righteousness, a display of God’s faithfulness. 
                                                
 624 Contra Ibid., 69. Cf. Gorman, Crucified Lord, 350. See our discussion on Rom 3:3, 5 
below. 
 625 Though agreeing with Wright, PFG, 943, fn. 472, in seeing the link between 1:17 and 
3:21, it is not necessary to see much distinction between ἀποκαλύπτω and φανερόω. The two denote 
the same thing. 
 626 Cf. Douglas A. Campbell, “The Faithfulness of Jesus Christ in Romans 3:22,” in The 
Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical, and Theological Studies, eds. Michael F. Bird and 
Preston M. Sprinkle (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2009), 60, who notes the link between 1:17 and 3:21-
22, calling them “sibling texts, if not twins.” Contra R. Barry Matlock, “Saving Faith: The Rhetoric 
and Semantics of πίστις in Paul,” The Faith of Jesus Christ, 80-81, Rom 1:16-17 and 3:22 should not 
be seen as part of a “trio” of texts (with 10:11) that suggest an objective reading of πίστις Χριστοῦ in 
3:22.  
 627 Hab 2:4 is a significant citation in Romans and Galatians and “it has had an enormous 
influence on the interpretation of Paul” (Moyise, Paul and Scripture, 73). 
 628 Contra Fitzmyer, Romans, 263, who suggests either a progression of faith or else 
something like “faith and nothing but faith” (our words).   
 629 Contra Schreiner, Romans, 71-72, who sees human, not divine, faith as the focus. See 
also Moo, Romans, 76. Wright, PFG, 1466, sees the first as a reference to God’s faithfulness and the 
second as a reference to human faithfulness. Cf. Gorman, Crucified Lord, 350; Young, “Romans 
1.1-5,” 281. See also Moyise, “Quotations,” As It Is Written, 20-21. 
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There are two reasons to prefer this interpretation. First, it accords with the equation of 
righteousness language with faithfulness in Rom 3 (see below). Second, this 
interpretation serves to make sense of the subsequent Habakkuk citation, as 
demonstrated below.  
In v. 17, Paul follows ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν with καθὼς γέγραπται· Ὁ δὲ δίκαιος 
ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται. The introduction to the citation, καθὼς γέγραπται, suggests to the 
reader that the prepositional phrase finds warrant from Scripture itself, namely, Hab 
2:4.630 The original text (LXX) says, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεώς µου ζήσεται, “but the 
righteous will live by my faithfulness.”631 Thus, Paul, in distinction to the LXX, does 
not include µου in his quotation.632 Moreover, the MT says, היחי ותנומאב קי דצו, “but the 
righteous by his faithfulness shall live.” The noticeable difference between the LXX and 
the MT is that, in the former, the first person is used to clarify faithfulness, while the 
latter has a third person suffix to הנומא. Moo says that Paul follows the MT closer and is 
therefore much closer to its own meaning.633 One wonders, however, if this conclusion 
needs to be so definitive. For as Moo himself admits, Paul remains “unique in omitting 
any personal pronoun,” and it should not be assumed therefore that, just because there is 
an omission, one should automatically take Paul’s text here as being nearer the MT.634 
(Could not the same be said about the LXX, after all?) It could be that Paul did not think 
it was necessary to include the LXX’s µου, just as he also did with the MT’s third 
person pronoun. 
Belaboring the point is beyond our scope, but it must be pointed out that part of 
the issue is that some opt for the idea that human faith is in view precisely because of 
                                                
 630 See Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 38-45. Though Watson’s understanding of the 
citation itself is not to be preferred, his insights into the dependence between the citation and its 
antecedent are. See also Campbell, “The Faithfulness of Jesus Christ,” The Faith of Jesus Christ, 58. 
 631 Cf. Moo, Romans, 77-78, and Schreiner, Romans, 73, on the two different ways one can 
translate ἐκ πίστεώς µου from Hab 2:4 LXX so as to modify either δίκαιος or ζήσεται. Cf. Young, 
“Romans 1.1-5,” 280, who takes ζήσεται a reference to Christ’s resurrection.  
 632 See Joseph Fitzmyer, “Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 606, fn. 
15, who notes differences in the LXX MSS on this. 
 633 Moo, Romans, 76-77, fn. 65. Cf. Fitzmyer, “Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead 
Sea Scrolls, 606. 
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the way the connection between v. 16 and v. 17 is viewed. For instance, Schreiner 
dismisses the thesis that divine faithfulness (whether God’s or Christ’s) is in view 
because of how he understands v. 16, that is, how it—speaking solely of human faith as 
a response for salvation—is seen as the definitive way to interpret v. 17.635 It is 
undoubtedly true that v. 16 concerns human faith, but it is not necessary to assume from 
this that v. 17 does so as well. For it is syntactically possible that Paul switches his 
emphasis from human faith as a response to the Gospel in v. 16 to God’s own 
faithfulness in v. 17.  
Moreover, Francis Watson thinks the structure of Paul’s wording will not allow 
for the idea of a divine faithfulness view. Though admitting ἐκ πίστεως can denote 
faithfulness, he is not content with such a view due to the fact Paul says nothing explicit 
in that regard.636 He says “a reference here to divine faithfulness would require other 
indications in the context and it is just these that Paul fails to provide in his interpretive 
gloss.”637 Watson asserts that the lack of explicit use of phrases like “the faithfulness of 
God” make it “unlikely that this is intended in 1:17.”638 Maintaining the divine 
faithfulness view, he says, would “require a reader who is hypersensitive to what is only 
implicit in the citation – that the ‘faithfulness’ in question is God’s or Christ’s – while 
ignoring the explicit contextual interdependence of citation and antecedent. A reading is 
to be preferred that can make sense of that interdependence.”639 It is hard to see how this 
is convincing.640 Watson seems to make a sweeping assumption, namely, that only 
explicit features of a text are allowed to convey genuine meaning, or, at the very least, 
these features are to be preferred over the implicit ones. Either way, such claims are 
hard to defend (see below). It is necessary to maintain the integrity of the essential link 
                                                                                                                                          
 634 Ibid. Moo compares this with Hebrews 10:38 as well. 
 635 Schreiner, Romans, 74.  
 636 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 46.  
 637 Ibid. 
 638 Ibid. 
 639 Ibid. 
 640 Though seeing this as a reference to Christ’s faithfulness is, as Wright, PFG, 1470, has 
said “probably a bridge too far.” Cf. Campbell, “The Faithfulness of Jesus Christ,” The Faith of 
Jesus Christ, esp. 64-66; Young, “Romans 1.1-5.” Gorman, Crucified Lord, 350.  
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and interdependence between citation and antecedent. It seems, though, that Watson 
thinks this link cannot be maintained by any view but his own precisely because he 
already assumes what the antecedent (in his view) needs to say based upon his views 
concerning the citation.641  
Furthermore, Schreiner is mistaken to suggest that, just because Paul failed to 
include µου that Paul therefore “intended to eliminate [the] possibility” that God’s 
faithfulness would be in view.642 One wonders if it is too strong to speak of the 
impossibility of the view in question. Could it not have been the case that God’s 
faithfulness was implied? Is it not possible that the implied portions of the text remain 
integral? These questions should be answered positively for reasons given below. 
The original context of Habakkuk suggests that what is in view is about trusting 
in God’s promise and covenant faithfulness.643 The context of Habakkuk does suggest 
that, even if human faith/faithfulness were in view (per the MT), the implied (and 
underlying) contextual emphasis is indeed a trust upon God’s own faithfulness.644 Truly, 
                                                
 641 See Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 45-46, esp. fn. 54, where his particular translation of 
the quoted Hab text is integral to his views. He opts for, “‘The one who is righteous by faith will 
live’ rather than, ‘The righteous one will live by faith.’” He then sees “by faith,” ἐκ πίστεως, in 1:17a 
as “scriptural” (45). He translates this antecedent as “by faith” because he is not comfortable with 
understanding the citation’s “by faith,” ἐκ πίστεως, as referring to divine faithfulness. The reasons 
are because of his comments about his preferences concerning empirical and implied features in the 
antecedent (45-46; see above). Watson is correct to highlight the interdependent relationship of text 
and antecedent (46), but his way of going about it is problematic, as the Hab text highlights God’s 
own faithfulness—however implicitly (see below).  
 642 Schreiner, Romans, 74. 
 643 See Wright, PFG, 1468-1471. See also Hays, Echoes, 40, who sees the original context 
of Hab 2:4 as being a “response to the problem of theodicy, an implicit assertion of God’s 
righteousness. The faithful community is enjoined to wait with patience for what they do not see: the 
appearing of God’s justice. This hope God will not disappoint.”  
 644 Even Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 148, says, “Whether they think in terms of 
‘faithfulness’ or ‘faith’, the prophet and the apostle are at one in their assumption that emunah and 
πίστις refers to the human response to the divine promise of definitive, eschatological saving action.” 
This, arguably, demands to be pressed further so that the emphasis is upon God’s faithfulness (our 
thesis). Wright, PFG, 1467, is correct in his critique when he says that Watson fails to see how this 
saving action of God has to do with God’s own covenant faithfulness. This is precisely our own 
present point. (Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 148-149.) See also Hays, Echoes, 40-41, who 
insightfully posits that Paul perhaps draws on both traditions (MT and LXX) in order to render the 
question of “whose faithfulness?” as ambiguous to say, in effect, that “in the gospel God’s own 
righteousness is revealed; and the gospel is the power of God for salvation to everyone who 
believes” (emphasis original). Cf. Moyise, Paul and Scripture, 88. 
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the faithfulness of God gives foundation to any subsequent call for human 
faith/faithfulness to God.645 It is not without reason, then, to suggest this is what Paul 
intended to convey as well. One wonders if strict attention to the text’s denotations have 
concealed its connotations. Thus, even if one were to follow the MT’s rendering and 
argue that human faith/faithfulness was in view, one must not fail to see this as a 
response to an already-implied and an even more paramount emphasis regarding divine 
faithfulness. Arguably, this emphasis was operative in Paul’s own rhetorical use of the 
quotation. It could be argued that the LXX emphasizes the divine foundation for a 
subsequent human response of faith/faithfulness, while the MT emphasizes the later 
(though without neglecting the former emphasis).646 In fact, this seems evident given 
how הנומא functions textually.647 Divine and human faithfulness, therefore, should not 
be played off against each other.648 Coupling all of this, secondly, with the fact that, 
within Romans, there is precedence for the parallel of righteousness language with that 
divine faithfulness in Rom 3:3 and 5 is instructive (more will be said on this below).649 
This parallel is essential for understanding the link between δικαιοσύνη and πίστις in v. 
17.  
In conclusion, Paul must be seen as emphasizing the faithfulness of God, even if 
human faith/faithfulness were in view on some level with the Habakkuk quotation. This 
emphasis on divine faithfulness, particularly in regard to righteousness language and its 
link to the Gentile question, remain pertinent for the make up of the narrative 
                                                
 645 See Wright, PFG, 1469. This idea fits quite well in Rom 1:16-17.  
 646 See again Hays, Echoes, 40-41, for a similar view. Wright, PFG, 1468, thinks it is 
possible the LXX’s addition of µου reflects either the original Hebrew text (the change, he says, was 
perhaps due to “an easy orthographic slippage”), or because the LXX translator understood µου as a 
gloss of “the more natural reading.” Cf. Moo, Romans, 78-79. 
 647 Moo, Romans, 78, fn. 69, observes the verbal cognate of הנומא “is used more often to 
depict a person’s acceptance of God’s words and promises and trust in and reliance upon him (Gen. 
15:6; Ex. 14:31; Num 20:12; 2 Chron. 20:20; Ps. 116:10; etc).” This lends to our view that, 
regarding Habakkuk in Rom 1:17, what is in view is ultimately God’s own faithfulness. Thus, an 
argument that says this is “misguided” (e.g. Schreiner, Romans, 74) is without warrant.  
 648 Again, see Wright, PFG, 1469. Cf. Garlington, The Obedience of Faith, 10-11. 
 649 Contra Schreiner, Romans, 68-69. 
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substructure, a narrative that, as will be seen, provides the hermeneutical background 
for Paul’s citation of Hosea in Rom 9:25-26.650 
5.5 Human Unrighteousness and Unfaithfulness 
While many views on 1:18-32 are well known, our attention will be focused 
primarily on those issues that are relevant for our investigation.651 Verses 16-17 are 
followed by a discussion on “the wrath of God,” which is “against all ungodliness and 
unrighteousness of men” (18a).652 Despite the temptation, one should not see an ultimate 
distinction between “ungodliness” (ἀσέβειαν) and “unrighteousness” (ἀδικίαν) in v. 18653 
because even if one were to observe what Cranfield has already noted—namely, that 
some understand ἀσέβεια as a violation of “the first four Ten Commandments” and 
ἀδικία as disobedience to “the last six [commandments]”654—both ἀσέβειαν and ἀδικίαν, 
though perhaps expressing varying nuances, have something much more inherent in 
common. There are at least two reasons for coming to this conclusion, both noted by 
Cranfield, saying,   
…in view of the fact that the single πᾶσαν embraces both ἀσέβειαν and ἀδικίαν, and the 
fact that in the participial clause ἀδικίᾳ by itself is apparently meant to represent the 
double expression, it is more probable that they are here used as two names for the same 
thing combined in order to afford a more rounded description of it than either gives by 
itself (ἀσέβεια focusing attention on the fact that all sin is an attack on the majesty of 
God, ἀδικία on the fact that it is a violation of God’s just order).655 
                                                
 650 Cf. the critique of Hays about “theodicy” in Moyise, “Does Paul Respect the Context?” 
Paul and Scripture, 110-111. 
 651 See Nijay Gupta, “Human Idolatry,” 29-30, who documents some of the views. Cf. 
Gorman, Crucified Lord, 352-354. 
 652 Cf. Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 38, on the “Adam theology” of 
Rom 1:18-32 and 5:12-19 as being “aimed specifically at the Jewish nationalistic self-
consciousness.” On the contrast between 1:17 and 1:18, cf. Peter Stuhlmacher, Paul’s Letter to the 
Romans: A Commentary, trans. Scott J. Hafemann (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1994), 
35f; Fitzmyer, Romans, 277-278. 
 653 Schreiner, Romans, 88. Fitzmyer, Romans, 278. Contra Jewett, Romans, 152. 
 654 C.E.B. Cranfield, The Epistle to the Romans, vol. 1 (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975), 
112. 
 655 Ibid. 
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Cranfield rightly observes first the presence of πᾶσαν as an aid in the 
understanding Paul’s use of ἀσέβειαν and ἀδικίαν, though for reasons given below it is 
his second observation that is significant, namely, “the fact that in the participial clause 
ἀδικίᾳ by itself is apparently meant to represent the double expression.”656 Cranfield is 
referring to the use of ἐν ἀδικίᾳ in v. 18b: “who by their unrighteousness suppress [ἐν 
ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων] the truth.” Knowing that “ἐν is the workhorse of prepositions” in the 
New Testament writings, it is understood that anytime ἐν is paired with a dative, there is 
a list of syntactical categories at the interpreter’s disposal—one of which is the 
instrumental use.657 How do the unrighteous and ungodly “suppress the truth” (18b)? 
Paul states it is “by their unrighteousness, ἐν ἀδικίᾳ.”658 This is telling, for it assumes 
that there exists for Paul a conceptual distinction between both “truth” and 
“unrighteousness.” However one defines “unrighteousness,” it cannot be understood to 
be “the truth”; after all, the former is what is suppressing the latter.659 Furthermore, 
verses 19a–20c serve largely as the reason for the final indictment of 20d: “They are 
without excuse.” It is clear Paul wants his readers to know that “the truth” of God (18b) 
and “what can be known about God” (19a) is evident, “plain to them” (19b), because 
“God has made it known” (19b). And it is this “truth” that is suppressed by 
“unrighteousness” (18b).  
But what is meant by “truth” in v. 18? Schreiner sees vv. 21-23 as describing 
what he calls “the root sin,” saying, “the root sin that dominates human beings and 
unleashes God’s wrath is specified in verses 21-23. These verses describe the same 
reality in various ways, but the fundamental sin is the failure to glorify God and give 
him thanks (οὐχ ὡς θεὸν ἐδόξασαν ἢ ἠυχαρίστησαν…).”660 The problem with saying “the 
failure to glorify God and give him thanks” is at the same time “the fundamental sin” is 
that it runs contrary to the text, for the true “fundamental sin” is what Paul seems to call 
                                                
 656 Ibid. 
 657  Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the 
New Testament (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 372. 
 658 Cf. the comment on v. 19 in Stuhlmacher, Romans, 36.  
 659 This proves to be important later; see below. 
 660 Schreiner, Romans, 87. 
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“ungodliness and unrighteousness” (v. 18) and not a failure to give God glory. Schreiner 
essentially takes “unrighteousness” mentioned in v. 18 and conflates it with the act of 
exchanging “the glory of the immortal God” in v. 23. But a careful reading will not 
allow for this. This is best seen when looking at v. 23 in conjunction with v. 25, which 
explains how humanity has gone about not honoring and thanking God. It is best to 
understand these two verses in comparison to one another.661 Verse 23a states: “[They] 
exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man and birds 
and animals and creeping things.”662  Likewise, v. 25: “They exchanged the truth about 
God for a lie and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator.”663 Thus, it 
is “the truth about God” and “the glory of the immortal God” which are set in parallel to 
one another. Paul’s discussion, then, of “exchanging the glory of God” in v. 23 and 
exchanging “the truth about God” in v. 25 come into focus: The “truth” and “glory,” 
both having been exchanged, mean to convey the same idea for Paul, that is, they are 
best seen as synonymous. Furthermore, the “truth” (ἀλήθεια) of v. 25 is to be understood 
as the “truth” (ἀλήθεια) that is “suppressed” in v. 18.664 Schreiner rightly observes: “But 
what truth (ἀλήθεια) have people suppressed unrighteously? The reference to ἀλήθεια in 
verse 25 provides a clue as does the subsequent context in verses 21-23. The truth that 
people have unrighteously suppressed and rejected is that the one true God should be 
honored and worshipped and esteemed as God.”665 
He is correct to say that the “truth” being suppressed in v. 18 is the truth that 
God is worthy of worship and glory. However, it is better to see v. 21 as an explanation 
of what is meant by “suppress the truth” at the end of v. 18 as opposed to a definition of 
what is meant by “unrighteousness” at the beginning of v. 18. The problem is how 
                                                
 661 Moo, Romans, 112; Cf. Jewett, Romans, 169–170. 
 662 Emphasis ours. 
 663 Emphasis ours. 
 664 See Jewett, Romans, 170, and his comments on v. 18.  
 665 Schreiner, Romans, 88. Cf. Moo, Romans, 112-113; Jewett, Romans, 170; James D. G. 
Dunn, Romans 1-8, ed. Ralph P. Martin, vol. 38a (WBC; Dallas: Word Books, 1988), 56, 63. Dunn 
(63) understands “truth” here as being grounded in a Jewish worldview, conveying God’s reliability 
and trustworthiness.  
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Schreiner defines “sin” and how he subsequently colors (and defines) 
“unrighteousness.” He says, 
We need to reflect further on the main thesis that Paul advances. Failing to glorify God 
is the root sin. Indeed, glorifying God is virtually equivalent with rendering him proper 
worship since Paul describes (v.25) the same reality as surrendering the truth of God for 
worship of the creature…We saw in 1:17 that the righteousness of God is rooted in his 
desire for the glory and honor of his name. He saves his people because it will bring 
glory to his name. It is hardly surprising to see, then, that the essence of sin is a 
rejection of God’s glory and honor. Sin does not consist first and foremost in acts that 
transgress God’s law, although verses 24-32 indicate that sin is the transgression of the 
law. These particular acts are all rooted in a rejection of God as God, a failure to give 
him honor and glory.666  
Schreiner follows this with an intriguing summary of his understanding of what the 
“righteousness of God” is in its most basic form: 
Paul uses the word “unrighteousness” (ἀδικία) twice in verse 18 to describe the sin of 
human beings…Human unrighteousness most fundamentally consists in a refusal to 
worship God and a desire to worship that which is in the created order. Unrighteousness 
involves the refusal to give God his proper sovereignty in one’s life. Since refusal to 
honor and glorify God is described in terms of ἀδικία, we have a clue here that both the 
saving and judging righteousness of God are rooted in a desire to see his name glorified. 
His wrath is inflicted upon the world because he is not prized, esteemed, and 
glorified.667 
It is true that, in the strictest sense of the word, unrighteousness “consists” in failing to 
worship God and it is perhaps truer still (generally speaking) that a “refusal to honor 
and glorify God is described in terms of ἀδικία.”668 One should be cautious, however, to 
understand ἀδικία as being reduced to these things.669 Schreiner seems to suggest this. 
For example, he says: (1) “Failing to glorify God is the root sin” and (2) that, “Paul uses 
the word “unrighteousness” (ἀδικία) twice in verse 18 to describe the sin of human 
beings.”670 Depending on what Schreiner means by “consists” and how he takes ἀδικία 
as a description of failing to ascribe God glory, it seems that he is on some level 
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 669 He is, however, much closer to Paul when he says, “Unrighteousness involves the refusal 
to give God his proper sovereignty in one’s life” (Schreiner, Romans, 88). The problem with 
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equating unrighteousness here with his own understanding of sin. It is perfectly 
agreeable, of course, to equate sin and unrighteousness. But the problem is that 
Schreiner arguably reads into his definition of sin the glory motif precisely because he 
does not trace carefully the way righteousness language works. Schreiner is not as clear 
on this issue as he might have been.671 
Perhaps it is not helpful in the long term to say that, for Paul, the “refusal to 
honor and glorify God is described in terms of ἀδικία.”672 It seems that 
“unrighteousness” should not be conflated to mean (or worse, equated with) not 
glorifying God,673 but rather to say that it simply results in such failure.674 This might, on 
first appearance, seem like splitting hairs, but the ramifications of not making such 
distinctions will prove problematic in the end as it will only serve to blur Paul’s 
covenant-based narrative. The basic problem with Schreiner’s exegesis is that it does 
not seem to consider that it is the “unrighteousness of humanity” in v. 18 that acts as the 
instrument by which “the truth” (i.e., that God should be glorified) is suppressed. 
Indeed, “the truth” that God deserves to be glorified and worshipped, which humanity 
has suppressed, has been done so “by their unrighteousness” (v.18).675 It is exegetically 
unsatisfying to suggest, therefore, that the instrument by which the truth is suppressed is 
also, at the same, the truth that is suppressed. Thus, whatever “unrighteousness” means 
in this passage,676 it cannot be said to be in itself the “failure to glorify God” (i.e., “the 
truth” of v. 18).677  
                                                
 671 Cf. Edward Adams, “Abraham’s Faith and Gentile Disobedience: Textual Links Between 
Romans 1 and 4,” JSNT, no. 65 (March 1997): 47–66, esp. 48, 65.  
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 675 Emphasis ours. See above on the instrumental use of the preposition.  
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What, then, can be said about Paul’s use of (un)righteousness language? It has 
been argued that, within Rom 1:19-23 (namely, vv. 22-23), Paul is “deliberately, though 
covertly, retelling the story of Genesis 3.”678 Arguably, there is plenty of room within 
the text itself for such a view.679 Wright offers comments on the nature of the first and 
“primal sin”: 
The primal sin was a matter of obeying instructions, or at least suggestions, not from the 
creator in whose image humans were made, but from an agent within creation itself. 
Instead of recognizing wisdom as an attribute of the creator, to be gained by 
worshipping and serving that God, humans boasted in a wisdom that consisted in 
supposed independence. But this wisdom consisted in the greatest folly possible—
namely giving allegiance instead to images of humans and also of birds, animals, and 
reptiles.680 
The “primal sin” (cf. with Schreiner’s “fundamental sin”) therefore concerns notions of 
allegiance, obedience, and faithfulness to God, not the glory of God (at least not 
specifically so). This view coheres with Paul’s stated mission of bringing Gentiles into 
“obedience,” namely, the ὑπακοὴν πίστεως (1:5). Thus, 1:5 acts as the answer to the 
fundamental problem of humanity – the failure to remain in allegiance to God, which 
has served to bring about the suppression of God’s glory and honor. Wright’s narrative 
view thus makes better sense exegetically as the text states that the “truth” is 
“suppressed” by “unrighteousness” (1:18; see above). When unrighteousness language 
is observed in this light, Paul’s argument gains some clarity. Further insight will be 
achieved, moreover, when one comes to see how Paul’s understanding of righteousness 
(faithfulness) has been reconstructed due to his christological pre-understandings (see 
below). This will be no minor detail in terms of working pre-judgments. 
In summary, “unrighteousness” should not be understood as the failure to glorify 
God, but is rather a failure of loyalty to God – resulting in a failure to glorify him. The 
important observation gleaned for our present purposes is that “unrighteousness” carries 
with it the idea of failing to stay faithful to the Creator, remaining obedient and allegiant 
to him. The issue concerns obedience. This conclusion was further reinforced when 
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Paul’s use of ὑπακοὴν πίστεως was considered. That is, “obedience,” in some way or 
another, was the answer to the plight of humanity mentioned in ch. 1:18ff. After this, 
Paul moves to his implied Jewish audience (ch. 2). There Paul will address what 
righteousness looks like, how it can be gained, and who can have it. 
5.6 Righteousness: By Hearing or Doing the Law? 
In ch. 2, Jewish righteousness is questioned. By starting with “therefore” (διὸ), a 
link is provided back to 1:32 as, 
[Paul’s] rhetorical tactic is to gain Jewish approval in 1.18-32 by reiterating an 
established line of Jewish critique of the immoral Gentiles, and then to turn the tables 
on his implied Jewish critics in 2.1 by pronouncing that they are just as guilty, aiming to 
achieve a rhetorical effect similar to that of Nathan’s charge against David in 2 Sam. 
12.7.681 
In fact, Paul presents a scenario where Gentiles are deemed more righteous than their 
Jewish counterparts.682 Rom 2:1-5 mark out the hypocrisy of Jewish judgmentalism, 
placing Jewish sin on the same level as the rest of humanity.683 Space does not permit a 
full accentuation into all the difficulties surrounding vv. 6-10 regarding what role works 
play in the final judgment.684 All the same, there seems to be in vv. 6-10 a stated 
emphasis upon the universality of God’s righteous judgment—whether in the giving of 
eternal life to those who in “patient good-working” pursue “glory and honor and 
immortality” (v.7) or wrath to those who do not (v.8).685 The principle point here is that 
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the judgment of God is not in any way, shape, or form subject to one’s racial or ethnic 
identity.686 This is evidenced from the use of πᾶς in vv. 9-10, as well as the well-known 
phrase “the Jew first and also the Greek” occurring in the same verses. Thus, whatever 
may be said about works and final judgment, it is universality and non-partiality that is 
front-and-center, as v. 11 says, “For there is no partiality with God.” This is a telling 
sign that the objective for Paul is to turn upside down the ethnic barriers and distinctions 
which served to separate Jews from Gentiles. Paul is not explicit about all that he is 
doing here, though things become clearer in what immediately follows in vv. 12-29 and 
in what follows even beyond that.687 
The fact that ethnic concerns between Jews and Gentiles are in view for Paul is 
explicit in v. 12. Here, the motif of law-keeping is observed, and Paul’s remarks about 
those who have “sinned without the law” and those who have “sinned under the law”688 
certainly serves to “[correspond] to the distinction between Jews and Gentiles.”689 
Commenting on what is meant by “the law” in v. 12, Moo observes that, “for Paul the 
unconverted Jew, ‘law’ refers, unless other qualifications are present, to this specific, 
historical, body of commandments that functioned, more than anything else, to give 
Israel its particular identity as a ‘people apart.’”690 Thus, Paul’s discussion is in pointed 
reference to that which distinguishes “the Jews” from others. The subject centers, 
therefore, on the question of identity. Specifically, Paul will argue that ethnic identity 
does not ultimately matter in being justified. Indeed, Jewish—i.e. physical lineage—is 
irrelevant insofar as justification is concerned. This is because “it is not the hearers of 
the law who are righteous before God, but the doers of the law who will be justified” 
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(Rom. 2:13).691 Thus, law-keeping is the foundation for justification (more on this 
below). Paul’s goal, of course, in the greater context is to set aside “Jewish 
superiority.”692 But his argument proceeds beyond this. Garlington notes rightly that 
2:12-16 serves to argue “that the possession of the law is in itself no guarantee against 
the wrath in the day of judgment; what is required is obedience to the law, which 
Romans as a whole clarifies to be the ‘obedience of faith’” (Rom 1:5).693 Of course, 
“obedience” was the very thing that humanity was not in 1:18-32; there humanity was 
ἀδικία, which connoted disloyalty (see above). 
Returning to the puzzling phrase of Rom 1:5, εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως, “the 
obedience of faith,” light begins to shine upon Paul’s overall thought. His intentions 
behind that phrase become sharper once the false—not to mention tediously 
distracting—dichotomy of either a subjective genitive understanding or an appositional 
one is avoided and a focus is given to the broader implications of Gentile inclusion into 
the covenant. Support for this stems from the context of 2:12-29. Here it is the “doers 
[and not necessarily the possessors] of the law who will be justified [δικαιόω]” before 
God (2:13). Again, one must remember 1:18, namely, that ἀδικία was set in terms of 
unfaithfulness, non-allegiance, and disobedience. The substance of 2:12-15, then, must 
not be viewed as an entirely new discourse or argument. One reads in 2:13 that, despite 
humanity’s ἀδικία, some of humanity (the Gentiles), by becoming “doers of the law,” 
will become “righteous” (δικαιωθήσονται). But what is meant by “doers of the law”? 
The “doers of the law” in Rom 2:13 is more than a “hypothetical category.”694 
Rather, since “the Judaism of Paul’s day knew of a future vindication based on present 
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fidelity to the covenant,” Paul wanted to reshape what, exactly, it meant to be faithful to 
the covenant, i.e., keeping the law, since the Messiah had now come.695 Paul’s “concern 
is seen to be that of calling into question the prevailing understanding of who ‘the 
righteous’ are and the grounds on which they may expect to be justified.”696 And to him, 
being “justified” meant becoming a “doer of the law.” The specific identity of those 
who are the “doers of the law” in 2:13 is understood when one notes the γὰρ in 2:14.697 
From this, we understand the “doers of the law” in v. 13 as “the Gentiles” mentioned in 
vv. 14-15. Gathercole notes that the scholarly consensus concerning the identity of “the 
Gentiles” in vv. 14-15 could be summed up as falling into one or two categories: the 
“non-Christian” and “Christian understandings.”698 The former would see vv. 14-15 as 
some sort of reference to “natural law,”699 in that Paul had imported into his soteriology 
a sort of “Hellenistic philosophy,”700 whereas the latter would see the same passage as 
referring to Gentiles who believe in Christ, and so “carry out the Torah as Christian 
believers.”701 Though the “believing-Gentile” reading of Rom 2:14-15 remains perhaps 
“a minority position,”702 there are notable scholars who have rightly argued for this type 
of reading.703 More will be said on this question below.  
                                                
 695 Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 60. 
 696 Ibid.  
 697 For an opposing view to how the γὰρ is functioning here, see Schreiner, Romans, 121. 
(Cf. Moo, Romans, 148.) 
 698 Simon J. Gathercole, “A Law unto Themselves: The Gentiles in Romans 2.14-15 
Revisited.” JSNT 85 (March 2002): 27-49, citing 29.  
 699 Ibid, 38. 
 700 Ibid, 37.  
 701 Ibid, 29. Emphasis ours.  
 702 Ibid. Gathercole states additionally that within the “the most common taxonomy of 
interpretations,” i.e., the Gentiles-as-believers and Gentiles-as-non-believers views, the latter “can 
be further subdivided into those scholars who see the purpose of these verses as establishing the 
responsibility of these Gentiles such that their condemnation is deserved [he calls this, ‘By far the 
majority position’ (fn. 10)], and those who see a positive portrayal of these Gentiles, whereby some 
unregenerate Gentiles have a better chance of vindication at the day of judgment than many Jews” 
(29; emphasis original). See also Mark A. Seifrid, Christ, Our Righteousness: Paul’s Theology of 
Justification [NSBT 9; Downers Grove: IVP, 2000], 53-54; cf. Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 
441-442.  
 703 See Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles: Beyond the New Perspective (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 215. See also the catalogue of scholars mentioned in Gathercole, “Law,” 
29-30.  
  
131 
It should be noted that justification in Rom 2:12-16 “is not present justification,” 
but rather “future.”704 Wright cautions, however, that the two differences in timing 
cannot “be played off against one another,” saying further that, “they belong together: 
present justification, as Romans makes clear, is the true anticipation of future 
justification.”705 The issue of timing in vv. 12-16 is beside the point for our purposes. 
That these Gentile “doers of the law” will be justified in the manner Paul describes is 
what remains paramount (more below). 
Michael Bird understands “the law in question as the Mosaic law.”706 This seems 
clear from v. 14: “For when the Gentiles, who do not have the law by nature, do the 
things of the law, though they do not have the law, they are a law to themselves,” ὅταν 
γὰρ ἔθνη τὰ µὴ νόµον ἔχοντα φύσει τὰ τοῦ νόµου ποιῶσιν, οὗτοι νόµον µὴ ἔχοντες ἑαυτοῖς 
εἰσιν νόµος. The fact that Gentiles are said to “not have the law,” τὰ µὴ νόµον ἔχοντα, 
should shed some light on what is meant by “the law” in 2:13—namely, that it is 
precisely that law which typified the Jews as distinct from the other nations (ἔθνη). A 
further clue is provided by φύσει, which follows the phrase. Opinions abound on how 
φύσει functions within this verse.707 Both Gathercole708 and Bird709 argue for a reading of 
2:14 as, “For when the Gentiles, who do not have the law by nature [φύσει], do the 
things of the law…” thus not allowing φύσει to modify ποιῶσιν but ἔχοντα.710 Bird 
comments, 
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The Gentiles are not persons who by nature do the law, instead the Gentiles are simply 
those who do not have access to the law as intrinsic to their ethnic identity. This is 
supported further by the use of φύσις again in Rom. 2:27 ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία (“by 
nature uncircumcised”) and denotes those who are outside of the covenant by birth.711 
A potential problem with saying φύσει is used to modify ἔχοντα is due to the fact 
that the word φύσει itself is outside of the phrase that contains ἔχοντα, and thus, 
arguably, should not be seen as its modifier.712 Gathercole argues against this objection 
(namely, against Dunn and Fitzmyer), saying that just because φύσει occurs outside of 
the phrase ὅταν γὰρ ἔθνη τὰ µὴ νόµον ἔχοντα, it does not necessarily imply the word in 
question (i.e., φύσει) does not modify another word found within the phrase (i.e., 
ἔχοντα).713 Gathercole cites specific examples to prove his point.714 Moreover, 
Gathercole comments that “one of the strongest arguments is that of Achtemeier and 
Maertens,” who both argue that “‘in every other instance in Paul’s letters’ φύσει is not 
used to ‘describe an action’, but rather argue ‘to characterize further some group.’”715 
Therefore, it is best to see Rom 2:14 as referring to “gentiles who [even though they do 
not] by nature have the law,” are able to “do the things of the law.”716 This being so, 
understanding v. 14 as such illuminates further the fact that what is at stake is ethnic and 
boundary, and thus identity, distinctions.717 
Returning to the phrase “doers of the law,” clarity is gained by allowing it to be 
illumined by Rom 2:25-29.718 Though more will be said on this link below, we note 
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presently that in v. 26, for example, the one who “keeps the precepts of the law” will 
“be regarded as circumcision,” though they are physically uncircumcised. And the one 
who “keeps the precepts of the law” (v. 26) – an expression reminiscent of earlier 
phrases about those who are “doers of the law” and who “do the things of the law” (vv. 
13-14) – are participating in a “comprehensive, not partial, fulfillment of Torah.”719 But 
how can they be seen as law-keepers? More will be said on this in the next chapter, but 
the way in which the uncircumcised are incorporated into the community of the 
circumcised, and hence fulfill the Torah, is for Paul through faith. Commenting on Rom 
4:12, Wright emphasizes this well when he says that it is not only true “that [the] 
uncircumcised believers are welcome into Abraham’s family but that the circumcised 
are welcome too if they too believe.”720 Being a “doer of the law” is rooted in faith in 
Christ.721 Of course, at this point in Paul’s argument, this is conjecture, for nothing 
explicit has been stated yet. That said, considering the context of 2:1-24, Paul is here 
only concerned with a preliminary stage of his much larger argument—namely, that 
ethnic distinctions are breaking down in regard to identifying those who will be justified 
at all. Paul’s main concern presently is the fact that there is a situation where law-
possessing Jews will not be justified and non-law-possessing Gentiles will.722 Although, 
the point about a christological role at the final judgment should be given full weight 
(2:16).723 After all, Paul states that Gentiles “show that the work of the law is written on 
their hearts…on that day when, according to my gospel, God judges the secrets of men 
by Christ Jesus” (Rom 2:15-16.)724 Just as the emphasis in vv. 6-11 is on perseverance, 
as well as the universality and impartiality of God’s judgment (see above), one must not 
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miss that, for Paul, the judgment itself has been realigned around the person of Christ.725 
There would perhaps have been no major controversy about these details, as Paul’s real 
polemical thrust, indeed his fundamental hermeneutical move, is that the Jewish idea of 
future judgment takes upon itself a christological focus.726 Thus, Paul’s point in this 
section is that Torah-keeping, which leads to divine acquittal, has now been revised.727 
More will be said on this below. 
Some scholars, however, propose a different construal. Schreiner, for example, 
does not see the obedience in question as a “saving obedience,”728 and Preston Sprinkle 
concurs, saying that the “emphasis in Rom 2:15-16 [is] on the condemnation, not 
salvation” concerning the people in question.729 Moreover, Dunn states that the phrase 
“doing (the things of) the law” is something Paul can, 
express…with some vagueness, simply because he need not be specific yet. It is enough 
for his present argument to adduce the example of Gentiles who show a moral 
sensibility such as the law looks for and greater than that shown by many Jews. He does 
not actually say that this “work of the law” will guarantee their acquittal on the day of 
judgment; if anything his language is designed rather to explain how it is that Gentiles 
who sin without the law can yet be held responsible (vv 12, 15bc).730  
Wright’s narrative framework, however, is to be preferred. First, Paul must be seen as 
alluding back to the new covenant promises of Jer. 31:33.731 Second, the phrase “the 
                                                
 725 Cf. Stuhlmacher, Romans, 43, who calls the reference to Christ “an emphasized remark.” 
However, this being rhetorically “sarcastic,” as Stuhlmacher supposes, is perhaps a stretch. Cf. 
Fitzmyer, Romans, 312. 
 726 See the discussion in Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 69, below. 
 727 See Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 34-43, who thinks Paul equates 
Jewish idolatry (in Rom 2:22 specifically and its greater context) to be a denouncement of their 
insistence on holding on to the Torah while neglecting Christ. He says (43) that, “For [Paul] Israel’s 
refusal to relinquish the Torah, the very emblem of its distinctiveness, was nothing less than an act 
of idolatry, because God had destined Jesus Christ to be the sacrifice for sins and the gateway of 
salvation for all races…[the unbelieving Jews came to] exalt the Torah to a status it was never 
intended to have in the long-rage purposes of God; it was to make the law an end in itself rather than 
a means to an end, viz., the coming of (the) faith (Gal 3:23-25). To phrase it another way, what 
Israel was seeking in the Torah Paul found in Christ.” 
 728 Schreiner, Romans, 124.  
 729 Preston M. Sprinkle, Paul & Judaism Revisited: A Study of Divine and Human Agency in 
Salvation (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2013), 190. Emphasis original.  
 730 Dunn, Romans, 38a, 107.  
 731 Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 442. Against this, Sprinkle, Paul & Judaism, 190, 
says that, while the “language is very close to Jeremiah 31:33 (38:33 LXX)... it is not conclusive”; 
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work of the law written on their hearts” (2:15) corresponds to732 the phrase 
“circumcision is a matter of the heart” (2:29).733 Moreover, the new covenant theme and 
allusion in 2:29 to Deut 30:6 is noticeable.734 The one with a circumcised heart is one 
whose “praise is not from man but from God” (2:29). Thus, those who are “doers of the 
                                                                                                                                          
cf. Schreiner, Romans, 122, who says something similar.  
 732 Cf. Schreiner, Romans, 119-126, who does not see doing the law in vv. 14-15 as a 
reference to Gentile Christians, though he does see them being referenced in vv. 26-29 (139-145). 
Interestingly, he does link the phrase in v. 13b, “the doers of the law…will be justified,” with the vv. 
25-29, saying it is not necessary to take v. 13b as a “hypothetical” (119). Moreover, he dismisses any 
supposed allusion to Jer. 31 in v. 15 (122), though he does say a connection can be made to the OT 
prophet when Paul discusses “circumcision of the heart” in v. 29 (142-143). Regarding his views 
about vv.14-15, Schreiner states that Paul’s point is that, since the Jews boasted in their possessing 
the law, Paul wanted to counter such a boast on the basis of the fact that the Gentiles, too, have heard 
of the law; therefore, the Jews should not boast in hearing the law when, for all practical purposes, 
so had the Gentiles. The two groups, then, are rendered to be no different in their standing before 
God. Schreiner acknowledges his view is “controversial” (see 116-117). In the end, Schreiner’s view 
in seeing a distinction between Rom 2:14-15 and Rom 2:25-29 is unpersuasive for two reasons. 
First, the whole of v. 13 should be linked to v. 14—that is, “the doers of the law” in v. 13 must be 
seen as connected to doing the law in v. 14 (contra Schreiner, Romans, 121, who sees v. 14 as only 
being linked to v. 13a, thus bypassing the phrase “the doers of the law” in v. 13b). By going this 
route, one can more easily come to see the connection between doing the law and circumcision 
language in vv. 25-29 simply because the law itself, being grounded in the covenant God made with 
his people, had become the foundational expression for Jewish covenant faithfulness (see Dunn, 
Romans, 38a, 119ff, and Moo, Romans, 166-167). It is hard, therefore, to see how “the doers of the 
law” in v. 13 could not also be seen as those who had become part of the “circumcision” by 
“keeping the precepts of the law” in vv. 25-29, since “law” and “circumcision” were so linked, at 
least covenantally. Second, when Paul speaks of “doers of the law” in v. 13, he understands this in 
terms with what is said in v. 15, namely, that “the law is written on their hearts” (see Sprinkle, Paul 
& Judaism, 190, who acknowledges the syntactical link between the two here). Moreover, what is at 
stake in vv. 12-16 is that which has to do with the heart, “the secrets of men” (v.16), all of which 
makes sense to view as the conceptual equivalent of being a Jew “inwardly” and “circumcision 
being a “matter of the heart” in v. 29. Cf. Stuhlmacher, Romans, 48. 
 733 See also the discussion in Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 440-442, 448-450, who, 
when commenting on vv. 14-15 (and vv. 12-13), says Paul will provide more clarity when he gets to 
vv. 25-29 (441). Wright even says that the discourse on “circumcision” in vv. 25-29 is “parallel with 
the point about Torah” (448) mentioned earlier. (Cf. Dunn, Romans, 38a, 127-128, on the redefining 
of even the term “Jew.”)  
 734 Wright, “Romans 2.17-3.9: A Hidden Clue to the Meaning of Romans? (2012),” 
Perspectives, 502-503. Cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, 322-323. See Jub 1:23, where the allusion to Deut 
30:6 is observed. When this part of Jubilees is compared to Rom 2:25-29, a striking difference is 
noticed between the two competing uses of the Deuteronomic promises. Starling, Not My People, 
129, rightly observes that, “Whilst the Deuteronomic language of the circumcise heart has obvious 
Pauline parallels (most notably Rom. 2:25-29) there is no hint in Jubilees that this motif is employed 
to narrow the scope of true Israel (as is the case in Rom.2:26-27); for the writer of Jubilees, the hope 
of restoration is a hope for all Israel, and to return to God is (emphatically and explicitly) to return to 
his commandments. Nor is Israel’s return ‘from amongst the Gentiles’ (Jub. 1:14; cf.1:8, 12) at any 
point explicitly or implicitly presented as a paradigm for the repentance of the Gentiles” (emphasis 
original). 
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law” are those who “have the law written on their hearts,” acquiring true 
“circumcision.” It is that group of people who are “righteous,” those who are 
“justified,” those who are “obedient” and “allegiant.” This group is the opposite of those 
who are “not in the right” (ἀδικία) in 1:18, those who are found to be disobedient and 
disloyal. Wright sees the entire issues as being about “status,” saying,  
…without needing either to have a previously existing Jewish category of ‘keeping the 
law’ in some attenuated or limited sense to draw upon, or to have worked out the 
implications of what he is saying in more than rudimentary detail, he is able to assert as 
a matter of theological logic (compare logisthēsetai in 2.26) that (c) uncircumcised 
gentile Christians do in fact ‘keep the statutes of the law’, as Ezekiel said. The 
prophecies of covenant renewal and blessing upon the gentiles have come true. The 
beneficiaries must be ‘fulfilling the law’ by their very existence. The question of an 
ethical ‘fulfilment’ such as that of 13.8 (corresponding very broadly to Luther’s tertius 
usus legis) is not yet in view. The fulfilment of which Paul speaks is, I think, first and 
foremost a matter of status.735 
Wright concludes by saying that the notion of “keeping the law” is best “seen as a new 
sort of theological category, derived from the ‘new covenant’ theme, ranged 
polemically against the failed Jewish ‘lawkeeping’, but yet to be worked out fully. It is a 
matter, not of achievement, nor yet of ethics, but of status.”736 One might very well 
wonder if such a “theological category” for Paul, like the theological categories utilized 
by the sectarians at Qumran, should also be understood hermeneutically?737 If “doers of 
the law” is truly about status and is at the same time a hint toward a “righteousness by 
faith in Christ” (which is to come shortly in Paul’s argument), then based on the 
continuing narrative substructure, we suggest that Paul’s “doing the law” is a concept 
that has been revised and reformulated due to factors existing within his own particular 
horizon of understanding.738  
                                                
 735 Wright, “The Law in Romans 2,” Perspectives, 141. Emphasis original. 
 736 Ibid. Cf. Schreiner, Romans, 140; Moo, Romans, 171. Wright, “The Law in Romans 2,” 
Perspectives, 139-140, questioning what Paul might have meant by law-keeping and completing the 
law in vv. 26-27, says that he cannot be referring to the decision of those Gentiles who have decided 
to become “law-observant Jews,” for they are, after all, not even circumcised. He further describes 
(140) Rom 2:26-29, 3:27, 8:4-9, and 10:4-11 as a “sequence” and a “crescendo of passages in which 
Paul says…that Christians do in fact fulfill the law, even though…they have not done what to a Jew 
was one of its most basic commands.”  
 737 See Section 6.1 below. 
 738 This becomes clear by the time Rom 3-4 comes along. See below. 
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This is not to deny that more is in play insofar as the final judgment is 
concerned—namely, Spirit-wrought works (Rom 2:6-11; cf. 29). And to be sure, this 
issue is important and continues to be debated. 739 But the problem which often snags 
real progress toward a proper understanding of Rom 2:12-16 is that debate has been too 
focused upon details surrounding how, and in what way, works plays in the final 
judgment.740 Garlington, then, is correct to point out that the critical issue was that 
Christ, not Torah, is now the focus of such perseverance:  
Of course, the idea of perseverance is hardly unique to Paul. Even a passing 
acquaintance with pre-Christian Jewish literature is sufficient to inform one that the 
issue before many of its authors was precisely loyalty to the Mosaic standards in the 
face of widespread apostasy. But what is new in Paul is that perseverance has changed 
its focus: no longer are the people of God to obey the Torah but rather the “form of 
teaching,” i.e., the Pauline gospel concerning God’s Son, to which they have been 
committed (Rom 6:17 in connection with 1:1-3a; 2:16). For him perseverance is bound 
up with one’s inclusion in Christ: only in Christ is there no condemnation (Rom 8:1); it 
is Christ who insures the perseverance of his people (Rom 5:12-19).741 
As will be seen, though being important to highlight presently, the point is that 
everything now centers upon faith in Christ as the all-encompassing requirement of the 
law, i.e., “the obedience of faith” (Rom 1:5).742 If Paul’s understanding—i.e., his 
judgment—is that Gentiles can be included in the covenant and can therefore be “doers 
of the law” (though they do not possess the law), then Paul’s christological horizon of 
understanding must be seen as making this understanding intelligible. The rhetorical 
emphasis, then, in Rom 2:12-16 should not be understood primarily about the 
relationship between works and the final judgment as much as it is about the fact that all 
believing uncircumcised Gentiles are now considered part of “the circumcision” and, as 
                                                
 739 See e.g., Sprinkle, Paul & Judaism, 186-192; Piper, Justification, 103-116; Wright, 
Justification, 182-193; Wright, “Justification: Yesterday, Today and For Ever (2010),” Perspectives, 
434-436; Gathercole, Where is Boasting, 124-135; Bird, The Saving Righteousness, 172-178; Cf. 
Seifrid, “Unrighteous by Faith,” Justification and Variegated Nomism, 124. 
 740 Cf. Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles, 209. 
 741 Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 69. Emphasis original. Wright, “The 
Letter to the Romans,” 437, commenting on Rom 2:1-16, says, “[The typical] Jewish depiction of 
the last great assize is now transposed into a Christian key: The judgment will be ‘through the 
Messiah, Jesus’ (2:16).” 
 742 See Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 420. See also Garlington, The Obedience of 
Faith, 248, who speaks of how the, “The complex of eschatology and Christology has for Paul 
expanded the horizons of the ‘obedience of faith.” Cf. Gorman, Crucified Lord, 355. 
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such, are considered full covenant members because they are in Christ.743 For Paul, 
there is now an obvious difference between saying, “The Gentiles do not have the law” 
and “the Gentiles are outside of the covenant.” That is, the former no longer implies the 
latter. Mere possession of the law is not sufficient for justification, thus placing Jews on 
equal ground with the Gentiles (2:12-29). And the Gentiles, who do not “have the law” 
yet end up doing “what the law requires” (v. 14), show “that the work of the law is 
written on their hearts” (v. 15), hence identifying the believing Gentile as a covenant 
member (as “justified”) and the disobedient Jew as a covenant breaker (cf. vv. 14, 17-
24). Therefore, Gentiles who find themselves “outside of the covenant” are not so 
because they are Gentiles (i.e., not because they are that group of people who “by nature 
do not possess the law”; v. 14). Rather, they are outside because they simply do not join 
the covenant (i.e., become that group of people who “do what the law requires”; v. 14). 
This is to observe negatively what Paul observes positively. But of course, some 
Gentiles do in fact “show that [i.e., ‘identify themselves as ones in whom’] the work of 
the law [has been] written on their hearts” (v. 15). This happens when they become 
“doers of the law,” irrespective of the fact that they never “by nature” possessed the 
law. Negatively, the point here is that the condition for Gentile inclusion is not natural 
possession (and hearing) of the law. The condition for Gentile inclusion is something 
other than being born into it by nature. This justification is a reversal of humanity’s 
status quo in 1:18 (recall ἀδικία), the focus of his apostolic calling in 1:5, and therefore 
in line with his greater argument.  
5.6.1 Summary 
There will be in the final judgment (vv. 6-11) Gentiles who fulfill the law by 
doing it (vv. 12-16) and who will “condemn” those who, unlike them, “have the written 
code and circumcision but break the law” (v. 27). Circumcision, after all, “is a matter of 
the heart, by the Spirit, not by the letter” (v. 29). These uncircumcised and non-
covenanted Gentiles nevertheless will be justified (v. 13), i.e., included in the covenant. 
Though much more remains to be seen, it must be pointed out that, significantly, this is 
the exact issue found in Rom 9:25-26 with the Hosea quotation: How could a Jewish 
                                                
 743 This emphasis remains highly important for the enquiry into 9:25-26 (see below). 
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promise of covenant inclusion ever find its fulfillment in Gentiles, who, by nature, were 
not the intended recipients? In Paul’s specific use of the oracle in Rom 9, then, it must 
be entertained that a specific fore-structure of understanding—something not unlike 
Gadamer’s concept of Vorurteil—was at work which served to establish his new, and 
revisionist, understanding of the oracle, something very much like his new 
understanding of law keeping in Rom 2.744 It stands to reason, then, that the perceived 
hermeneutical problem of Rom 9:25-26 that has worried modern interpreters could be 
accounted for if Paul’s Vorurteile were brought to light.  
Gadamer says, “Es bedarf einer grundsätzlichen Rehabilitierung des Begriffes 
des Vorurteils und einer Anerkennung dessen, daß es legitime Vorurteile gibt, wenn 
man der endlich-geschichtlichen Seinsweise des Menschen gerecht werden will.”745 In 
light of Gadamer’s efforts to this end, therefore, one must ask, what prejudgments 
informed (and formed) Paul’s understanding of what it meant to be “doers of the law,” 
by which Gentiles can be said to have been included? In ch. 2, Paul was not explicit, 
except for what is mentioned in v. 16, about the christological basis for justification and 
covenant inclusion for the Gentiles.746 But he does not have to be forthright; after all, 
pre-judgments, being components of one’s interpretive fore-structure of understanding, 
exist behind explicit judgments. As we will see as his argument progresses, what it 
means to be a doer of the law in Rom 2 is for Paul re-oriented around his christological 
convictions.747 The judgment Paul makes concerning believing Gentiles being covenant 
members is what it is because of this hermeneutical pre-judgment, Vorurteil, concerning 
                                                
 744 That Paul’s understanding of carrying out the requirements of the law in Rom 2 is 
revisionist will become clearer when we see Rom 3-4 below. 
 745 Gadamer, WM, 281; TM, 278. See again Sections 4.4 and 4.5 above. 
 746 Cf. Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 441, who says, “Throughout this section so far 
Paul has been saying things that cry out for further explanation, which he will provide as the letter 
moves forward. He is at this point sketching a scene, not filling in the details... Paul’s view, to 
anticipate the later argument, is that those who are in Christ, who are indwelt by the Spirit, do in fact 
‘do the law,’ even though, in the case of Gentiles, they have never heard it.” (Emphasis ours.)  
 747 This view is, again, not without warrant among biblical scholars. E.g. Garlington, Faith, 
Obedience, and Perseverance, 70-71, comments, “With [the] necessary christological qualifications, 
‘doing the law,’ in Rom 2:13, is no different in kind than the OT’s classic statement of ‘covenantal 
nomism,’ Lev 18:5: one continues to live within the covenant relationship by compliance with its 
terms, i.e., perseverance. Otherwise put, in Christ one becomes, according to 2 Cor 5:21, ‘the 
righteousness of God’” (emphasis original). 
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the reality of the Christ-event in relation to the manifestation of the righteousness of 
God. This will be clarified in subsequent discussions below. 
For comparative purposes, it is helpful first to attend to the reading practices of 
Paul’s contemporaries. Portions from the CD and Pesharim remain particularly helpful 
to this end since, like Paul’s writings, they actively engage Scripture (specifically the 
twelve prophets), as well as with motifs that are relevant for this study (e.g., Torah-
keeping, the Gentile question, and covenant fidelity). What will be shown below is how 
prejudgments in general are at play for the sect in reading the scriptural texts, not least 
in regard to the above motifs. Much like Paul, it will be seen that the sect’s interpretive 
judgments about Scripture have the meanings they do because of the essential pre-
judgments that lie behind them. What will be discovered is that both Paul and pesherist 
interpret texts according to their respective community’s fore-structure of 
understanding. In this vein, clear similarities and dissimilarities will emerge.  
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Chapter 6: Texts and Contexts, Part 2 
6.1 Pesharim and CD748 
In what follows, a comparative analysis of the interpretive practices in the 
Pesharim and CD will allow us to evaluate better Paul’s own reading of similar 
prophetic texts – not least Hosea in Rom 9:25-26. Specifically, this section enhances our 
broader study by making several observations. First, it will be seen that the sect often 
interprets texts creatively. This section allows us, then, to demonstrate that interpretive 
creativity was not a practice exclusive to Paul but something common to all interpreters 
due to the prejudices they have (as Gadamer says). 
Second, while it will be observed that Paul and the sect are often similar in their 
creative use of Scripture, clear differences will still be evident. For example, when we 
compare below what it means to do the law for the pesherist with Paul’s understanding 
of the same in Romans, noticeable differences emerge due to the distinct prejudices that 
each one brings with them to the text.749 This section is significant for our entire study, 
therefore, because it will demonstrate, among other things, the role interpretive 
prejudices played in the creative reading of texts – a creative reading that was so 
integral to confirming and validating each interpreter’s respective communities. 
 (a) Joel 2:12, 13 in 4Q266 fxi 5  
The quotations from Joel 2:12, 13 follow a string of two others from Lev 4:27 
and 26:31. The quoted portion from Joel reads: “And in another place it is written: 
‘Turn to God in weeping and fasting’” (4Q266 fxi 4-5; v. 12). This is followed by: 
“^And in another place it is written, ‘Tear your hearts and not your garments^’” (4Q266 
fxi 5; v. 13). The quotation that occurs before the one from Joel, namely, Lev 4:27 (lines 
2-3), states that those who sin “in unintentional error” are to offer a “sin-offering.” 
Following this is Lev 26:31 (lines 3-4), which states that God will not “smell the 
                                                
 748 In what follows, the reader is encouraged to keep in mind the observations gathered in 
Section 2.3 above. 
 749 This becomes clear by the end of chapter 6. 
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soothing aroma” of the sacrifice. In other words, even though there is the divine call to 
make such sacrifices, these have been rejected by YHWH. The point of the passage, and 
the quotations which support it, is to denounce those sacrifices presently happening in 
the Temple.750 Immediately following the Joel 2:13 quotation one reads: “And everyone 
who despises in these ordinances [  מטפש ] according to the mouth of all the statutes [ חק ] 
which are found in the Torah of Moses will not be considered among all the sons of his 
truth” (lines 5-7). Those who perform sacrifices in the temple, the non-sectarians, are 
despising the ordinances of the Law and are not considered “sons of his truth.” A 
sectarian bent is obvious here. 
Furthermore, in line 10, there is a brief discussion about the “peoples” ( ]ע[םימ ). 
This should be understood as “the Gentiles” because the ]ע[םימ  are further described as 
being divided in terms of “languages” (line 10). Moreover, these “peoples” are those 
who have been caused to “err/go astray in a pathless chaos” ( ולו והתב םעתתו ךרד {ולו} ; 
lines 10-11). In distinction to these people, it is read that: “You chose our fathers and 
gave their descendants your truthful statutes [ חק ] and your holy ordinances [  מטפש ], so 
that man could carry them out and live” (lines 11-12). When understood in light of the 
Joel citations and the comments about them in lines 5-7 (see above), it is easy to see that 
the “statutes” ( חק ) and “ordinances” (טפשמ) (which have not been carried out by Jewish 
non-sectarians nor have they been given to the nations) have nonetheless found their 
fulfillment in the sect itself. Lines 12-19 reinforce this conclusion. For example, the sect 
sees YHWH as the agent who has set up their “boundaries” and those who “transgress” 
them will be cursed (lines 12-13). The transgressors are in distinction to the sect, who 
remain the “people of your redemption,” the “sheep of your pasture” (line 13). 
According to the sect, it is they who have been “caused to be raised up,” contrary to 
those who are under the “curse” (line 14). Lines 15-16 speak of the person who has 
been expelled from the sect, and “those who dwell in the camps” are those who “will 
curse” those who swerve from the Torah (line 17). Lastly, it is read that “this is the 
explanation/interpretation of the ordinances (טפשמ) which they are to do in the entire 
age of visitation...] (lines 17-18).” 
                                                
 750 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 88.  
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Unlike the non-sectarians, the sect follows the “statues” [ חק ] and “ordinances” 
[טפשמ] of God (cf. lines 5-7 and 11-12). Sectarianism, then, seems to be much more 
than a mere sociological category, but also a sort of hermeneutical lens through and 
from which Scripture is read.751 That is, these scriptural texts find the meaning they do 
because of a sectarian Vorstruktur des Verstehens. After all, the assumption in the 
implied author is that the texts cited speak to the sect’s own contemporary situation, 
their dispute with the temple leaders; thus, the texts were meant for them.752 Indeed, 
“contemporizing tendencies” are distinctive to pesher in general.753 Steven DiMattei is 
therefore right to observe that, “[O]ne of the central characteristics of pesher exegesis, 
that which best defines its hermeneutical presupposition, is its contemporizing 
eschatological interpretation of prophetic texts, sometimes referred to as an 
‘actualization’ of the text or as ‘fulfillment’ interpretation.”754 He continues, 
The hermeneutical principles or assumptions at work in Qumran pesharim are thus 
often recognized as a conviction that (1) biblical prophecies refer to end times, and (2) 
the end time is now. In other words, Israel’s historical past is to be interpreted in light of 
the contemporary circumstances or history of the sect, with the added belief that the 
community is currently living in the end times.755 
Both our observations and DiMattei’s here will prove significant as further pesher texts 
are examined below.  
Furthermore, with a comparison between the sect and the “peoples,” that is, the 
Gentiles, one sees how the latter have gone astray but the former remain privileged, 
                                                
 751 On the sociological aspects of the Qumranites (not least in regard to their hermeneutical 
activity), see Charleswhorth, Pesharim, 6-14. Cf. Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 3-4. 
 752 Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 101-102. Connecting this observation to Gadamer’s 
theory, see Section 4.7 above. Cf. Brooke, “Reading the Plain Meaning,” Jewish Ways of Reading 
the Bible, 90. 
 753 Lim, Pesharim, 52. See also Lim, Holy Scripture, 120. 
 754 Steven DiMattei, “Biblical Narratives,” As It Is Written, 77. See also Shani Berrin, 
“Qumran Pesharim,” in Biblical Interpretation at Qumran, Studies in the Dead Sea Scrolls and 
Related Literature (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 114; Lim, Pesharim, 52. 
 755 Ibid., 77-78. Regarding our continued observations on Paul’s interpretations below, 
DiMattei rightly asks, “Are these not the same hermeneutical principles that govern Paul’s approach 
to biblical narrative…?” See also p. 88, where DiMattei—in line with what we have said at the 
beginning of this thesis about “contextual awareness”—observes how definitions about “meaning” 
and “context” should be understood to include the “contemporary” and “eschatological” place and 
“situation to which the text is applied” (i.e., for Paul and pesherist). 
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those who are in line with the covenant purposes of God. Using Scripture as the 
foundation, the sect’s chosen status is reinforced; they are the beneficiaries of God’s 
covenant favor, as opposed to those who are “cursed”—those who swerve from the 
Torah (line 17). It is the sect who has kept the “statutes” and “ordinances.” 
Sectarianism, as a type of theological-sociological category is explicit (e.g. see lines 5-
7). “The Qumranites’ interpretation of Scripture defined and shaped their ideology and 
categorized their Community.”756 But, arguably, one must take notice that the 
Qumranites’ ideology and Community served to shape their interpretation of Scripture 
as well. In this way, then, the sect’s sectarianism is operating at some level 
hermeneutically. For example, generally speaking, non-sectarian Jews—those being 
denounced by the sect—would have seen themselves as also carrying out the prescribed 
statues and ordinances, thus faithfully interpreting the Law.757 What gives the sect’s 
particular quotations its rhetorical voice is the fundamental prejudgement, Vorurteil, 
that the Torah, with its “ordinances and statues,” must be carried out according to a 
sectarian interpretation of the Law.758 
Our observations are congruent with DSS specialists. For example, looking at 
the use of Micah in the Community Rule, Tzoref has observed certain “exegetical 
modifications” in the citation of Micah that “[emphasize] community.”759 Tzoref says 
further, “The author of 1QS combines biblical allusion with self-referential linguistic 
modifications in order to recontextualize the verses from a specific historical setting 
concerning Israel as a whole, to a more general ongoing situation pertaining to his 
community.”760  
                                                
 756 Charlesworth, Pesharim, 41. 
 757 See Bilhan Nitzan, “Repentance in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 150-
151, especially fn. 19. 
 758 Cf. the discussion in Ibid., 149-151. 
 759 Shani Tzoref, “The Use of Scripture in the Community Rule,” in A Companion to 
Biblical Interpretation in Early Judaism, ed. Matthias Henze (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 222.  
 760 Ibid., 222. Tzoref says, however, that such recontextualizations are not flippant, 
unchained from the original context (see e.g. 207, fn. 15; and 212). Cf. Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 
41-42, on the work of F.F. Bruce and O. Betz; Lim, Holy Scripture, 95-111. 
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(b) Micah 2:6 in CD iv 20 
That this is the case is seen, for example, in CD iv 20. This text utilizes Mic 2:6 
in order to provide scriptural foundation for the identification of the sect’s enemy, 
Zaw.761 With the witness of other scriptural texts (Is 24:17; Gen 1:27), the greater 
context of this passage concerns judgment upon Israel. Belial, it is said, will be released 
against those in Israel as a judgment against their “fornication,” “wealth,” and 
“defilement of the Temple.”762 Moreover, the “builders of the wall walk after Zaw,” 
who is described as “the one who preaches” (line 19). In line 20, the scriptural text is 
introduced with רמא רשא, “of whom he said.” The Mic 2:6 citation immediately 
follows: “They will surely preach.” Zaw might have been a “leader in the priestly 
establishment” or perhaps even the Man of Mockery.763 The exact identification is 
irrelevant, though it is important to observe in this case that “it is clear that the sect’s 
opponents are all identified in advance in the prophetic scriptures.”764 Indeed this is a 
recurring prejudgment, a hermeneutical Vorurteil, in the sectarian texts. What remains 
clear, then, is the sect has from the outset already assumed certain hermeneutical 
parameters from which they will read the prophetic texts—parameters including a pre-
commitment to the idea that the prophetic text has specific contemporary relevance.765  
This prior notion of contemporaneity, inherent to their sectarianism, acts as an 
interpretive forestructure for their way of reading the texts.766 That sectarianism is in the 
background is perhaps evident from the way the text, “they will surely preach” (line 20; 
Mic 2:6), is applied. The plural construction “is actually a reference to a single preacher, 
Zaw,” an enemy of the sect who, arguably, held a prime position within the temple 
establishment.767 This unique application suggests a helpful insight: finding Zaw as the 
                                                
 761 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 89.  
 762 Cf. Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 30. 
 763 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 89. 
 764 Ibid. 
 765 That this has a contemporary focus, see Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 30. 
 766 Cf. Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 3-4, 283. Recall the role of contemporaneity 
(Gleichzeitigkeit) in Gadamer’s thought. See again DiMattei, “Biblical Narratives,” As It Is Written, 
77-78.  
 767 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 89. 
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focal point of the application of the text is possible if and only if there exists some 
concrete and situational frame of reference from which it can emerge, namely, an 
already-in-place sectarian horizon of understanding.768  
(c) Malachi 1:10 in CD vi 13-14 
Line 13 cites Mal 1:10 to provide scriptural justification for not participating in 
the events occurring at the temple.769 Column vi begins by noting that some have falsely 
prophesied over Israel in order to lead them astray, but God raised other men up to help 
Israel regain their spiritual footing (lines 1-3). Citing a passage from the Torah, a 
metaphor is given about how these men “dug the well,” saying, “The well the princes 
dug, with a staff the nobles of the people dug” (Num 21:18; lines 3-4).770 The 
interpretation is given: the well is the Torah, those who dug it out are those of Israel 
who turned and repented ( שבו ) and thus left the land of Judah and began to dwell in the 
land of Damascus (lines 4-5).771 With a citation from Is 54:16, the staff is said to be “the 
interpreter of the Torah” (line 7).772 The nobles, too, are those who have dug the well 
(lines 8-9).  
The issue is about the sect’s exodus from the temple life and to a true keeping 
and interpretation of Torah.773 Thus, lines 11-14: “But all of those who have been 
brought into the covenant shall not enter into the temple in order to cause to light his 
altar in vain.” This is followed by: “They are those who cause to shut the door, of which 
God said, ‘Whoever among you would shut my door [...] and will not cause to light my 
                                                
 768 Cf. Tzoref, “Community Rule,” in Companion, 230, who says, “The author of the 
Community Rule rereads his biblical source texts to accommodate his own message, but he does not 
wreak havoc on the original sense of the text in its biblical context. He recontextualizes the scriptural 
terms and concepts within his own sectarian system, reworking inherited conceptions and 
interpretations within his interpretive framework.” 
 769 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 90. Watson acknowledges the trouble with this 
understanding of the sect’s interpretation, though he rightly proceeds with it (see 90, fn. 60). 
 770 Cf. Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 30-31. 
 771 Cf. Ibid., 57-60. 
 772 See Collins, “Reading for History,” 302-303, on why the “interpreter of the Torah” here 
should be understood as the Teacher of Righteousness. Cf. Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 64; Lim, 
Pesharim, 75. 
 773 Cf. Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 31. See Nitzan, “Repentance in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” 
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altar in vain” (Mal 1:10; lines 13-14). Those who “cause to shut the door” finds its 
Scriptural basis upon the “of which God said” introductory phrase. The point, it seems, 
is that participation in the temple is strictly prohibited for those who have left Judah—
those “who have been brought into the covenant.”774  
The original context of Mal 1:10, is a denouncement of those who offer poor 
offerings to God (Mal 1:6-14). Verse 10 specifically calls for a person to arise in order 
to close the doors so that sacrifices would not be offered in vain anymore. It is therefore 
easy to see why the sect utilized this text as support for separating themselves from the 
temple establishment and their works. The context of Mal 1:10 does indeed support, in 
terms of theological principle, a certain denouncement upon those who offer improper 
sacrifices which are not in strict accordance with the law. However, the citation itself, 
for the sect, contains little rhetorical weight in its own denouncing of the temple 
establishment unless a sectarian fore-structure of understanding is already at work. 
Once again, one can be certain that the temple establishment most certainly would have 
understood their teachings and practices in the temple to be in accordance with the 
Torah. What is assumed—and that is the key word—for the sect is that (1) the original 
text prophetically spoke directly to their contemporary situation and (2) that their 
sectarian approach to Torah is the only means by which correct interpretation is 
achieved.775 The passage from Mal 1:10 is not utilized merely to argue for a sectarian 
understanding of the Torah, but is also read from a decidedly sectarian pre-
understanding. That is to say, the Mal 1:10 citation makes little sense, having no 
rhetorical force or weight, unless one reads it through the lens of an already-established 
                                                                                                                                          
The Dead Sea Scrolls, 159-160, esp. fn. 47, on observations concerning the sect’s temple theology.  
 774 Furthermore, the following practices, among others, are commanded as well: stay 
separate from “the sons of perdition” (lines 14-15); stay away from “unclean wicked wealth” (line 
15); and “from the wealth of the temple” (line 16). By separating oneself from these things, one is 
walking in line with “the new covenant in the land of Damascus” (line 19). The fact that the “wealth 
of the temple” is mentioned serves to reinforce the idea of the moral opposition between the sect and 
its temple counterparts. Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. 90.  
 775 See above. Cf. Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 41-42, on F.F. Bruce and O. Betz. 
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sectarian commitment.776 Thus, one might suggest that the sect’s sectarianism operates 
hermeneutically. 
(d) Amos 5:26-27; 9:11 in CD vii 14-15; CD vii 16  
 In CD vii 14-15 and 16, passages of Amos are cited in such a way to validate the 
sect’s departure from Jerusalem and into Damascus.777 The texts cited read: “As he said, 
‘I will cause to remove the Sikkut of your king and the Kiyyun of your images from my 
tent to Damascus’ [CD vii 14-15; Amos 5:26-27].”778 This is followed by the “books of 
the Torah [הרותה ירפס] are the Sukkat of the king” (lines 15b-16a).779 Then a scriptural 
citation from Am 9:11 is given: “For which is said, ‘I will cause to rise the fallen Sukkat 
of David’” (line 16).780 “A reference to the ‘star of your god’ is omitted from the 
quotation but included in the interpretation, in conjunction with a text from 
Numbers,”781 which according to the CD, reads: “A star travels from Jacob and a scepter 
rises from Israel” (Num 24:17; lines 19-20). Interpretations are then given: the king is 
associated with the assembly, the Kiyyune of the images are the prophetic writings, and 
the star is “the Interpreter of the Torah” (see lines 16-19).782 
                                                
 776 One wonders how this might compare with Berrin’s observation regarding motive in the 
pesharim: “Although ‘motive’ is rarely viewed as a ‘generic factor,’ it may be the key to the most 
informative description of pesher. After all, the identifying form of pesher, its sectarian 
contemporizing eschatological content, and the conception of inspired exegesis inherent in its 
production are all means to a particular end. Each of these factors is essential for the maximal 
achievement of authorial motive: the communication of the theologically significant truth latent in 
the selected biblical base text” (Berrin, “Pesharim,” in Biblical Interpretation at Qumran, 133; 
emphasis original). See also Lim, Pesharim, 52, as well as cf. comments in Lim, Holy Scripture, 
111. 
 777 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 89. See also CD vi 1-19.  
 778 See Florentino García Martínez and Eibert J. C. Tigchelaar, eds., The Dead Sea Scrolls: 
Study Edition, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 561 and 577, (CD vii 10-21 and CD xix 7-12, 
respectively), for how the oracles quoted differ between the A and B texts. (See also Watson, 
Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 90.) 
 779 See Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 306. 
 780 On the link between the Amos 9:11 and 5:27, see Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 306-307. 
 781 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 89. The reference to “star god” is in Am 5:26. 
 782 See Knibb, “Eschatology and Messianism,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 387-389, on the 
textual and interpretive issues surrounding this text. See again Collins, “Reading for History,” 302-
303, on the identity of the Interpreter as the Teacher (cf. CD vi 7). See also Brooke, Exegesis at 
Qumran, 307; Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 64, 75. 
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 The sectarian pre-understandings are particularly evident here. For example, it 
seems that, in the original text, Amos 5:26-27 prescribes judgment (hence “exile” in v. 
27). Those going into exile “beyond Damascus” are being sent due to sin and judgment 
(see Am 5:11ff). The CD, however, understands the passage as referring to them, the 
sect, who is sent to Damascus. The textual changes which occur between the CD and 
MT perhaps suggest this.783 The conclusion reached from the sect’s reading of the text is 
that they are the ones who, on prophetic grounds, are “sent out” from Jerusalem into the 
region of Damascus. The “star”—the Interpreter of the Torah—will be sent to them as 
well.784 Nothing in the original context suggests this particular reading.785 But what does 
become clear is that these resultant interpretations are such because the sect, once again, 
reads them from a sectarian horizon of understanding.786 Regardless as to whether these 
particular pre-commitments are (or are not) conducive to a proper reading of Amos, our 
only point is to say that pre-understandings are at work. 
 With the quotation of Am 9:11 (line 16), the introductory statement “as he said” 
(רמא רשאכ) serves as a scriptural support of the sect’s interpretation that the “books of 
                                                
 783 The CD reads “I will cause to remove the Sikkut of your king and the Kiyyun of your 
images from my tent to Damascus” (CD vii 14-15),” while the MT has, “And you will lift up Sikkut 
your king, and your images, your star god, which you have made for yourselves; and I will exile you 
beyond Damascus” (Am 5:26-27). The somewhat major textual differences occur between the first 
and last clauses of each passage. The first is that, in the CD, the first person Hifil perfect is used: “I 
will cause to remove” (יתילגהו); in the MT, the second person Qal perfect is used: “you will lift up” 
(םתאשנו). Secondly, in the CD it is read that the Sikkut will be removed “from my tent to 
Damascus” (קשמד ילהאמ; line 15. Cf. translation given by Martínez and Tigchelaar, 1:561), but the 
MT reads “beyond Damascus” (קשמדל האלהמ; Am 5:27). That “Damascus” might have been a 
referent to Qumran, see Hempel, The Damascus Texts, (58-59) 60. See also Watson, Hermeneutics, 
2nd ed., 88, fn. 55; cf. Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 306.  
 
 784 See Knibb, “Eschatology and Messianism,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 387, on the 
grammatical ambiguity. 
 785 This is not to deny, however, that certain exegetical techniques might have been at work 
such that the sect was able to ascertain from (or give?) the biblical text certain meanings (e.g., see 
Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 306). Putting the question of exegetical method aside, we are asking 
the question of hermeneutics (a distinction that is even made by Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 283). 
Whatever techniques and rules the pesherist might have employed, we wish to enquire into the 
horizon of understanding that gave rise to the pesherist’s technical approach to the biblical text. The 
pesherist’s decision to employ a particular method over some other one (whatever options he might 
have had) was in Gadamerian terms determined by his specific questions for the text at the time of 
reading. This is all the more true when one considers that the employment of a particular exegetical 
method was not always consistent (Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 354-355).  
 786 See again Sections 4.4 and 4.5 above. 
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the Torah [הרותה ירפס] are the Sukkat of the king” (lines 15a-16b). These “books of the 
Torah” are among those things which will be carried away “to Damascus.” It is 
interesting that the context of Amos 9:11-15 itself, as the final portion of the entire 
prophetic text, concerns the promised eschatological restoration of “the captivity of my 
people Israel” (v.14 MT). Furthermore, the prophet speaks of this renewal as 
permanent, never again to be uprooted (v.15). Thus, by citing Amos 9:11, it is likely 
that the sect saw themselves as living in the middle (or perhaps the beginning?) of this 
renewal.787 At any rate, the sect conceived themselves as playing an integral part in the 
time of the renewal and restoration. And it is important to point out that Torah and 
Torah’s proper interpretation are no longer, according to the sect, to be found in 
Jerusalem but from within the sect. When compared to Paul’s discussion of Torah in 
Rom 2, this becomes intriguing. 
(e) Zechariah 13:7 in CD xix 7-9  
The passage from Zechariah is employed to denounce those who are unfaithful 
to the statutes ( חק ) of the covenant (lines 13-14). Leading up to the citation, CD xix 1-5 
discusses (aided by a citation from the Torah) how the favor of God rests upon those 
who keep covenant with him (lines 1-2). Some sectarians can live in the scattered camps 
if they do so “according to the rule of the land” (ץראה ךרסכ) and thus be living “in 
accordance with the law” (הרותה; lines 2-3 and 4, respectively). The point in this 
section concerns familial affairs, namely, marriage and having children—all in step with 
the teaching of the law (see line 3). This appears to be what the subject of covenant 
faithfulness to the statutes ( חק ) and the resulting favor of God in lines 1-2 concern. Line 
5, with its citation from Num 30:17, seems to reinforce this idea. Immediately following 
this, a warning is given about those who “despise the commandments ( מהוצ ) and 
statutes (קח),” who will be punished as the wicked are punished (lines 5-6).788 This will 
happen “when God comes to the earth” (ץראה תא לא; line 6), a fulfillment of the 
prophetic word: “When there comes the word which was written by the hand of 
                                                
 787 Cf. Charlesworth, Pesharim, 3, 5.  
 788 Cf. lines 1-6 of this B text with CD vii 1-9 (A text).  
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Zechariah the prophet” (line 7). That is, punishment for covenant unfaithfulness finds 
its scriptural basis and assurance in what the prophet has prophesied. The prophecy 
says, “Wake up, sword, against my shepherd and against the man who is my associate—
the utterance of God—strike the shepherd and the flock shall scatter, and I will cause to 
turn my hand against the insignificant ones” (lines 7-9).789  
It is important to remember that the impending doom predicted in CD xix 7-9 is 
set in the context of those who first entered the covenant (of the sect), but who 
subsequently fell away from it.790 This is where a citation from Hos 5:10 comes into 
play (see below).791 Line 14 states that these people did not continue following the 
“statutes” ( חק ), having left the sect. Thus, the assumption is that those in the sect are, in 
fact, the ones who truly keep the statutes of the law. Perhaps the sect sees a correlation 
between those who were being denounced in the original context of Zech 13:7792 
(wayward, idolatrous prophets) and those who have abandoned the sect, those who 
“despise the commandments (הוצמ) and statutes (קח)” of the law (lines 5-6).793 Implicit, 
of course, in this is that the sect (i.e., the implied author) does not despise the 
commandments and statutes. Thus, to leave the sect is equivalent to despising the law; 
to remain faithful to the sect is not to despise it. Without this assumption, there exists 
little rhetorical force.794  
                                                
 789 The citation is virtually similar to the MT (see Martinus J. Menken, "Striking the 
Shepherd: Early Christian Versions and Interpretations of Zechariah 13,7." Biblica 92, no. 1 (2011), 
41). On the relationship between this alternate “B” text with the “A” text, as well as the 
hermeneutical significance it implies, see Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 90. See also Cook, “The 
Damascus Document,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 57-58. 
 790 The promised punishment for falling away will be the destruction that comes at Belial’s 
hand (line 14). Cf. the discussion of CD iv 20 above, where Belial comes as punishment because of 
“fornication,” which is to be seen in line with the denouncements given here in CD xix 7-9 
concerning proper marriage “in accordance to the law.”  
 791 In the B text (CD xix 15-16) Hosea 5:10 is a “quotation”; in the A text (CD viii 3) it is an 
“allusion” (Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 88). 
 792 On the difficulties surrounding the original meaning of v. 7, see George L. Klein, 
Zechariah, vol. 21b (NAC; Nashville: B&H, 2008), 385-391. 
 793 Hence the reason Zech 13:7 is quoted (Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed, 90). 
 794 Cf. Paul’s understanding of doing the law in Rom 2:12-13. 
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Two important things are noted. First, the meaning of walking “in accordance to 
the law” (lines 2-4) is realigned around the sect.795 Second, the prophecy is used in the 
way that it is because of this sectarian prejudgment, a necessary hermeneutical 
component by which the text is read and applied. The words to “strike the shepherd,” 
for example, can be applied to the non-sectarian because sectarianism as a prejudgment 
is already at play.796 Though, of course, the rhetorical function of the citation suggests 
that an argument is being made for sectarianism—namely, by the warning of impending 
doom. However, the prediction of scattering sheep and striking the shepherd can only 
have the rhetorical force it does because, from the outset, it has already been assumed 
that sectarianism is the proper category from which the prophetic text will be read. 
Thus, it can be concluded that a sectarian hermeneutic is, once again, present; this 
recognition allows the citation to have the rhetorical force and contemporary 
applicability that it does.  
(f) Hosea 4:16 in CD i 13-14  
The first section (col. i) of the CD concerns the judgment of God upon his 
people Israel, who have acted “in treachery” (םלעומב) by “forsaking” their God (lines 1-
3). Because of their sins, God turned his face from them and “gave them up to the 
sword” (line 4). One reads next that God remembered the covenant he had made with 
the forefathers, and so “caused to set aside a remnant for Israel and did not deliver them 
up to complete destruction” (lines 4-5). After acknowledging their guilt, this “remnant” 
is described as those who were “like blind people and as those who grope for a path” 
(line 9). Because of this, God “considered their deeds” and “raised up for them a 
Teacher of Righteousness to cause to guide them in the path of his heart” (lines 10-
11).797 In line 12, there is the mention of “the congregation of traitors,” which line 13 
                                                
 795 See again Tzoref’s observations on this above. 
 796 Menken, “Striking the Shepherd,” 41, notes the term “shepherd” can be understood as 
being applied by the sect to either a “positive figure” or a “negative figure.” It is best, however, to 
opt for the latter. This becomes clear when the parallel passage occurring in the A text is considered, 
i.e., CD vii 10-21, especially line 13, where the “renegades were delivered up to the sword” (as 
translated in Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:561). Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 86. 
 797 On the lack of article in “a Teacher of Righteousness,” see Lim, Pesharim, 75 (on CD i 
1-11, see 75-76). 
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defines as, “Those who turn aside from the path.” A quotation is then given from Hos 
4:16: “This is the time of which it is has been written: As a straying [ררס] heifer, so has 
Israel strayed [ררס]” (lines 13-14).798 This quotation was employed in connection at the 
time “when the Man of Mockery arose” and subsequently “caused them [Israel] to 
wander in chaos without path” (ךרד; lines 14-15).799 The key word ךרד in line 15 is to be 
connected with the same word which occurs in lines 9, 11, and 13. Here, it is recalled 
that Israel was described as “blind” and were those who “grope for a path (ךרד)” (line 
9). Israel was subsequently given the Teacher of Righteousness “to cause to guide them 
in the path (ךרד) of his heart” (lines 10-11). But the “traitors” have turned “from the 
path (ךרד)” (line 13). And this, as was seen, was due to the Man of Mockery who led 
Israel “in chaos without path” (ךרד).  
The following observations are relevant. First, since “the Teacher of 
Righteousness” was given specifically to the sect, and since Hos 4:16 was cited as the 
scriptural warrant for why there were those who fell away from the Teacher, following 
the Man of Mockery, one can sense that the hermeneutic employed in this particular 
reading of Hos 4:16 entailed a horizon of sectarianism.800 This is further evidenced by 
the assumption that to turn away from the Teacher of Righteousness (and his direction, 
line 11) is to remain in a state of covenant violation (lines 16-20).801 After all, not to 
follow the sect’s Teacher was not to be on the right path. And moreover, not to be in the 
sect was to be part of “wayward Israel,” as the prophetic text which was cited has 
spoken. This text, therefore, was cited and interpreted in the way that it was due to 
sectarian horizon of understanding, epitomized by the assumption of the Teacher’s own 
teaching authority. As already mentioned, sectarianism was not for the sect a mere 
theological position, but also a hermeneutical presupposition.  
                                                
 798 Cf. the translation given by Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:552-553, and Watson, 
Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 88. See also Francis Brown, et al., Enhanced Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew 
and English Lexicon (Oak Harbor, WA: Logos Research Systems, 2000), 710:2.  
 799 On the Man of Mockery, see Collins, “Reading for History,” 301-302; Hempel, The 
Damascus Texts, 65. 
 800 To validate this point, see Nitzan, “Repentance in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea 
Scrolls, 150-151, fn. 19. That the “congregation of traitors” is a rival group, see Hempel, The 
Damascus Texts, 27. 
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Second, this passage is cited from the assumption that it has contemporary 
significance to the sect in its present time.802 This assumption is disclosed in the 
introductory phrase immediately prior to the citation itself in CD i 13 that “This is the 
time of which it has been written...” Thus, the assumption of contemporaneity is made 
explicit from the outset, as the sect sees themselves as a living witness to the 
waywardness of non-sectarians.803 What, exactly, the significance of the prophetic text 
was for the sectarians is illumined when it is recognized that the Hosea text, originally 
for the purpose of addressing wayward Israel, was for the sect interpreted as being 
applicable to present-day Jews. Thus, a Hosea text originally meant for wayward Jews 
in the past was still being utilized for wayward (though non-sectarian) Jews in the 
present. Conversely, Paul in Rom 9:25-26 uses a Hosea text originally meant for Jews 
in the past as a warrant for the inclusion of Gentiles in the present. What this means of 
course is that there are here interpretive characteristics of both similarity and 
dissimilarity in each respective use, but the question—indeed, the ultimate question—is 
how such characteristics can even be constructed (see below).804  
(g) Hosea 5:10 in CD xix 15-16  
This citation occurs in the same context as the one from Zechariah (above).805 
Here it is read (lines 13-14) that “judgment” is coming “to all of those who come into 
his covenant, who do not cause to hold fast in these statutes (קח).” It is further read that 
the coming judgment is put forward in terms of “destruction at the hand of Belial” (line 
14). To support this assertion, the CD cites Hos 5:10, saying that, “This [destruction at 
the hand of Belial] is the day when God will make a visitation, as he said, ‘The Princes 
of Judah will be as those who cause to change the boundary; he will pour out against 
                                                                                                                                          
 801 Cf. Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 27-28, 79. 
 802 That this is a “contemporary rival group,” (emphasis ours), see Hempel, The Damascus 
Texts, 27. 
 803 Recall the role of contemporaneity (Gleichzeitigkeit) in Gadamer’s thought (see above). 
On this, see again DiMattei, “Biblical Narratives,” As It Is Written, 77-78. 
 804 See DiMattei’s comments above (6.1a), as well as our critique of his otherwise helpful 
views in ch. 7 below.  
 805 That is, in the B text. Cf. e.g., CD vii 10-21 with CD xix 7-12 (see Martínez and 
Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:561 and 1:577, respectively). 
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them fury as water’” (lines 15-16).806 The promise of “destruction” finds warrant in the 
prophetic text; the introductory phrase to the citation (“as he said”) evidences this fact. 
Appealing to this Scripture is useful for the sect since the context concerns how 
the “Princes of Judah” have committed a transgression of changing the “boundary”—
presumably speaking of the Law’s “statutes” (קח) as mentioned above.807 This is 
focused exclusively upon those who, having entered into the covenant, did not 
subsequently remain true to its tenets: “For they entered into the covenant of 
repentance, but they did not depart from the path of the treacherous and have polluted 
themselves with the path of fornication and wealth of wickedness” (lines 16-17). This is 
followed by further accusations of taking vengeance in their own hands, showing 
resentment and hate toward brothers, and doing only what was right in their own eyes 
(lines 17-20). The transgressions, then, have been set in terms of moral impurity. But 
another facet of the accusations is the fact that, in committing the above sins, and in 
failing to live in moral purity, “they did not separate from the people and from their 
sins” (lines 20-21). This is the fullest description of the problem—that is, a failure to 
separate. This is described as both an act of neglect and as a “walk in the path of wicked 
ones” (lines 21). These acts of neglect and walking in the ways of wicked people, 
furthermore, find prophetic support in Deut 32:33, where it is said that, “Their wine is 
serpents’ venom and cruel poison of adders” (line 22).808 This is thus interpreted: the 
serpents are the kings of the peoples, the wine is said to be the paths of the kings, and 
the poison of the asps is said to be “the head of the kings of Greece,” who have been 
brought up to bring about judgment (lines 22-24). Lines 33-35 conclude col. xix by 
saying that “all the people who entered into the new covenant in the land of Damascus 
                                                
 806 In the A text this is merely an “allusion,” whereas in the B text, this is an “explicit 
quotation” (Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 88).  
 807 On “Princes of Judah,” cf. Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 32. 
 808 The introductory formula “against whom God has said” (םהילע לא רמא רשא) evidences 
that the CD saw this as a prophetic insight into the problem of contemporary sectarian 
unfaithfulness.  
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and who turned and betrayed and turned aside from the well of waters of life, they shall 
not be counted among the assembly of the people...”809  
The Hosea passage is understood as a scriptural foundation for coming wrath 
upon those in Judah who have swerved from the covenant’s statutes. This transgression 
of the Law, as was shown above, was set in terms of moral impurity. And this, 
moreover, was set in terms of walking in the paths—in the “poison”—of the kings of 
the surrounding nations. The “changing” of the “boundary” is relevant to the sect as its 
interpretation centers upon those unfaithful Jews who have walked in the path of 
Gentiles.810 This is not against the original context per se of Hos 5. Moral purity was a 
major theme for the oracle. Having said that, what is involved here is more than just a 
correlation between the original context of adherence to the Law’s moral codes and the 
sects’ contemporary context which consisted of the same problem. There is, arguably, 
more at play, for the entire column is set in terms of a sectarian view of the Law. Lines 
2-3 speak of adherence to the “rule of the land” and the “custom of the Torah,” but as 
was shown in the section above on the Zechariah citation, as well as the discussion in 
this section in lines 33-35, this particular understanding of the Torah arises only through 
a sectarian-centered hermeneutic—or more appropriately, a sectarian horizon of 
understanding. Thus, when Hos 5:10 is quoted about those who “change” the 
“boundary,” the underlying assumption is that this transgression is a transgression 
insofar as one reads it from a sectarian horizon—from the standpoint of those “who 
entered into the new covenant in the land of Damascus” and have not “turned and 
betrayed and turned aside from the well of waters of life” (unlike those who did turn 
from it; see lines 33-34). Otherwise—and this is important—the use of Hos 5:10 would 
be rhetorically empty. Thus, observing the prior commitment to sectarianism in the 
citation helps account for the rhetorical force that is obviously present with the use of 
the citation itself.811  
                                                
 809 Cf. translation given by Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:578–579. On “new covenant,” 
see Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 79-80. 
 810 Cf. with Hosea pesher, “festivals of the Gentiles,” above. 
 811 Cf. Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 61: “[The] strong scriptural influence on the 
community’s self-consciousness can be explained partly by their belief that they constituted the true 
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(h) Hosea 3:4 in CD xx 16-17  
Working toward the Hosea 3:4 quotation in lines 16-17, it is first read that, those 
who enter the covenant, yet fail to remain steadfast, will be judged and forced out of the 
congregation (lines 1-3). Lines 4-12 further discuss the eviction of the unfaithful, whose 
deeds are shown “according to the explanation of the law (הרותה שרדמ) in which the 
men of perfect holiness walked” (lines 6-7).812 The unfaithful person is an outcast and 
the community is not to have anything to do with him, for they are cursed, being full of 
stubbornness and idolatry, and these have “no portion in the house of the law (תיבב 
הרותה)” (lines 7-10). This judgment will be like the judgment given to those “who 
spoke wrongly against the righteous statutes ( חק ) and despised the covenant [...] and the 
agreement that arose in the land of Damascus—the new covenant” (lines 11-12).813 
Again, there is no place for them in the house of the Torah (line 13). It is then read that, 
during the interim period of “gathering in of the unique teacher” (i.e., the death of the 
Teacher of Righteousness) and the end of those people who fell away, following the 
Man of Lies, will be a time of about forty years (lines 13-15).814 It is during this time 
that the anger of God will come upon Israel (line 16). This is followed with the phrase 
“as he said,” which provides the introduction for the Hos 3:4 citation: “There is not 
king, and there is not prince, and there is not judge, [nobod]y causes to reprove in 
righteousness” (lines 16-17).   
This judgment contrasts with what is given in the Malachi citation (below) 
which states that there awaits restoration for those who repent (lines 17-21). In lines 21-
25, there is a discussion about both the faithful and unfaithful. In lines 25-26, it is said 
that those who “have entered the covenant” and yet “break through the boundary of the 
law,” shall be cut off from the camp. This is contrasted with lines 27-43 and its 
discussion about “all those who cause to be steadfast in these ordinances” (םיטפשמב 
                                                                                                                                          
Israel.” 
 812 Cf. Ibid., 32. 
 813 Cf. Ibid., 33 (on “Damascus,” see also 58-60; on “new covenant,” see 79-80). 
 814 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd Ed., 88. See also Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 33; Lim, 
Pesharim, 78. On the identity of the “Man of Lies,” see Charlesworth, Pesharim, 36; 94-97; cf. 
Collins, “Reading for History,” 301-302; Lim, Pesharim, 72-74; Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 65.  
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הלאה). These steadfast people will be rewarded with rejoicing and strength of heart, 
“and they will prevail over the sons of the world. And God will atone for them, and they 
shall see his salvation, for they took refuge in his holy name” (lines 33-34). The phrase, 
“All those who cause to be steadfast in these ordinances” (line 27) is linked with the 
infinitive-construct that immediately follows:  
“to [g]o and to come (תא[צ]̇ל אובלו) in accordance with the law, and listen to the 
Teacher’s voice, and confess before God: ‘We have surely sinned, both we and also our 
fathers, to walk in hostility to the statutes of the covenant. Righteous and true are your 
judgments against us’; and do not cause to raise their hands against his holy statutes and 
his righteous ordinances and true testimonies; and they are left over to the first 
ordinances, with which the men of the Unique One were judged; and they caused to 
listen to the voice of the Teacher of Righteousness; and do not reject the righteous 
statutes when they hear them” (lines 27-33).815  
Significantly, Torah observance for the sect is described in many ways, not least in 
adherence to the voice of the Teacher of Righteousness. The infinitive-constructs 
לתא[צ]  and אובל are to be seen as descriptive of, and a result and consequence to, what 
it means to be “steadfast.”816 Moreover, what follows the infinitive-constructs (and the 
phrase they introduce) is a further description of what it means to be “steadfast”—
namely, “and listen to the Teacher’s voice (line 28; cf. line 32).817 Thus, the test for 
faithfulness to the covenant is not simply “to go and to come in accordance with the 
Law” but it is also measured by one’s adherence to the “Teacher’s voice.” In other 
words, true steadfastness to the ordinances is, among other things,818 a coupling of 
Torah observance with falling under the Teacher’s interpretive authority.819 Here, it is 
                                                
 815 See Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 33, on the MS issue here. 
 816 Ronald J. Williams, Hebrew Syntax: An Outline, 2nd ed. (Buffalo: University of Toronto 
Press, 1976), 36. Williams notes that, with the  ְל, infinitive-constructs can be translated with a 
“thus... -ing”; this would better bring out the sense of “consequence,” as is to be seen here in line 27. 
Cf. the translation, “But all those who remain steadfast in these regulations, [co]ming and going in 
accordance with the law...”given by Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:580–581 Cf. also how the 
infinitive-construct functions in line 29, where the CD says, “We have surely sinned, both we and 
also our fathers, to walk (ונתכלב) in hostility to the statutes of the covenant.” Here, the infinitive-
construct ונתכלב serves to elaborate on the phrase “we have surely sinned.” It serves an explanatory 
role, such that what counts as “sin” is the resultant “walking in hostility to the statutes of the 
covenant.” 
 817 “Further description” because of the conjunction ו which serves to connect the infinitive-
constructs with what follows.  
 818 E.g., confession of sin in lines 28-30. 
 819 Cf. Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 268, regarding 1QpHab vii 1-2. 
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explicit that, faithfulness to Torah and covenant is understood through the pre-
understanding of a sectarian was of life.820 The text of Hos 3:4 in lines 16-17 
demonstrates this thesis. First, when looking at the original context, Hosea 3:4 concerns 
judgment and 3:5 speaks of eschatological hope.821 Though it is not quoted, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the context of v. 5 would also have had been in view with 
the quotation of v. 4. There is warrant for this idea, since lines 33-34 do have an 
eschatological ring to them.822 The quotation in line 16 of Hos 3:4 is a time of “interim 
wrath”—a time between “the gathering in of the unique teacher” and a time of “the end 
of all the men of war who turned back with the man of lies.” Thus, the sect utilizes the 
original context of v. 4, namely, that there will be political chaos, until the designated 
end. While finding common ground with the text of Hosea in that eschatology is in view 
in both places, the sect is interpreting it—in a way that includes both explanation and 
application—from a decidedly sectarian horizon of understanding. For example, who 
will see the coming “salvation” of God (line 34)? Who will reap the eschatological 
benefits (Hos 3:5)? For the sect, the interim judgment spoken about in the quotation of 
Hos 3:4 is seen to be “against Israel” (line 16), but those who will see salvation are the 
“steadfast,” which as we described in detail above, are those who adhere to the voice of 
the sect’s interpretive authority, the Teacher (line 28)—in other words, those who are 
members of the sect. The interpretation of Hos 3:4 proceeds from a sectarian vantage 
point. Hos 3:4, and the key themes involving that text, are informed by a sectarian fore-
structure of understanding.  
Second, at some level, it could be surmised that the sect saw a correlation 
between the unfaithfulness of Israel and Gomer in Hosea’s time and Israel with the 
                                                
 820 Cf. Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 79. 
 821 See Dearman, Hosea, 136–139. Dearman says, “In the typology of representation [i.e., 
Hosea’s wayward wife in 3:1 represents the wayward nation of Israel], Israel is separated from God 
as a result of its sinfulness and will be restored after a period of judgment and purification. As a 
consequence, it will exist for a time without the political status of a sovereign people. This is a form 
of self-incurred punishment that functions also as a period of purification. Afterward, a return to the 
Lord is anticipated, at a time described as the latter days (’aḥărît hayyāmîm). Whatever the phrase 
indicated about Hosea’s concept of eschatology, the quality of life depicted in 3:5 is similar to that 
expressed in Deut. 4:29-30, where the failure of Israel and its subsequent exile are anticipated as a 
painful prelude to a future return to the Lord” (139).  
 822 E.g., “salvation” is coming to the faithful; cf. also line 1. 
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temple-establishment of their own time.823 Thus, the objects of the sect’s judgment find 
their conceptual continuity, comprised of the theme of unfaithfulness, with wayward 
Israel/Gomer of Hosea’s context. But this does not answer the fundamental 
hermeneutical question; it merely pushes it back one step further. One must ask what 
gives rhetorical force to this conceptual continuity and what, for the writer of the CD, 
constituted unfaithfulness? It has already been shown above that unfaithfulness to the 
statutes and the Law was set in terms of non-sectarianism. That is, to be unloyal to the 
Teacher was to be unfaithful to the ordinances of the Law (e.g., see the discussion on 
Hosea 5:10 in CD xix 15-16 above). Thus, the most basic pre-understanding at work is 
that non-sectarians, in not heeding the authoritative, interpretive voice of the Teacher, 
are unfaithful like Gomer, and like the Israel of Hosea’s time, there will be an interim 
time of political upheaval for the Israel of their time before the end. In this way, the 
historical-distanced gap between Hosea’s text and the sect’s reading of it is bridged. 
Thus, the dialogue between both horizons—of text and interpreter—is on some level 
mediated by a received tradition of a sectarian way of life and therefore meaning, for 
them, is achieved. These interpretations serve to validate the sect’s sectarian way of life, 
which served to provide footing for their interpretations. When compared to how Paul 
understands Torah observance and covenant fulfillment in Rom 2, key similarities (and 
dissimilarities) emerge: Paul, likewise, understands Torah observance and fulfillment, 
though in his own unique way and from his own unique horizon.824  
(i) Mal 3:16, 18 in CD xx 17, 20  
The Malachi quotations appear within the same section as the Hos 3:4 quoation 
above. In lines 15-16, an interim time of judgment was noted. Immediately following 
the Hos 3:4 citation, lines 16-17 states, “But those who turn from the transgression of 
                                                
 823 Perhaps this is evident by the mention of fornication, et al., in previously analyzed 
passages (e.g., CD iv 17; xix 17). 
 824 So Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 278, who likewise speaks of the sect’s and the 
NT’s similar “creative” use of Scripture to “legitimate the novel beliefs of a community.” We would, 
however, caution those who would want to say that, for the sect and (not least!) Paul, what typified 
their interpretive activity was a mere one-sided endeavor. We prefer to speak of interpretation as 
dialogical given the assumption of prejudgments in the interpretive acts (see ch. 7 below). 
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Jacob have kept the covenant of God” (line 17). There are small references to Mal 3:16 
sprinkled throughout, which mention how, upon turning from the sin of Jacob,  
They shall then speak, each man to his friend, causing himself to act righteously with 
his brother in order to support their steps in the way of God, and God will cause to 
attend to their words. And he will listen. And it will be written in the scroll of 
remembrance [before him], to those who fear God and take into account his name, until 
salvation and judgment is revealed to those who fear God (lines 17-20).825 
Immediately following this is the quotation from Mal 3:18: “And he shall again 
distinguish between [lit., “restore sight between”] the righteous and the wicked, 
between he who honors God and he who does not honor him.”826 This citation should be 
seen as the eschatological reversal of the Hos 3:4 quotation. Whereas the latter spoke of 
judgment in causing the political forces to cease to be able to discern justice, the former 
promises that, for those who fear God, the political upheaval will be overturned.  
 Hence, the Malachi quotations concern a restoration. The original context of the 
prophetic text speaks about the coming “refiner” who would help bring about a 
restoration of the sacrificial system (Mal 3:1-4). This is followed by promised 
judgments upon those who commit various injustices (3:5). The subsequent divine 
charge against the “sons of Jacob,” who have robbed God” is then given (3:6-12) along 
with a lament at the prosperity of the wicked (3:13-15). Verses 16-18 record that the 
people of God came together, to whom God is said to have given them his attention, and 
promises to make those who fear him his “treasured possession,” his sons.  
 Thus, given the original context of Mal 3-4, it is not surprising why the sect 
would have desired to use this particular oracle. But what was the point of the sect’s use 
of it? It was argued that, in light of our investigations into this section of CD xx (see 
above), the answer to that question concerned covenant faithfulness. And this 
faithfulness was interpreted in light of (among other things) loyalty to the Teacher of 
Righteousness—in other words, sectarianism. It should be assumed that, in light of all 
that has been observed in the Hos 3:4 citations above, the promised restoration 
                                                
 825 Italicized portions indicate the phrases incorporated from Mal 3:16. The phrases from the 
CD are virtually similar to that of what is recorded in the MT. See also Hempel, The Damascus 
Texts, 33. 
 826 This, again, is virtually similar to what is given in the MT. 
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described here via Mal 3:16, 18 is in terms of an implied sectarian covenant faithfulness 
as well. Moreover, this leads one to see for the sect a link between righteousness and 
faithfulness language, not least in terms of covenant.827 Moreover, if the Hos 3:4 citation 
was used to argue for judgment against those who refused the sectarian teachings, then 
the Mal 3:16, 18 citations are to be seen as arguing for the restoration of those who have 
accepted them. It is, after all, the sect—those who live by “going and coming in 
accordance with the law, and listen to the Teacher’s voice, and confess before God” 
(lines 27-28)—who will rejoice and see the salvation of God (lines 33-34).828 These 
texts are utilized precisely the way they are because it has already been assumed that 
they speak of the sect’s own contemporary situation. Thus, the verses from Malachi, 
contextually linked with the Hosea quotation, is also interpreted and applied in light of a 
sectarian pre-understanding. 
(j) Micah Pesher – 1Q14  
This pesher draws out a polemic against the adversary of the “Teacher of 
Righteousness” (קדצה ירומ; 1Q14 fviii-x 6).829 The references to “Judah” and 
“Jerusalem” (both found in Mic 1:5) are directly interpreted by the pesherist as “the 
Teacher of Righteousness” (קדצה ירומ) (1Q14 fviii-x 5-6).830 The Teacher is the one 
who “[teaches the law to] his [council] and to al[l] those who freely join the chosen of 
[God, doing the law] in the council of the community,” and it is read further that it is 
this community who will be saved from the judgment (1Q14 fviii-x 7-9).831  
                                                
 827 Cf. Rom 3:3, 5. 
 828 Cf. Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 33. 
 829 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 95. See also Horgan, Pesharim, 56. As to who the 
Teacher of Righteousness and his adversary, the Wicked Priest, might have been, see Craig A. 
Evans, Ancient Texts for New Testament Studies, a Guide to the Background Literature (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), 87; deSilva, Introducing the Apocrypha, 249; Hempel, The 
Damascus Texts, 61-65; Charlesworth, Pesharim, 30-40, 83-93. The phrase קדצה הרומ (and its 
variant above) has been translated consistently as “the Teacher of Righteousness.” For an overview 
about translation issues, see Charlesworth, Pesharim, 28-30, who prefers “the Righteous Teacher.” 
Cf. James Vanderkam, “Identity and History of the Community,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 508-514, 
525-527; Lim, Pesharim, 26, 67-78. 
 830 Ibid., 94. 
 831 Cf. Horgan, Pesharim, 57, 61, and Abegg, Jr., QSM, 1Q14 fviii-x 7-9, on the 
reconstruction (Horgan has lines 5-7); Lim, Pesharim, 30-31. See also Martínez and Tigchelaar, 
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By glossing “Judah” and “Jerusalem” as the Teacher of Righteousness, the 
pesherist reveals his own sectarian prejudgments as coming to bear upon the text. 
Moreover, those who “join” this “chosen” group are the beneficiaries of the Teacher’s 
instruction concerning the Law, and what characterizes this community is that its 
members practice “doing the law.” Thus, law-keeping and communal membership are 
linked. As a polemic to the Teacher’s adversary, this pesher regards its own community 
as the true community and therefore safe from judgment (1Q14 fviii-x 7-9). For the 
pesherist, as opposed to physical Jerusalem, the true “Jerusalem” spoken about in the 
Micah text is centralized upon the sect’s Teacher. This is because the Teacher offers to 
the community a true teaching of the Torah. It is therefore the sect who does the law, 
which is to be seen as the opposite result of what the “preacher of lies” has taught, for 
he is the one “[who has caused the] simple [to err]” (1Q14 fviii-x 5). For the pesherist, 
observing law is in the specific context of the Teacher’s own community. The original 
text has been interpreted in light of its sectarian convictions in order to proclaim the 
community’s legitimacy.832 
Here in the Micah pesher, the interpretation of Judah and Jerusalem as being the 
Teacher of Righteousness, the sectarian leader, ought to be understood as the result of 
sectarian prejudice.833 The pesherist’s own sectarian horizon, in dialogue with the 
original text, guides his own understanding of Micah, thus consequently finding the 
verse’s application in his own concrete situation and time.834 In Gadamerian language, 
the judgment that “Judah and Jerusalem” refer to the “Teacher” is what it was because 
of certain sectarian prejudgments brought to the text, which were shaped and formed by 
the pesherist’s own horizon—a horizon comprised of, broadly speaking, a dispute with 
the Temple establishment. “Doing the law” is, therefore, in the context of these 
prejudgments. This is not unlike Paul’s own use of the phrase, albeit under the guide of 
                                                                                                                                          
DSS, 1:9. See Collins, “Reading for History,” 306, on the purpose of the pesharim as an assurance of 
the sect’s vindication.  
 832 Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 275-276, has observed the same thing regarding the 
“function” of the pesher texts. 
 833 Cf. again Tzoref’s comments above. 
 834 See Collins, “Reading for History,” 306. 
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differing prejudgments. For him, “doing the law” is also interpreted from within the 
specific context of a certain community: the Christ-believing community.835 
(k) Habakkuk Pesher – 1QpHab836 
In 1QpHab i 16, there is a quotation of Hab 1:5: “[Look, traitors, and behold; 
וטיבהו םידגוב ואר ].”837 This quotation diverges from the MT, which reads:  םיוגב ואר
 בהווטי , “Look among the nations and see.” One can be certain that the textual issue is 
not with the reconstruction of the Habakkuk pesher.838 The textual concern might be 
solved by seeing the commentator’s quotation as being the result of a necessary reliance 
upon the LXX’s Hebrew Vorlage (LXX: ἴδετε, οἱ καταφρονηταί, καὶ ἐπιβλέψατε), 
though there is evidence to suggest that this reliance was not compulsory since the 
Vorlage was not the only text he had available to him.839 Therefore, the pesherist’s 
failure to use the phrase “among the nations” appears to have been deliberate.840 Watson 
is convinced that what is in view here is the “suppression of the universal dimension of 
the prophet’s message.”841 This particular quotation will be revisited below in further 
detail, but suffice it to say presently that this, arguably, is yet another example of a 
sectarian hermeneutic on the part of the commentator.842 Indeed, for the pesherist, this 
prior commitment remains integral, for in addition to being a theological and 
sociological category, sectarianism functions hermeneutically.843 This thesis is further 
                                                
 835 So Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 278. Cf. Lim, Pesharim, 83-85, and his 
discussion about a “Common Sectarian Matrix.” 
 836 Lim, Pesharim, 33-35, offers a helpful outline of the structure of this pesher. 
 837 This is the text and translation given by Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:10–11. 
 838 Horgan, Pesharim, 23. 
 839 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 113. Watson says, “the proto-Masoretic reading may also 
have been available to him, since it is present in the Minor Prophets manuscript from Wadi Maraba 
‘at (Minor Prophets [Mur 88] xviii.3). Elsewhere, the commentator reveals the influence of a proto-
Masoretic reading even where his own Vorlage diverges from it (cf. 1QpHab xi.8-14).”  
 840 Ibid. Watson continues, “It may therefore be more than an accident of textual 
transmission that neither his text nor his comment refers to a work of God ‘among the nations.’”  
 841 Ibid.  
 842 Cf. Brooke, “Reading the Plain Meaning,” Jewish Ways of Reading the Bible, 87-88. See 
also Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 273-274. 
 843 Cf. Berrin, “Pesharim,” Biblical Interpretation at Qumran, 122: “A theologically 
distinctive, historical, and specifically eschatological application of the base text is certainly [an] 
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evidenced by 1QpHab xii 2-6, where an interpretation is given of Hab 2:17. Here, the 
prophet bemoans “the violence done to Lebanon,” as well as the “devastation of the 
beasts/animals.” The pesherist interprets “Lebanon” as “the council of the Community” 
and reads “animals” as “the simple people of Judah, those who do the law” (1QpHab xii 
3-5).844 Overall, the pesharim differs from a straightforward understanding of the 
prophetic text, which states that the victims of violence are the surrounding 
nations/Gentiles ( םיוגה־לכ/םימעה־לכ , “all nations/all peoples,” Hab 2:5; םיבר םיוג “many 
nations,” 2:8a).845 Thus, the passage is given a sectarian spin by the pesherist. In this 
instance, the pesherist excludes the Gentiles from being understood as victims—
substituting themselves as the group to be pitied.846 Moreover, the commentator’s 
hermeneutical move is such that the ones doing violence are not a surrounding pagan 
nation (such as Babylon for Habakukk), but rather the Wicked Priest, “the main object 
of the denunciations” (1QpHab xii 2).847 Along with this, the pesherist understands the 
reference in Hab 2:17c-d (where “from blood of the city and violence to the land” is 
mentioned [1QpHab xii 6-7]) as a reference to Jerusalem, the place where “the 
^Wicked^ Priest did acts of abomination” (1QpHab xii 7-8).848  
These are examples of how, instead of the polemic being centered on a pagan 
nation (as in the original context), the interpretation renders the non-sectarian Jew, i.e., 
the Wicked Priest, guilty and responsible for the coming judgments. Whatever this 
might mean, the important thing to recognize is that these substitutions of Babylon for 
the Wicked Priest reveal a hermeneutic of sectarianism. That is, the Habakkuk text is 
read from a sectarian horizon of understanding. The prophetic text is interpreted in light 
of the contemporary concerns of the community, finding its meaning in the precise 
                                                                                                                                          
essential [feature of pesharim].” Emphasis original. On Berrin’s thoughts on the “eschatological 
content of pesher... reflecting basic sectarian tenents” (117), see below. 
 844 Cf. Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 267, 270, 272. 
 845 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 113. Cf. 1QpHab ix 7.  
 846 Ibid.  
 847 Ibid. 
 848 Cf. Lim, Holy Scripture, 97-98. See Timothy H. Lim, “The Wicked Priests of the 
Groningen Hypothesis,” JBL 112, no. 3 (1993): 415-425, on the question of whether, and how, 
“wicked priest” in 1QpHab 8-12 might denote a plurality of six priests (of the so-called “Groningen 
hypothesis”); Lim, Pesharim, 67-74; Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 62-65. 
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application within the concrete situation of the pesherist.849 Thus, an attempt at fusion 
was attained when the horizon of the text encountered the horizon of the reader.850  
This thesis gains additional warrant when the commentary on Hab 2:14 is 
considered. Here it is cited that “the earth will be filled with the knowledge of the glory 
of YHWH like the waters cover the sea” and is taken by the pesherist to mean that the 
“knowledge” in question will be abundant for the sect themselves and is not interpreted 
as having a global dimension in the literal sense, as the original oracle foretold.851 For 
the commentator, the knowledge in question has more to do with the volume of 
knowledge given to the sect, not the scope of such knowledge given to non-sectarian 
outsiders (1QpHab x 14 – xi 2).852 Since this has been interpreted “in terms of the 
knowledge attained by the sect... the universal scope of the prophetic text is again 
eliminated from the interpretation.”853 These interpretive glosses are telling, for, as 
Watson has observed, the pesherist does not shy away from understanding the universal 
scope of judgment upon the Gentiles in the commentaries given in 1QpHab xii 12-14 
and 1QpHab xii 17 – xiii 4.854 Here the judgment pronounced was a promised 
destruction upon every idolater, and they will be destroyed “from the earth” (ץראה ןמ; 
1QpHab xiii 3-4). Building upon these observations, one can conclude that the 
inconsistency of limiting the universal scope of God’s knowledge to the nations, and 
filling up “the earth” with it (and everything that entails), yet all the while allowing a 
universal scope of God’s judgment upon the nations, driving them from “the earth,” 
                                                
 849 Cf. Edward Cook, “A Commentary on Habakkuk (1QpHab)” in The Dead Sea Scrolls: A 
New Translation, 115. See also Section 4.7 above. 
 850 Does this mean legitimate fusion occurred? The answer to that question is 
inconsequential, for we are only wanting to describe the hermeneutical situation. However, the 
answer can only be found not in interrogating the particular resultant judgments, but rather in the 
pre-judgments. At any rate, sectarianism remains a clear hermeneutical approach. 
 851 See F.F. Bruce, “Habakkuk,” in The Minor Prophets: An Exegetical and Expository 
Commentary, vol. 2, ed. Thomas Edward McComiskey (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1993), 869. Cf. 
Michael H. Floyd, Minor Prophets, Part 2, The Forms of the Old Testament Literature, Vol. XXII, 
eds. Rolf P. Knierim, Gene M. Tucker, and Marvin A. Sweeney (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 
143. 
 852 This occurs in the context of denouncement of non-sectarians (see Nitzan, “Repentance 
in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 151, fn. 20.)   
 853 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 113. 
 854 Ibid., 113-114. 
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seems to have been due to deliberate exegetical decisions on the part of the pesherist. 
Part of the reason for these interpretive moves is due to a hermeneutical pre-
commitment to sectarianism, as we have argued throughout.855 
At the beginning of this discussion on the Habakkuk pesher, i.e., 1QpHab i 16, 
the textual substitution of “the traitors” in place of “among the nations” was discussed. 
Revisiting this, it was remarked that the commentator was interpreting the quotation 
from a sectarian prior commitment. The pesherist does not leave the reader in the dark 
as to who these “traitors” are. He says they are those who became “traitors with the Man 
of Lies” ( שיא םע םידגובה בזכה ; 1QpHab ii 1-2). The conjunction יכ, which serves to link 
this phrase to what follows it, functions in a causal way.856 Thus, specifically they are 
“traitors with the Man of Lies, because [יכ] [they did] not [believe in the words of] ^the^ 
Teacher of Righteousness from the mouth of God” (1QpHab ii 2-3).857 Therefore, 
unbelief in the Teacher makes up the first reason why they are deemed “traitors.” They 
are traitors, secondly, because they failed to believe in the new covenant and failed to 
honor God’s name: “and it concerns the traito[rs of the] new [covenant] be[cau]se [יכ] 
they did not believe in the covenant of God [and began to profane] his holy name” 
(1QpHab ii 3-4). Belief in the Teacher and in the New Covenant seem, then, to be 
intertwined. Furthermore, the traitors are described as “violator[s of the coven]ant, who 
will not believe when they hear everything that will com[e to pass t]o [...] the last 
generation from the mouth of the Priest whom God has placed with[in the commun]ity” 
                                                
 855 Cf. Watson, who says, “The association between faith, the Torah and the elect 
community makes the Pauline emphasis on faith’s universal scope quite inconceivable for the 
Qumran commentator” (Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 114). One might very well add that the same 
“association” between these three things also makes the universal scope of Paul’s concept of faith 
possible, given that the essence of his own “elect community” is redefined around Christ. Hence, 
prejudgments are operative in both the pesherist and Paul. (Cf. what Watson says about the 
similarity of “eschatological interpretation” being focused for both pesherist and Paul around a 
“singular figure,” as well as his comments about an “oppositional ethos” in Hermeneutics, 114.) 
 856 See Williams, Hebrew Syntax, 72, 89. 
 857 See Horgan, Pesharim, 24, who argues briefly, though convincingly, for this 
reconstruction. Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 110-111. Like Watson, we have included “in” in 
the above translation (110; cf. Horgan, Pesharim, 13, 24). See Lim, Pesharim, 76, on the Teacher’s 
assumption of a “prophetic tradition” via his prime “hermeneutical role.”  
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(1QpHab ii 6-8).858 The Priest, we are told, is the interpretive agent for the prophetic 
words (1QpHab ii 8-10). Thus,  
If the traitors will not believe God’s work when it is told, this suggests that God’s work 
is announced in advance. Although that announcement initially takes place through the 
prophets, the prophets require an interpreter: and God has provided such an interpreter, 
in the figure of the “Priest” who is also the Teacher of Righteousness.859 
For the moment, the point to be taken from this passage is that the pesherist has labeled 
a certain group of people “traitors” for colluding with the “Man of Lies.”860 This 
colluding is set in terms of covenant violations, which itself is linked with failure to 
have faith in what was spoken on behalf of God through the Teacher of Righteousness. 
Since the Teacher/Priest is the interpretive agent of the prophetic words, and since 
violators of the covenant are such because they have failed to believe in him, they will 
not believe that which is to come to pass on the “last generation” (1QpHab ii 6-8). What 
is evident is that a sectarian hermeneutic is at play. Indeed, Collins is right to observe 
that the interpretive activity in the pesharim “presuppose a body of information about 
the figures mentioned that is correlated with the prophetic text but not derived from 
it.”861 Commenting on this pesher, he continues: 
...the interpretation cannot be derived from the text. The interpretation presupposes that 
the Man of the Lie and Teacher are known figures and that the designation “traitors” 
can be plausibly referred to the Man of the Lie and his followers. The pēšer correlates 
the prophetic text with the otherwise known history of the community, using the words 
“traitors” and “believe” as catchwords.”862 
Thus, the pesherist’s presupposition was the interpretive authority of the Teacher.863 
This sectarian precommitment was integral. The repeated emphasis upon the idea of 
“traitors” and covenant violations brings to the forefront a rather important feature of 
the pesherist’s hermeneutical activity: The commentator interprets the texts from a 
                                                
 858 See Ibid., 25-26, regarding the reconstruction. Though it does not effect this study one 
way or the other, we have chosen to follow the reconstruction given in Martínez and Tigchelaar, 
DSS, 1:12-13; See also Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 108. 
 859 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 108. 
 860 Watson, Ibid., sees three groups of traitors here. Cf. Charlesworth, Pesharim, 94-95. 
 861 Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 273. It is to be cautioned, however, to suggest that 
the text plays no role; though Collins’ point stands.  
 862 Ibid., 274. Emphasis original. 
 863 Cf. Lim, Pesharim, 52. 
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sectarian pre-commitment and Vorstruktur des Verstehens. Significantly for our 
purposes, moreover, this is set in terms of keeping covenant. That is, the covenant is not 
violated when the Teacher’s interpretive authority is realized. The central hermeneutical 
issue revolves around Torah-keeping from a particular sectarian angle. This fact is 
brought to light when 1QpHab vii 1-2 is examined presently.  
1QpHab vii 1-2 is eschatologically oriented, and lines 3-4 signal that the 
prophetic writings were for a latter interpreter, namely, the sect’s own Teacher of 
Righteousness.864 Moreover, it is read that the pesherist interprets the Habakkuk 
prophecy/vision as meaning “the final age will be prolonged and go beyond everything 
that which the prophets speak” (1QpHab vii 7-8). The prophetic encouragement to 
“wait” for the culmination of the final age (Hab 2:3b) is interpreted by the pesherist as 
referring to “the men of truth” (תמאה ישנא לע ורשפ; 1QpHab vii 10). Specifically, these 
“men of truth,” i.e., those who are patiently waiting for the end, are such because they 
are “those who do the Torah” (הרותה ישוע; line 11). Furthermore, the pesherist sees 
“those who do the Torah” as “the men of truth” because, as those who patiently “do the 
Torah,” they are those “whose hands do not falter from the service of the truth when the 
final age is stretched out beyond them” (lines 11-12). Indeed, “Torah” is for the 
pesherist kept only through a sectarian way of life. After all, in the original Habakkuk 
prophecy, Torah keeping is not mentioned in the immediate context as a characteristic 
of what it meant to wait for the fulfillment of the vision. This insertion, then, ought to 
be seen as a sort of interpretive gloss.865 It sheds light on what it means to “believe in 
the covenant” and in the Teacher (see 1QpHab ii 2-4). Law keeping for the pesherist is 
understood in light of a sectarian horizon of understanding, being centered around the 
Teacher of Righteousness.866 This becomes clear in the following.  
                                                
 864 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 104-105. See also Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 
268; Lim, Pesharim, 52. 
 865 Ibid., 112, observes this insertion too. Our emphasis, though, is that the reference to law-
keeping here is interpreted in a sectarian manner (see below). 
 866 This is potentially significant when this fact is compared to Rom 2, as Paul understood 
“doers of the law” in his own unique way. Paul, too, understood law-keeping in light of a specific 
horizon.  
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The quotation of Hab 2:4b in 1QpHab vii 17 and its subsequent interpretation in 
viii 1-3a is most intriguing, especially so because Paul quotes this passage in Rom 
1:17.867 For the pesherist, Hab 2:4b, “The righteous one, by his faithfulness, will live,”868 
is interpreted as:  
“Everyone who does the Torah [הרותה ישוע לוכ] in the house of Judah, whom God will 
cause to free from the house of judgment because of their labor [םלמע] and faithfulness 
[םתנמאו] to the Teacher of Righteousness [קדצה הרומב]” (1QpHab viii 1-3a).  
Here righteousness language is clearly set in terms of doing the Torah.869 Again, 
however, nothing in the prophetic text itself (i.e., within the immediate context) 
mentions explicitly “doing the law.”870 The commentator seeks, however, to insert into 
his interpretation a Torah-centeredness.871 The pesherist, moreover, says that “the 
righteous one will live” in not just “doing the law” but also by remaining faithful to the 
Teacher of Righteousness (lines 2-3).872 Watson sees this interpretation as being a 
“fundamental soteriological statement”: 
Here, the “righteous one” [קידצ] of the text is identified not with the Teacher himself (as 
in the comments on Habakkuk 1.4, 13) but with “all who observe the law in the house 
of Judah”. The “life” that is promised to the righteous consists in the divine deliverance 
“from the house of judgment”, and the faith which secures this outcome is oriented 
towards the Teacher of Righteousness. The order in which the three elements of the 
lemma are treated has the effect of placing still greater emphasis on “by his faith,” 
understood soteriologically as the means of escape from “the house of judgment” into 
“life”. For the pesherist as for Paul, Habakkuk 2.4b represents a fundamental 
soteriological statement in which the entire basis of a particular form of communal 
existence is summed up.873 
There is little doubt that soteriology is in view for both Paul and the pesherist. 
However, there is more to say, especially in comparison to Paul. First, on this issue and 
                                                
 867 See again Section 5.4 above. 
 868 On the restoration of Hab 2:4b in vii line 17, see Horgan, Pesharim, 39; Cf. Martínez and 
Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:16–17. Cf. the translation here with Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 109-110.  
 869 Cf. Rom 2:13. 
 870 Though “law” is mentioned in Hab 1:4 (Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 112). 
 871 See again the similar observations by Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 112. 
 872 For a helpful caution on how to understand “faith in” the Teacher of Righteousness, see 
Charlesworth, Pesharim, 89. See also Fitzmyer, “Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea 
Scrolls, 605-606. (Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics, 110-111; Horgan, Pesharim, 17, 40.) See also Lim, 
Pesharim, 76 (and 85, where he likewise notices the significance of the Teacher’s hermeneutical 
authority). 
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in distinction to Watson, Fitzmyer is correct to note one helpful distinction between 
Paul and the pesherist’s understanding of Hab 2:4, namely, that “‘life’ for Paul means 
not just deliverance from the oppression of invaders (as in Habakkuk) or a rescue ‘from 
the house of judgment’ (as in the Qumran commentary), but ‘life in Christ Jesus,’ a 
share in the risen life of Christ (see Rom 6:4b).”874 Secondly, in highlighting the 
soteriological features of the commentary, one is also obliged to highlight the 
communal, i.e., sectarian, features. Watson of course does this, though, as seen so far in 
this study on the Pesharim, there is a strong sectarian fore-structure of understanding at 
play in those texts that undergird the interpretive activity—not least the interpretations 
of soteriologically-charged texts such as the one above. As will be seen in our 
investigation into Paul (see below), this is also largely true of him. One might say, then, 
that the soteriological features appear dependent, at least hermeneutically, upon the 
sectarian ones. After all, the interpretation of “the righteous one, by his faithfulness, will 
live” for the pesherist “concerns everyone who does the Torah in the house of Judah,” 
and it is that group who will be delivered by God from judgment (1QpHab viii 1-2).  
The fact is that this text for the pesherist is not universalized, as was observed 
above, and expanded to the Gentiles, but is restricted only for “the house of Judah,”875 
and the “righteous one” is not righteous only in “doing the law” but also in his 
faithfulness to the Teacher of Righteousness” (lines 1-3)—a sectarian claim if there 
ever was one. “Doing the law” and “righteousness” are mutually defining not just in 
terms of soteriological claims, but also in terms of how sectarian prejudgments have 
come to bear upon them.876 In this manner righteousness language and law-keeping are 
intertwined.  
                                                                                                                                          
 873 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 110.  
 874 Fitzmyer, “Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 606 (see also fn. 14). 
 875 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 113.  
 876 Watson, Ibid., acknowledges that the pesherist understands the “righteous” in the Hab 
2:4 text as referring only to "the minority within Israel who observe the law and believe in the 
Teacher," and as a result, "minimizes every indication of universal concern in the Scriptural text." 
Watson comes very close to understanding sectarianism at play hermeneutically, yet one should 
bring it to a higher prominence. The issue is that Watson sees that “for Paul, the divine saving action 
is the comprehensive context both of ‘christology’ and of ‘ecclesiology.’ Christology and 
ecclesiology speak of different aspects of the many-sided and comprehensive saving event in which 
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It must be said that, in relation to Paul, there is similarity and disimilarity. On 
the former, both the pesherist and Paul understand law-keeping and righteousness as 
linked (e.g. Rom 2:13-15). On the latter, Paul’s reading is christological (Rom 2:16), 
that is, centered around the revelation of Jesus (see Section 6.2 below). On this, 
Moyise’s comments are helpful. It is true in one sense that the pesherist’s focus on law 
in his exegesis of Hab 2:4 is “precisely what Paul is intending to eliminate” in his own 
reading.877 And it is also certainly true, as Moyise points out as well, that this is due to 
differing “prior convictions.”878 While both of these observations are somewhat true, it 
is perhaps not accurate to speak of Paul’s prior conviction as the negation of law as the 
basic prior conviction itself. Moyise comments that “it is difficult to imagine any 
circumstances where Paul would have interpreted the verse as applying to ‘those who 
observe the law in the house of Judah.’ It must therefore be due to their very different 
prior convictions.”879 If our exegesis of Rom 2:13-15 above is correct (as well as the 
exegesis of chs. 3-4 below), then Paul, like the pesherist, also understands righteousness 
as being intertwined with law-keeping, howbeit in a different sense. The point is that 
what constitutes hermeneutical differences between Paul and the pesherist is not the 
prior conviction of the insertion or absence of law, but rather the prior conviction of the 
manner in which law is fulfilled—for Paul, it is through Christ. Thus, Paul does not in 
one sense see law and the revelation of Christ as compatible (e.g. Rom 3:21a), yet in 
another sense this is not to be taken as a negation of the law’s being fulfilled and 
completed through Christ (e.g. Rom 2:13-16, 25-29; 10:4). Paul’s radical claim, then, is 
                                                                                                                                          
the cosmos finds itself ‘invaded’ by God (J.L. Martyn). In that sense, Paul’s exegesis is determined 
by his soteriology” (17; emphasis original). One possible reason why Watson does not bring to the 
forefront the significance of a sectarian hermeneutic in his analysis of the pesharim is because, 
perhaps, he has chosen from the outset to subsume ecclesiology under God’s saving action. This is 
not to say that Watson has no room for ecclesiology; he does. But it is not as hermeneutically 
significant for him as perhaps it could be. For him, the assumption is that ecclesiology and 
Christology are subsumed under soteriology—that is, God’s saving activity is prior to each: “If, for 
Paul, the church is ‘the community of people who confess that Jesus Christ is Lord’ [Hays, Echoes, 
86], it is also the community created by the exaltation of Jesus Christ as Lord. This exaltation occurs 
by way of Jesus’ death and resurrection, the culmination of a life that embodies God’s reconciling 
action on behalf of the entire world” (17; emphasis original). 
 877 Steve Moyise, Evoking Scripture: Seeing the Old Testament in the New (New York: 
T&T Clark, 2008), 62.  
 878 Ibid. 
 879 Ibid.  
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really the fact of Christology.880 What this means, though, is that his hermeneutic is just 
as sectarian. 
Furthermore, in terms of righteousness for the pesherist, faithfulness to the 
Teacher is paramount because he is the hermeneutical authority concerning the 
prophetic texts, placing them a level lower in status to the Teacher (hermeneutically 
speaking). It is worth quoting at length Watson’s remarks on 1QpHab vii 1-5: 
Under divine inspiration, the prophet writes of the end-time, but he does not understand 
what he writes. This leads directly into the following comment on v.2b: the prophet is 
told to ‘write the vision...so that its reader may run,’ and the pesherist explains that the 
latter phrase ‘concerns the Teacher of righteousness, to whom God has made known all 
the mysteries of the words of his servants the prophets (1QpHab vii.3-5). The two 
comments on Habakkuk 2.2 exploit the contrast in the text between the writer and the 
reader, and the implication that what is written is written for the sake of the reader. 
Thus the contrast between the writer (Habakkuk) and the reader (the Teacher of 
Righteousness) is also a contrast between one to whom God did not make known the 
appointed end and one to whom God did make known all the secrets of that end. The 
Teacher knows more than the prophet because the Teacher has been given full 
understanding of the prophet’s divinely inspired words, whereas the prophet himself has 
not. When Habakkuk writes of the Kasdim (the Babylonians), he is unaware that he is 
really writing about the Kittim (the Romans). Only the Teacher knows that, for, in 
inspiring the prophetic writing, God had the Teacher in mind as its primary addressee. 
The same is true, indeed, of all the prophetic texts. Habakkuk’s subordination to his 
divinely authorized reader establishes the model for all other prophetic writers, for God 
has made known to this reader ‘all the mysteries of the words of his servants the 
prophets’ (vii. 4-5)...Habakkuk’s commission to write for the reader’s sake serves to 
validate the sect’s most fundamental hermeneutical decision.881 
Thus, the eschatological ministry of the Teacher serves to play a hermeneutical role in 
the subsequent use and application of the prophetic texts.882 The interpretive authority 
afforded to the Teacher (1QpHab vii 3-5) serves to be the key to unlocking the 
interpretive decisions that are made with the text itself. In this way, the meaning of 
                                                
 880 How this works out in terms of Paul’s reading of Scripture, see the conclusions in ch. 7 
below. Cf. the last paragraph in Moyise, Evoking Scripture, 62.  
 881 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 105-106; on the last sentence, emphasis ours. Cf. 
Charlesworth, Pesharim, 83-87; Horgan, Pesharim, 229; Lim, Holy Scripture, 117-120. On the 
identity of the Kittim in 1QpHab, see Vanderkam, “Identity and History of the Community,” The 
Dead Sea Scrolls, 510. See also Lim, Pesharim, 65-67. 
 882 See Lim, Pesharim, 26-27. On “revelation” as part of the interpretive activity, see Berrin, 
“Pesharim,” Biblical Interpretation at Qumran, 116–117, 123–130. Cf. Collins, “Prophecy and 
Fulfillment,” 276. 
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scriptural texts, as well as the motifs within them (e.g. “doing the law”), become what 
they are for the sect because of their sectarian horizon of understanding.   
The pesharim given in 1QpHab xi is also intriguing. First, the prophetic text 
begins by interpreting Hab 2:15, where the prophet denounces the Chaldeans, saying, 
“Woe to him who causes his companions to drink. Indeed, causing to pour out his 
wrath, making drunk in order to look into their festivals!” (lines 2-3). This is interpreted 
by the pesherist as a reference to when the Wicked Priest “pursued after the Teacher of 
Righteousness to swallow him up with the heat of his anger in the house of exile,” and 
this was “at the time of the festival, at the rest of the day of the atonement, he caused 
himself to appear to them in order to destroy them and to cause them to stumble in the 
day of fasting, the Sabbath of their rest” (1QpHab xi 4-8). Citing Hab 2:16, the Wicked 
Priest is again taken as the object of God’s wrath by the pesherist in lines 8b-17. The 
reason given for the Wicked Priest’s judgment is “because he did not circumcise the 
foreskin of his heart and has proceeded to walk in ways of abundance in order to take 
away the thirsty” (lines 13-14a).  
What is of immediate interest is how the Wicked Priest did not “circumcise the 
foreskin of his heart.” This could be an allusion to Deuteronomy, and is pertinent to our 
discussion because Paul himself makes a similar reference in Rom 2:25-29. In the 
original context, the prophet was speaking to the Chaldeans, the Gentiles. Yet, the 
pesherist applies this to the Wicked Priest, a Jew. Two things are noted. First, 
hermeneutically, this is the opposite what Paul does with the quotations from Hosea in 
Rom 9:25-26—he applies Jewish-oriented texts to sectarian (Christian) Gentiles. The 
pesherist, on the other hand, applies a Gentile-oriented text to a non-sectarian (Jewish) 
Priest.883 Second, by interpreting the prophetic text the way he did, the pesherist’s 
sectarianism is again highlighted when it was said that the Wicked Priest did not 
“circumcise the foreskin of his heart” (lines 13-14a). The assumption is that the sect, 
following the Teacher, is the community of the spiritually circumcised, while the 
Wicked Priest and his followers are not; they are uncircumcised.884 The latter caused 
                                                
 883 Similar to the Nahum and Hosea pesharim (see below). 
 884 On this pesher, see Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 273-274, whose work lends to 
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others to “stumble” in their fasting and Sabbath-keeping. The entire issue is one of law-
keeping in a sectarian manner. Interestingly, for the sect, the Jewish establishment’s 
circumcision was counted as uncircumcision. Both Paul and the Jewish sectarians are, 
interestingly, understanding the Jewish rite of circumcision in a similar vein.885 
(l) Nahum Pesher - 4Q169  
The first part of the Nahum pesher is a commentary concerning judgment upon 
“the Kittim.”886 Concerning Nah 1:4, the commentator remarks that when the prophet 
says, “He roar[s] at the sea and caus[es it to be dried up],” its interpretation is, “the sea 
is all the K[ittim]” (4Q169fi-ii 3).887 The “Kittim” should be seen as a reference to the 
Romans.888 The judgment is further detailed in the following line: “to bri[ng] against 
them judgment and to destroy them from the face of [the earth]” (4Q169fi-ii 4). When 
the prophet speaks of God drying up all the rivers (Nah 1:4), this is applied to the 
Kittim,889 specifically their rulers: “with [their rule]rs, whose dominion will end” 
(4Q169fi-ii 5a).890  
The pesher is focused not only with judgment upon the Gentiles, i.e., “the 
Kittim,” but also on those who compromise with the Gentiles. For example, in Nah 
2:11-13 the prophet describes Ninevah as a “lion’s den.”891 The words “Where the lion 
went to enter” (Nah 2:11b) is taken as a reference to “[Dem]etrius, king of Yavan, who 
                                                                                                                                          
our observations. See again his comments in the discussion on 1QpHab i 16 above. 
 885 Cf. Rom 2:24. 
 886 Lim, Pesharim, 31, observes that the Nahum pesher is often deemed “the historical 
pesher” as it is not shy in naming certain historical figures (see below; see also 43, 64).   
 887 That the Kittim are in view in light of the poorly preserved nature of the fragment, see 
Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 95, fn. 70; Horgan, Pesharim, 167-168. (For a different view, see 
Hagedorn and Tzoref, “Gentiles,” 505-506.)  
 888 Evans, Ancient Texts, 87; Hagedorn and Tzoref, “Gentiles,” 498, 505-506. See also 
Charlesworth, Pesharim, 73, 109-112; Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 96, fn. 74; Collins, “Reading 
for History,” 306-307; Lim, Pesharim, 32. 
 889 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 95. For the textual issue on f1-2 4a, see Horgan, 
Pesharim, 168.  
 890 Watson, Ibid., has, “with [all their l]eaders, whose rule will end.” Martínez and 
Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:337 have, “with [all their chi]efs, whose rule will end.” Cf. Abegg, Jr., QSM, 
4Q169 f1-2:5a (the text used here). 
 891 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 95. 
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sought to go into Jerusalem upon the council of the Interpreters of Smooth Things” 
(4Q169fiii-iv 1:2).892 “The main focus of the pericope, however, is the Jerusalem 
establishment.”893 The “false interpreters” are the Pharisees.894 One reads that these 
interpreters “walk in treachery and lie[s],”895 and as a result, will be judged harshly 
(4Q169fiii-iv II:2-6). The point here is that prophetic word is interpreted in light of the 
sect’s own present concerns with the non-sectarian Jewish establishment being taken up 
as the focus of wrath.896 Watson explains, 
When he wrote as he did, the prophet Nahum was attacking the Pharisees of the 
commentator’s time, as well as foreseeing an incident in which their final doom would 
be anticipated. The polemic is no doubt to be understood against the background of the 
Pharisees’ return to political power after the death of Alexander Jannaeus.897 
Moreover, this interpretive move where the original adversary, Assyria (to whom the 
original prophecy was given), is taken up by the pesherist in one instance to be the 
present enemy—i.e., his own Jewish contemporaries—is “particularly clear” in 
4Q169fiii-iv 2:1-2.898 Here, the woe is ascribed to the “city Ephraim, the Interpreters-of-
Smooth-Things.”899 Moreover, even though “lion” is taken by the pesherist to refer to 
Demetrius, it also finds a referent in Alexander Jannaeus (4Q169fiii-iv 1:4-7).900 Of 
                                                
 892 Cf. the translations given in Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 95, and Edward Cook, “A 
Commentary on Nahum (4Q169)” in The Dead Sea Scrolls, 217. On the identity of Demetrius, see 
Charlesworth, Pesharim, 112-115. See also Collins, “Reading for History,” 306-307; Lim, 
Pesharim, 31; see also 32-33, where Lim notes that “lion” has dual referents in this pesher. 
 893 Hagedorn and Tzoref, “Gentiles,” 506. 
 894 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 95 (esp. fns. 71-72 for textual and historical detail). See 
also Charlesworth, Pesharim, 97; Vanderkam, “Identity and History of the Community,” The Dead 
Sea Scrolls, 530; Fitzmyer, “Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 608; Collins, 
“Reading for History,” 307; Lim, Pesharim, 31. 
 895 Cf. Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:338–339. 
 896 Hagedorn and Tzoref, “Gentiles,” 506. 
 897 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 96. (Cf. Nitzan, “Repentance in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” 
The Dead Sea Scrolls, 151, fn. 20.) On Jannaeus in this pesher, see Vanderkam, “Identity and 
History of the Community,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 530-531; and Collins, “Reading for History,” 
306-307. 
 898 Hagedorn and Tzoref, “Gentiles,” 507 (note: in the original cited article, the authors have 
“Frgs. 3-4 iii 1-2”). See also Lim, Pesharim, 31.  
 899 See also Ibid., where Hagedorn and Tzoref observe the same interpretive move in 
4Q169fiii-iv 3:8–4:8, where Ephraim has taken the place of the original Nineveh. 
 900 Lim, Pesharim, 32.  
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course, the “lion” motif was originally a referent to “the strength of Assyria,” but now 
finds its focus on a non-sectarian Jew.901 
 A few conclusions emerge. First, the actions of “the Interpreters of Smooth 
Things,” namely, compromising with the nations, was, for the Qumran sect, wicked and 
worthy of judgment. These “interpreters” were those who “walk in treachery and lie[s]” 
(4Q169fiii-iv 2:2-6). This, of course, is in the context of capitulation and compromise 
with outsiders—those outside of the covenant of YHWH. To engage in agreements with 
other nations was, in this case, treacherous. This leads up to, second, the observation 
that the interpretation of the Nahum pesher is, again, the opposite of how Paul uses 
Hosea in Rom 9:25-26. For example, the “lion” (originally Assyria) is applied to 
Jannaeus (4Q169fiii-iv 1:4-7). Moreover, in the 4Q169fiii-iv 2:1-2, the non-covenant 
Gentiles are substituted for rebellious Jews as objects of wrath; in Rom 9:25-26, 
rebellious Jews are substituted for non-covenant Gentiles as objects of mercy. The issue 
is about covenant membership in both cases (as will be seen in due course regarding 
Paul). Moreover, the Nahum pesher is not the only instance of applying the biblical text 
to a contemporary rival (or, in light of Gadamer’s hermeneutic, what one may call 
application by concretization); it also occurs in the Hosea and Habakkuk pesharim.902 
That said, the sect’s way of reading the Twelve ought to be taken as insightful. Their 
reading occurs from the standpoint of a decidedly sectarian, eschatological horizon.903 
Thus, what grounded the pesherist’s interpretive activity were the underlying 
prejudgments inherent to their eschatology, sectarianism, and to some extent, their own 
national hopes.904 In this way, the horizon of the pesherist encounters the horizon of the 
biblical text.905 The sect reaches the understanding it does because of its own present 
                                                
 901 Ibid. 
 902 Hagedorn and Tzoref, “Gentiles,” 490. See Section 4.7 above. 
 903 For a good overview as to how eschatology plays a roll in Qumran interpretive practices 
in regard to application, see Berrin, “Pesharim,” Biblical Interpretation at Qumran, 114–117. 
 904 See and cf. Hagedorn and Tzoref, “Gentiles,” 491. On how eschatology for the sect 
functioned in terms of past, present, and future, see Berrin, “Pesharim,” Biblical Interpretation at 
Qumran, 117. 
 905 Regarding such historical/horizon “contact,” it is perhaps helpful to consider 
Charlesworth, Pesharim, 115, who describes the pesharim as “pneumatic commentaries” and 
“historicizing allegories of Scripture.” Specifically, he says, pesher is “fulfillment exegesis,” distinct 
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experiences and circumstances. Thus the question: what prejudgments enabled Paul’s 
own reading of similar Jewish texts and traditions?  
(m) Zephaniah Pesher - 1Q15 & 4Q170 
The original text discusses how “all the earth will be consumed” ( ראה־לכץ ), and 
how he will bring to an end “all the inhabitants of the earth” ( ראהץ   בשי־לכי ; Zeph 1:18). 
The commentator then mentions “[all the inhabitants of] the land of Judah” (1Q15fi 5). 
Watson thinks that the prophetic phrase, “all the earth will be consumed” (1:18), found 
its interpretation in “[all the inhabitants of] the land of Judah.”906 Hence, the pesher 
should be understood as focused upon non-sectarian Jews as opposed to exclusively the 
nations in general. The pesherist puts a sectarian spin on the text. This idea is not 
without precedence among scholars, for the “eschatological content of pesher” in 
general does indeed “[reflect] basic sectarian tenets,” one of which is “the election of 
the Community.”907 Thus, a pre-commitment to sectarianism (i.e., the election of the 
community) allows the pesherist to interpret Zephaniah as a proof for their own 
particular understanding of what covenant loyalty (or law-keeping) looked like. What 
remains interesting is that this pesher, as the Nahum pesher above, appears to have been 
interpreted quite distinctly when compared to Paul’s treatment of Hosea in Rom 9. This 
pesher utilizes a text originally meant, seemingly, for the entire world908 and narrows its 
focus upon rebellious non-sectarians. Paul, on the other hand, reads the Hosea text that 
                                                                                                                                          
from “historical works,” though “some of them mirror history by refracting the facts pneumatically 
and eschatologically for an in-group cut from the mainstream” (116; emphasis original). 
 906 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 99. Watson comments further that, “it is characteristic of 
Zephaniah that the universal ‘day of wrath of YHWH’ (2.1) is directed primarily against YHWH’s 
own people. This was no doubt also the main theme of the commentary.... The book of Zephaniah as 
a whole lends itself to an interpretation in terms of the forthcoming divine judgment that will befall 
the whole world, but especially the ungodly majority in Judea and Jerusalem. That is likely to have 
been the main theme of the Zephaniah commentary (or commentaries)” (99). This is not to deny our 
present thesis, however, for even in light of Watson’s observations that this pesher might be in line 
with the spirit of Zephaniah’s overall intent, it does not follow that a sectarian prejudgment is not in 
play, for the Zephaniah text is used by the sect to speak to their present concerns (see below). 
 907 Berrin, “Pesharim,” Biblical Interpretation at Qumran, 117. Emphasis original. Here, she 
also notes “dualism” and “historical determinism.” On some level, therefore, sectarianism is more 
than a social or theological category; it is part of their hermeneutic.  
 908 See J. Alec Motyer, “Zephaniah,” in The Minor Prophets: An Exegtical and Expository 
Commentary, vol. 3, ed. Thomas Edward McComiskey (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), 924.  
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was originally focused upon rebellious Jews and widens the focus to include any 
believing Gentile. Both read from a sectarian horizon, howbeit from somewhat different 
horizons.  
Sectarianism as a hermeneutic for the pesherist becomes clear again when one 
looks to the fragment from cave 4. This is a pesher on Zeph 1:12-13 and is a polemic 
against “those who say in their hearts, ‘YHWH will not cause to do good, nor will he 
cause to do evil” (1:12). This results in the rendering, “[they] will not eat” (4Q170fi-ii 
2).909 Watson concludes that, “The commentator no doubt exploited the threatening 
scriptural reference to Jerusalem (‘At that time I will search Jerusalem with lamps’) 
[Zeph.1.12a] in order to denounce contemporary opponents in Jerusalem.”910 Thus, the 
text is interpreted in such a way that the non-sectarians are the focus of wrath. Once 
more, a sectarian hermeneutic is observed.  
(n) Hosea Pesher – 4Q166 & 4Q167911  
The pesher in 4Q166 concerns Hos 2:8-14. The biblical context deals with 
Yahweh’s judgment on Israel through the metaphor of the marriage between Hosea and 
Gomer.912 Hos 2:7 records Gomer (Israel) saying that she has pursued her own “lovers” 
(LXX: ἐραστῶν µου; MT: יבהאמ), specifically saying that these “lovers” have provided 
her with bread (LXX: τῶν διδόντων µοι τοὺς ἄρτους µου; MT: ימחל ינתנ), water (LXX: τὸ 
ὕδωρ µου; MT: ימימו), wool (LXX: τὰ ἱµάτιά µου; MT:  רמצי ), fine linens (LXX: τὰ 
ὀθόνιά µου; MT:יתשפו ), and oil (LXX: τὸ ἔλαιόν µου; MT: ינמש).913 Most likely these 
“lovers” are the deities of the Canaanites.914 However, this is not to exclude the 
possibility that surrounding nations, specifically treaties with them, might also be in 
                                                
 909 On the textual issue surrounding f1-2:2, see Horgan, Pesharim, 192. 
 910 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 99. See again Section 4.7. 
 911 See Lim, Pesharim, 30, on the dating of the copies of 4Q166 and 4Q167.  
 912 Dearman, Hosea, 116.  
913 Note the different endings between Hos 2:7 (MT): ייוקשו; and Hos 2:7 (LXX): καὶ πάντα 
ὅσα µοι καθήκει. 
 
 914 Dearman, Hosea, 112. 
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view.915 By playing the “harlot” (7; LXX: ἐξεπόρνευσεν; MT: התנז), Israel has the 
promise of Yahweh’s interference (8-9). Verse 9 seems to suggest that Israel will have a 
moment of realization and, because of Yahweh’s interference, she will begin to consider 
the idea of returning back to Yahweh, though it is unlikely that true repentance is in 
view.916 Furthermore, concerning the items for which Israel has ran after her “lovers”—
that is, for the items mentioned above—she has failed to see that it was her God, 
Yahweh, who gave her these things and not the gods of the nations (10).917 In return, she 
has rendered worship to Baal (10). The result, according to Hosea’s oracle, is judgment, 
where Yahweh will “uncover her shame” (12; LXX: ἀποκαλύψω τὴν ἀκαθαρσίαν αὐτῆς; 
MT: התלבנ־תא הלגא). Specifically, the means by which Yahweh promises to uncover 
the shame of Israel is by taking away the things he had given her. Verse 12 states that 
Israel’s judgment cannot be stopped by anyone: “[N]o one can rescue the exposed 
Gomer from her fraught state. Israel is under the judgment of YHWH.”918 Moreover, 
God promises to do away with the festivals, Sabbaths, et al., of Israel (13). These 
celebrations are nationalistic festivals.919 Lastly, God promises to destroy the fruit that 
Israel believed Baal had given to her, which was displayed most emphatically when she 
worshipped the Baals (14-15). The great sin, it seems for Hosea, is that Israel has 
forgotten her God (15). 
 The pesherist sees Hos 2:8—where God blocks, or interferes in, the ways of 
Israel—as due to “the era of their disloyalty” (4Q166 i. 9).920 Like Hosea’s unfaithful 
wife, 4Q166 depicts “those who are led astray” as “the unfaithful ones.”921 This 
“disloyalty” (or “treachery”922) ought to be seen as covenant disloyalty. Though it is 
                                                
 915 Ibid.  
 916 Ibid., 113–114.  
 917 Specifically, Hosea only mentions “corn,” “wine,” and “oil” in v. 10 (LXX), but bread, 
water, wool, and fine linens are no doubt also in view considering v. 11. 
 918 Dearman, Hosea, 116. 
 919 Though it is unsure if this is to be seen as exclusively referring to just Israel’s religious 
functions. See Ibid., 117. 
 920 Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:330–331. 
 921 Horgan, Pesharim, 139. 
 922 Abegg, Jr., has םלעומ as “treachery.” See Abegg, Jr., QSM, “לַעוֹמ. ”  
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fragmentary, 4Q166 i. 11 suggests that this might very well be the case, since 
faithfulness to the covenant seems to be at least part of the subject of the text since it 
mentions “those who [upho]ld the [cov]enant.”923 Presumably, this is meant to refer to 
the sect itself. One might assume this, moreover, since the scroll speaks about “the 
generation of the visitation” (4Q166 i. 10), which, as part of the interpretation of Hosea 
in lines 7-8, most likely refers to those outside of the sect, being employed in order to 
link non-sectarians to the role of Gomer, who remains the epitome of covenant 
disloyalty.924 When Gomer (Israel) is pondering a return to her husband/God in the 
original text (2:9 MT; line 15), having recognized she was better off there than where 
she currently finds herself, line 16 makes a fragmented interpretation and reference to 
“the return of the captives” (יבש בושב).925 If indeed the non-sectarian is already in view 
as unfaithful Gomer, then one wonders what “repent” here might have denoted for the 
sect—that is, whether repentance was a possibility for the non-sectarian. Of course, it is 
highly unlikely that this reference, whatever it might have meant for the pesherist, could 
ever have been taken as a reference to Gentiles. Since, firstly, the sect’s argument is a 
contextualized one. That is, the pesher is employed as (and within) a polemic against 
Jewish non-sectarians. Secondly, the subject is disloyalty on the part of God’s once-
covenanted people, Israel, and it seems the “return” being pondered would not have 
been understood by the sect as referring to anyone other than Israel. After all, in the 
mind of the sect, the only one needing a return was wayward Israel herself.926 When 
compared to Paul’s interpretation of Hosea in Rom 9, this is revealing. 
The scriptural citation mentioned in 4Q166 ii 1-2 is from Hos 2:10: “[She does 
not know that] it was I who gave her wheat, [wine] [and oil.] I increased [the silver] and 
the gold (which) they used [for Ba‘al.]”927 The sect sees this as being an act of forgetting 
                                                
 923 Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:330–331. Horgan, Pesharim, 143, doubts this 
reconstruction. 
 924 On the link to Jewish non-sectarians, see Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 93.  
 925 Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:330–331. Cf. Edward Cook, “A Commentary on Hosea 
(4Q166-167)” in The Dead Sea Scrolls: A New Translation, 214; Horgan, Pesharim, 143-144; 
Abegg, Jr., QSM, 4Q166 i. 16. 
 926 On “repent,” cf. the discussion in Horgan, Pesharim, 143-144. 
 927 Reconstruction and translation as found in Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:330-331. Cf. 
with MT: “But she does not know that I gave to her the corn and the wine and the oil, and that I 
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(חכש) God and forsaking his precepts (lit: “fling his commandments behind their 
backs”; םוג ירחא וכילשה ויתווצמ), which came through God’s prophets (lines 3-5). The 
sect laments that, “they listened to those who misdirected them and they acclaimed 
them” (line 5).928 Furthermore, concerning the quotations from Hos 2:11-12, that God 
will take back that which he had given them (the very things of which Israel credited to 
the Baals), the sect sees this as a judgment in order to bring about “sham[e] and disgrace 
in the eyes of the nations on whom they relied” (lines 12-13).929 Here, “the nations” 
(מיאוגה) are said to have been for Israel the focal point of reliance.930 Yet the nations 
will not be able to provide security from God’s judgment (line 14). Understanding what 
is meant by the idea of Israel relying upon the nations for security is better understood 
in the interpretation that comes from Hos 2:13 (lines 14-17). God will put an end to 
Israel’s “joy” (השושמ), “her fea[st, her new] moon and her Sabbath and all her 
festivals” (lines 14-15). These “festivals” are described as being, somehow, in 
partnership with the surrounding nations: םיאוגה ידעומב וכילוי תודע[ומה לוכ] (“[in all the 
fest]ivals, they walk in the festivals of the nations”; line 16).931 The phrase “they walk in 
the feasts/festivals of the nations” seems to reflect an established “exegetical tradition” 
taken from Jubilees.932 According to Hagedorn and Tzoref, there seems to be a 
consensus among scholars that the “insistence upon a 364-day year was a defining 
characteristic for the Qumran Community and related circles.”933 Moreover, this would 
have been a point of controversy between the sect and the Jewish establishment.934 In 
light of these facts, one essential feature of this interpretation is the fact of its 
                                                                                                                                          
increased the silver, but they used gold for Baal” (our translation). 
 928 Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:330-331. 
 929 Ibid., 1:330–331. 
 930 On “nations,” cf. Lim, Pesharim, 30. 
 931 Our translation. This translation differs from Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:331, 
though the reconstruction given by them (330) is followed here. 
 932 Hagedorn and Tzoref, “Gentiles,” 493–494; See also Moshe J. Bernstein, Reading and 
Re-Reading Scripture at Qumran: Law, Pesher and the History of Interpretation, ed. Florentino 
García Martínez, vol. 2, Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah 107 (Boston: Brill, 2013), 674–
685. 
 933 Ibid., 493 (see also 494-495). Cf. Hempel, The Damascus Texts, 81-82. 
 934 Horgan, Pesharim, 146 (see also 50). 
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contemporization to the present circumstances in which the sect itself was involved.935 
So-called “sectarian adaptations” have been observed in the Hosea pesharim—this 
specific pesher being one of them.936 It is telling, then, that covenant disloyalty—things 
like forgetting God, forsaking his commandments, and relying on the nations (line 
13)—is established in terms of a decidedly sectarian horizon of understanding (perhaps 
not unlike Paul in Rom 2:12-29). With the Hos 2:13 pesher understood as a “sectarian 
polemic,”937 the interpretations given by the sect only works if one assumes from the 
start a sort of sectarian pre-understanding.938 
4Q167 contains a pesher on Hos 5:13-15. The pesher mentions a “raging lion” 
(4Q167 fii 2). As Watson has observed, this is linked to Hos 5:13.939 It is possible that 
the pesher has in mind Jannaeus, who relied upon Gentile help in order to push back a 
revolt.940 Concerning Hos 5:14, the commentator says that, “[Its interpretation con]cerns 
the last priest who will stretch out his hand to strike Ephraim” (line 3).941 Again, Watson 
sees this as quite possibly another reference to Jannaeus (who put to death six thousand 
people at a festival gathering), saying, “In the light of the lemma, in which the lion is 
YHWH himself, the commentator would understand this event as a divine judgment 
upon ‘Ephraim’ (the non-sectarian Jewish community).”942 As was the case in 4Q166, 
there is judgment upon the non-sectarians for, presumably, breaking covenant with God 
by taking part, in some form or fashion with Gentiles—whether that be participating in 
the pagan festivals, adapting Jewish festivals to be in accord with Gentile festivals, or 
simply relying on them for help. The Qumran texts carry a significant amount of weight 
                                                
 935 Hagedorn and Tzoref, “Gentiles,” 492. See also Lim, Pesharim, 52. 
 936 Ibid., 497. 
 937 Ibid., 493. 
 938 See Nitzan, “Repentance in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 150-151, 
especially fns. 19-20, where 4QpHosa 2 5 and 4QpHosa 2:2-6, 15-16 are mentioned in the context of 
denouncement from the standpoint of sectarian interpretive authority.  
 939 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 93-94. Here Watson notes that the ןורחה ריפכ is “known 
from the Nahum commentary and identifiable as Alexander Jannaeus (4QpHosb 2 2; 4QpNah 3+4 
i.5, 6).” 
 940 Ibid., 94. See also Lim, Pesharim, 30. 
 941 Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:333.  
 942 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 94. Cf. Charlesworth, Pesharim, 101; Horgan, Pesharim, 
149. 
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concerning covenantal purity. Hence, one can easily discern, in relation to the use and 
application of the Hosea texts in regard to this covenantal purity, a rather negative focus 
upon the Gentiles. 
Following this, there are fragments which comment on portions from Hos 6-7. 
First, 4Q167 ffv-vi 1-3 cites a small portion from Hos 6:4: “[What] shall I do with you, 
[Ephraim;] what [shall I do with you, Judah?...].”943 Though nothing remains of an 
exegesis of v. 4 in the sectarian text, it is possible that the citation given here is meant to 
lament, once again, the covenant unfaithfulness of the people to YHWH. This could be 
evidenced by the reference to Israel’s דסח in the original text being likened to a 
“morning cloud” and “the dew,” both of which vanishes out of sight quickly.944 That 
this is in view is perhaps clear in light of the pesher on Hos 6:7, which speaks of the 
explicit disloyalty on the part of the people: “[But they, like Adam,] broke the 
covenant.”945 Though fragmented, the application of this passage in 4Q167 fvii 1-2 is 
straightforward: “[…] they forsook God and [w]alked in the statutes of [...] ...”946 It is 
difficult to tell in whose statutes the wayward people walked, though having 
investigated the discussion surrounding 4Q166 (see above) concerning Israel’s 
participation in the festivals of the nations, it is very possible—indeed, one ought not be 
surprised to discover—that the “statutes” mentioned above are the very rules and 
customs of the nations’ festivals and celebrations.947 If that is so, then at some level, the 
sect sees their non-sectarian counterparts as guilty of similar intermingling. Moreover, 
the pesher considers Hos 6:9-10, where Israel’s priests are condemned for “heinous 
                                                
 943 Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:333. MT: “What am I to do with you, Ephraim? What 
am I to do with you, Judah? Your love (דסח) is like a morning cloud, and it is like the dew that rises 
early to go away” (our translation). 
 944 Dearman, Hosea, 195–196. Dearman says Hosea 6:4 is “God’s response to the people’s 
continuing faithlessness,” and the word hesed (Dearman translates this as “loyalty”) “appear here in 
a simile in the context of a charge of fickleness against the people...[the similes show] the fleeting 
commitment of Ephraim and Judah to YHWH (cf. 13:3).”  
 945 Martínez and Tigchelaar, DSS, 1:333. MT: “But they, like Adam, broke covenant; they 
dealt faithlessly with me” (our translation). 
 946 Our translation of 4Q167 f7-9:2.  
 947 See Bernstein, Qumran, 675, fn. 7, who suggests that the phrase from 4Q167fvii 2 
(“They... [w]alked in the statutes...”) is based upon a similar phrase found in Lev 20:23 (and 2 Kgs 
17:8): “And you shall not walk in the statutes of the nations...” Moreover, he says this latter passage 
serves as the basis for the idiom “They walk in the festivals of the nations” in 4Q166 fii 16.   
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activities”—such as, robbery and murder—their sins are described in terms of 
“harlotry.”948 Interestingly, when an interpretation is given, there is a mention, once 
more, of “the [w]icked nation[s]” [ יאוגה]ם  ]ר[יעש ; 4Q167 x 3). Because of the 
fragmentary nature of the passage, it is difficult to tell in what context “the wicked 
nations” is used in regard to the priestly sins. However, conclusions with some 
confidence can be drawn. Considering all that has been said above, one could expect 
that the evil which befalls Israel has to do, at some level, with involvement with non-
Jewish people, that is, the Gentiles. This would make sense with the use of “harlotry” in 
this context (Hos 6:10; 4Q167 fx 1).949  
6.1.1 Vorurteile and Anwendung at Qumran  
The prejudgments that undergird the sect’s interpretive activity have been noted. 
Given the necessary role prejudgments have on every interpretive act, one must see, 
therefore, the sectarian prejudgments as key.950 There is no question that sectarianism 
functions theologically and sociologically; but the observations given above point to the 
idea that these themes also function hermeneutically. It is worth quoting again Watson, 
who, seeking to drive a wedge between Paul’s use of Hab 2:4 and the pesherist’s own 
use, says,  
For Paul, who uses Habakkuk 2.4 to advocate an antithetical understanding of the 
relation of faith and law, “faith” corresponds to the universal scope of God’s address in 
the gospel, directed as it is to Jews and Gentiles alike (cf. Rom. 3.29-30). For the 
Qumran commentator, the “righteous” of the prophetic text are identified with the 
                                                
 948 Dearman, Hosea, 198–199. 
 949 Outside of Hos 6:10, the word תונז can be used metaphorically. For example, see Ezekiel 
23:27, where the reference seems to be to idolatry, i.e., to unfaithfulness, due to some sort of 
participation with Gentiles; in this case, Egypt.   
 950 So Brooke, “Reading the Plain Meaning,” Jewish Ways of Reading the Bible, 90: “There 
is really no neat dividing line between pure exegesis and applied exegesis, between the copying of 
biblical manuscripts and their interpretation and over-interpretation. All handling of scripture in the 
scrolls from Qumran shows not antiquarian interest but that certain authoritative traditions were 
understood to be continuously relevant. Of course the understanding of all the finds at Qumran is, 
like the finds themselves, still very fragmentary, but the rich range of materials now available from 
one place offers the modern scholar an unequalled opportunity to embark on a comprehensive 
analysis of the place of authoritative scriptures in a believing community. Any such analysis must 
give proper place to the texts of the scriptures themselves, which includes their plain sense, as well 
as outlining the broader exegetical assumptions of those who transmited and interpreted them.” Cf. 
Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran, 283; Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 276. 
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minority within Israel who observe the law and believe in the teacher. The commentator 
therefore minimizes every indication of universal concern in the scriptural text.951 
Thus, one can make sense of such phenomenon by saying the texts as interpreted by the 
sect have the sectarian flavor they do precisely because they are read from a sectarian 
horizon of understanding. 
Moreover, since the sect itself didn’t claim to have special “revelation” in the 
sense of visions, dreams, or the like, it is likely their re-reading of the original material 
was largely due to an “intellectual transformation of prophecy.”952 George Brooke 
comments that, “[T]his intellectual transformation is associated in the collective 
memory of the sectarian movement with the Teacher of Righteousness.”953 Extending 
Brooke’s thought, it seems that one could say the sect’s re-reading of the prophetic texts 
took the shape it did because of the horizon of the sect’s shared consciousness, with the 
Teacher as the central and essential gatekeeper.954 In determining and defining what 
exactly was essential to the pesharim (i.e., what makes the pesharim what it was), one 
must consider the outlook—and situatedness—the sect had toward the prophetic texts 
themselves. Specifically, Berrin cites the work of Dimant, who discusses “the sect’s 
own position in history” and their own “peculiar attitude to the base-text” in relation to 
their interpretive activity.955 Indeed, the sect’s interpretations are “in terms of the 
history, life, and beliefs of the Qumran community.”956 With respect to philosophical-
                                                
 951 Watson, Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., 113. 
 952 George J. Brooke, “Prophetic Interpretation in the Pesharim,” in Companion, 249. For 
his observations, Brooke relies on the work of Edward M. Cook, “What Did the Jews of Qumran 
Know about God and How Did They Know It? Revelation and God in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in 
Judaism in Late Antiquity, Pt. 5: The Judaism of Qumran: A Systemic Reading of the Dead Sea 
Scrolls, Vol. 2: World View, Comparing Judaisms, ed. Alan J. Avery-Peck, Jacob Neusner, and 
Bruce D. Chilton. HO 17 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 7.   
 953 Ibid. 
 954 Cf. Lim, Holy Scripture, 119-120. 
 955 Berrin, “Pesharim,” Biblical Interpretation at Qumran, 122-123, fn. 48, citing Devorah 
Dimant, “Qumran Sectarian Literature,” in Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period: 
Apocrypha, Pseudipigrapha, Qumran Sectarian Writings, Philo, Josephus, ed. M. E. Stone, CRINT 
II.2 (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 507. It should be noted that Berrin takes a (slight) exception to 
Dimant’s definition of pesher here (though this is somewhat inconsequential for our point here). See 
again Collins, “Prophecy and Fulfillment,” 273-274. 
 956 Horgan, Pesharim, 259. (Horgan here is commenting specifically on the so-called 
“continuous pesharim.”) 
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hermeneutics, this observation is significant, for one is immediately reminded of 
Gadamer’s vital concept of wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein.957 This concept lends 
itself as a helpful tool in that it gives conceptual terminology and language to what has 
been observed in the pesharim texts above. Recalling Gadamer’s theory, one’s own 
tradition and historical place in the world enables all interpretive activity—not least for 
the pesherist. 
Gadamer’s thesis ought to be recalled, namely, that “all understanding inevitably 
involves some prejudice”958 and Thiselton’s remarks that “there is no presuppositionless 
interpretation”959 and that an interpreter’s prejudgments must be brought to light, for “he 
must inevitably come to the text with ‘anticipatory ideas’; [and] it is part of the 
hermeneutical task to make these conscious.”960 So in the quest to understand the sects’ 
use of those same texts which were also familiar to Paul, how might one describe such 
use? The interpretive practices of the sect can be described—or at the very least, 
helpfully clarified—in terms of the prejudgments they brought to the text, that is, those 
Vorurteile which made the interpretations possible in the first place. Just as the 
sectarians could not physically see past the horizon of the desert landscape, neither 
could they hermeneutically see past the horizon of their own tradition. The sectarian’s 
horizon, like every interpreter before and after him—including Paul himself—was what 
it was because of the effect of their shared history, tradition, and theology out of which 
they lived and interpreted. For Gadamer, it is recalled, “Verstehen ist seinem Wesen 
nach ein wirkungsgeschichtlicher Vorgang.”961 For the sect, what brought fusion 
between the prophetic text and their own present reading of it was a prior commitment 
to an eschatologically-oriented sectarianism, centered upon the interpretive authority of 
the Teacher. In light of these Vorurteile, the texts themselves were applied in judgment 
toward non-sectarians, thus validating the sect’s own existence. It was from within these 
                                                
 957 See Section 4.4 above. 
 958 Gadamer, TM, 272. 
 959 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 304. 
 960 Ibid., 305. 
 961 Gadamer, WM, 305; TM, 299. See again Section 4.4 above. 
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concrete applications of the texts to the present circumstances that the text took on 
meaning for the sectarian.  
Specific conclusions are as follows: (1) sectarianism operated hermeneutically at 
Qumran; (2) the motif of doing the law underwent a decidedly sectarian re-
appropriation;962 (3) the texts often found contemporized re-appropriation for the sect in 
that new focuses were contrived, e.g., texts originally speaking of Gentiles were 
reapplied to the present enemy of the sect; (4) covenant inclusion was, at times, 
understood in spiritual terms, i.e., a “circumcision of the heart”; (5) there is scant 
evidence—not least in the interpretations of Hosea texts—to suggest that the sect would 
have seen Gentiles qua Gentiles as objects of mercy as Paul does; and (6) the texts of 
Hosea which spoke of Jewish inclusion were still, for the sect, understood to speak of 
contemporary wayward Jews, not Gentiles. In this way, similarities and dissimilarities 
emerge. 
6.2 Righteousness, Faith, and the Story of Abraham (Romans 3-4) 
Chapter 3 has as its initial focus the faithfulness of God. Specifically, God’s 
faithfulness is questioned because of the covenant unfaithfulness and disloyalty on the 
part of some Jews (themes not unlike those found in the pesharim above).963 Paul 
continues in Rom 3 with the same line of thought in 1:17-2:29. And so the question: 
“What, therefore, is the advantage of the Jew? Or what value is there for circumcision?” 
(3:1). This question is in response to what came before.964 Paul answers the 
interlocutor’s question in the affirmative, saying, “they were entrusted [πιστεύω] with 
the oracles of God” (2). This is to be taken as reference to how the Jews were entrusted 
                                                
 962 See above. Cf. to Section 5.6. 
 963 Moo, Romans, 178–179. Moo notes “two broadly different approaches to the text” of 
3:1-8. He calls the first view the “traditional model,” which sees the first part of vv. 1-8 as focusing 
upon the Jewish people, while the latter half is broadened to include all of humanity. The other way 
of viewing this text, according to Moo (and the one which he believes to be “nearer to the truth”), is 
that the entire passage (vv. 1-8) is focused on the Jewish people. Under this account, vv. 5-8 “do not 
take up a general objection to the fairness and consistency of God, but affirm the faithfulness of God 
to Israel or the ‘right’ of God to judge even his own covenant people” (179). It is this second 
approach that we believe to be the correct one. Cf. Gorman, Crucified Lord, 356. 
 964 Jewett, Romans, 241. Cf. Stuhlmacher, Romans, 51f. 
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with the task of bearing witness to the world, i.e., to the Gentiles.965 The immediate 
follow up question is, “What if some were found unfaithful [ἀπιστέω]? Does not their 
unfaithfulness [ἀπιστία] bring to nothing the faithfulness [πίστις] of God?” (3). 
Observing the reoccurrence of the πίστ- word group here is instructive,966 for the 
cognates display the interconnectedness of the passage better than what a typical 
English translation can, as in v. 2, “entrusted” appears in English as an entirely different 
sort of word than “faithful” or “faithfulness.” That said, “faithfulness,” both Israel’s and 
God’s, is the center of Paul’s diatribe.967 While “unfaithfulness” can be seen as a 
reference specifically to not having faith in Jesus,968 it remains preferable to see 
“unfaithfulness” as the failure to carry out the divine mission of being “the light of the 
world,” the very thing they were entrusted to do.969 This, of course, was due to their own 
sinfulness, which undermines their “boast” in 2:17 and 23a, as they too are corrupt (vv. 
21-24).970 Does, then, Jewish unfaithfulness render God’s faithfulness invalid, or put 
another way, does Jewish unfaithfulness “cause [God’s faithfulness] not to function”?971 
If it is true that the covenantal promise was “to bless the world through Israel,” and if 
God decides to bless the world in a different way, i.e., “bypass Israel,” it would be true 
therefore, as Wright maintains, that “he [God] stands convicted of unfaithfulness: 
unfaithfulness…not in relation to his promise to Israel, but to his promises through 
Israel for the world; promises to bless the world by this means rather than some 
other.”972 Paul’s response is µὴ γένοιτο.973  
                                                
 965 Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 453. Cf. Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and 
Perseverance, 54-55; Stuhlmacher, Romans, 52, takes this as a reference to “commandments.” Cf. 
Fitzmyer, Romans, 326-327. See also, Wright, “The Meaning of Romans,” Perspectives, 489-509, 
esp. 490-495. 
 966 E.g. see Dunn, Romans, 38a, 131. 
 967 Cf. Moo, Romans, 178–179. 
 968 Jewett, Romans, 244; Cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, 327; Dunn, Romans, 38a, 131–132.  
 969 Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 453. See also Wright, “The Meaning of Romans,” 
Perspectives, 491, 497-499. 
 970 Wright, “The Meaning of Romans,” Perspectives, 497. 
971 Fitzmyer, Romans, 327, has “ineffective.” See the entry on καταργέω in Johannes P. 
Louw and Eugene Albert Nida, vol. 1, Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament: Based on 
Semantic Domains (electronic ed. of the 2nd edition.; New York: United Bible Societies, 1996), 682. 
 
 972 Wright, “The Meaning of Romans,” Perspectives, 492. Emphasis original. 
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Quotations follow from the Psalms, the second of which is linked with God’s 
eschatological judgment spoken of in 2:12-16.974 Then comes an explanation of 
“faithfulness” in v. 5. “But if our unrighteousness demonstrates God’s righteousness, 
what shall we say?” Before moving into the rest of Paul’s line of thought, it is observed 
that in v. 5 “righteousness” is set in direct parallel to the “faithfulness” spoken about in 
v. 3, and furthermore, “unrighteousness” in v. 5 is linked with “unfaithfulness” 
mentioned in v. 3.975 Righteousness language, therefore, is tied to the concept of 
“faithfulness,” not least to covenant and obedience.976 Thus, a continuity of thought 
must be observed, flowing backward from “un/righteousness” (ἀδικία and δικαιοσύνην in 
3:5a) to “un/faithfulness” (ἀπιστέω, ἀπιστία, and πίστις in 3:3) to “decrees of the law” 
(δικαιώµατα in 2:26) to the “righteous” (δίκαιοι in 2:13). Moreover, “righteousness” was 
already observed in terms of human (and Jewish) unfaithfulness (1:18ff; see above). The 
present observations here serve to affirm those previous conclusions. Thus, the 
substance of ch. 2 is indeed a continual thought from 1:18-32. This reflection helps the 
reader not to lose Paul’s overall train of thought, which began in Rom 1 and into chs. 3-
4 (see below). Finally, in response to the interlocutor’s accusation that Paul’s argument 
is self-contradictory, Paul finishes the rest of this diatribe defending the right of God to 
judge and inflict wrath (i.e., 5-8).977 
Verses 9-20, established by a catena of Scripture, provide a sweeping case for 
the guilt of all humanity.978 Verse 19a comes after the last citation, saying, “And we 
know that what the law says, it says to those within the law (ἐν τῷ νόµῳ).” When the 
preposition ἐν, being translated as “within,” is employed by Paul, it serves to mark out 
the precise role Jewish law played in separating the chosen people, Israel, from the 
                                                                                                                                          
 973 On the “triple theme” at work here concerning continuity between Paul’s Gospel and 
God’s covenant with Israel, see Dunn, Romans, 38a, 132. On µὴ γένοιτο, see Fitzmyer, Romans, 
327-328. 
 974 Dunn, Romans, 38a, 140.  
 975 Dunn observes this link as well (see Ibid., 134). 
 976 Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 453; Cf. Moo, Romans, 189–190. 
 977 Jewett, Romans, 247–248; Dunn, Romans, 38a, 141. 
 978 See Gorman, Crucified Lord, 357-358. On possible literary similarities between Rom 
3:10-18 and Qumran writings, see Fitzmyer, “Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 
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Gentiles.979 The “law” serves to make sure that “every mouth may be stopped and the 
whole world may become accountable to God” (19b). This is followed by v. 20: 
“Because by works of the law (ἐξ ἔργων νόµου), no flesh will be justified in his sight, for 
through the law comes knowledge of sin.” As in 2:13, the topics of justification and law 
are again taken up in 3:20. The potential problem between these two passages is that it 
is difficult to reconcile them. On the one hand, in 2:13, justification is said to happen 
when people become “doers of the law.” In 3:20, though, it is read that “works of the 
law” will not bring justification.980 Having established that the phrase “doers of the law” 
cannot be a mere hypothetical but something actual, one must see “doers of the law” 
and “works of the law” as two separate ideas for Paul.981 The case has already been 
made for 2:12-13 as emphasizing identity—that is, those who will be justified. It is not 
within the scope of this research to address every complexity about “works of the law,” 
though we only wish to reaffirm the non-hypothetical possibility of the “doers of the 
law” in 2:13ff, while affirming the real impossibility of justification by “works of the 
law” in 3:20. Concerning the latter, it is contended that “works of the law” refers to 
those things that were argued against in ch. 2, namely, circumcision of the outward 
flesh, etc.982 Some scholars have argued that “works of the law” cannot refer merely to 
exclusive Jewish categories, for Paul says that οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σὰρξ, “no flesh 
shall be justified” (3:20). Moo states that the reference to “all flesh” refers to both Jews 
and Gentiles, saying, “‘Works of the law’ cannot be, then, so interpreted as to restrict 
the principle to Jews only.”983 It must be observed, however, that πᾶσα σὰρξ is a Pauline 
insertion, from an allusion to Psalm 142 (LXX), where πᾶς ζῶν was used possibly as a 
“neutral expression for humans.”984 Presumably, then, Paul’s insertion of σὰρξ in place 
                                                                                                                                          
613. 
 979 Dunn, Romans, 38a, 152; Cf. Schreiner, Romans, 168. Cf. Rom 3:19a with 2:12-14. 
 980 On Paul’s awareness regarding his use of ἔργα νόµου in relation to a “Palestinian Jewish 
tradition,” see Fitzmyer, “Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 614. 
 981 Dunn, Romans, 38a, 153, 158–159; Against this, see Sprinkle, Paul & Judaism, 186–
192. 
 982 Ibid., 158. 
 983 Moo, Romans, 208; See also Sprinkle, Paul & Judaism, 153–154. 
 984 Jewett, Romans, 266. On the allusion, see Dunn, Romans, 38a, 152–152. Cf. Ware, 
“Law, Christ, and Covenant,” 529-533, esp. in light of his overall project; Fitzmyer, Romans, 337. 
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of ζῶν had deliberate theological intent, namely, to point out “human finitude, 
weakness, and corruptibility.”985 Moreover, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Paul is 
arguing against Jewish ethno-religious pride and “fleshly distinctiveness,” which was 
symbolized in physical circumcision.986 This view can be further validated when it is 
recalled that Paul’s previous use of the word σὰρξ in 2:28 in reference to the issue of 
physical circumcision was cast in a negative light.987   
 If “works of the law” (3:20) is the functional equivalent to circumcision of the 
flesh in 2:28 (σαρκὶ περιτοµή), and when 3:21-22 follows in antithesis988 (“the 
righteousness of God has been manifested apart from the law...the righteousness of God 
through the faithfulness of Jesus Christ for all who believe”), the following conclusions 
can be made.989 First, the revealing of “righteousness” (δικαιοσύνη) is linked to the 
discussion about justification (δικαιόω) in 2:13.990 There, the details about justification 
were not explicated, only anticipated, but now a more coherent picture emerges.991 
Second, the link between 3:21-22 and 2:11-29 is reinforced when we observe vv. 22b-
23a: “For there is no distinction: for all have sinned” (οὐ γάρ ἐστιν διαστολή, πάντες γὰρ 
ἥµαρτον).992 This clearly parallels 2:11, where the issue of partiality is discussed. 
                                                
 985 Dunn, Romans, 38a, 155. Cf. Jewett, Romans, 266. 
 986 Ibid. Cf. Ware, “Law, Christ, and Covenant,” 523-524, 535-536.  
 987 Jewett, Romans, 266. 
 988 So Ware, “Law, Christ, and Covenant,” 522, who describes the relationship between vv. 
19-20 and 21-26 as “antithetical.” 
 989 Contra Matlock, “Saving Faith,” The Faith of Jesus Christ, esp. 79-81, 86-89, we take 
πίστεως Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ subjectively as the “faithfulness of Jesus Christ.” See again Campbell, “The 
Faithfulness of Jesus Christ,” The Faith of Jesus Christ, esp. 60, where he discusses the link between 
3:21-22 and 1:17. See the discussion in Section 5.4 above. Cf. Jae Hyung Cho, “The Christology of 
Romans in Light of Πιστις Ιησου Χριστου (Rom 3:22-26),” RQ 56, no. 1 (2014): 41-51, pp. 43-46; 
Gorman, Crucified Lord, 358-359.  
 990 See Dunn, Romans, 38a, 164–165, who says the phrase χωρὶς νόµου was “intended to be 
understood in contrast (νυνὶ δὲ) to the ἐν τῷ νόµῳ and ἐξ ἔργων νόµου of vv 19-20, implying that Paul 
thinks of the law in the same way in each of the phrases--the law as a boundary marker ('those within 
the law'), where 'works of the law' is the distinctive pattern of religion and lifestyle demanded of 
those marked out by the law. 'Without the law' then means outside the national and religious 
parameters set by the law without reference to the normal Jewish hallmarks...”  
 991 See again Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 441. 
 992 See Dunn, Romans, 38a, 167, 178. Contra Jewett, Romans, 279–280. Cf. Moo, Romans, 
226. Cf. Rom 3:22b and 3:31 with 1 Macc 2:11, where the “lawless” plea for a tearing down of 
  
193 
Likewise, when Paul states in 3:21 that, “now the righteousness of God has been 
revealed apart from the law,” this should be seen as running parallel to 2:13-14, where 
Gentiles are given “justification” (δικαιωθήσονται, v. 13) even though they do not by 
nature possess the law (v. 14).993 Third, 3:21-22 fills in the details of 2:12-16 and, not 
least, 3:1-3.994 That is, the “righteousness of God” is said to be through Christ (v. 22) 
and all people are said to now be “justified” (δικαιόω) by grace (v. 24). At this point, 
Paul concludes by saying all “boasting” is null and void (v. 27), and justification “by 
faith” is set in contrast to justification by “works of the law” (v. 28).995 Remembering 
that fleshly, i.e., Jewish, “works” were those things Paul was arguing against in 2:25-29, 
one sees that those who have the “circumcision of the heart” (2:29)—those who are 
“doers of the law” (2:13), the ones who “show that the work of the law is written on 
their hearts” (2:15)—are those who have faith in Jesus Christ. Moreover, one must not 
miss that discussions about righteousness (3:21-22) and justification (3:24) are 
decidedly christological discussions. While Paul never mentions “justification by faith” 
in 2:13ff, and only subtly hints at the christological role in future judgment (2:16), 
looking back from 3:21-22, 24, the parallels thus far presented suggest they were very 
much implied. Thus, in the spirit of Gadamer, Paul had approached the subject of 
Gentile covenant inclusion in Rom 2 with “anticipatory ideas.”996  
 Rom 3:29-31 offers additional insight:  
Or is God a God of the Jews only? Is he not also the God of the Gentiles? Yes, and also 
of Gentiles, since God is one. He will justify [δικαιώσει] the circumcised by faith and 
the uncircumcised through faith. Do we then nullify the law through faith? By no 
means! Rather, we maintain the law. 
                                                                                                                                          
distinction between Jew and Gentile.  
 993 Note especially the parallel use of the δικ- word group. 
 994 See Wright, “The Meaning of Romans,” Perspectives, 503, where he discusses the 
faithfulness of Jesus Christ as “precisely his faithfulness to God’s Israel-shaped purpose,” thus 
connecting this back to the discussion of 3:1-3. 
 995 Ibid., 504, sees a plausible connection of the boasting in 3:27 to the boasting of 2:17-24, 
that is, to (in his mind) the idea of a Jewish boast of special “privilege of being God’s instrument in 
rescuing the world from the plight of 1.18-2.16.” This boast is obviously laced with national/ethnic 
overtones. Stuhlmacher, Romans, 65, says 3:27 links back to 2:17 with the catchword of boasting. 
 996 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 305. 
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Thus, the fact that the question as to whether God is also the God of the Gentiles (and 
the fact that the issue of Gentile justification is for Paul tied to that question) 
demonstrates, firstly, that the issue of ethnocentric concerns are still present issues, 
issues mentioned earlier in 2:11-29.997 Secondly, the fact that δικαιώσει is set in the 
future tense, and is not a mere “logical future,” is indicative of the link back to the 
argument in 2:12-16, specifically v. 13 (δικαιωθήσονται).998 Thirdly, the continued need 
for Paul to discuss circumcision serves to tether the line of thought back to 2:12-29.999 
Fourthly, the matter of nullifying the law versus establishing it (3:31) ties once more 
back to the previous discussion in 2:25-29, where he says, “The one who is by nature 
uncircumcised but keeps (τελέω) the law will condemn you who has the written code 
and circumcision but breaks the law” (27).1000 Thus, as will be seen, Paul sees those who 
have faith in Christ as the ones who “maintain the law,” i.e., those who “keep (τελέω) 
the law,”1001 despite not being circumcised. These views are permissible for Paul, since 
God is the God of the Gentiles too (3:29).1002 Though there is more to be said, the 
emergence of 3:21-22, 24 with 27-31 (in dialogue with 2:12-16, 25-29) suggest in Paul 
a christological horizon of understanding.1003 The most significant part observed is the 
underlying, indeed hermeneutical, point—namely, the christological basis for the entire 
narrative’s re-construal of righteousness, law-keeping, and the Gentile question. The re-
appraisal of the people of God (which itself was the result of his revisionary readings of 
key Jewish texts and themes) was what it was for Paul because of a decidedly 
christocentric emphasis. Thus, here Wright can speak of a “christologically redefined 
                                                
 997 So Dunn, Romans, 38a, 188; Cf. Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 482–484. 
Fitzmyer, Romans, 365, sees an illusion Psalm 66:8 in Rom 2:29b. 
 998 Ibid., 189; Contra Moo, Romans, 252, fn. 33. Cf. Schreiner, Romans, 206; Fitzmyer, 
Romans, 365. 
 999 See Ibid., who also makes this observation. 
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 1001 Cf. Rom 10:4 
 1002 Cf. Schreiner, Romans, 206–208; Moo, Romans, 255. 
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195 
election.”1004 Paul’s reading of Scripture, and the theology which comes from it, was no 
doubt informed by his christological convictions,1005 operating therefore as part of his 
Vorstruktur des Verstehens. This, of course, necessitates a discussion about his own 
Vorurteile. These concepts and terms provide helpful clarification.1006  
 Chapter four concerns the story of Abraham, where Paul puts into antithesis 
faith and works. “What, therefore, shall we say was found by Abraham, our forefather 
according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα)? For if Abraham was justified by works (ἐξ ἔργων 
ἐδικαιώθη), he had something to boast about, but not before God” (4:1-2).1007 
Unsurprisingly, σάρκα is understood negatively again. Moreover, the phrase “by works” 
(ἐξ ἔργων) is a shorter version of the phrase ἐξ ἔργων νόµου which occurred in 3:20.1008 It 
is recalled that this phrase (ἐξ ἔργων νόµου in 3:20) pointed backward to the discussion 
about circumcision of the flesh in 2:28 (σαρκὶ περιτοµή), which is its functional 
equivalent.1009 Thus, Paul is not speaking of “works” in a general sense, but in a 
specific, Jewish cultic sense.1010 One cannot say, then, that “merit theology” is as 
inherent to the discussion as one might think, as Paul’s primary issue is “with the works 
of covenant loyalty… [and that] Paul’s opposition to Jewish covenantal nomism can be 
reduced to his insistence on Christ-fidelity vs. Torah-fidelity.”1011 This claim is 
substantiated by the issue of circumcision in 4:9-12.1012 In order to exploit the details of 
the Abraham story to his advantage, Paul states with scriptural citation that Abraham 
                                                
 1004 Wright, PFG, 848. 
 1005 See the discussion on Seyoon Kim’s work below. 
 1006 See Sections 6.5 and 7 below. 
 1007 Wright, “The Meaning of Romans,” Perspectives, 505-506, connects “boast” here back 
to the boasting 3:27 and 2:17-24. See Dunn, Romans, 38a, 199, on κατὰ σάρκα. Cf. Moo, Romans, 
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 1008 Dunn, Romans, 38a, 200; Cf. Schreiner, Romans, 218.  
 1009 Note that σαρκὶ περιτοµή in 2:28 is tied back to those who, by nature, “have the law” and 
those who are merely “hearers of the law” in 2:13-14. The progression of Paul’s working narrative, 
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 1010 Contra Schreiner, Romans, 217–218. 
 1011 Garlington, Faith, Obedience, Perseverance, 6-7. Emphasis original. Cf. Wright, 
“Justification,” Perspectives, 433-434. 
 1012 Contra Schreiner, Romans, 218. 
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was “counted” righteous, not by works, but by believing God (vv. 3-5).1013 This is 
buttressed by a quotation from the Psalms (vv. 7-8).1014 Paul adds that Abraham’s 
righteous status was prior to his circumcision, not during or after it (vv. 9-10). 
Paul’s argument is straightforward: the event of which Gen 15:6 speaks precedes the 
event described in Gen 17:23-27. Paul insists on separating into distinct phases what his 
fellow Jews, and no doubt he himself previously, had always taken as a whole...by 
narrowing the issue to circumcision as such, Paul takes up a strong position, and one 
difficult to contest. For the evidence of Scripture is that Abraham was reckoned 
righteous, accepted in covenant relationship by God, prior to his being circumcised and 
without reference to circumcision. That one fact is sufficient to establish the point that 
God’s righteousness was not dependent upon works of the law, or any cultic 
observance, in the case of Abraham. And if Abraham is the paradigm for God’s 
dealings with humankind, including his covenant dealings with the seed of Abraham, 
that also means that God’s acceptance in general is or at least can be “apart from 
works.”1015 
Indeed, this is the content of Paul’s argument. However, as we will see, there is much 
more at play for Paul than merely the question of the timing of events. All the same, that 
circumcision is used by Paul as an example of a “work” of the law is instructive, as it 
connects the argument to Rom 2. The purpose was to show that Abraham would 
become “the father of all who would believe without being circumcised, so that 
righteousness would be counted to them also” (v.11b). The connection to Rom 2:13ff is 
clear: “Righteousness” is counted even to Gentiles, who “do not by nature have the 
law,” nevertheless, they “show that the work of the law is written on their hearts” (vv. 
14-15). How so? Because the law did not bring about the promised inheritance of the 
world to “Abraham and his offspring”; rather, the promised inheritance came “through 
the righteousness of faith” (4:13), as the Abraham story shows plainly.1016 Thus, the 
                                                
 1013 See Juncker, “Children of Promise,” 131–160, for how the motif of the paternity of 
Abraham is consistent between the substance of Rom 4 and Gal 3. (Gen 15:6 is also cited in Gal 
3:6.) 
 1014 On how significant, or perhaps insignificant, this citation is to Paul’s overall argument, 
see Dunn, Romans, 38a, 230. Concerning Paul’s use of gezerah shawah with his citation, see: 
Fitzmyer, Romans, 375-376; Barrett, Romans, 85. 
 1015 Dunn, Romans, 38a, 231. 
 1016 See Mark Forman, “The Politics of Promise: Echoes of Isaiah 54 in Romans 4.19-21,” 
JSNT 31, no. 3 (March 1, 2009): 301–324, on the phrase “inherit the world.” Cf. Juncker, “Children 
of Promise,” 144–146. It is true that Paul fails to highlight a christological emphasis concerning 
“offspring” like he does in Gal 3:16, as the focus here is indeed “collective” (Moo, Romans, 274). 
However, it would be a mistake to think Christology is entirely absent (hermeneutically speaking; 
see below)—not least because the corporate and the individual, the ekklesia and the christos, cannot 
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persons who “share the faith of Abraham” are to be included in the covenant made with 
Abraham, and this includes Gentiles (vv. 16-17a).  
 What does “faith” mean with respect to Abraham’s faith? Dunn describes it (and 
the substance of vv. 17b-21) accurately and simply: “Abraham’s faith was nothing other 
than unquestioning trust in God’s power.”1017 Abraham’s “faith” was not lacking a 
proper object, as if it could be described as abstract wishful thinking.1018 Rather, his faith 
was in God and in God’s ability to bring “life to the dead” and as the “one who calls 
[καλέω] the things that do not exist to have existence” (17b). Tellingly, Paul’s use of the 
Abraham story has been set in terms of God’s calling into existence “the things that do 
not exist.” This is not unlike his calling of the Gentiles, who were “the Not My People,” 
but who are now called “My People,” the “Not Loved, [but who are also now] Loved” 
in Rom 9:25 (more below).1019 One should see Paul’s use of the Abraham story as a 
preview for ch. 9. Indeed, “[t]he identity of the people of God is clearly at the heart of 
Paul’s argument in Rom 4, and this is what comes to the fore in Rom 9-11, the ‘climax’ 
and ‘heart’ of the whole epistle.”1020  
 Moreover, Rom 4 is connected to Paul’s previous discussion in Rom 1. Adams, 
who has documented thematic links between the Abraham story and the status Gentiles 
have in Rom 1:18-32, says, “As ἀσεβής, Abraham’s initial status before God, prior to 
his being reckoned as righteous, was exactly that of the ungodly Gentiles portrayed in 
1.18-32...But as justified, Abraham’s new status and orientation toward God through 
faith is the very antithesis of that of the disobedient Gentiles of 1.18-32.”1021 Abraham 
                                                                                                                                          
be played against each other as if the two are not, in Pauline thought, closely intertwined (see e.g. 1 
Cor 12:12-13, 27). 
 1017 Dunn, Romans, 38a, 236. 
 1018 Moo, Romans, 282–283; See also Dunn, Romans, 38a, 239. 
 1019 So Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 498. 
 1020 Juncker, “Children of Promise,” 146.  
 1021 Adams, “Abraham’s Faith and Gentile Disobedience,” 52, (emphasis original; see also 
62-63). Cf. Gorman, Crucified Lord, 361; Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 50-51; 
Barrett, Romans, 21; Moyise, Paul and Scripture, 37-38. 
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here is “opposite” of the person in ch. 1.1022 The central character in Paul’s narrative, 
Abraham, goes from a status of “ungodly Gentile” to become the Jewish patriarch.1023  
 Furthermore, despite the deadness of his own body and the impossibility of 
Sarah to carry a child, Abraham believed God could fulfill the promise with full hope 
and expectation (vv. 18-21). This faith in God grounds Abraham’s being counted 
“righteous” (v.22). Interestingly, Paul says that the words, “‘It was counted to him’ was 
not written for him only, but also for us” (vv. 23-24). Paul’s hermeneutical assumption 
is that the text of Gen 15:6 (indeed the story itself) is written for the present.1024 Paul 
narrows down this assumption—by which he had been operating all along1025—to a 
specific group, namely, the believers in Jesus the Messiah: “To those whom it will be 
counted, to those who believe in the one who raised Jesus our Lord from the dead (ἐκ 
νεκρῶν), who was delivered up for our trespasses and was raised for our justification” 
(vv. 24-25). Thus, this hermeneutical assumption has a christological basis, being 
centered around the one who was raised from the dead, ἐκ νεκρῶν.1026 This language 
echoes Rom 4:17 and 19 where Abraham believed in the resurrecting power of God 
“who gives life to the dead, τοὺς νεκροὺς” (v. 17; νεκρόω and νέκρωσις in v. 19).1027 The 
correspondence of language is suggestive: Those who possess similar faith are 
considered children of Abraham (v. 16).1028 Indeed, Abraham’s faith for Paul finds its 
                                                
 1022 Fitzmyer, Romans, 388. 
 1023 That this can shed light on Rom 9:25-26 cannot be overemphasized. 
 1024 This is not unlike the sectarian interpretations discussed above. See also Jewett, 
Romans, 340, who says Paul was “[f]ollowing the tradition of Jewish hermenutics”; Barrett, 
Romans, 388. Cf. Robby Holt and Aubrey Spears, “The Ecclesia as Primary Context for the 
Reception of the Bible,” Manifesto, 76-77. 
 1025 Moo, Romans, 287. He says, “The conviction expressed in vv. 23-24 that what is written 
in Genesis about Abraham has relevance to the Christian believer has been the implicit assumption 
of the whole of chap 4.” 
 1026 Cf. Richard Holst, “The Meaning of ‘Abraham Believed God’ in Romans 4:3,” WTJ 59, 
no. 2 (September 1, 1997): 319-326, p. 325. Cf. Fitzmyer, “Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The 
Dead Sea Scrolls, 604-605.  
 1027 Thus when Ibid., 325, attempts to subsume Christology under a more broader 
theological category, seemingly because in the Abraham story, “Faith is emphatically in the God 
who raised Jesus,” (emphasis original) is to perhaps miss the point. Of course, it is true that God 
(and not Christ per se) is the object of faith for both Abraham and Paul. But one should be hesitant 
to play the two against each other. Paul is, after all, reading this story as a Christian.  
 1028 See Juncker, “Children of Promise,” 134, who comments on the Abrahamic sonship of 
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present parallel in the Christian’s faith.1029 This faith has a specific object, which is God, 
specifically in his “life-giving power” as it relates to the resurrection of Christ.1030 From 
an interpretive standpoint, one must notice how “faith” takes on a christological 
emphasis for Paul.1031 Thus, as said above, while the content of Paul’s argument (i.e., 
that justification is on the basis of faith) is indeed rooted in Scripture by pointing out 
that the timing of Abraham’s justification in Gen 15 preceded the work of circumcision 
in ch. 17, it is not the case that this can account for the entirety of Paul’s hermeneutic. 
After all, Paul’s argument stands insofar as his christological horizon of understanding 
is in place. The Scripture, by itself, cannot establish Paul’s claim here since, after all, 
the fact that Abraham was deemed righteous prior to circumcision was true all the while 
the command for circumcision was in force prior to the Christ-event (as even Paul 
would agree; cf. Gal 3:23-29). Without Paul’s christological prejudgment in place, then, 
the rhetorical force of his argument is severely weakened.1032 Paul’s argument from 
Scripture is what it is because of what he brings to Scripture, namely, his christological 
convictions. This dialogue between text and interpreter results in a fresh and revisionist 
understanding of the text. For Paul, the Jewish text speaks, but it speaks to new 
                                                                                                                                          
the Gentiles in Gal 3:7 (where Gen 15:6 is cited, as in Rom 4:3). 
 1029 So Fitzmyer, Romans, 388: “Paul sees an exact correspondence between Abraham’s 
faith and the faith of all Christians.” See also Moyise, Paul and Scripture, 38. 
 1030 Bird, The Saving Righteousness of God, 146.  
 1031 So Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 17-19, who, commenting on “faith” 
and “obedience” in Jewish thought, says (18-19), “One of the most striking phenomena of the extant 
letters is that [Paul] nowhere debates the meaning of faith with his opponents. Faith as such was 
never a point of controversy…What is radical about Paul, however, is faith’s object—Christ. Apart 
from the scandal of a crucified Messiah, the deciding factor, to coin a phrase, was Paul’s 
‘Christological eschatology’” (emphasis original). See also Garlington, The Obedience of Faith, 9-
13. Cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, 388.  
 1032 This arguably solves a dilemma pointed out by Stanley, Arguing with Scripture, 151-
153, in his evaluation of the rhetorical strategy of Paul’s use of the Abraham story in Rom 4. Stanley 
is correct to say that “a more skeptical member” of an “informed audience” (a hypothetical category 
employed by Stanley as part of his larger project; see 68-69) would have found a problem in Paul’s 
handling of the story (151). After all, Paul fails to mention, in line with Jewish custom, the essential 
relationship between Abraham’s faith and his latter action (not least the “covenantal context” of the 
rite of circumcision (151-152, esp. 38). Such a skeptic, then, would easily find Paul’s reading 
difficult. But again, as we propose above, the essence of Paul’s exegesis here is not divorced from its 
most fundamental element: Christology. When this element is granted full attention, the problem 
found in Stanley’s otherwise helpful rhetorical analysis is relieved. Thus, Stanley’s idea that because 
of “the ready availability of an alternative reading” on the part of an “informed audience” therefore 
“suggests that Paul did not expect the Romans to conduct a careful verse-by-verse analysis of his 
argument” ought to be reconsidered (153). See also Section 7.3 below. 
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purposes and into new horizons. Paul’s hermeneutic is not a mere exercise in repeating 
the historical facts of the text; he is doing more: he is interpreting them (in the way that 
Gadamer means).  
 The Abraham story, moreover, centered around the central plot of how 
“Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him as righteousness” (4:3). Yet Paul 
understood “righteousness” as having been revealed “through the faithfulness of Jesus 
Christ” (3:22). The Abraham story found completion in this revelation. It is true for 
Paul that the faith Abraham exhibited “foreshadows” the faith of a Christian, as 
Fitzmyer says.1033 It is equally true that Paul reads the entire Abraham story from the 
position of Christian faith. This is the point of vv. 23-25, namely, that the gift of 
righteousness seen in the Abraham story is really, Paul says, to be read not just for him 
but also for believers in Christ. Given the correspondence of language (vv. 17, 19, 24-
25), Paul finds in the Abraham story answers to the questions of his Christian horizon. 
But in saying that believers in Christ are children of Abraham (vv. 16-17), Paul is also 
seeing the Christian horizon as an answer to which the story was a question.1034 
 That Paul’s Christology is supplementing the Abraham story and is operating 
hermeneutically is best seen when compared to a reading of the same story in Sir 44:19-
21. There the Abraham story is told in such a way that, 
Torah and circumcision are the central features, along with Abraham’s near-sacrifice of 
Isaac (Genesis 22, which is absent from Romans 4. Sirach also highlights Abraham’s 
faith(fullness) (εὑρέθη πίστος heurethē pistos, “he was faithful,” 44:20), but this does 
not have the sense of “believing the promise” that Paul has drawn out. The two belong 
on the same map; but Paul’s new construal, his new way of telling the story, grows 
directly out of what he now believes about God because of the events concerning Jesus, 
resulting in the establishment of the Jew-plus-Gentile family with faith as its central 
demarcating feature.1035  
It can be said that the hermeneutical assumption, from which Paul read the Abraham 
story, is christological, for Paul’s particular reading of these texts is contingent upon 
                                                
 1033 Fitzmyer, Romans, 388. 
 1034 Recall Section 4.5 and interpretation as dialogical. 
 1035 Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 498. Emphasis ours. Cf. Gorman, Crucified Lord, 
360-361. Elsewhere, Wright, PFG, 850, says that, “Abraham’s faith in God the creator, the life-
giver, is thus well re-expressed in terms of Christian faith in the raising-Jesus God” (emphasis ours). 
See also Moyise, Paul and Scripture, 33-34.  
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this conviction. For without it, his reading simply does not work. In fact, it enables his 
interpretations. Thus, it functions as a Vorurteil.1036 
6.3 Pursuing Righteousness (Romans 9-10:4)  
While the literary divisions in Romans can be over emphasized, suggesting a 
fragmented plot, it is not unreasonable to treat chs. 1-4, 5-8, 9-11, and 12-16 as separate 
literary units.1037 For our purpose of examining Rom 9:25-26, and in light of space 
constraints, it will be necessary to bypass chs. 5-8 to get to the more relevant discussion 
occurring in chs. 9-10.1038 It was beneficial to begin our investigation of Rom 9:25-26 
with an analysis of chs. 1-4 because Paul’s discussions in ch. 9 assume much of the 
content that occurs in those first four chapters. Specifically, the content of Rom 9:1-10:4 
will be given attention.1039 Links between chs. 1-4 and 9-10:4 will be noted by attending 
to the stream of thought that begins in ch. 9.1040  
Paul’s grief over Israel’s unbelief is recorded in 9:1-5, as well as the specific 
privileges that belong to them.1041 Verse 6a follows with, “It is not as though the word of 
God has failed.” Though Israel has failed to believe, their unbelief is not because 
“God’s word has failed; for God has always specified one son and not the other, one 
twin and not the other, one small group while the rest fell away, one tiny remnant while 
the rest were lost to view...”1042 For Paul, “[n]ot all who are descended from Israel (ἐξ 
Ἰσραήλ) are those who belong to Israel” (6b).1043 Thus, not everyone who is a physical 
                                                
 1036 See Section 4.5 above on Gadamer’s concept of Vorurteil. Cf. Moyise, Paul and 
Scripture, 45, about Paul’s “christological ‘reconfiguration.’” 
 1037 Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 397. Cf. Gorman, Crucified Lord, 345-346. 
 1038 This is not to deny that these chapters are digressions to Paul’s overall argument. E.g. 
see Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, esp. chs. 4-5.  
 1039 This is so because of the explicit discussion and interconnected use of righteousness 
language, law, and the Gentile question. Cf. Wright, “The Meaning of Romans,” Perspectives, 494, 
who notes a specific conceptual link between the subject matter of ch. 3 and ch. 9. 
 1040 See Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 622.  
 1041 Cf. Susannah Ticciati, “The Nondivisive Difference of Election: A Reading of Romans 
9-11,” JTI 6, no. 2 (2012): 257-278, esp. 259, (in view of her larger project); Gorman, Crucified 
Lord, 380. 
 1042  Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 634. 
 1043 On defining the second use of “Israel” in 9:6b, see Juncker, “Children of Promise,” 143. 
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descendant of Abraham (σπέρµα Ἀβραάµ) is included among Israel (v.7a). Rather 
(ἀλλά), it is “in Isaac your offspring will be called [καλέω, ‘named’]” (v.7b). This 
citation from Gen 21:12 is explained in v. 8: “That is, it is not the children of the flesh 
(τὰ τέκνα τῆς σαρκὸς) who are the children of God, but the children of the promise who 
will be counted as offspring.”1044 Verse 7 is concerned with the question of who the 
people of God are, an echo back to Rom 2:12-29. In both places, the questions are: Who 
are the people of God? and How are they classified as such?1045 In Rom 2:13 and 28-29 
it is “the doers of the law” and the circumcised in heart, respectively, who are classified 
as the people of God.1046 In 9:7 Paul continues this discussion, though providing more 
detail. Paul says the true descendants are those who are “children of the promise.” This 
refers to the promise of providing Abraham a son through Sarah (v. 9). It reminds the 
reader of 4:13-25, where Abraham believed God and was given a righteous status. 
There the precedent had already been established that God operates on the basis of the 
divine calling. 
The purpose of promise and election, i.e., of divine calling, over and against the 
“flesh,” is further substantiated in 9:10-13, where the story of Jacob and Esau is given. 
Before these twins could do “good or bad” (11), and “in order that God’s purpose of 
election might stand,” he chose one over the other—Jacob over Esau (12-13). This 
“doing” (πράσσω) “good or bad” (11) is clarified in v. 12: “not by works, but by the one 
who calls” (οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος).1047 This must refer to “works of the 
law” in the Jewish cultic sense.1048 The reason is because, like Paul’s point with the 
Abraham story (concerning a specific prescription of the Law, namely, circumcision in 
4:10-12), the same narrative is still at work, arguing that covenant status (those who are 
truly “Israel,” v. 6) is conferred prior to the giving of the Law. Thus, in terms of 
designating who the people of God are, observing the Law no longer does that in Paul’s 
                                                
 1044 Σάρξ in v. 8 is used disapprovingly as in Rom 2:25-29; cf. 3:20. 
 1045 See also Bird, The Saving Righteousness of God, 74, who says the same question 
“permeates” ch. 4. 
 1046 See Gorman, Crucified Lord, 381, on the link to 2:28-29. 
 1047 See Ibid. 
 1048 Against this, see Schreiner, Romans, 499, fn. 23. 
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view. Before Jacob or Esau could do “anything good or bad” (11), a status of “loved” 
(ἀγαπάω) was given to Jacob, though he was “lesser” than his brother (12-13). Thus, 
covenant love and covenant status precede “doing good” (11), i.e., “works” [of the law] 
(12). Moreover, that “works of the law” primarily mean those ordinances which 
separate Jews from the nations is evidenced when one takes into account the passage 
cited in 9:12b, namely, Gen 25:23, where the distinction between “nations,” ἔθνη, and 
“peoples,” λαοὶ, is clearly made (LXX), which is “precisely the point at issue: the 
identity and status of two eschatological nations or peoples.”1049 Along with this, one 
should note the primacy of “love” in v. 13 and its connection to “calling” in v. 12 (cf. 
9:25). Again, “love” and “hatred” refer specifically to the status of different 
peoples1050—specifically, covenant status. What Paul is ultimately arguing for here is 
nothing less than that covenant status, even for the Jewish nation, came prior to their 
works of the law—indeed, prior to the giving of the Law.     
Verse 14 begins with a question, “What, therefore, shall we say? Is there 
unrighteousness with God?” The οὖν serves to connect with the previous thoughts, not 
least with v. 6 and is parallel to 3:5.1051 Is there ἀδικία with God? For Paul this is 
inconceivable. This is confirmed because even Moses was told that mercy depends upon 
divine prerogative, not human willing or exertion (9:15-16). Pharaoh is utilized as 
support for this assertion (17). Following this is the discussion concerning divine 
hardening and mercy (18-23). Significantly, all of this occurs in the context of 
explaining the question posed in v. 14: “Is there ἀδικία with God”? This question is put 
forward because of the audacious world of thought compressed in v. 6b. If not everyone 
who happens to be a descendant of Israel is really to be counted as “Israel,” and if 
Jewishness is defined as a circumcision of the heart (2:28-29), and if Jewishness is not 
defined by nature—by those who have the law, hearing it regularly (2:12-13)—then 
perhaps the word of God has failed; perhaps he is unfaithful to his promises through 
                                                
 1049 Juncker, “Children of Promise,” 153. 
 1050 Ibid., 154. 
 1051 Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 638; See also Schreiner, Romans, 505–506. 
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Israel and hence, unrighteous, ἀδικία.1052 Paul answers this charge by citing examples of 
how God’s mercy, calling, and faith have been how God’s redemptive story has always 
worked. But, polemically, these are now reworked around Christ (see below).  
After rebuking his interlocutor, Paul asks: “What if God, although desiring to 
show his wrath and make his power known has endured with much patience vessels of 
wrath prepared for destruction, and in order to make known the riches of his glory for 
vessels of mercy, which he prepared for glory?” (vv. 22-23).1053 The question is left 
hanging, but the phrase “vessels of mercy” is picked up, bringing it into human 
focus.1054 “There is no question, though, who Paul has in mind as these ‘vessels of 
mercy.’ It is ‘we, whom he has called,’”1055 and those who have been called are not just 
from the Jews, but also from the Gentiles. Supporting this claim, Paul quotes Hos 2:25; 
2:1 (LXX), which will be examined below.1056  
Verses 30-32 bring the issue of Jew-Gentile righteousness to the fore and help 
illuminate the hermeneutical dilemma surrounding the Hosea quotation in vv. 25-26. 
Paul asks, “What, then, shall we say? That Gentiles who did not pursue righteousness 
have attained righteousness—a righteousness by faith, but Israel who pursued a law of 
righteousness has not reached the law? How come? Because they did not pursue it by 
                                                
 1052 Cf. Wright, PFG, 1186-1187, who sees the question of v. 14 as being one a Gentile 
would ask. It is agreeable that this is perhaps in view (however partly). However, one should not 
dismiss the polemic still being pressed against Jews as well. True, Paul is putting on display the 
story of Israel to show that God is faithful to his promises through Abraham, as Wright says. But a 
case could still be made that the argument here is still against Jews (contra Wright, PFG, 1187). 
There are a couple of reasons for this. First, since 9:14 and 9:6 is linked back to 3:3-5 (and that back 
to the argument of ch. 2), then v. 6ff should still be seen as continuing the same line of argument—
namely, to reorient what Jewishness means. Second, the greater argument includes a provocative 
statement about the inclusion of Gentiles in 9:24-26, which no doubt would have, as Wright admits 
(1185, 1187), stirred Jews to cry foul. The fact is that vv. 24-26 are no mere aside (as Wright seems 
to suggest) to the greater narrative; rather, it is perhaps a climactic part of it.  
 1053 I take the participle as a concessive. Regarding the different views, see Wright, “The 
Letter to the Romans,” 641. 
 1054 Ibid., 642. 
 1055 Ibid. 
 1056 Postponing this discussion until Section 7 is to establish a context so that the logic 
behind the citations’ use becomes clear. Following these are quotations from Isaiah (10:22; 28:22), 
which speak of how only a remnant from Israel will be saved. For the view that ἡµᾶς in v. 24 
encompasses both believing Gentiles and believing Jews, see Juncker, “Children of Promise,” 156. 
On Rom 9:6-29, cf. Ticciati, “Romans 9-11,” 259-261, and her larger discussion.  
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faith, but as from works” (vv. 30-32).1057 Various approaches to the enigmatic phrase 
“law of righteousness” have been given.1058 Arguably, it becomes clear when it is set in 
parallel with Rom 2:13-14: “Gentiles who did not pursue righteousness” in 9:30 is 
conceptually parallel to “Gentiles who do not have the law” in 2:14, and “Israel who 
pursued a law” in 9:31 is parallel to “the hearers of the law” in 2:13. Thus:  
A “Gentiles who do not have the law” (2:14)      
B “the hearers of the law” (2:13)                  
A1 “Gentiles who did not pursue righteousness” (9:30)  
B1 “Israel who pursued a law” (9:31)         
 
This parallel is not without basis, for in addition to 9:30, “Paul connects righteousness 
language and the word nomos absolutely in only two other verses in Romans: 2:13 and 
10:5.”1059 Moreover, the narrative from which Paul has been arguing is that those in 
lines A and A1 are those who become “justified” (2:13), i.e., those who have “attained 
righteousness” (9:30). Conversely, those in lines B and B1 are those who will not be 
justified (2:13), having not reached righteousness (9:31). Thus, Rom 2:12-16 aids in 
understanding 9:30-31 and, as we will see, vice versa.  
Concerning how this might shed light upon the quotations from Hosea, one sees 
that 9:30-32 pertains to the exact issue found in 9:25-26—namely, Gentile inclusion. 
The Gentiles have attained covenant status, i.e., “attained righteousness,” because they 
pursued it by “faith” (32). The Jews, on the contrary, did not “reach righteousness” 
because they “did not pursue it by faith, but as through works” (32), which refer to 
Jewish “works of the law.”1060 Two observations are noteworthy. First, it is recalled that 
Rom 2:12-15 mentioned nothing about “justification by faith,” only a “justification” by 
“doing the law,” but in 9:30-32 the answer to that riddle becomes clear. Both passages 
concern the issue of covenant inclusion. Those who “do the law” are justified and the 
                                                
 1057 On the textual issue here, see Moo, Romans, 620, fn. 13. 
 1058 See Ibid., 622–627. See also Fitzmyer, Romans, 577-578; Barrett, Romans, 180; 
Stuhlmacher, Romans, 152.  
 1059 Ibid., 625. 
 1060 Contra Schreiner, Romans, 539–540, who sees “works” in the broad sense. 
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“hearers of the law” are not because, as 9:32-33 shows, the former believed (i.e., had 
faith), while the latter did not express faith and so stumbled. Second, carrying this logic 
specifically to the Hosea quotations in 9:25-26, one sees again that there is no mention 
of “faith in Christ” as the means by which the Gentiles attained covenant status—i.e., a 
status of “my people,” “beloved,” and “sons of the living God” (9:25-26). That said, 
what Paul does include in the Hosea quotation is the divine call, which of course he 
connects to faith (see below). But it is not enough to say that covenant status is gained 
“by faith” or not gained by “not having faith.” The real issue—to which all the 
discussions about faith, calling, and covenant have been implying all along—is 
christological.  
Verse 32 suggests that Christology served as the interpretive foundation for 
Paul’s reappraisal of OT themes in his narrative.1061 If v. 32a explains what caused the 
Jews to fail to reach covenant status (“they did not pursue it by faith but as by works”), 
then 32b perhaps explains how the Jews failed at what they did.1062 “They stumbled over 
the stone of stumbling” (32b).1063 This is grounded on the scriptural quotation which 
immediately follows: “Behold, I lay in Zion a stone of stumbling and a rock of offense, 
and everyone who believes upon him will not be ashamed” (33ab). Importantly, the 
substance of what was previously discussed in regard to “faith,” “calling,” and 
“righteousness” has now been summed up into this “stone of stumbling.” This is 
reinforced by v. 33b, which connects the concepts of “the stone of stumbling and rock 
of offense” in v. 33a with the concept of “faith.” Thus, the deciding factor for Gentile 
inclusion and Jewish failure (spoken about in 30-32a) is how each group responded to 
“the stone/rock” in v. 33a.1064 The obvious conclusion is that the Gentiles believed 
“upon him,” but the Jews did not. Therefore, it seems that this “rock of offense” is the 
                                                
 1061 Moo, Romans, 626–627, notes Paul’s “christological emphasis” here. See also Ticciati, 
“Romans 9-11,” 261. 
 1062 Cf. ibid. who also makes a similar observation. 
 1063 Contra Barrett, Romans, 181, this cannot possibly be a reference to “law.” Cf. Fitzmyer, 
Romans, 579.  
 1064 See Ticciati, “Romans 9-11,” 261. 
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axis around which Paul’s ecclesiology and soteriology rotate, being central to Paul’s 
hermeneutic.1065 
Paul begins ch. 10 by saying that the Jews have zeal, “but not according to 
knowledge, ἐπίγνωσις” (v.2). Some have argued that the zeal in question should be 
understood in terms of devotion to God, that is, “for God.”1066 It is best to see, 
unambiguously, “zeal” as still having to do with the issue of Jew-Gentile relations, i.e., 
with ethnocentric concerns.1067 The γὰρ immediately following in v. 3 connects this 
“knowledge” with saying they are ignorant (ἀγνοέω) “of the righteousness of God, and 
seeking to establish their own, they did not submit to the righteousness of God” (3).1068 
Thus, the problem of Jewish zeal for righteousness “not according to knowledge” is that 
they have failed to understand the righteousness from God, since they have sought to 
“establish their own.” Likewise, the γὰρ in v. 4 serves to connect it with v. 3: “For [γὰρ] 
Christ is the culmination (τέλος) of the law for righteousness to all who believe” 
(v.4).1069 Here Paul seeks to explain the Jewish failure to “reach righteousness” (9:31)1070 
and make explicit how this happened, that is, to describe the nature of their “stumbling” 
(9:33). The Jewish problem, then, is christological. Thus, Paul’s understanding that the 
Jewish failure to “reach righteousness” was founded upon a fundamental pre-
understanding about the faith and the Christ event and its unique role it has come to 
play in redemptive history. (This pre-understanding, interestingly, also informed his 
particular construal of the Isaiah texts in 9:33.) Christ, as “the culmination of the law for 
                                                
 1065 Juncker, “Children of Promise,” 157, calls 9:30-33 a “theological summation” of 9:6-29. 
Cf. the following statement by Holt and Spears, “The Ecclesia,” Manifesto, 78: “…Paul reads the 
Scriptures ecclesially because he reads them christologically” (emphasis original). 
 1066 Dane C. Ortlund, “‘Zeal Without Knowledge’: For What Did Paul Criticize His Fellow 
Jews in Romans 10:2-3?,” WTJ 73, no. 1 (March 1, 2011): 23-37, citing 26 (emphasis original); See 
also Moo, Romans, 623; However, one should specifically understand this in the context of 
covenant: Dunn, Romans, 38b, 586–587; See also Morris, Romans, 378, fn. 5; See esp. Wright, 
PFG, 1169. 
 1067 Contra Vincent M. Smiles, “The Concept of ‘Zeal’ in Second-Temple Judaism and 
Paul’s Critique of It in Romans 10:2,” CBQ  64, no. 2 (April 2002): 282–299, esp. 285-286; Cf. 
Ortlund, “Zeal Without Knowledge,” 34–35, 37. 
 1068 Cf. Ortlund, “Zeal Without Knowledge,” 34, who describes the “ignorance” in question 
as anthropological (i.e., their sinful state), christological, and salvation-historical. 
 1069 Contra John Paul Heil, “Christ, the Termination of the Law (Romans 9:30-10:8),” CBQ  
63, no. 3 (July 2001): 484–498. Cf. Morris, Romans, 402-405; Gorman, Crucified Lord, 383. 
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righteousness to all who believe,”1071 is Paul’s way of explaining how the Gentiles have 
“attained righteousness” in v. 30—i.e., they have believed in Christ.  
If, for Paul, the Jewish problem of exclusion was christological, then the Gentile 
solution of inclusion was also christological (a point not insignificant for when Rom 
9:25-26 is analyzed below). According to Paul, covenant status is found in “attaining 
righteousness,” in reaching a point of culmination of the law, which was the entire point 
of Rom 2:12-29,1072 namely, that Gentiles could be considered part of God’s covenant—
circumcised (spiritual)—people.1073 Thus, the implicit features that served to enable the 
interpretations of key OT themes given in Rom 2:12-29 and 3:20-21 (and ch. 4) come to 
light in 9:32-10:4.1074 Specifically, Paul’s christological convictions undergirded his 
fresh, revisionist understanding of the prevailing motifs found in his working narrative, 
namely, righteousness, law-keeping, and the Gentile question.  
6.4 Interpretive Horizons  
 The clearing of distinction between Jew and Gentile was founded upon Paul’s 
use of scriptural texts, stories, and quotations—all of which were christologically 
construed. Without Christology, there is still “distinction” between Jew and Greek, for 
the Law—which served to divide the two ethnic groups—would still be in place (3:20-
31).1075 With the Jewish texts contributing to Paul’s argument, Paul’s Christology 
dialogued with Scripture, functioning hermeneutically.1076 It was with the christocentric 
                                                                                                                                          
 1070 Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 656. 
 1071 See Section 4.5: “Vorurteil” above.  
 1072 Τελοῦσα is used Rom 2:27 in terms of Gentiles keeping and fulfilling the law, linking it 
to τέλος in 10:4 (Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 657). 
 1073 Cf. Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 657–658. 
 1074 Space does not permit looking into Rom 10:5-13, which explains in large part 10:4. On 
this, see Wright, PFG, 1165–1176. 
 1075 See esp. the way v. 29 functions significantly within the overall argument, as Wright, 
Justification, 211-212 (see also 52-53, 179), observes. See also Garlington, The Obedience of Faith, 
255. 
 1076 Cf. Starling, Not My People, 185, who observes the hermeneutical role christology 
played in Ephesians, saying, “For the writer of Ephesians, the death of Christ is thus not only a 
soteriological event (reconciling Jew and Gentile to God) and an ecclesiological event (reconciling 
Jew and Gentile to one another within the ‘new humanity’ of the church) but also a hermeneutical 
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retelling of the Abraham story that this became evident. In fact, the story itself in some 
ways climaxed everything leading up to it by revealing how all who believe as 
Abraham are his children (4:11-12). The “as” is important, for Abraham’s faith was 
never originally christocentric. Even though the Abrahamic covenant spoke of a future 
blessing upon the nations (e.g., Gen 12:3), and though Paul probably had this in mind in 
his retelling of the story,1077 it would be a mistake to think that Paul’s christological 
convictions contributed nothing to the Abraham story itself—and hence to the entire 
narrative which centered upon the Jew-Gentile question.1078 This is apparent when one 
considers how the story was employed as a rhetorical event.1079 These christological 
convictions, being central to Paul’s exposition,1080 allow the story of Scripture to be 
meaningful to the Roman Christian community. The place where the 
Horizontverschmelzung takes place (and only there) is where the Pauline hermeneutic is 
understood.  
 As dialogue, therefore, Paul’s Christology is not engaged in a battle with 
Scripture. This is not the essence of his exegesis, for the Jewish text is important for 
Paul (Rom 1:2). However, one cannot clarify his interpretive activity without taking 
into account his prejudgments; his exegesis was such that he did more than merely 
repeat the original text and its meaning. Paul’s way of reading Scripture cannot be 
described as interpretation-as-repetition. Paul, after all, is reading the texts as a 
Christian. This is where Gadamer’s hermeneutic is clarifying.1081 Interpretation cannot 
be limited to mere reproduction of the text, for every act of interpretation involves the 
interpreter’s own prejudgments.1082 The text has its own horizon; the reader theirs. 
                                                                                                                                          
event, transforming the relationship of his readers to the scriptural promise, law and covenants.”  
 1077 See Holst, “The Meaning of ‘Abraham Believed God’ in Romans 4,” 323–325. 
 1078 Cf. the discussion about Gospel writing in Murray Rae, “Theological Interpretation and 
Historical Criticism,” Manifesto, 105-106. 
 1079 In regard to the implicit role Paul’s christological beliefs played in ch. 4, see Forman, 
“The Politics of Promise,” 316. 
 1080 Cf. Holst, “The Meaning of ‘Abraham Believed God’ in Romans 4,” 325, who argues 
that christology is subsumed under the broader category of “theology” and covenant.   
 1081 See Section 4.4 above on Gadamer’s idea of “tradition.”  
 1082 Gadamer, TM, 272.  
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Understanding is accomplished when a fusion of horizons takes place.1083 It can be said, 
then, that Paul views Jewish texts, motifs, and stories from a christological horizon. 
Both the horizons of the text and of Paul inform the other. For example, the text of the 
Abraham story demonstrated the historical fact of Abraham’s reckoning of 
righteousness as being prior to Mosaic Law observance—i.e., circumcision—and that is 
indeed what Paul concluded.1084 The text, as such, was a distanced text. But texts must 
speak to the present, as Gadamer says: “Nun haben uns unsere Überlegungen zu der 
Einsicht geführt, daß im Verstehen immer so etwas wie eine Anwendung des zu 
verstehenden Textes auf die gegenwärtige Situation des Interpreten stattfindet.”1085  
 It was in 4:23-24 where Paul sought to apply the text to his contemporary 
situation (i.e., to the Christian community at Rome), establishing an “archetype of 
Christian belief in (relation to) Jesus.”1086 The rhetorical force inherent to the Abraham 
story, therefore, served to validate his previous discussion about circumcision in 2:25-
29, namely, that uncircumcised believers can share in the righteous status as well, which 
was exactly Paul’s point with the Abraham story all along (4:16-17, 22-25). Yet, 
underlying all this was a certain christological conviction—already in place for him, as 
well as, presumably, for his implied audience. Similar to how the Qumran community 
interpreted covenant inclusion from a decidedly sectarian sort of away, so did Paul. For 
the pesherist, to be included in the covenant was to be in the sect. For Paul, it was to be 
in Christ.1087   
 Recalling the sectarian texts, it is remembered that DiMattei argued (as we did 
similarly) that a “central characteristic” of the pesherist’s reading of Scripture was its 
“contemporizing eschatological interpretation.”1088 Interestingly, and with an affirmative 
answer in mind, he asks, “Are these not the same hermeneutical principles that govern 
                                                
 1083 Ibid., 305. 
 1084 Dunn, Romans, 38a, 239.  
 1085 Gadamer, WM, 313; TM, 306-307. See also Section 4.7 above. 
 1086 Dunn, Romans, 38a, 239. Recall Gadamer’s idea of “contemporaneity,” Gleichzeitigkeit 
(see Section 4.3.2). See again DiMattei, “Biblical Narratives,” As It Is Written, 77-78. 
 1087 See e.g., 2 Cor 5:17. 
 1088 DiMattei, “Biblical Narratives,” As It Is Written, 77-78. See Section 6.1a. 
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Paul’s approach to biblical narrative…?”1089 He also affirms, and gives recognition to 
the fact, that Paul’s Christology plays a role in the interpretive act, though he is quick to 
locate Christology as something that “influences and shapes the content of [Paul’s] 
hermeneutic” in distinction to “the underlying hermeneutical assumption that guides his 
interpretation,” namely, a “contemporizing eschatological interpretation,” an 
assumption shared between Paul and the pesherist.1090 DiMattei’s distinction here is 
unnecessary for us—not least because of our adoption of Gadamer’s theory. This, 
arguably, sets our thesis apart from DiMattei’s otherwise helpful proposal. Whereas he 
is right to notice the similarity between the pesherist’s and Paul’s contemporizing 
hermeneutic, he falls short by not connecting this strongly to Christology, pushing the 
latter to the background and thus failing to see this as the distinguishing hermeneutical 
factor for Paul (in relation to the pesherist). With Gadamer’s hermeneutic in hand, one 
can bring back to the forefront Pauline Christology as a key hermeneutical component, 
specifically as an integral prejudgment, one not shared by the pesherist.1091   
 Thus, Joseph Fitzmyer, citing Rom 4:24-25, can say Paul “differed from his 
Essene contemporaries,” not least regarding the fact that, “Paul speaks of justification as 
an effect of the Christ-event. Christ Jesus has brought it about that sinners stand 
acquitted before God’s tribunal…That God’s justifying grace comes to human beings 
through Jesus Christ obviously has no place in Essene thinking.”1092 Thus, what makes 
possible Paul’s re-appraisal of the Jewish tradition (i.e., the concepts and themes 
inherent to the Jewish nation—circumcision, Torah, inter alia) is his Christology.1093 
Indeed, “Christ is the key to Pauline hermeneutics.”1094 Christology is not, however, a 
                                                
 1089 Ibid., 78. He does however see “one notable difference,” namely, in the “form” between 
how a text is cited in Paul compared to the pesherist. We comment on this below.    
 1090 Ibid., 77. In DiMattei’s view, the distinction is warranted because of a difference 
between “content and method,” Christology being placed in the former (77). 
 1091 So Lim, Holy Scripture, 171. 
 1092 Fitzmyer, “Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” The Dead Sea Scrolls, 604-605. 
 1093 Thus when Moyise (“Quotations,” As It Is Written, 20) asks whether or not there is “a 
‘christological’ or ‘messianic’ dimension to Paul’s hermeneutics that cannot be paralleled in the 
Qumran writings,” demands—at least based upon the specific observations above—an affirmative 
answer in many respects.  
 1094 Lim, Holy Scripture, 171. He says elsewhere that for Paul, “To understand the true 
meaning of scripture is to read the texts from [a] Christological perspective” (171); “At the heart of 
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mere imposition onto the text; rather, it is active dialogically (see below). On the one 
hand, the christological convictions allow the text of the Abraham story to be 
meaningful for the community of Christians.1095 On the other hand, the text also informs 
these christological convictions.1096 The point, moreover, is that the Abraham story had 
the meaning it did because of its precise application to the Christ-believing 
community.1097 Gadamer is clear: “Verstehen ist hier immer schon Anwenden.”1098 Thus, 
Paul’s Christology and Abraham’s story must be seen as engaged in a sort of 
dialogue.1099 Both inform the other, despite the fact that each distinct horizon remains 
exactly that: distinct, separate from the other.1100 Following Gadamer, Paul’s 
Christology was acting as a type of Vorurteil, a prejudgment by which he was able to 
render his judgments.1101 This was a pre-understanding that enabled his understanding 
                                                                                                                                          
Paul’s hermeneutics is his own and fellow believers’ experience of Christ” (172); “Paul’s 
hermeneutics are anchored in the revelation of God through the belief that Jesus, the Messiah, was 
crucified, died, was buried, and resurrected. Through his own experience on the Damascus Road and 
subsequent, trance-like, ecstatic encounters with the visionary Christ, he has come to interpret 
scripture not according to the traditions of the fathers, but in the new light of this revelation” (172); 
“Central to Paul’s hermeneutics is his own experience of Jesus and understanding of the significance 
of the cross. On this basis, all his exegetical techniques and scriptural interpretation depended” 
(175); “Whatever [Paul] may do exegetically, there is a theological agenda around which the biblical 
texts had to be conformed…To be sure the authoritative writings of Israel constituted the framework 
in which he worked, but his hermeneutics and exegetical endeavors have their source beyond these 
boundaries” (176). The benefit of using Gadamer’s hermeneutic is that it brings clarity to how Paul 
can do all that Lim has described above. For example, a hermeneutic that seeks to understand how 
Scripture contributes to Paul’s arguments must also at the same time coherently take into account 
Paul’s assumption that his arguments from Scripture can only be what they are in light of what he 
brings to Scripture, namely, his christological prejudgments. Gadamer’s theory provides such a 
hermeneutic. 
 1095 The story holds very little rhetorical weight if Christology is not already being assumed. 
Moreover, these observations are not without warrant; see e.g. Käsemann, Romans, 129, who 
discusses this issue along the same lines when he mentions the circular relationship between 
Christology and the doctrine of justification (see also 95-96). It is our present contention that 
Gadamer’s theory helps to bring explicit illumination to this fact. 
 1096 Cf. Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 76-83, who discusses how the OT acts as a 
preunderstanding for NT writers (not least Paul). This study brings more attention to this idea. 
 1097 See again Gadamer, TM, 307–308. Cf. Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 89. See also Gadamer, 
“Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task,” Gadamer Reader, 263-264, specifically his 
comments about the “orator,” “rhetoric,” “application,” and “questions.” (Cf. DiMattei, “Biblical 
Narratives,” As It Is Written, 91, on his term the “Abraham-Christ story.”) 
 1098 Gadamer, WM, 314; TM, 308. See again Section 4.7 above. 
 1099 Gadamer, TM, 361–362.  
 1100 Ibid., 271–272 (see also 303–306). 
 1101 See Section 4.5 above. 
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of the story of Scripture. Truly, “the being of the interpreter belongs intrinsically to the 
being of what is to be interpreted.”1102 Paul’s fundamental conviction served as the 
mediality between the past stories of Israel (depicted in her texts) and Paul’s present 
situation—i.e., the question of a Jew-Gentile church.  
 Applying these observations through Paul’s argument, one can see further that 
his idea of covenant inclusion in Rom 2:12-16 and what counts as true circumcision in 
Rom 2:25-29 work if and only if certain prejudgments were in place—which were later 
revealed in chapters 3-4. What sustained his interpretation of “law” in 2:13? Though it 
was not told at the time1103 (except for a subtle reference in 2:16), the decisive point for 
Paul was later seen to be christological (3:20ff; 4:23-24). In Gadamerian terms, Paul’s 
christological convictions permeated his historically-effected consciousness.1104 And so: 
“Darum sind die Vorurteile des einzelnen weit mehr als seine Urteile die geschichtliche 
Wirklichkeit seines Seins.”1105 One should posit, then, that Paul’s experience of the 
resurrected Christ on the Damascus road (see Acts 26:12-32; Gal 1:11-24) was an 
experience (in Gadamerian language) that helped give shape to his hermeneutic.1106 This 
thesis is not without warrant among some exegetes. For instance, Seyoon Kim in his 
excellent work, The Origins of Paul’s Gospel,1107 grants special attention to Paul’s 
account of his conversion on the Damascus road and offers a rather convincing 
exegetical case that Paul’s gospel—not least his own mission to the Gentiles—found its 
beginning in his experience of the resurrected Christ. Kim describes this event as having 
“brought about a revolution in Paul—both in his thought (i.e., theology) and life: he 
received his gospel and apostolic call to preach it among the gentiles.”1108 Our aim has 
                                                
 1102 Gadamer, “Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task,” Gadamer Reader, 263. 
 1103 So Wright, PFG, 922 (see especially fn. 412). 
 1104 Gadamer, TM, 301. 
 1105 Gadamer, WM, 281; TM, 278. Emphasis original. 
 1106 See Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall in the translators' preface in Gadamer, 
TM, xiii. Here, the translators observe the way Gadamer used the word Erfahrung (“experience”). 
See also Ian W. Scott, Paul’s Way of Knowing: Story, Experience, and the Spirit (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2009), 169–178, who, similarly, argues in the same vein and offers an excellent 
commentary on the relationship between Paul’s narrative logic and Paul’s experience in Galatians.   
 1107 Seyoon Kim, The Origin of Paul’s Gospel (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982).  
 1108 Kim, Origin, 274. In depth interaction with Kim’s argument is not possible. However, 
his work demonstrates that our conclusions, which have been drawn from a distinctly philosophical-
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been to elaborate more on this issue, namely, to propose via Gadamer that while 
Christology indeed played a crucial part in shifting Paul’s theology and gospel, it also 
served, arguably, to shift his hermeneutic.1109 
 Though the entirety of Kim’s exegetical work does not need to be affirmed, 
much of it lends to otherwise helpful conclusions.1110 Indeed, his insights serve to 
buttress the conclusions of the present study. Arguably, too, our study offers a 
philosophical, and hence hermeneutical, support for his own. For example, after 
spending a great deal of time working out the exegesis of the relevant texts, Kim 
concludes that Paul’s gospel and apostleship (and all that these entailed) found its root 
in the Christophany itself.1111 But Kim rightly acknowledges along with this that Paul’s 
Damascus road experience, while altering his theological disposition, does not imply 
“that up to that moment his mind was theologically a tabula rasa.”1112 Kim 
acknowledges that Paul held to Jewish traditional thoughts and beliefs, e.g., “messianic 
beliefs,” “conceptions of the law and Wisdom,” as well as “other ideas and concepts in 
Judaism and the primitive Christian kerygma,” and “Hellenistic ideas and concepts”—
all things with which Paul would have been familiar.1113 That being said, Kim rightly 
asserts that “these religionsgeschichtlichen materials neither made Paul a Christian nor 
produced his theology.”1114 The major turn, Kim says, was when Paul experience the 
                                                                                                                                          
hermeneutical approach, are not without warrant among standard scholarly exegesis. 
 1109 Cf. Hays, Echoes, 182, who rightly says that one cannot separate Paul’s gospel from his 
interpretive practices. Lim, Holy Scripture, 172, makes a remarkably similar observation: “Through 
his own experience on the Damascus Road and subsequent, trance-like, ecstatic encounters with the 
visionary Christ, he has come to interpret scripture not according to the traditions of the fathers, but 
in the new light of this revelation. The hermeneutical shift involved the reading of scripture around 
this basic belief that ‘in Christ’, a formula for the significance of the Christ-event, the intended will 
of God can be ascertained, and he used all the techniques known to him as [an] exegete to argue for 
its biblical indications.”  
 1110 E.g. his failure to see telos in Rom 10:4 as anything but “termination” (Kim, Origin, 
307-308). This is not, arguably, a mistake with minor consequences. 
 1111 See Kim, Origin, 330ff. 
 1112 Ibid., 334. Cf. Starling, Not My People, 121-122, who, although citing Kim’s work 
positively (122, fn. 52), seems to suggest later that this would be untenable for passages like Rom 
9:25-26 where OT texts are used as an argument. His fear is that this would amount to vicious 
circularity. Gadamer’s theory, however, sets such fears aside. 
 1113 Ibid. 
 1114 Ibid. 
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resurrected Jesus, and at that point—that is, at that “catalyst of the living experience” of 
seeing Jesus—“were these materials precipitated into Paul’s Christian theology.”1115 He 
says,  
To put it another way, the real experience of the Damascus revelation led Paul to use all 
those religionsgeschichtlichen materials as interpretive categories and concepts for his 
Christian theology. That is to say, those materials provided Paul only with certain 
categories and concepts with which he could interpret the Damascus experience and 
produce his theology. But without the real experience of the Damascus revelation Paul 
could not have had his gospel at all, not to mention his unshakable and lively conviction 
in it.1116 
Put in Gadamerian terms, one might say that Kim notices a certain Pauline dialectic 
where both the traditional “materials” come into a temporally-distanced (indeed, a 
tensioned) dialogue with his own experience of Christ. Thus, a fundamental dialogical 
interaction occurs in Paul’s reading of Scripture—one informed by the horizon of the 
textual material (being imbedded with traditions inherent to the Jewish people) and with 
that which served to make up his own horizon, specifically his own christological 
convictions. Truly, “the events of Jesus’ death and resurrection…caused [Paul] to read 
old texts in new ways.”1117 Gadamer’s hermeneutic gives language to this dialogical 
tension in way that is not detrimental, but rather in a way that reveals, cogently, its 
essential character. 
 Paul’s use of key motifs like righteousness and law keeping (see above) were 
interpreted in light of the Christ-event. Significantly, the Gentile question was 
understood in light of the re-appraisal of these two motifs and in light of the Christ-
event.1118 Thus, it seems that Paul’s christological convictions served to support his 
entire narrative substructure (a narrative comprised of these three motifs). Faith in 
Christ, one can conclude, is the interpretive Vorurteil for matters regarding law keeping, 
righteousness, as well as in terms of answering the Gentile question itself.1119 Thus, 
                                                
 1115 Ibid. 
 1116 Ibid. 
 1117 Wright, PFG, 827. Emphasis original. See the context of the discussion, esp. 825-828. 
 1118 Cf. Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 37. 
 1119 See Starling, Not My People, 162–163, who observes that, instead of “incorporation into 
Christ” being the dominant hermeneutical motif in Romans, the theme of “the righteousness of faith” 
takes its place. The lack of attention to chs. 5-8 (see below) is because, even though it does address 
  
216 
Paul’s christological convictions informed his readings of Jewish texts; conversely, the 
texts themselves, comprised of these motifs, served to give shape to this key 
conviction.1120 Thus, Gadamer’s idea of hermeneutical dialogue is once more helpful in 
bringing clarity and insight. And it will continue to prove helpful as Paul’s use of Hosea 
in Rom 9 is explored below. 
6.5 Summary 
The purpose for having drawn out parallels from Rom 1:5, 18-32 to 2:12-29 
continuing through chs. 3-4 to the immediate context of 9:6-10:4 was to display the re-
occurring, relevant thematic construals within them. Moreover, this gives Rom 9:25-26 
a proper narrative context—i.e., the surprising announcement of Gentile 
righteousness/inclusion—and allows one to engage the perceived hermeneutical 
dilemma. What should be seen therefore at this point is that any difficulty with the 
quotations from Hosea in Rom 9 (i.e., with a Jewish text being applied to non-Jewish 
people) mirrors the previous discussions concerning Jewish motifs, which began before 
the quotations in 9:25-26 (e.g., 1:5; 2:12-29; chs. 3-4) and after them (9:30-10:4). Thus, 
by analyzing these passages, it should be clear that, far from being an odd and isolated 
instance of a novel interpretive event, the re-appraisal of the Hosea quotations in 9:25-
26 remain part of a larger pattern of re-appraisal.  
Paul argued, first, that righteousness was attained by some Gentiles but not some 
Jews (2:12-29). He concluded, second, that this was because Gentiles pursued 
righteousness “by faith,” and the Jews did not (9:30-32). It was found, third, that 
Christology played a role in this entire evaluation. Thus, Paul’s christological 
                                                                                                                                          
the so-called “union with Christ” motif, it does not explicitly deal with the Gentile question (as 
Starling, too, has noted; see 162). Moreover, one shouldn’t forget that the “in Christ” theme isn’t 
completely lacking from the texts we have examined (see Starling, Not My People, 162, fn. 209). 
Thus, taking into account the context of Gal 3:14, union with Christ ought to be seen as an implicit 
Pauline assumption at work within the Abraham story in Rom 4. “Faith” or “faithfulness” in relation 
to “righteousness” is always for Paul wrapped up in the person of Christ.  
 1120 Scott, Paul’s Way of Knowing, 170-171, reaches similar conclusions, howbeit via a 
different route. See also Garlington, The Obedience of Faith, 247-248, who discusses how for Paul, 
in an act of “reversal of his heritage as a Jew” which would have made it “inconceivable” to 
understand the phrase ὑπακοὴ πίστεως “apart from Jewish identity,” has allowed the “the complex of 
eschatology and Christology” to be instrumental in “expand[ing] the horizons of ‘the obedience of 
faith.’”  
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convictions in 9:33 and 10:4 proved both instructive and significant. It was instructive 
because one can see how Paul connected it with his previous use of righteousness 
language (chs. 2-4) and significant because it revealed just how hermeneutically 
indispensable Christology proved to be in the re-appraisal of Jewish motifs and stories. 
For Paul, after all, there exists no scenario where righteousness is attained by faith (or 
failed to have been attained by faith) in 9:30-32 if there fails to exist an already assumed 
christological backdrop.1121 If that is true in 9:30-32, then it is also true in the parallel 
texts examined (e.g., 2:11ff; also chs. 3-4). Indeed, Paul’s interpretations concerning the 
three motifs (see above), which served to frame his working narrative, simply do not 
work without this essential fore-structure of understanding. Paul’s revised 
understandings of the aforementioned Jewish motifs did not occur in a vacuum, but 
were formulated as a result of fusion between the horizon of the traditional stories and 
texts (e.g., the Abraham story) and his christological horizon.1122 How do these insights, 
specifically, come to bear upon the Hosea citation in Rom 9:25-26? 
                                                
 1121 See again Campbell, “An Evangelical Paul,” 337–51 (see esp. 342-349). 
 1122 Scott, Paul’s Way of Knowing, 173, makes a similar argument in his analysis of 
Galatians, referring to a “dialectical interplay of story and experience.” Moyise, Paul and Scripture, 
31, speaks likewise of “Paul’s exposition of Abraham” and how it did not occur “in a vacuum” 
(though here Moyise is emphasizing how Paul’s reading “competes” with other contemporaneous 
readings).  
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Chapter 7: Finding Fusion in Romans 9:25-26 
Paul’s use of Hosea is initially difficult to understand because he explains very 
little about it. He quotes it in passing and quickly moves on. Considering the above 
argument, however, Paul does not need to elaborate further. This is conceivable 
because, as said above, Paul’s re-appraisal of the Hosea oracle is quite consistent with 
the pattern that has gone before it. In the narrative leading up to the Hosea quotations, 
important details, assumptions, and implied beliefs were already at work 
(hermeneutically).1123 In what follows, therefore, an account of Horizontverschmelzung 
in Rom 9:25-26 will be offered. 
7.1 Hermeneutical Tension 
Continuing with his ongoing re-appraisal of Jewish texts and motifs, Paul does 
nothing novel in 9:25-26. For example, that Paul allowed himself considerable freedom 
to invert the Hosea text, substituting καλέσω for ἐρῶ in 9:25, ought to be seen as an echo 
back to 4:17, where Abraham’s justifying faith was described as a belief in the God who 
could “call [καλέω] the things that are not as though they are.” It should be remembered, 
moreover, that this story took on applicability with respect to a christological 
horizon.1124 This observation needs to be given its due weight. Christologically, the 
motif of God’s “calling” remained significant for Paul throughout key parts of the 
narrative. This ought to be carried over to 9:25-26. For example, “faith” and “calling” 
were depicted as opposed to “works” in both the Abraham story (4:2-4, 16-17) and in 
the discussion about Jacob (9:11), respectively. Likewise, the motifs of “calling” and 
(covenant) “love,” being syntactically linked in Rom 9:11 and 13, were seen as opposed 
to “works” and covenant rejection, respectively. Tellingly, this is not unlike the Hosea 
quotation in 9:25, where the motifs of “calling” and “love” are likewise linked 
regarding the inclusion of the New Covenant people of God, the Gentiles.1125 In v. 24, 
Paul says that the “vessels of mercy” are those who have been “called” (καλέω). Here it 
                                                
 1123 Cf. the argument given in Christopher D. Stanley, “Rhetoric of Quotations,” Exploring 
Intertextuality, 42-62, esp. 56, 60-61, on Paul’s lack of interpretive explanation. 
 1124 See Sections 6.3 and 6.5 above. 
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is not the Jews of Hosea’s prophecy, but specifically the Gentiles, which the immediate 
quotation from Hosea reinforces:1126  
I will call the Not My People, “My People,” and the Not Loved, “Loved.” And in the 
place in which it was said to them, “You are Not My People,” they shall be called sons 
of the living God (9:25-26).  
This brings us to the fundamental question: How might the tension inherent in 
Paul’s use of the oracle be accounted for? Like the discussion concerning Gentile 
inclusion in Rom 2:13-29 (with the subsequent discussion in chs. 3-4), and the re-
appraisal of certain key motifs inherent to the Jews, the Hosea interpretation appears 
corroborated, not because of explicit reasons that are given at this point (they are not), 
but rather when—and perhaps only when—Paul’s Vorstruktur des Verstehens, which 
has been operative throughout, is still seen as having full force. As will be seen, this 
intertextual passage can be described as a dialogue between text and reader.  
7.2 Horizons: Text and Reader in Dialogue 
This instance of intertextuality is clarified when one addresses it with Gadamer’s 
concepts of horizons (and from there, the fusion of horizons).1127 What comprised 
Hosea’s interpretive horizon was Jewish unrighteousness and rebellion and the 
prophetic announcement that this would be reversed—with, to be sure, a Davidic King 
playing some role.1128 What made up Paul’s horizon of understanding was the prophetic 
announcement of Christ, who, for Paul, was the means by which both reversal would be 
fulfilled and divine faithfulness be manifested for those who believe.1129 Paul read the 
oracle in light of this fundamental conviction, but his reading was not merely his.1130 
Understanding as an interpretive event is not a one-sided process; it is dialogical.1131 
                                                                                                                                          
 1125 See Juncker, “Children of Promise,” 155. 
 1126 Starling, Not My People, 116. 
 1127 See Gadamer, TM, 305. 
 1128 See Sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 above. 
 1129 See e.g., Rom 3:22. 
 1130 Cf. Moyise, “Hosea as a Test Case,” What Does The Scripture Say, 50, who says, “Paul 
does seem to be engaged in something more sophisticated than simply replacing the original 
meaning with his own” (emphasis original; see the discussion on 47-50). 
 1131 See Gadamer, PH, 57; TM, 271-272. 
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Meaning is authored in this dialogical process. Paul’s reading of Hosea, then, can be 
described as a dialogical re-authoring since it takes what is relevant from the original 
text (e.g., a new covenant reversal of unrighteousness) and applies it to the present 
question of Gentile inclusion.1132 But determining “what is relevant” (and consequently 
what is not relevant) in the original text is possible only in light of the specific questions 
Paul poses to the text and the specific answers Paul gives to the text’s own questions. 
Texts must be able to speak;1133 the text’s “otherness” must be respected, but this does 
not entail the preclusion of the interpreter’s prejudgments.1134 Gadamer is clear that 
understanding is hindered if “the text remains mute.”1135 But when the text is unmuted 
and is speaking, its speaking is not “in lifeless rigidity,” but rather “gives ever new 
answers to the person who questions it and poses ever new questions to him who 
answers it. To understand a text is to come to understand oneself in a kind of 
dialogue.”1136 In this dialogue, Paul can understand the oracle afresh, letting what was 
irrelevant fall away (Jewish exclusivity) and what was situationally relevant emerge 
(Gentile inclusion). This is the way one can account for the hermeneutical 
phenomenon—not in covering up the tension between Hosea’s text and Paul’s 
revisionist reading, but in letting it appear. 
Additionally, it was seen in one proposal for understanding Rom 9:25-26 that 
Paul was illuminated by a “new covenant awareness” which enabled him to read the 
oracle anew.1137 That hypothesis, however, lacked clarity for it could not account for the 
entire hermeneutical event: The citation was used rhetorically by Paul to argue for a so-
                                                
 1132 Cf. Steve Moyise, “Dialogical Intertextuality,” Exploring Intertextuality, 3-15, whose 
essay is not, it seems, incompatible with the present thesis. Indeed, the idea of a “dialogical 
intertextuality” is helpful, for it gives space to multiple voices (see pp. 13-14). It seems, though, that 
a better term might be dialogical re-authoring, as the reader does have a choice “to amplify one of 
the voices” involved in intertextuality (p. 14). And when certain choices are made, new meaning is 
authored. This is, arguably, one of the benefits of utilizing Gadamer’s theory. With his emphasis on 
dialogue, prejudgments, and, not least, application by the interpreter as being integral to interpretive 
activity, the notion of re-authoring must be given its due weight.  
 1133 Gadamer, PH, 57. 
 1134 Gadamer, TM, 271-272 (see also 272-285).  
 1135 Gadamer, PH, 57. 
 1136 Ibid (see also 58). 
 1137 See Sections 1.3 and 1.4. (See specifically Tanner, “The New Covenant,” 102–110; esp. 
106.) 
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called “new covenant awareness,” not the other way around.1138 The quotations in 9:25-
26 took on a specific function in the overall narrative. Thus: 
Inevitably, enquiries into Paul’s hermeneutic and its relationship with other Second 
Temple readings of Scripture will be informed by assumptions, articulated or implicit, 
about the situations into which Paul understands his letters to be directed, the purposes 
which he intends them to accomplish, and the ways in which he expects his scriptural 
citations and allusions to serve those purposes.1139 
One sees this clearly in 9:24, where Paul uses the word “calling” to refer to Gentiles 
who are now part of the covenant of God. The quotations from Hosea immediately 
follow this verse, and therefore serve to function in a way so as to reinforce that claim, 
namely, that Gentiles are included among the people of God. This reinforcement is done 
via scriptural citation, an argument for the fact of a new awareness of Gentile inclusion. 
The citation functions here rhetorically. The point in highlighting these features is to say 
that the otherness of each horizon—the text’s and interpreter’s—must be acknowledged 
without one overcoming the other. And it is the proposed dialogical re-authoring that 
can allow for Paul to read the text afresh in light of his horizon all the while allowing 
the text to speak rhetorically as part of an argument.1140 This observation is not 
insignificant. Thus, both text and reader bring meaning (i.e., “author” it) together 
dialogically.  
It is conceivable that one might object to our proposed term, dialogical re-
authoring, on the grounds that it could lead to the charge of frenzied, interpretive 
relativism. If interpreters can re-author texts, after all, does this not do violence to the 
texts being read? A few responses are in order. First, dialogical re-authoring is a term 
used in this study to describe Paul’s reading of Scripture in light of the hermeneutic put 
forward by Gadamer. In this sense, the term is merely a description of Gadamer’s 
theory. That said, Gadamer has already discussed the charge of this sort of relativism, 
                                                
 1138 See Section 1.4. That said, considering our investigations, we of course would affirm 
Tanner’s thesis that something informed Paul’s reading. Our point presently is that Gadamer’s 
hermeneutic can make sense of both realities. See Section 7.2.1 below.  
 1139 Starling, Not My People, 16. 
 1140 This was the problem with Starling’s thesis. Indeed, the idea of dialogical re-authoring 
alleviates some of the problems found in the scholars examined in Section 1.4. 
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dismissing the concern.1141 Second, the term “re-authoring” is deliberately qualified by 
the preceding term “dialogical,” thus implying that re-authoring is always in light of, 
and not apart from, a dialogue with the text being read.1142 Third, with respect to the 
Pauline texts examined above, we have shown that Paul’s re-authoring is not divorced 
from his Christology.1143 Therefore, modern interpreters, if they are to follow Paul, are 
not free to re-author the biblical text apart from a thorough commitment to the limits set 
by Christology.1144  
7.2.1 Christology as Question and Answer 
Being an answer to Paul’s question, the Hosea text was read in light of his 
christological convictions. Paul’s Christ illuminated the Hosea text. Tanner was correct 
to imply, then, that something informed his reading of Hosea.1145 Considering the 
exegetical investigations above, clarification is afforded when the Christ-event is seen 
as acting as the key prejudgment for Paul’s reading of the oracle. It is only in light of 
this prejudgment that the text was able to take on new meaning. The relevance of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutic is clear when Moyise’s comments regarding intertextuality are 
considered: 
It is not that the meaning of Hos 1:10 and 2:23 can be “objectively” described as a 
reference to Gentile inclusion but rather that, when the text is read in the light of what 
Paul thinks God is doing in the present, his interpretation becomes understandable and 
perhaps even inevitable… It should be noted that this does not imply that readers can 
make texts mean whatever they like. This is a common objection to ‘reader-centered’ 
approaches, but it is mistaken. We could not talk about interpretation at all if there were 
not a text to interpret. The point is that texts do not present themselves to readers as 
                                                
 1141 See again Section 4.7 above (esp. fns. 503-504) where I discuss the question of radical 
subjectivism in Gadamer’s theory. 
 1142 In light of Gadamer’s discussion about “co-determined” interpretation (see TM, 296 and 
my Section 4.4 above), I have often used the term “co-creation” as a description of his hermeneutic 
(see e.g., Section 4.2.5 above and Sections 7.2.2 and 8 below; cf. Vanhoozer, Is there a Meaning in 
this Text?, 107, who also describes Gadamer’s hermeneutic as a process of “co-creation.”). Thus, for 
Gadamer, meaning is determined and created within a dialogical context and can therefore be 
described as dialogical re-authoring. 
 1143 See e.g., Section 6.2 above. 
 1144 Christology, of course, is inclusive of the teachings of Christ. Thus, to re-author the 
texts of Scripture, the interpreter reads the texts creatively and freshly within the boundaries of 
Christ’s teachings. (See also fn. 1175 below.)  
 1145 Tanner, “The New Covenant,” 106. Cf. Wright, PFG, 758-760; Moyise, Paul and 
Scripture, 85. Recall also the critique of Starling above. 
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transparent packages of meaning; readers have to do something in order to interpret 
them. Intertextuality suggests that what they do is relate them to other intertexts, which 
might be actual texts or, more generally, events, cultural phenomena, or personal 
experiences and commitments.1146 
This is particularly clear when the interpretive differences between Paul and the 
pesherist are compared. Moyise says the differences are what they are because of how 
each brings texts to bear upon “a different set of intertexts,” and this includes their 
respective understandings about God’s “particular purpose for their own 
community.”1147 And yet for Paul, this “particular purpose” for the Christian 
“community” is decidedly christocentric. After all, Christ is the focus of the “obedience 
of faith” (Rom 1:5) for both Jew and Gentile, a truth that reaches its interpretive 
pinnacle in Rom 9:25-26. 
This is not a one-sided reading, as said above.1148 It is true that the oracle served 
to inform his apostolic horizon, for it is the subject of covenant inclusion spoken about 
in the original oracle that comes to bear upon the eschatological reality of Paul’s Christ 
and what his work has accomplished, namely, covenant inclusion. It is equally true that 
the Pauline Christ—and the profound effect that his coming occasioned on behalf of 
Gentiles—spoke afresh to the promised covenant inclusion of the “Not My People,” as 
it was itself not merely a question to which the text was an answer, but also an answer 
to which the text was a question. As Warnke says: 
We come to works of literature from the horizon of our lives; we bring to those works 
certain questions and issues, whether we have articulated them explicitly or not, and the 
answers we find in literature are answers to our questions, just as the questions literature 
asks of us are questions we apply to our lives. Gadamer thus sees the interpretation of 
works of literature as dialogue in which both work and interpreter must raise and 
answer questions they address to one another.1149 
Thus, this intertextual event is neither (1) a mere repetition of the original meaning of 
the past into the present nor (2) a complete abrogation of the past in favor of the present. 
In other words, this interpretive event was not a monologue, an overbearing emphasis 
                                                
 1146 Moyise, “Latency and Respect for Context,” Paul and Scripture, 134. See also his 
thoughts on “theological outlook” and “rhetorical situation” (138). 
 1147 Ibid. Hence, the value of ch. 6 above. 
 1148 See 7.2 above. 
 1149 Warnke, “Literature, Law, and Morality,” Repercussions, 91. Recall Sections 4.5 and 
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on either horizon. What characterizes Paul’s reading of Hosea is that it was dialogical. 
In this way, neither horizon is obscured.1150  
7.2.2 Horizontverschmelzung 
At this point, the perceived problem of historical distance of Paul’s use of Hosea 
is alleviated.1151 Gadamer’s theory, after all, renders this not just as unproblematic, but 
rather “positive and productive.”1152 For this distance, again, “is not a yawning abyss but 
is filled with the continuity of custom and tradition, in the light of which everything 
handed down presents itself to us.”1153 The interpreter’s consciousness of their 
“hermeneutical situation,” that is, a “consciousness of being affected by history 
(wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein),” is what allows them to formulate and assert 
“the right questions to ask.”1154 This emphasis on question and answer, as seen above, is 
fundamental to the hermeneutical event. Paul’s “hermeneutical situation,” therefore, 
was “determined by the prejudices” he had.1155 And while these made up his own 
“horizon of a particular present,” they were not “fixed” or existing in distinction to “the 
otherness of the past.”1156 The place of meaning was, therefore, in the act of 
application—in his “present situation.”1157 Thus, in ways perhaps foreign to post-
enlightenment hermeneutics, Paul in this way is able to read the Hosea text with a 
considerable amount of freedom. In fact, he does. Interpretation is an act of co-creation.  
                                                                                                                                          
4.6 above; see esp. fn. 449. 
 1150 In this way, the Gadamerian approach offers clarity into making sense of how Paul’s use 
of the OT can be both “contextual in nature” yet all the while “fresh,” as David J. H. Beldman and 
Jonathan Swales (“Biblical Theology and Theological Interpretation,” Manifesto, 163) rightly 
observe in the general apostolic use of the same. The “issues are complex,” as they say (p.163), but 
one must wonder if such complexity is not due to the meddling of certain enlightenment 
assumptions. 
 1151 See again ch. 1 above. 
 1152 Gadamer, TM, 297. 
 1153 Ibid. 
 1154 Ibid., 301. Emphasis original. 
 1155 Ibid., 304. 
 1156 Ibid., 304-305. 
 1157 Ibid., 306-307. See Section 4.7.  
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It is a dialogical re-authoring which began at his conversion, where Paul 
acquired a new conceptual language (though, again, not one untethered from his Jewish 
past). And his new language—indeed, new Welt—was the very thing from which he 
could read and understand and find fresh meaning in the Hosea oracle. The oracle found 
“expression in [Paul’s] own language” by speaking not just about renewed Jewish 
people, but Gentile people.1158 This was clear in our evaluation of Rom 2, where Paul 
understood righteousness in terms of law-keeping.1159 But this was not the type of law-
keeping that meant being a Jew; this meant being in Christ. Truth, faithfulness, 
righteousness, and covenant keeping culminated in Christ (Rom 2-4; 10:4). Thus, in 
what one could describe as nothing less than dialogue, the oracle posed new answers 
and new questions to Paul, and he to it. Hermeneutically speaking—as our analyses of 
the relevant passages from Romans sought to elucidate—Paul’s own apostolic questions 
(not least about Christ and Gentiles)1160 came to be a conversation starter as he looked 
backward onto the text of Hosea. There, he found answers about covenant inclusion. 
But, again, he also discovered this as a question itself, namely, about divine promise 
and redemption for castaways, to which his Christ was the answer. In an act of 
Horizontverschmelzung, Paul’s reading can be (and should be) understood as more than 
merely a repetition of the oracle. Following Gadamer, rather than seeing (Paul’s) 
interpretation as repetition, one should understand interpretation as co-creation.  
This act of question-and-answer between Hosea and Paul resulted in higher 
ground, indeed a higher horizon of understanding, such that the conclusion both (1) 
affirmed and (2) moved beyond Hosea’s and Paul’s respective horizons.1161 On the first, 
Paul found a basis for the claim of covenant inclusion and redemption in Hosea’s 
oracle, thus affirming its promise. Yet Paul could move beyond the text’s original 
horizon of understanding as his prejudgments allowed him to find the oracle meaningful 
to his own situation and apostolic calling to the Gentiles. On this, Paul’s beliefs about 
covenant inclusion were affirmed by the Hosea oracle in that it, too, promised so much. 
                                                
 1158 Gadamer, PH, 57. 
 1159 See Section 5.6. 
 1160 E.g., see Rom 1:5. 
 1161 See Section 4.6. 
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Yet, arguably, the Hosea oracle did more than merely affirm Paul’s situation; it also 
expanded his horizon so as to move it beyond any false conception that the Christ event 
was an autonomous phenomenon about redemption, but rather one rooted and grounded 
in Jewish religion and tradition.1162 
7.3 Quotation as Application 
In Gadamerian language, one would speak of the rhetorical use of the oracle as 
therefore being applied to an already working narrative. As Gadamer says, it is the 
understanding of “the text of Christian proclamation,” that is, in the sermon, that “the 
understanding and interpretation of the text first receives its full reality.”1163 Here 
understanding happens because the text speaks via the sermon and “begins to find 
expression” in the person’s “own language.”1164 Specifically, “one must take up into 
himself what is said to him in such a fashion that it speaks and finds an answer in the 
words of his own language.”1165 Thus, the text is only understood if it speaks “directly” 
to the recipient in their situation, and the “completion of understanding” happens in the 
sermon’s “reception as an appeal that is directed to each person who hears it.”1166 
Similarly, the rhetorical use of the Hosea quotations are an appeal for the claim of 
(Gentile) inclusion. This accords well with the notion of dialogical re-authoring. 
Therefore, the use of the Hosea quotations is to be seen as an instantiation of 
Gadamer’s idea of Anwendung.1167 The assumption behind the rhetorical use of these 
quotations is to bring the Hosea oracle into dialogue with Paul’s present purposes, 
situation, and questions, namely, that of Gentile inclusion.1168 That narrative was traced 
by calling attention to a substructure of motifs: righteousness language, law-keeping, 
and the Gentile question. Along the way, these three have at times intertwined and 
                                                
 1162 See Section 7.5. 
 1163 Gadamer, PH, 57. 
 1164 Ibid. 
 1165 Ibid. 
 1166 Ibid., 57-58. 
 1167 See Section 4.7. 
 1168 So Moyise, “Latency and Respect for Context,” Paul and Scripture, 138. 
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intersected. As the claim for Gentile inclusion began to accelerate (particularly in Rom 
2), that claim was later reinforced and anchored in a certain conviction—namely, Paul’s 
christological conviction (Rom 3-4). After placing the Hosea quotations in Rom 9:25-26 
within their literary and thematic context (9-10:4), the use of the oracle itself can be said 
to be a pinnacle of the narrative. In other words, the oracle was the applied answer to 
the Gentile question itself. That is, as it was functioning rhetorically, it served to 
reinforce the claims made about Gentile inclusion earlier in his letter (e.g., Rom 2:12-
16). The text of Hosea was applied to Paul’s present situation, not least in regard to 
Gentiles and his apostolic Christian mission (Rom 1:1-5).1169 It was in this application 
that Paul found the meaning he did.1170 The text, if not applied, would have remained 
only an historical text concerning the New Covenant, but it found meaning when Paul 
assigned, or applied, to it the question—not least of which was the Gentile question.1171  
In terms of the rhetorical and applicative nature of the Hosea citation, 
Gadamer’s insights remain key. In an important essay, Gadamer discusses the 
relationship between rhetoric and hermeneutics.1172 Importantly, he says, this 
relationship finds its link in that both require attention to kairos, “time.” His thoughts 
are worth quoting at length: 
                                                
 1169 Garlington, The Obedience of Faith, 242, is right to connect Paul’s train of thought in 
Rom 9:25 (with the citation of Hosea and use of ἠγαπηµένην) back to the context of Rom 1:5, 
specifically 1:7 where Paul applies the “honorific title of Israel,” ἀγαπητοὶ θεοῦ, to the Roman 
Christians. 
 1170 See Gadamer, TM, 307–308.  
 1171 See Section 4.5. As Evans, Reception History, 234, has said, Gadamer has been 
criticized for not providing a means by which “valid,” “responsible,” or “adequate” interpretation 
could be determined; here Emilio Betti (Die Hermeneutik als allgemeine Methodik der 
Geisteswissenschaften [Tübingen: Mohr, 1962], 49), Thiselton (in Roger Lundin, Clarence Walhout 
and Anthony Thiselton, The Responsibility of Hermeneutics [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985], 110), 
and Hirsch (Validity, 251) are citied. Evans states that what could “possibly” offer a “constraint, a 
measure of ‘adequacy’, is [Gadamer’s] emphasis on ‘the rightness of the question’” (234). Evans 
then discusses how such “questions” find themselves in both the horizon of the text and the reader, 
such that the text and reader are both questions and answers to each other (234-235). In this 
dialogical process, “Understanding is neither merely the reconstruction of the author’s view nor an 
assertion of the reader’s. Understanding takes place in ‘dialogue’, in which to reach understanding 
(as a fusion of horizons) means ‘being transformed into a communion in which we do not remain 
what we were’ [Gadamer, TM, 371]. In this construction, ‘truth’, ‘tradition’ and ‘prejudgment’ are 
dialectically, not subjectively, conceived.”  
 1172 Gadamer, “Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task,” Gadamer Reader, 246-
265.  
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Only the individual is truly capable as a speaker who has acknowledged as good and 
right the thing about which he is trying to persuade people and is thereby able to stand 
up for it. This knowledge of the good and this capability in the art of speaking does not 
mean a universal knowledge of “the good”; rather, it means a knowledge about that to 
which one has to persuade people here and now, a knowledge of how one is to go about 
doing this, and a knowledge of those whom one has to persuade. Only when one sees 
the concretization required by the knowledge of the good does one understand why the 
art of writing speeches plays such a role in the broader argumentation…In addition to 
all that goes into knowledge…, real knowledge also has to recognize the kairos. This 
means knowing when and how one is required to speak. But this cannot be acquired 
merely by learning rules or by rote. There are no rules governing the reasonable use of 
rules, as Kant stated so rightly in his Critique of Judgment.1173  
Linking rhetoric to application, Gadamer continues, 
In Plato this comes out in the Phaedrus (268ff.) by means of an amusing exaggeration: 
if anyone were to possess only all the physician’s information and rules of thumb 
without knowing where and when to apply them, he would not be a physician. Were a 
tragedian or musician only to have learned the general rules and techniques of his art 
and yet produced no work using that knowledge, he would not be a poet or musician 
(280ff.). In the same way, the orator has to know all about where and when to speak 
(hai eukairiai te kai akairiai; 272a6).1174  
For Paul, now that Christ has come in the present time, the text of Hosea can speak 
afresh to the situation at hand, i.e., be applied, even in the most intuitive (indeed, 
artistic) of ways.1175 After all, Paul’s arguments in the passages examined would not 
have worked had the Christ-event not yet happened. It is true, for example, that his 
arguments are rooted in the text of Scripture, as in the case of the Abraham reference in 
Rom 4. The point, as we have said, with referencing that story was to show that 
Abraham was deemed righteous before being circumcised thus leading to the conclusion 
that Gentiles qua Gentiles are now to be seen as included in the covenant. And so, 
Paul’s argument was exegetical: as a matter of textual and historical fact, that Abraham 
was justified prior to being circumcised was true, being clearly seen by a chronological 
reading of Scripture. But it would be a mistake to think that Paul’s argument here rested 
entirely upon this historical/exegetical fact—namely, that since the text undoubtedly 
shows Abraham was deemed righteous prior to receiving circumcision, such works of 
                                                
 1173 Ibid., 253. (Italics original.) 
 1174 Ibid. (Italics original.) 
 1175 It should go without saying at this point, but the term “Christ-event” at this point as a 
hermeneutical prejudgment should be understood “to speak not only of Christ’s life, death, and 
resurrection but also what followed, namely, the birth of the church and especially the inclusion of 
the Gentiles” (Moyise, “Does Paul Respect the Context?” Paul and Scripture, 97, fn. 1.  
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the law are therefore unnecessary for justification and the Roman church should 
therefore get on board. Paul’s argument here should not be understood as resting upon 
such thinking. It was much more than “historical” or “exegetical” (in the strict sense of 
the terms). After all, the historical/textual fact (that Abraham was justified prior to being 
circumcised) was true prior to the Christ-event just as surely as it was after it. And yet 
such an argument from the text based upon this historical/textual fact would not have 
been intelligible prior to the Christ-event. Therefore, it is not helpful to say that Paul’s 
argument from Scripture (i.e., of the Abraham story) rests exclusively upon this fact. 
His argument, rather, must have been based upon something much more fundamental. 
What mattered for Paul—and this is our entire point—is that he argues from the 
scriptural text by means of an already-assumed christological horizon of understanding. 
Now that Christ has come, the Jewish texts, stories, and oracles, as well as the small 
details in them (e.g., the historical fact that Abraham was declared righteous prior to 
being circumcised) are now, in the present time and situation, to be read quite 
differently.  
Furthermore, the philosophical-hermeneutical observations on application here 
(and earlier on in the study)1176 are congruent with mainstream scholarship. For 
example, DiMattei notices a difference between the way the pesherist and Paul utilize 
Jewish texts. The former uses the paradigmatic textual formula for introducing 
interpretations, namely, “this is interpreted,” while such formulas remain largely absent 
in the latter.1177 “Usually,” says DiMattei, “the scriptural passage is cited in its 
interpretive context; that is, the interpretive meaning of the base text is already assumed, 
and the text is simply presented in its contemporized context.”1178 Interestingly, 
DiMattei observes this very feature in Paul’s quotation of Hos 2:23 in Rom 9:25. He 
says: 
Unlike Pesher, Paul does not provide his readers with a hermeneutical key that bridges 
text and interpretation, translating Hosea’s “my people” as “the Gentiles.” He simply 
assumes the interpretive connection by means of its application: Hosea’s “my people” 
are “the Gentiles.” It has often been asserted that Paul cites this passage with no regard 
                                                
 1176 See Section 4.7. 
 1177 DiMattei, “Biblical Narratives,” As It Is Written, 78.  
 1178 Ibid. Emphasis ours. 
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for its original context; through its application, the text assumes a new meaning and 
thus a new context. The hermeneutical assumption at work here, however, mirrors the 
principles of Qumran pesharim: for Paul, the prophetic text speaks of contemporary 
events and/or personages, here specifically the Gentiles…Thus for Paul, the appropriate 
and perhaps the only context within which to read and understand the prophetic text is 
the contemporized eschatological context.1179 
DiMattei’s findings here confirm our own. The essence of Paul’s use of Hosea is its 
application to Paul’s present situation. Textually speaking, DiMattei is right.1180 Indeed, 
in line with our investigations above, such was the case for many writers in the first 
century, not least Paul and the sectarians.1181 Yet what distinguishes this thesis from 
DiMattei’s is that where he rightly shows what Paul is doing intertextually, we are here 
attempting to go one step further to show how Paul is doing what he is doing, not least 
in a way that is grounded hermeneutically.1182  
                                                
 1179 Ibid., 78-79. Emphasis ours. We have waited until this point to highlight DiMattei’s 
insights until after Gadamer’s theory had been developed so that the former’s thesis might be given 
full weight and value. 
 1180 Our conclusion that the Hosea quotations should be understood most basically as being 
applied to Paul’s contemporary situation was found independently of DiMattei, whose own 
conclusions were largely drawn from an awareness to the textual features of the passage. Our own 
findings, however, have come via a distinct philosophical-hermeneutical analysis that offers its own 
unique approach (e.g., for Gadamer, the term “application” is a technical term loaded with 
philosophical meaning, being located within the context of his larger hermeneutical project). That 
said, DiMattei’s textual work confirms exactly what we have been saying in terms of hermeneutic 
theory. For what further distinguishes our project from his ideas, see below. 
 1181 See Moyise, “Does Paul Respect the Context?” Paul and Scripture, 98, who observes 
how, in contrast to 21st century “conventions,” these early writers would “fuse” the various steps of 
textual explanation and interpretation “in the form of a modified quotation.” This is the very thing 
Paul does in Rom 9:25-26. It is worth comparing Moyise’s observation here with Gadamer’s 
hermeneutic which grants philosophical space for accounting for such fusion.  
 1182 DiMattei’s clarifying textual insight confirms our utilization of Gadamer’s hermeneutic, 
and our study gives hermeneutical clarity to his textual observations. Thus, we can proceed beyond 
DiMattei’s insightful observations. For example, our thesis has been that Paul’s reading of Hosea is 
patterned to a larger project of reappraisal, one grounded largely on Christology. Despite the 
otherwise helpful comments regarding the key role of application, DiMattei seems to minimize the 
hermeneutical role of Christology. Commenting on another passage, DiMattei (“Biblical 
Narratives,” As It Is Written, 81) observes rightly how Paul does not “simply narrate the past” but 
rather that “he also reshapes it, retelling the story and often interjecting elements and themes drawn 
from the context of the contemporary situation to which the narrative is being applied.” He is also 
keenly aware that, “Past and present, the text and its re-presentation (not to mention its 
interpretation) seem to coalesce into a single narrative fabric,” noting even how the “Qumran 
pesharim display this same tendency toward reshaping the historical story or narrative to suit the 
contemporized situation” (82). The problem perhaps is that DiMattei makes Paul’s contemporizing 
of texts do too much hermeneutically. For Paul, this contemporizing is only possible in light of 
Christology and, in contrast, should therefore be seen as being part of Paul’s hermeneutic posture; in 
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7.3.1 Interpretation as Performative and Situational 
Recalling Gadamer’s remark that, “Schauspiel ist erst eigentlich, wo es gespielt 
wird, und vollends Musik muß ertönen,” one quickly recognizes how his aesthetic 
critique can be applied presently.1183 That is to say, the Hosea text was a performative 
event, providing for Paul a picture, ein Bild, as to what covenant inclusion looks like in 
the present. As Kunstwerk, the original Hosea text existed for Paul in its presentation, a 
Gadamerian instance of Darstellung, bringing its latter reader into play; Paul’s reading, 
then, was an act of Spiel, a deconstruction of autonomous subjectivity.1184 The Hosea 
text, as a reading, presented itself as a kind of play for Paul’s aim of Gentile inclusion. 
Moreover, this intertextual reading is helpfully clarified if it is understood in light of the 
fact Paul “[brought] into play… certain ideational ‘preconceptions.’”1185 After all: 
“There is no pure seeing and understanding of history without reference to the present. 
On the contrary, history is seen and understood only and always through a 
consciousness standing in the present.”1186 Thus, the text itself is given the framework it 
is because of Paul’s bringing into play his most basic present assumptions. 
Interpretation is thus performative and situational.  
                                                                                                                                          
other words, Paul’s Christology and contemporizing of texts must be seen as comprising one 
hermeneutical event (see Section 4.7 above). The problem, again, is that DiMattei divorces the 
“content” from “method” (77). On “content,” he says Christology “influences and shapes the content 
of [Paul’s] hermeneutic,” for it is part of Paul’s “specific historical circumstances” and is definitely 
central to Paul’s “theological beliefs” (77). However, this “is not to be confused with the underlying 
hermeneutical assumption that guides his interpretation,” what DiMattei calls Paul’s “approach” and 
“method,” namely, the idea that the text speaks to the reader’s contemporary “situation” (77; 
emphasis original. See also 82-83). Such distinctions make his later comments about “Christ” being 
part of the interpretive context confusing (see 92). At any rate, distinctions like these are hard to 
substantiate under a Gadamerian paradigm where application and understanding are not two distinct 
events—prejudgments cannot be so easily severed from one’s application to a situation. In this 
manner, Gadamer provides clarity. 
 1183 Gadamer, WM, 121; TM, 115. See Section 4.3.2 above. 
 1184 See Sections 4.3.1; 4.3.2 
 1185 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 176. Here (and in the following quote) Palmer is commenting on 
Heidegger’s thought, which was formative for Gadamer. 
 1186 Ibid. 
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7.4 Interpretation as Traditioned and as Movement within Tradition 
Yet, the beauty of this approach is such that it also “affirms the operativeness of 
the past in the present: The present is seen and understood only through the intentions, 
ways of seeing, and preconceptions bequeathed from the past.”1187 The past for Gadamer 
is not a “pile of facts… but rather is a stream in which we move and participate, in 
every act of understanding,” as Palmer says.1188  
Considering all that has been said about Pauline prejudices, it would be 
inaccurate to conclude that there is an inherent contradiction in Gadamer’s theory. For 
example, if one’s prejudice comes from tradition, then how can the interpreter’s 
prejudice inform, critique, or modify the tradition from which it came? On the contrary, 
Gadamer’s “concept of tradition is not to be construed as something fixed or reified. 
Rather, it is a formal concept which exhibits no concrete content of its own and, 
perhaps, could be said to have more of a regulative than a constitutive function.”1189 
Atkinson admits that “particular traditions” do carry with them content, but “truth or 
meaning” is found “by engaging in dialogue with it,” that is, the questioning is what 
matters.1190 Thus, “Someone can embrace certain aspects of his traditions or he can 
reject those parts that he regards as degenerate, obsolete, or irrelevant. What finite 
human beings cannot do is transcend the effects of their history or traditions as a general 
rule.”1191 The point is not so much that one cannot critique one’s tradition as it is that 
one cannot critique that one has a tradition. Thus, as Gadamer says, “In Wahrheit gehört 
die Geschichte nicht uns, sondern wir gehören ihr.”1192 It must not be forgotten that, 
“understanding always involves something like applying the text to be understood to the 
interpreter’s present situation.”1193 Thus, while each interpreter operates from within 
tradition, being historical persons, each nonetheless interpret from within their 
                                                
 1187 Ibid.  
 1188 Ibid., 176-177. 
 1189 Atkinson, “Hermeneutic,” 289. 
 1190 Ibid. 
 1191 Ibid (and 290-293).  
 1192 Gadamer, WM, 281; TM, 278. See Section 4.4 above. 
 1193 Gadamer, TM, 306-307. See Section 4.7. 
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respective, even differing, present circumstances. Like a jurist who does not see the 
“law” as something “to be understood historically,” but rather something “to be 
concretized,” so also Paul sought to concretize the Hosea text into his own situation.1194 
Like a preacher who does not see the “gospel” as something “to be understood as a 
merely historical document, but to be taken in such a way that it exercises its saving 
effect,” so also Paul sought to let the Hosea text speak afresh into his present.1195 
Therefore, “the text…if it is to be understood properly—i.e., according to the claim it 
makes—must be understood at every moment, in every concrete situation, in a new and 
different way. Understanding here is always application.”1196 This makes sense as to 
why Paul the apostle’s reading might have been radically different from, say, that of his 
own former self. The differences lie in differing prejudgments, indeed in differing 
experiences, present situations, and horizons. Since, therefore, interpretation is both 
traditioned and also a movement within tradition, it makes sense, then, that Paul can at 
the same time both appeal to the Hosea text as an argument from Scripture and also read 
it radically afresh. 
For, by virtue of how all interpretive activity happens, as Gadamer taught, 
“meaning” and “understanding” are not attained when the object of interpretation (the 
text) is dominated by the subject (the reader) or when the latter is dominated by the 
former.1197 If interpretation is dialogical,1198 the reader’s own particular “situation” 
remains the place where the production of meaning happens.1199 That is to say, the text 
takes on meaning when the reader applies it in light of his or her own acquired tradition 
and historicality. 
Thus, Gadamer described the process of understanding as being “weder 
subjektiv noch objektiv” but rather “als das Ineinanderspiel der Bewegung der 
                                                
 1194 Ibid., 307. 
 1195 Ibid. 
 1196 Ibid., 307-308. 
 1197 See Section 4.7.  
 1198 See Section 7.2 and Gadamer, TM, 301; 356–371, especially 366–368.  
 1199 Gadamer, TM, 306-307. 
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Überlieferung und der Bewegung des Interpreten.”1200 In this case, the traditionary text, 
Hosea, remains a dialogue partner with Paul. Gadamer states that the “anticipation of 
meaning that governs [a person’s] understanding of a text is not an act of subjectivity, 
but proceeds from the commonality [Gemeinsamkeit] that binds [the person] to the 
tradition.”1201 To clarify the phenomenon of Paul’s use of Hosea in Rom 9:25-26, one 
must enquire, therefore, into this “commonality” (Gemeinsamkeit). Gadamer is clear 
concerning the unstatic characteristic of this commonality, namely, that it is “constantly 
being formed in our relation to tradition.”1202 It is important to remember that tradition is 
itself also unstatic. It is not “a permanent precondition,” but something “we 
produce…ourselves inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of 
tradition, and hence further determine it ourselves.”1203  
This accords, then, with what is observed in Paul’s reading of the text of Hosea, 
namely, its non-static characteristics. Paul’s own “relation to tradition,” as Gadamer 
might say, was in movement, for it is true that “ideological commitments are integral to 
the historical contingencies of both text and reader.”1204 Moreover, given the original 
contexts of Hosea and Rom 9:25-26 within the greater argument of Romans, it can 
surely be argued that Gadamer’s “commonality” principle finds its instantiation in the 
New Covenant theme inherent to both biblical texts. The New Covenant motif itself, 
being a preoccupation for Paul (e.g., Rom 2:25-29), is what binds him to the Hosea text. 
But this commonality is likewise not static; it, as Gadamer says, “is constantly being 
formed in [Paul’s] relation to [Jewish] tradition.”1205  
                                                
 1200 Gadamer, WM, 298; TM, 293. This effectively fills in gaps found in our analysis of 
several positions in Section 1.4. 
 1201 Ibid (WM, 298). 
 1202 Ibid. 
 1203 Ibid. 
 1204 Evans, Reception History, 254. Emphasis original. Cf. 260-263, 272, where, in a 
different context and argument, Evans makes the point against critics who claim that “ideological” 
or “theological” claims are “external” in some way to the process of understanding. The context of 
these points are much different than our present one, though the point stands.   
 1205 Gadamer, TM, 293.  
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Moreover, tradition itself is not a “permanent precondition,” for Paul himself is 
active in its own production and “evolution.”1206 Because Paul’s own horizon is itself in 
movement,1207 as the Christ-event dawned, his horizon was filled with the light of 
Christology and therefore was able to find fresh meaning in the Hosea text, a meaning 
that spoke to the question of the place of Gentiles in the commonality of New Covenant. 
“The real meaning of a text, as it speaks to the interpreter,” says Gadamer, “does not 
depend on the contingencies of the author and his original audience.”1208 As we have 
already seen, meaning for Gadamer is a “co-determined” process “by the historical 
situation of the interpreter and hence by the totality of the objective course of 
history.”1209 Hence, Gadamer’s famed line: “It is enough to say that we understand in a 
different way, if we understand at all.”1210 Such statements reveal the heart of 
Gadamer’s theory. Joel Weinsheimer’s comments are helpful: 
Sameness and difference are indivisible in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and neither can be 
suppressed if interpretation is to be made intelligible. An interpretation that is not the 
same as what it interprets is not an interpretation but a new creation; an interpretation 
that is not different from what it interprets is not an interpretation but a copy. What 
distinguishes Gadamer’s hermeneutics in this regard is that for him interpretation 
involves this interminable interplay between sameness and difference, the irreducible 
methexis of the one and the many.1211 
In light of Gadamer’s hermeneutic, Paul’s use of Hosea likely represents a bigger 
hermeneutical event than is typically recognized by interpreters. 
7.5 Interpretation as Prejudiced 
With a detailed analysis of select pesher texts, we have highlighted the sect’s 
prejudiced and situational readings, and in comparison to Paul, we have discovered both 
dissimilarity and similarity in their respective interpretations.1212 That Paul’s 
                                                
 1206 Ibid. 
 1207 Ibid., 303. 
 1208 Ibid., 296. 
 1209 Ibid. 
 1210 Ibid. Emphasis original. 
 1211 Weinsheimer, “Meaningless Hermeneutics,” Repercussions, 165.  
 1212 See Sections 6.1 and 6.4. 
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Christology was an integral prejudice for his interpretation of similar prophetic texts 
found in the Scrolls is clear.1213 The notion of prejudice, as seen above, was for 
Gadamer a subversive concept in light of the Enlightenment’s project of neutrality.1214 It 
has been shown, moreover, that the concept of prejudice was for Gadamer more than 
the mere imposition of the interpreter upon texts; rather, prejudice was seen to exist 
within an horizon, which is capable of genuine fusion.1215  
Gadamer’s concept of prejudice, therefore, is helpful in regard to this instance of 
intertextuality, as it is able to (1) deflect the charge of a theological interpretation of 
Hosea that merely imposes upon Hosea and (2) still provide an account for an active 
and creative role of Paul as reader. Because of its dialogical character, Gadamer’s 
theory, while accounting for Paul’s prejudgments, can also at the same time account for 
Paul’s rhetorical use of the oracle. That is, one can make sense of how Paul can both 
argue from Scripture, saying, “As it is written,” all the while accounting for his often-
revisionary conclusions of the said Scripture. Hence, by reflecting on Gadamer’s idea of 
Vorurteile (and all that it entails), Paul’s reading of Hosea is afforded clarity.1216  
One might probe further. It is surely the case that any enquiry into the legitimacy 
of the Hosea quotations—that is, whether Paul’s is a good reading, a good judgment of 
the texts—is to be placed squarely back upon Paul’s theological assumptions. In other 
words, his interpretive judgments are to be evaluated by his pre-judgments. One should 
ask, therefore: Are Paul’s christological convictions warranted?1217 Perhaps that is the 
ultimate hermeneutical question. 
                                                
 1213 See Section 6.4. 
 1214 See Section 4.5. 
 1215 See Section 4.6. 
 1216 See again Gadamer, TM, 278, where he discusses the prime position a person’s “pre-
judgments” have in relation to their “judgments.” (Cf. 1 Cor 15:14.) 
 1217 See Gadamer, TM, 298, about the “question of critique.” See also Section 4.4. Cf. Rae, 
“Theological Interpretation and Historical Criticism,” Manifesto, 105-106. This is not unlike 
Moyise’s observations about the use of Hos 13:14 in 1 Cor 15:54. There he discusses how, for those 
who argue for a christological interpretation, the question of what it means to “respect” a text is to be 
placed squarely back upon the veracity of the christological assumptions that make them possible in 
the first place (“Hosea as a Test Case,” What Does the Scripture Say, 43; see also his evaluation of 
this on 44). Indeed, Gadamer’s hermeneutic would advance such a thesis. 
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Chapter 8: Final Summary & Further Questions 
This study began in a place where the co-creative nature of understanding is 
most clearly seen in, perhaps, all of Scripture: Rom 9:25-26. These verses appeared at 
first enigmatic. Surveying key scholarly approaches, as well as how gaps and questions 
still remained, this research sought to bring to bear upon the issue the hermeneutic 
theory of Hans-Georg Gadamer. It was argued that Gadamer’s theory could be utilized 
as a clarifying basis upon which the biblical scholar could carry out his or her work. It 
was observed that, at the heart of his intentions, Gadamer sought a thorough and 
decisive critique of some of the Enlightenment’s most guarded tenets. It was argued in 
this research that some of his conclusions could be used in a helpful way to make sense 
of Paul’s interpretive reading—a reading, obviously, that existed prior to, and therefore 
outside of, the restrictions imposed by the Enlightenment’s influence. Accounting for 
the intuitive nature that typified Paul’s seemingly odd use of Hosea, it was argued that 
perhaps a hermeneutic that did not carry some of the Enlightenment’s interpretive 
assumptions and baggage could contribute to clarifying Paul’s otherwise elusive 
interpretive activity. Gadamer’s aesthetic-based hermeneutic provided such a 
hermeneutic. With his emphasis upon the situatedness of the interpreter, their horizon 
and prejudgments, as well as his equally consistent emphasis upon the otherness of the 
text itself, Gadamer’s theory laid a particularly helpful groundwork for a way to make 
sense of interpretive phenomenon—not least what is observed in Rom 9:25-26, an 
epitome (if there ever was one) of the problem of understanding a distanced text. 
To accommodate such an approach to its fullest extent, at least within the 
constraints of this research, Paul’s interpretive practices were brought into a 
comparative relationship with other readers of his time, namely, the interpreters at 
Qumran. The pesher texts, it was argued, allowed for the modern reader to see, in a 
profound way, how one’s situatedness in tradition, affects one’s own interpretive 
activity. This was equally true when it came time to examine the key texts in Romans. 
The substructure of key motifs, which served to frame the narrative of Paul’s argument, 
displayed a rather intriguing result—namely, that these motifs took on new meaning for 
Paul. That is to say, they were re-aligned around Christ. These observations helped lead 
us into an analysis of Rom 9:25-26.  
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Thus, in order to account for what was observed in the texts examined, 
Gadamer’s theory provided helpful terminology. That is, it made hermeneutical sense 
of, and afforded interpretive clarity to, what was encountered in Paul’s text. His 
hermeneutic illumined the dialogical character of Paul’s use of Hosea. As a hermeneutic 
based upon dialogue, that is, question and answer, the Hosea oracle was allowed to be 
understood as both (1) a text from which Paul could make an argument and (2) a text to 
which Paul’s assumptions could illuminate. The Hosea text was, therefore, both 
question and answer. In this way, insights were gleaned that could, conceivably, address 
the problems posed in chapter 1 above. We have described the phenomenon in terms of 
a dialogical re-authoring: “dialogical” because of Gadamer’s emphasis on the co-
creative nature of all interpretation, and “re-authoring” because of the co-creative nature 
of the same. Hermeneutically, meaning for Paul was found to be both tied to the text of 
Hosea and at the same time existing beyond it in a fresh way. 
 At this point, it would be beneficial to consider areas of further enquiry. In what 
follows, suggestions will be made that might spurn others working in the field to 
consider avenues for further research. First, it might be intriguing to expand what has 
been done in this research to other second temple texts. This would include not just 
Jewish texts, but also those which come from the NT canonical writers.1218 Due to space 
constrains, this has remained unexplored. Second, how might Gadamer’s theory hold up 
when applied to other Pauline instances of intertextuality? How would the conclusions 
compare to what has been argued for here?  
Third, and finally, how might Gadamer’s theory come to bear upon some of 
recent theological controversies where text, reception, and application seem to be 
interrelated? An example might be in regard to the so-called “New Perspective on 
Paul.” How might Gadamer’s idea of Anwendung forge a hermeneutical peace between 
Luther’s application of key Pauline texts to his own situation—namely, to his battle 
with Roman Catholicism—and the prevailing post-Sander’s scholarship regarding 
phrases like “the works of the law”? Is it conceivable that, in the view of many new 
perspective advocates, Luther’s somewhat slippery exegesis of Paul’s key texts is a 
                                                
 1218 E.g., 1 Peter 2:10. 
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mere instance of situational application, much like Paul’s use of Hosea? That is, is it 
possible, from all that has been learned about Gadamer’s theory, that Gadamerian 
hermeneutics could help to affirm both new perspective insights as well as Luther’s 
creative application of the biblical text? 
However Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics might be utilized in the future, 
it is hoped that, at the very least, biblical scholarship will seek fresh ways in which it 
might glean from the insights afforded by philosophical enquiry itself. It is, after all, 
quite illusory to think that biblical scholars are immune to philosophical assumptions 
and pre-commitments. The great need, arguably, for those working in the biblical text—
not least for commentators—is to clarify and give thoughtful expression to the 
underlying pre-understandings that, like it or not, ground their own approach and 
methodology. Perhaps it is appropriate, then, to let the text which has been so central to 
this study have the concluding, yet ever-applicable, word: 
Es bedarf einer grundsätzlichen Rehabitilitierung des Begriffes des Vorurteils und einer 
Anerkennung dessen, daß es legitime Vorurteile gibt, wenn man der endlich-
geschichtlichen Seinsweise des Menschen gerecht werden will.1219 
 
 
 
                                                
 1219 Gadamer, WM, 281. 
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